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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis looks through the lens of bank balance sheet accounting to investigate the structural 
change in the British banking system between 1780 and 1832, and how classical quantity 
theorists of money attempted to respond to the ensuing financialisation of the wartime economy 
with its growing reliance on credit funded with paper-based instruments (the ‘Vansittart system’ 
of war finance).   
 
The thesis combines contributions to three separate fields to construct a holistic historical 
example of the challenges faced by monetary economists when ‘modelling’ financial innovation, 
credit growth, ‘fringe’ banking, and agent incentives – at a time of radical experimentation: the 
suspension of the 80-year-old gold standard (“the Restriction”). 
 
First, critical text analysis of the history of economics argues that the 1809-10 debate between 
Ricardo and Bosanquet at the peak of the credit boom, bifurcated classical theory into two 
timeless competing policy paradigms advocating the ‘Scarcity’ or ‘Abundance’ of money relative 
to exchange transactions. The competing hypotheses regarding the role of money and credit are 
identified and the rest of the thesis examines the archival evidence for each.  
 
Second, the core of the thesis contributes to the historical literature on banking in relation to 
money by reconstructing a taxonomy of bank business models, their relationships with the 
London inter-bank settlement system, and their responses to the Restriction - drawing on some 
17,000 mostly new data points collected from the financial records of London and Country 
banks. 
 
The final section contributes to the economic history of money by constructing aggregated 
views of total bank liabilities from the firm-level data, scaled to recently available British GDP 
estimates. These are examined to establish (with hindsight) the relative merits and lacuna of the 
competing theoretical hypotheses postulated by political economists. It was the period of 
deleveraging after 1810 that revealed the lacuna of both paradigms.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
1. Introduction 
2. The Restriction Act: impact on the economy and economists 
3. Approach: Research question, methods and contribution 
4. Data contribution 
5. Definitions, concepts, and terminology of ‘money’ 
6. Structure of thesis 
 
            
1.1 Introduction 
 
On the 19th Sept 1792, two days before the French Revolutionary forces declared the First 
Republic and war raged across Europe, a bank clerk working at Child & Co in London, 
possessing both artistic skills and a sense of humour, sat down to sketch the telling 
caricature below (Exhibit 1.1). In the sketch we observe a senior cashier (with his back to 
us) behind the bank counter saying to a colleague or one of the partners, “upon my honor, 
Sir, we run very low in Caish”. While this is going on, a younger clerk (watched by a 
monkey with hat!) is handing John Bull a five-pound note to the evident disgust of the 
latter, who says: “Pounds, Sir, not five pounds in money”. The sketch neatly captures the 
monetary system of the day – a system that was to be totally transformed in the 
subsequent twenty-five years in ways that disturbed the theoretical understanding of 
political economists who viewed ‘money’ as only ‘caish’ and based their views of its role in 
the economy upon the headline classical quantity theories passed down from Hume and 
Smith.  
 
Two key features of the pre-Restriction monetary system stand out in the sketch. Firstly, 
that what we call ‘money’ today, in 1792 was considered to be only cash, meaning metallic 
coin (“Caish”). It referred principally to guinea coins (21 shillings) minted from gold, and 
did not include banknotes. Banknotes were “pounds in money”, and in 1792 John Bull, as 
a caricature of the typical Englishman, did not like to be paid in paper banknotes. “Pounds 
in money” were resisted, being seen as a less trustworthy surrogate for true “caish”, also 
referred to as “specie”.  
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Monetary theory and banking practice reflected this perception of ‘money’ between 
themselves. Before 1797 classical analysis of the functioning of the monetary system was 
conducted as a series of comparative statics1, where any paper-based monetary instrument 
employed as ‘circulating media’ was seen merely as a temporary substitute for commodity-
based specie, between sequential points in time. The institutional framework reflected this 
notion insofar as neither Bank of England banknotes nor Country banknotes were legal 
tender. Furthermore, for the previous twenty years the minimum denomination of 
banknotes at this time was £5 (outside Scotland), approximately equivalent to £500 today: 
banknotes may have been familiar to the wealthy clients of Childs, but “Englishmen of the 
rank and file – wage-earners and small traders – knew little of paper money” (Clapham, 
1970: II, 2) and were relegated to using mostly poor quality debased silver and copper 
coins.  
 
Exhibit 1.1 – “Shaking the nerves of John Bull and his wife” 
           Source: archive reference CH306/29. Reproduced by kind permission of The Royal Bank of Scotland.   
 
                                                
1 Alvin Hansen used this term to describe J.M.Keynes’ General Theory; see Hansen, Alvin (1953: 39-54). 
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The second feature captured by the sketch is the shortage of gold coin within the banking 
system. Although both gold and silver coin were legal tender (until 1816), Britain had been 
on a de facto gold standard since 1717 when the gold-silver mint parity had over-valued 
silver. Gold coin was the high-powered money – the monetary base. Gold coin was the 
‘money’ that could not legally be refused when tendered in the discharge of a debt. Hence, 
in theory, gold coin was viewed as the principal means of exchange, and the only monetary 
instrument that the banking system would hold as its liquidity reserve against future calls 
to redeem deposits or banknotes. Banknotes were contingent claims on the Bank of 
England and Country banks that were allowed to issue them, and they were under the 
obligation to redeem them upon the request of the bearer by paying out the equivalent 
sum in specie. The London banking system operated with a high ratio of such specie 
reserves relative to their lending activities, typically around one-third of the total balance 
sheet (Chapter 5). In 1750-1775, although living in Scotland where banknotes already 
circulated to a greater extent than in England, Hume and Smith constructed their ‘models’ 
with specie at the centre of the monetary system and perceived as the main component of 
the circulating media.  
 
By the time the Child clerk drew his humoristic sketch in 1792 there was a growing 
tension between, on the one hand, this perception within monetary theory that ‘money’ 
was only gold coin and, on the other hand, the practical aspects of how a growing private 
banking sector was meeting the needs of the nominal economy, accentuated by years of 
government borrowing to finance war-related exports of specie to pay for British and 
allied troops fighting the American War of Independence (1778-1783) and the French 
Revolutionary Wars in Europe (1793-1802). By early 1797, when the Bank of England was 
the largest in England with a balance sheet of £20 million, ten times the size of the two 
chartered banks in Scotland and twenty times that of the next largest London bank 
(Chapters 10 & 11), its bullion reserve fell below £2 million, less than it had been two 
decades earlier in 1778 (£2.6 million). Writing in 1809, David Ricardo noted that by 1797: 
“the currency of the country was reduced particularly low; the amount of banknotes in 
circulation being less than it had been for ten years preceding”  (Ricardo, 1810a: 169-172). 
 
Yet by 1815, less than a generation later, the monetary economy had been transformed. 
Paper instruments had become accepted as the main part of the circulating media; London 
bank balance sheets gearing to “caish” had risen significantly and a new bank business 
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model had become dominant; the ‘fringe’ banking system outside London had 
mushroomed; and monetary theory had evolved into two competing paradigms that have 
defined monetary policy lobbies for the past two centuries. How did all this happen? 
 
 
1.2 The Restriction Act: impact on the economy and economists 
 
The Restriction Acts of 1797 suspended the obligation of banks to redeem their 
banknotes with specie, bringing to an end eighty years during which Britain had operated 
on a de facto gold standard.  
 
By comparison to financial life after the 1770s, the British monetary system in the prior 
century was relatively under-developed, with transactions often non-monetary and credit 
existing as an inter-personal contract. Founded a century earlier in 1694, the Bank of 
England was a for-profit entity with a large shareholder group and publicly traded shares, 
and as yet without a modern mandate to act as a central bank or lender of last resort, but 
de facto operating with some of the same characteristics by virtue of its size and certain 
privileges granted to it under its original mandate: e.g. in return for lending to the 
government it could issue banknotes partially backed by government securities rather than 
gold. The creation of the Bank of England had served more to stabilize and modernize the 
government bond market - as evidenced by the gradual elimination over the subsequent 
fifty years of the large yield premium of British government bonds (Consols) relative to 
Dutch government bonds (Stasavage, 2003) - than to encourage the development of 
broad-based banking in Britain. Until 1826, in England only the Bank was entitled to take 
the form of joint-stock limited-liability company, with all other banks restricted to 
unlimited-liability partnerships of no more than six partners.  Within a radius of 65 miles 
around London, the Bank also had a monopoly of banknote issuance, and this right was 
restricted to large denomination notes until 1797.   
 
These limitations on the formation and reach of British banks as compared to Scottish 
banks (as described by Adam Smith – see Chapter 2) during the first two-thirds of the 
eighteenth-century are the most likely explanation for the slow financial deepening in 
Britain (Cameron, 1967; Parnell, 1827: 25-37). In the years 1750-1765 just after Hume 
wrote Of Money (1752), it is estimated there were still only twenty to thirty banks operating 
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in London (Clapham, 1970: Vol. I, 158), the majority of which had originated from 
goldsmith businesses that followed conservative balance sheet practices with high cash 
reserves (Temin and Voth, 2013: 46). This made banks akin to their conceptual 
description within classical monetary theory, namely intermediaries of real resources. 
Outside London, where banks were notionally allowed to more flexibly respond to the 
demand for credit and circulating media by issuing their own banknotes, scholars have 
often quoted Edmund Burke’s estimate that no more than a dozen such ‘bankers’ shops’ 
existed there (Clapham, 1970: 157). 
 
From the 1770s the banking landscape began to change and there was rapid growth in the 
number of banks, especially in the ‘fringe banking’ sector outside London. By 1795, the 
Bank of England balance sheet had grown to £22.5 million. Nearly half of its liabilities 
were banknotes in circulation and on the asset side it now held one-quarter in bullion 
reserves, with the rest mostly in government debt securities and a small amount of 
discounted private sector bills (Mitchell and Deane, 1962: 441-3). In London, the number 
of banks grew from some 50 to 69 in 1797. The largest London bank balance sheets had 
reached approximately £1 million (Child & Co, Coutts & Co, and Drummonds), but the 
more typical size was still only a quarter to half a million (Chapter 4). Outside London, 
with the exception of Scotland (Chapter 6), only a few of the largest Country banks 
reached half a million in balance sheet, such as the Old Bristol Bank and Heywood & Sons 
in Liverpool (Part III), and most are estimated to have been less than £100,000, supported 
by equity capital of £10,000 or less (Pressnell, 1956). In Scotland, the two large quasi-state 
joint stock banks (limited liability), the Bank of Scotland (balance sheet of £2 million, 
supported by £0.75 million of equity and reserves, and funded for an other £1 million by 
issuing their own banknotes – Chapter 6) and the Royal Bank of Scotland had been re-
capitalised following Scotland’s earlier financial crisis of 1772  and the country had for 
some time operated with a greater degree of paper money.  
 
Subsequently, between 1797 and 1814, the average London bank nearly doubled in size 
and the number and size of Country banks also grew rapidly (Chapter 11). Already in the 
twenty years prior to the Restriction Act, the number of Country banks had nearly tripled 
to 276 from approximately one hundred in the early 1780s. Then, after 1797, their number 
nearly tripled again, and in half the time, to an estimated peak of 740 in 1810, before 
beginning a long decline back to under 400 by 1850. What did the Restriction Act change? 
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The Restriction Act of 1797 
 
On the 23rd February 1797 rumours began to circulate that the French army had landed 
near Fishguard on the Pembrokeshire coast, causing a run on the Bank of England 
banknotes with people wishing to exchange them for gold coin. Three days later, the Privy 
Council hurriedly issued an order dispensing the Bank of England from the obligation to 
pay the bearer of its banknotes upon demand the equivalent sum in specie. On 3rd May 
1797 Parliament confirmed the order with the objective of “maintaining the Means of 
Circulation and supporting the Public and Continental Credit of the Kingdom” (Act of 
Parliament, 1797: 1) (i.e. the financing of the war against France) and passed two further 
statutes specifying that:  
 
1. “it shall not be lawful for the Governor and Company of the Bank of England 
to issue any Cash [i.e. gold & silver coin] in Payment of any Debt or Demand 
whatsoever” (Act of Parliament, 1797a: paragraph II) except for amounts of 20 
shillings or less (paragraph III); and even when specie was deposited with the 
Bank it was to be returned to its depositor only for three-quarters in specie and 
the rest in banknotes 
2. The Bank of England at its discretion may “advance for the Accommodation of 
the Persons dealing as Bankers in London, Westminster and the Borough of 
Southwark, in Cash [i.e. “sums of money in gold and silver”], any Sums of 
Money not exceeding £100,000 in the whole” and not more than £25,000 to 
each of the two leading Scottish banks 
3. “it shall and may be lawful to and for … the Bank of England upon application 
being made to them by and on behalf of the Treasurer of the Bank called The 
Bank of Scotland or … The Royal Bank of Scotland to issue and pay … for the 
sole use of the said banks such sum or sums of money in gold and silver as may 
be required not exceeding the sum of £25,000 for each of the said bank banks 
(paragraphs VI and VII). 
 
Furthermore, the Act allowed the banks to print banknotes with denominations of £1 and 
£2, and the note-issuing Country banks quickly followed, thereby bringing banknotes – 
and the attendant conceptual dilemmas - into the daily experience of a larger portion of 
the population. 
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The Restriction was considered a monetary experiment initially intended to last six 
months. In the event it was extended throughout the Napoleonic Wars. Aware of the 
public’s fears that the pound might collapse like the French assignat five years earlier 
(Dickson White, 1912) and conscious that these fears could hinder its ability to refinance 
the ever-larger public debt, the government was keen to manage expectations by insisting 
the Restriction was temporary. The continuing Act of 30th November 1797 capitulated and 
made the Restriction open ended “until One Month after the Conclusion of the present 
War” (Act of Parliament, 1797b: 1). It was not until 1818 that the decision was finally 
taken to return to the gold standard – and it took three more years to be fully 
implemented.  
 
Whether commentators welcomed the Restriction as a long overdue unshackling of the 
monetary constraints upon the real economy (the “Abundance-of-broad-money lobby”, 
see Chapter 3), or as a threat to the long-run stability of the real exchange value of the 
monetary unit of account (“Scarcity-of-base-money lobby”), all commentators agreed that 
it was an experiment previously untested in Britain – and one which had been recently 
tried in France with disastrous consequences. This experiment was perceived differently 
by political economists, merchants, politicians, landowners and other pamphleteers – a 
favourite way to lobby Parliament at the time. Merchants such as Bosanquet welcomed the 
experiment as bringing succour to the state of trade; others such as Ricardo saw it as a 
dangerous experiment that placed the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Bank of 
England in effective control of the supply of money without restraint or regard to 
maintaining its parity to a standard of value determined in the real world of commodities.  
 
Over the following generation this political and cognitive tug-of-war between money as a 
lubricant to exchange transactions versus money as a standard of value exploded into the 
open. Was the role of money that of a means of exchange, whose primarily function was to 
oil the economic adjustments required during wartime, with its supply always responding 
to the needs of debtors in commerce who sought to have their bills of exchange 
discounted, such borrowers being assumed to never suffer from myopic expectations, and 
with the nominal money unit of account ‘carried’ by whatever financial instruments were 
available in the most abundant supply? Or was the role of money that of a store of value, 
with the money unit of account affixed to the best available standard of (real) value, gold, 
  
18 
even when the latter was too scarce to prevent painful deflationary adjustment of the 
general price level to the supply of that commodity?  
 
Over the following twenty years the British economy underwent unprecedented events 
that ignited this theoretical debate about ‘money’. While observers at the time did not have 
today’s national statistics available to them, they perceived these changes through more 
immediate means such as the price of corn, the price of bullion, sterling’s exchange rate in 
foreign markets, the frequency of government debt issues, the demand for the products 
they manufactured, and the rare disclosures to Parliament by the Bank of England. As 
Bosanquet (1810: 49) tells us, until 1797 “it was deemed a sort of sacrilege to pry into [the 
Bank’s] secrets [but] At that period many leading facts were made known, and information 
has since been annually communicated to Parliament [and] much additional light was 
thrown on the nature of their dealings, by the Finance Committee, in 1807”. In the 
previous eighty years the Bank of England’s balance sheet had barely doubled, 
compounding at 1.3% p.a. (Mitchell and Deane, 1962: 441-3), growing 0.8% p.a. faster 
than real GDP (Broadberry et al, 2015: 240-4), and there had been almost no inflation in 
consumer goods – a trend rate of 0.25% p.a (Mitchell and Deane, 1962; 468-9). After the 
Restriction Act of 1797, the Bank of England balance sheet more than doubled by 1814, 
growing at an annual compound rate of 5.1%, nearly four times faster than the previous 
centennial trend and 3% p.a. faster than real GDP (Chapter 10). This balance sheet 
expansion was the result of a tripling of private sector discounts to their peak in 1810 (9% 
p.a. compound), funded by an unprecedented increase in its banknotes in circulation, from 
£10 million in 1796 to £26.6 million in 1814 (Chapter 10). This was accompanied by a 
tripling of consumer price inflation to 3.7% p.a. from 1797 to 1814 (Mitchell and Deane, 
1962; 468-9). For the first twelve years of the Restriction the trade account was in deficit 
every year except 1802 and 1809 (Bank of England, 2016: tab A24) and there were 
unusually large depreciations of sterling on the foreign exchanges against Hamburg 
(Ricardo, 1810a: 121) and later also against the Dollar (Bank of England, 2016: tab A21). 
Government debt (funded and unfunded) nearly tripled in nominal terms, rising to a peak 
of 250% of nominal GDP (Exhibit 1.2).  
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Exhibit 1.2 – British government debt, 1780-1844: nominal, and as % of nominal GDP 
 
 
Exhibit 1.3 – The implied real interest rate and its volatility, 1710-1832 
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In 1717 the usury laws had set a maximum lending rate of 5%, and for the next eighty 
years this had become the de facto reference rate for all but the most prestigious borrowers: 
inflation had exceeded it only once every 10 years. Since 1780, this had already begun to 
change: inflation exceeded that reference lending-rate once every three years, and on three 
of those occasions the effective real rate was below -7%, while it had never previously 
been less than -3% (Exhibit 1.3). Whether consciously or unconsciously, for over half a 
century prior to 1780, lenders and borrowers had internalised a zero-bound medium-term 
real interest rate of 5%, calculated and earned on a money unit of account carried equally by 
both metallic and paper-based money instruments that had a fixed parity to gold as the 
money standard; and that money standard in turn was characterised by scarcity relative to the 
real economy.  
 
The radical departure in monetary policy represented by the Restriction Act, together with 
these subsequent extreme changes in the economy, both altered the British banking 
system and acted as a catalyst for the theoretical debate over which parts of classical 
theory should be retained and which should be thrown away. Focusing on the changes in 
banking, Clapham (1970, Vol. II: 1) states:  
 
“It is not easy to exaggerate the changes in the British banking system and 
currency systems during the first decade of suspended cash payments at the 
Bank.” 
 
More recently, Arnon (2011: 95) focused on the changes in monetary theorising, and 
similarly states: 
 
“The Restriction is one of those sudden events that changes the way things are 
done and forces people to rethink the obvious.” 
 
For twenty years after 1797, Britain’s total supply of the means of exchange no longer had 
a legally assured contingent link to the physical world of commodities. No longer was 
there a fixed parity between the pound as a unit of account and the value of a gold pound 
coin.2 The removal of this legally-enshrined arbitrage exposed more clearly how a 
                                                
2 Before 1816 the main gold coin was the guinea (21 shillings), but communication of this point is made easier by 
refereeing to a pound as the unit of account and the coin.  
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banknote was not a temporary substitute for gold coin, as Hume and Smith had generally 
supposed, but instead was a potentially permanent yet derivative representation of gold 
coin, able to ‘snatch’ the money unit of account away from gold coin. It revealed the 
money unit of account to be more a unit of “circulating individual credit” (Heywood, 
1812: 78) that came into existence only with the simultaneous creation of a debt.  
 
By the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, Britain had experienced a financialization of the 
economy: the banking system and its clients had learned to go about their economic life 
with a proportionally much smaller stock of what, in 1792, “John Bull” had considered to 
be the only acceptable ‘money’. Eighteen years after the Restriction Act of 1797, the bank 
balance sheet gearing to the reserve asset “caish” had more than doubled. Nominal GDP 
had doubled to £403 million, while real GDP rose only 37% (Broadberry et al, 2015: 242-
3)3; the nominal outstanding national debt had increased more than threefold to £744 
million (Mitchell and Deane, 1962: 402-3); the Bank of England’s balance sheet had grown 
two-and-half times larger to £47 million (Mitchell and Deane, 1962: 442-3); the typical 
balance sheet of one of the London banks had also doubled in size (Chapter 11); and three 
times more Country banks were registered as operating, with the typical balance sheet also 
doubling (Chapter 12). And yet – the stock of that much desired ‘specie’ inside the 
banking system had barely changed. By 1814 the bullion reserves of the Bank of England 
stood at £2.2 million, little changed from the start of the Restriction and less than half 
what they had been in 1792 (£5.9 million). The stock of “caish” reserves held by the 
London banks in our sample had risen only 16% since 1792 (Chapters 4 and 11) which, 
given their relative size, was insufficient to match the fall in the Bank of England reserves, 
leaving a net reduction in the stock of gold coin inside the London banking system. In the 
typical Country bank balance sheet, specie accounted for no more than 1% of assets (Part 
III). 
 
This thesis examines how the monetary system achieved this structural transformation in 
the banking system’s gearing to specie reserves, and how this impacted the way money was 
perceived and ‘modelled’ by political economists. For the first time, this thesis explores 
how this change came about through the lens of an empirical analysis of bank business 
models and their respective balance sheets. In doing so, it seeks to expose any time-
invariant lessons from juxtaposing contemporary early nineteenth century theoretical 
                                                
3 Converted to nominal GDP using the GDP deflator kindly provided by the authors. 
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monetary arguments with actual bank balance sheet behaviour observed with the full 
benefit of hindsight. 
 
 
1.3 Approach: Research question, methods and contribution 
 
The Restriction has caught the attention of many illustrious scholars during the past 
century, all in some part attracted by the discovery of a theoretical debate that resonates 
with the monetary policy issues of their respective times. This thesis adopts a similar 
intent, but pursues it with a novel approach. 
 
This thesis poses the following question: How did the bifurcated response of political 
economists in the way they sought to adapt classical theories of money to the events they 
observed after the Restriction Act, compare to actual concurrent behaviour of the banking 
system when analysed with the benefit of hindsight?  
 
In order to answer this question, I have drawn from three different strands of the 
literature, which explains why the thesis contains three historiographies (in Chapters 2, 5 
and the preface to Part III). The existing literature from the history of economics 
beginning, as many do, with the seminal account by Viner (1937), is interested in the 
scientific genesis of different monetary theories and provides rich accounts of the 
theoretical ideas that emerged during the monetary debate as it evolved from the pre-
Restriction writings of David Hume and Adam Smith (see historiography, Chapter 2). This 
literature mostly relies on the occasional citing of others’ empirical work in order to 
provide historical context, and does not attempt any comprehensive quantification of the 
British monetary system beyond the more widely available Bank of England data. This 
approach has left scholars free to focus on their preferred comparison of Ricardo with 
Thornton, whose 1802 work they most rightly praise as the more sophisticated. They pay 
less attention to the more revealing and antithetical debate - explored here in Chapter 3 - 
between Ricardo and Bosanquet in 1809-10 at the height of the boom in private sector 
credit. While some of this work recognises the pivotal importance of the London money 
market during the Restriction, as we conclude here, it invariably treats the London banks 
as opaque heterogeneous components of it. If this literature explores the Country banks, 
quantification is limited to their total number or, at best, top-down estimates of their total 
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banknote issuance extracted from parliamentary papers, with no deep quantification of 
their internal ledgers.  
 
Conversely, the historical and empirical literature on banking as it relates to money 
beginning, as all must do, with the seminal work of Pressnell (1956) on Country banks, is 
rich with detail of monetary and banking practices, and treats the theoretical debate on 
monetary policy in tangential manner (see historiography, Chapter 4 and Part III). More 
striking is how much of the empirical work by economic historians has focused on the 
Bank of England or the Country banks, and has seemingly bypassed attempts to quantify 
the aggregate behaviour of the London banks and its relations with correspondent banks 
in the country. A recent paper analyses micro lending practices and the rationing of credit 
(Temin and Voth, 2005), but is based on a single bank and a business model that I show is 
no longer representative of the whole banking system at this time. Alongside this work, 
biographical works by historians of banking during the Restriction (prior to the formation 
of joint-stock banking after 1832) recount the history of an individual bank or a group of 
banks in a single provincial city. These works (with one notable exception) focus on the 
story of individual bankers, and have been less interested in relating this to the conduct of 
the business revealed by a comprehensive quantification of balance sheet data.  
 
Economic historians have focused on the relationship between, on the one hand, the Bank 
of England’s issuance of more banknotes and, on the other, both the unprecedented 
inflation, as well as the financing made available to the government debt during the 
Napoleonic Wars in relation to that available to the private sector Industrial Revolution 
(Chapter 12). They have typically analysed how to allocate blame to either the Bank or the 
Country banks for any perceived welfare costs generated by the inflationary boom and 
bust, rather than unpick the underlying functioning of the banking and monetary system. 
 
This thesis draws upon the strengths of all three approaches described above, but aims to 
bring them together in order to fill some of the lacuna – most especially the absence of a 
comprehensive analysis of London banks and their practices. This thesis’ primary 
contribution is the comprehensive quantification of the business conduct of London 
banks from 1770 to 1832 as revealed by the changes in their balance sheets, which for 
different reasons has been a lacuna in both the history of banking in relation to money and 
in the history of economics literature. The thesis then explores case studies of Country 
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bank balance sheets with a focus on quantifying the relationship with their correspondent 
in London, as well as their cash reserve management practices. In the final part of the 
thesis this research is used to construct aggregated continuous data to contribute to the 
economic history of money at the time of the Restriction. The thesis combines these 
contributions in order to better situate the competing theory building by political 
economists at the start of the nineteenth-century as they sought to adapt the classical 
‘modelling’ of money. As such, the thesis is not solely a ‘cliometric’ exercise in providing 
economists with data, or solely an examination of the history of economic ideas, with its 
traditional focus on the cultural and scientific context in preference to the economic and 
monetary. If Rosselli (2013: 866) is correct in saying that “historians of economic thought 
and economic historians often appeal to economists, urging the relevance of their work to 
developments in economic science, [but] they never appeal to each other, stressing the 
importance of collaboration”, then this thesis is both an organisational expression of that 
partnership (within the LSE) and a blending of the two types of intellectual curiosity.  
 
I am interested in the historically observed aftermath, present in both the monetary system 
and monetary theorising, when the perceived boundaries to agent actions are swept away 
by a radical new experiment. In looking for answers, I am mostly “looking for big things 
in small places” (Joyner, 1999 in Vaara and Lamberg, 2014: 20): analysing details of 
balance sheets and correspondence in order to infer insights into the operation of the 
wider monetary system. This is done with the objective, not of allocating blame for the 
macro-economic outcomes, but to understand how major monetary experiments such as 
the Restriction period can lead monetary theoreticians of all policy persuasions to err and 
misjudge the fluid yet unruly nature of money.  The micro-economic examination of this 
historical period reveals how such monetary experiments can lead to structural change in 
the banking system that was inconceivable by the mainstream theoretical framing of the 
role of money prevalent prior to the events that motivated that experiment; and how the 
full consequences of that structural change can be misunderstood or misjudged for many 
years, leading to the inability or unwillingness of the executive to demarcate and act upon 
the soft boundary between Bosanquet’s goal of Abundance, and Ricardo’s goal of Scarcity 
of money relative to the (realistically anticipated) volume of output. 
 
The Restriction was an event that forced people to review their consensus view of what 
money was, and what they thought was obvious about the role it played in the economy. 
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The classical theories of Hume and Smith viewed money as a real resource with an 
important deadweight cost that had to be set aside from the current production cycle in 
order to act as both circulating medium and as representative of the real inputs required to 
begin the next cycle. Although banks were already playing a more important role in the 
creation of ‘circulating media’, they were not yet considered as central to the theoretical 
modelling of the monetary process. At most, banks were viewed as conduits for issuing 
lower-cost paper-based substitutes for the quantity of gold-money that would otherwise 
‘naturally circulate in the economy’, with each of these paper-based liabilities being 
extinguished by their redemption back into specie at the end of each notional production 
cycle.  The Restriction changed all this. 
 
There are (obvious) similarities between the modelling of money in the economics of the 
pre-Restriction period and recent neo-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models employed in mainstream economic theory. A recent Bank of England 
working paper by Jakab and Kumhof (2015) lucidly explains how the typical DSGE 
models were constructed around real variables, with little role for money other than as a 
neutral unit of account, and there was no separate role for the banking system. Banks were 
not viewed as independent ‘manufacturers’ of loanable funds, but as passive conduits, with 
bank lending viewed as mere intermediation of real savings between non-bank savers and 
non-bank borrowers, occurring in semi-instantaneous ways between one state of 
equilibrium and the next in reaction to changes in the real interest rate.  
 
By contrast, in practice, by the ‘magic’ of double entry bookkeeping, banks can expand 
their balance sheet – and thereby also the broad supply of money - by the simultaneous 
booking of an asset (the loan) and a liability (e.g. a deposit by the borrower). In 1797 
banks could do this by extending loans paid out with their own banknotes. By the act of 
making loans or purchasing assets (e.g. discounting bills), banks can and did ‘manufacture’ 
new transferable liabilities, and hence new monetary purchasing power. This is so as long 
as the instrument thereby created is accepted as a means of payment by participants – and 
accepted by other banks as an instrument eligible for the offsetting of assets and liabilities 
in their accounting.  
 
The essential nature of the constraints on this endogenous credit creation has not 
changed: good quality matching – in time; in contractual redemption terms; and in 
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‘currency’ of denomination – between assets and liabilities in order to manage liquidity 
risk, plus sufficient equity to confront unexpected credit losses when the offsetting and 
netting mechanisms fail. This can be interpreted as a suitable operational definition of the 
Real Bills Doctrine espoused by the Anti-Bullionists, and one that motivates the analytical 
method used in this thesis.  
 
Political economists during the financialisation of Britain in period 1770-1832 marked by 
the Restriction had to adapt their models accordingly. The accelerated structural change in 
the monetary system and the behaviour of bank balance sheets, both during the long 
monetary expansion up to 1814 and the subsequent de-leveraging and retrenchment of the 
“fringe banking sector” of Country banks, caused political economists of the day to 
reconsider three important aspects of established theories of ‘money’: 
 
(i) The effects of innovation – in instruments and methods – upon the monetary transmission 
mechanisms, a role played at the end of the eighteenth century by the bill of 
exchange and banknotes, in terms of the instruments; and as methods, by the 
developing London Transfer and Set Off (Heywood, 1812) machinery permitting a 
greater netting of monetary transactions within the banking system, as well as the 
enhanced use of Exchequer bills for smoothing out liquidity cycles as a substitute 
to holding reserves of “caish”.  
 
(ii) The role of credit, and the role of non-core financial institutions - i.e.. “fringe banking”  - in the 
supply of credit-based money, a role played after at the end of the eighteenth century by 
the London banks that adopted the Discounter business model, as well as many 
Country banks “pushing out notes”. 
 
(iii) The true rationales underlying the actions of economic agents, and especially decision-makers 
inside banks, which after 1797 involved questioning the belief in the ‘headline’ 
version of Adam Smith’s Real Bills Doctrine, and instead re-learning the numerous 
practical impediments to its functioning in the real world that he had carefully 
enumerated already in 1772  
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For the past two centuries these same three aspects of the monetary system have been 
central to monetary policy debates, and represent the main concerns being addressed by 
monetary economists today as they attempt to learn from the most recent financial crisis.  
 
This thesis identifies how these same three factors impacted the re-shaping of the classical 
theory of money after 1797.  
 
 
1.4 Data contribution 
 
I have collected all annual balance sheet data that survive for London banks between 1770 
and 1845, constituting approximately 11,000 data points, only 10% of which was 
previously available. Nine of these banks account for most of the data. I have also 
collected approximately 6,000 data points for 12 Country banks drawn from more 
dissipated records on the basis of regional diversification, of which less than 30% were 
previously available.  
 
Exhibit 1.4 summarise the available records of London bank balance sheets for the period 
under investigation. The investigation would have been impossible in the time available 
without the invaluable work of Orbell & Turton (2001), sponsored by the Business 
Archives Council, which (as Pressnell puts it in the Foreword) lists the “scant 
documentation […] of long defunct banks [as well as a most welcome] brief histories 
which ease the often bewildering path through numerous name changes” (2001: 
foreword). They list surviving records of 66 London banks for all periods, 14 of which 
were formed after 1814. Of the 52 banks operating in 1814 or earlier, records for 19 
contain some balance sheet records. Upon inspection, only 13 of those proved sufficient 
in scope to allow some comparative analysis relevant to the Restriction period (shown in 
bold in the detailed table in Appendix A). Of these, 9 banks have sufficient continuous 
data to form the basis of my core analysis.  
 
Thanks to the kind assistance of the archivists at Lloyds Bank and The Royal Bank of 
Scotland I was able to locate additional records not listed by Orbell & Turton that outline 
the draft balance sheet summary of, respectively, Willis Percival & Co (one of the original 
goldsmith firms founded in 1677) for the years 1806, 1819 and 1838; and the same for the 
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major bank of Smith, Payne & Smith for the years 1812-3, 1815-17, 1820-24 and 1829. 
The latter provide a valuable complement to the two earlier years available to the bank’s 
biographer, allowing me to complete a reasonably comprehensive picture of the entire 
Smith group (Chapter 7). More typical of the research was disappointment in finding 
partial records covering only a small set of sub-ledgers and for limited periods or, as in the 
case of Curries & Co, finding detailed records, but for only three and half years.  
 
Exhibit 1.4 – Summary of surviving archival records of London banks, 1770-1845 
 
 
Where available, I have focused on the year-to-year changes in the composition of the 
assets and the liabilities, but also analysed some information about the profit and loss. On 
the asset side, where possible, data was collected for positions in cash (including the 
amount of Bank of England notes and a bank’s own banknotes held “in the chest”), 
government securities (broken out in the different types of bills and bonds), other listed 
securities (typically East India Co. bonds, company shares, American securities), secured 
lending (sometimes broken up into the type of collateral), bills discounted, and finally 
overdrafts granted to correspondents. On the liability side, typically less detail is available, 
and was collected on total client deposits (rarely separating out partner deposits), deposits 
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by correspondents, notes and bills outstanding, paid-up capital and capital shares. Data on 
the profit and loss is typically limited to profit before and after distributions, but 
sometimes includes gross interest received, operating expenses (“shop expenses”) and 
allocation to reserves or bad debt write-offs. Other data collected include articles of 
partnership, examples of client accounts and correspondence, and any supporting working 
papers. 
 
Appendix B summarises the contribution made by the new data. I highlight how the data 
complement that collected previously by other scholars by shading the data points they 
analysed. I estimate the maximum overlap to be less than 10% for London banks and less 
than 30% for Country banks. The data contribution for London banks has only a small 
overlap with previous work and is almost entirely related to the data for Hoare’s Bank 
collected by Temin and Voth (2013). Because they focused on the emergence of goldsmith 
banks during C18, most of the data they worked with covered the earlier period 1650 to 
1790. Only for Hoare’s and Goslings is the data taken as far forward as 1820; and in the 
final chapter on the financing of the Industrial Revolution they use data exclusively from 
Hoares’ total lending and holdings in government securities, which they take up to 1860. 
In addition to these overlaps, Bolitho and Peel (1967) collected data for Drummonds as an 
appendix to their biography of the family. For Country bank data I have partly relied on 
approximately 1,000 data points collected for two banks by Pressnell (1956) and the 
Leighton-Boyce (1958) biography of the Smith bankers; he collected 700 data points for 
the Smith banks in London, Nottingham, Lincoln, Hull and Derby, which I was able to 
complete with more than a 1,000 additional data points from archival records.  
 
Not all banks have records allowing comparative work on all topics. Following Temin and 
Voth (2013), I proceed by analysing each topic using the maximum number of banks 
whose records allow comment on the relevant balance sheet behaviour. However, in 
contrast to Temin & Voth (2013), because the focus of this analysis is on a later period, I 
have been able to collect, analyse and aggregate data for more banks than the four 
available to them, and for some comparisons I am able to use data from most of the 13 
banks. While this remains a relatively small sample, that is not fully stratified, it is the first 
comprehensive aggregation of the London bank records that survive. This allows the 
construction of a continuous series for the aggregated balance sheet series that 
triangulation with a set of newly discovered data from the Bank of England (Chapter 11) 
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indicatives is representative of the two main business models and sufficient to draw some 
robust inferences therefrom.  
 
Country bank records are notoriously scant, but instead of circumventing this difficulty, I 
have complemented a review of previous scholars estimates of the breadth of such banks 
with a deep analysis of case studies chosen for their diverse regional dispersion (Part III).  
 
Where the analytical gains appear sufficiently worthwhile and are likely to strengthen the 
reader’s persuasion of a particular conclusion, the period used for the analysis is defined 
less by the need to reflect the timing of known events, but rather by the need to match the 
dates for which data are available for a maximum number of banks. 
 
 
1.5 Definitions, concepts, and terminology of ‘money’ 
 
Throughout the thesis I distinguish between various categories of ‘money’. Some of these 
categories of money are defined by technical material distinctions between monetary 
instruments; others are categories used to highlight different functions and concepts of ‘money’.  
I make no apology for this multiplication of terms, as this interplay between the 
material/legal and the conceptual/perceptual definitions of money lies at the heart of the 
blending of different research streams (and helps to identify where misunderstanding 
arose amongst political economists during the Restriction debate).  
 
1. Money instruments. ‘Specie’ and ‘cash’ are used interchangeably – as they were in the 
historical context – to signify the stock of metallic coins minted mostly from gold (but 
also silver).  ‘Notes’ and ‘banknotes’ are used interchangeably to signify an IOU issued by 
a bank, generally for a round number of pounds, without a fixed maturity, not bearing 
interest, and promising to pay the bearer the equivalent sum in ‘cash’. A ‘Banknote’ refers 
to the notes issued by the Bank of England; a ‘banknote’ to those issued by all other 
banks. Notes bearing interest are ‘promissory notes’. ‘Bills’, ‘bills of exchange’ and the 
modern term of (private sector) ‘commercial paper’ are used interchangeably to refer to a 
different type of IOU drawn (usually) by a merchant for a given amount (usually 
corresponding to a specific transaction in goods) and promising settlement (i.e. payment in 
‘cash’ or ‘banknotes’) to a named counterparty at a fixed future date (usually 1 to 6 
  
31 
months) and at a particular location. Unlike banknotes, each counterparty involved in a 
transfer of ownership of a bill – the “discounting” of the bill – would become jointly liable 
for its redemption at maturity. The above dividing line was not always so clear cut at the 
time of the Restriction, but serves to identify the main distinction between (a) notes issued 
as paper-based bearer liabilities of a bank and (b) commercial bills that were held by banks 
as an asset. Occasionally bank asset ledgers refer to the term ‘bills and notes’: this could 
variously refer to the banknotes of other banks, or the personal notes given by individuals 
as evidence of (senior) indebtedness – the text will specify which in each case.  
 
2. The functional categories of money. By ‘high-powered money’ I refer to the money 
instrument that acts as the liquidity reserve for the banking system (e.g. because it is legal 
tender) and the highest ranked form of money in the hierarchy of types of circulating 
media, and hence legally able to extinguish all forms of credit-based monies. Under the 
gold standard system prior to the Restriction this meant specie, as Bank of England notes 
were not made legal tender until 1833. By ‘broad money’ or simply ‘money’, I refer to the 
stock of all monetary instruments that at any given point in time are acting at least partially 
as money in its broad role as the means to intermediate the exchange of goods and 
services across geographical space and/or across time periods, or to effect the transfer of 
purchasing power between individuals. At the time of the Restriction this meant specie 
plus Bank of England banknotes plus Country banknotes plus, increasingly, bills and 
drafts of all kinds.  
 
3. The conceptual representations of money. The terms ‘commodity money’ and ‘paper 
money’ are mutually exclusive conceptual categories. ‘Commodity money’ is used as a 
conceptual description of all money forms whose value in exchange derives from the 
intrinsic value of their physical commodity content, typically metals. During this historical 
period, this conceptual term happens to contain the same set of instruments as ‘cash’ 
above. Similarly, the conceptual term ‘paper money’ refers to the same set of instruments as 
‘banknotes’ and ‘notes’. The additional term ‘quasi-money’ or ‘paper-based quasi-monies’ is a 
broader one that refers to all other forms of (credit-based) monies, such as bills and drafts. 
Hence, at the conceptual level the total ‘broad money supply’ consists of the sum of 
‘commodity money’ and ‘banknotes’ and  ‘quasi-monies’. By the term ‘intrinsic value’ of 
money I refer to the market value of its material content, e.g. the gold contained in gold 
coins when melted down and sold as bullion. By contrast, the term ‘extrinsic value’ or 
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‘exchange value’ is used to refer to – according to the context - either the value of a 
money instrument when exchanged for goods and services at a single point in time or, as 
Adam Smith defines it, the value of the aggregate stock of a given money type calculated 
cumulatively over multiple time points. The latter concept is essentially referring to the 
income velocity of money, and this requires additional clarity.  
 
        Definitions of velocity 
 
Morgan (2007), building on a Federal Reserve paper by Axilrod (1983), explains that in the 
history of economics there are three main interpretations given to the term V in Irving 
Fisher’s accounting identity, also known as the ‘equation of exchange’ (Fisher, 1911: 
Chapter 2):  
MV = PQ 
Fisher states this equation is valid for a given ‘community’ over a given time period, where 
M is the supply of ‘money’, V is the velocity of ‘money’ measured over a fixed unit of 
time, Q is the total quantities transacted over the same time period, and P is the volume-
weighted average price level.  
 
 “At one extreme, velocity might be considered as no more than the arithmetic by-product 
of forces acting independently on the supply of money [i.e. M] and other forces acting 
independently on GNP [i.e. PQ]” (Axilrod, 1983 in Morgan, 2007: 125).  In other words, 
“it is simply the measured ratio between two things, each of which are determined 
elsewhere than the equation of exchange [and therefore] velocity has no autonomous 
causal connections” (Morgan, 2007: 125). A second, and alternative interpretation at the 
opposite extreme, views velocity as “an independent concept and its measurements might 
exhibit its own (autonomous) trend growth rate (though sometimes unreliably so)” 
(Morgan, 2007: 125). Or, thirdly, as a middle ground, “velocity can be considered as the 
inverse of the demand for money relative to GNP” (Axilrod, 1983 in Morgan 2007: 125); 
this leads to velocity as having “a relationship to the behaviour of money demand, a 
relationship which is both potentially reliable and potentially analyzable” (Morgan, 2007: 
125). 
 
In this thesis I interpret V as being in the second category. V is neither a passively derived 
ratio (first category) nor solely reflecting a stable demand for money (third category). I am 
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interested in V as the GDP-based income velocity of high-powered money (I frequently refer to it in 
short form as the income velocity of specie.), which this work analyses through the lens of 
bank business-model innovation and its impact on bank balance sheet velocity of specie. This 
GDP-based velocity of specie is not to be interpreted as the physical turnover of gold coin 
in people’s pockets. Instead, it is the value of annual economic transactions supported by 
each gold pound: the ratio of total nominal incomes divided by the total stock of specie 
(the same definition given by Adam Smith – Chapter 2). In this work it is assimilated to 
aggregate ‘bank balance sheet velocity of specie’, which is to say the degree to which the 
banking system is able and willing to create credit-based money to support the sum total 
of economic activity, for any given stock of high-powered money (specie) held within it. 
At the level of the individual bank, the ‘balance sheet velocity of specie’ is a bank’s asset-
side gearing to specie reserves: the ratio of a bank’s total assets divided by the reserve 
stock of specie. At the level of the whole banking system, the two notions would only be 
the same if all specie was held inside the banking system; naturally this was not the case, 
and we discuss this in Chapter 12.  
 
In summary, I treat the income velocity of high-powered money (specie) as an 
independent factor, capable of exhibiting its own variable behaviour around a trend, 
representing the waxing and waning of the banking system’s appetite for credit creation as 
measured by aggregate bank liabilities.  As such, this view of velocity can be compared to a 
numerical proxy for the inverse of what Akerlof and Shiller (2010: 16) called the 
“confidence multiplier”. Conceived as in this thesis, velocity is amenable to being 
observed and measured ex post, if not predicted ex ante.  
 
 
1.6 Structure of thesis  
 
The thesis is organised as follows. In Part I, I summarise the key tenets of the classical 
monetary theory of Hume and Smith prior to the Restriction (Chapter 2). I then use the 
Fisher accounting identity to define two antithetical monetary policy paradigms (Chapter 
3), respectively advocating for Scarcity or Abundance in the supply of ‘money’ relative to 
the growth in the real economy, and use critical text analysis to trace the roots of each of 
these paradigms to the bifurcated theoretical treatment by Bullionists (Ricardo) and Anti-
Bullionists (Bosanquet) at the time of the Bullion Report of 1809. I show how they each 
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chose to adapt classical theory to the new institutional environment, and identify the 
differing assumptions they made regarding the role of specie in the economy and the 
functioning of the banking system. 
 
In Part II I use the pre-1797 portion of the newly collected data points from London 
bank balance sheets to identify a taxonomy of business models employed on the eve of 
the Restriction in their attempts to profitably intermediate financial flows (Chapter 4). I 
show how the business model of the ‘Goldsmith bank’, better known through the work of 
Temin and Voth (2013), was not the only one, nor even the main one, as an increasing 
number of new (or recently re-articled) banks adopted the ‘Discounter’ business model. I 
then show (Chapter 5) how banks increasingly clustered around one or the other business 
model types; and infer a typology of their cognitive framing of commercial strategy and 
money that resonates with the theoretical debate, and lays the groundwork for explaining 
the different reactions to the Restriction Act. 
 
 In Part III I explore detailed case studies of Country banks, taken from the different 
regions of Britain, paying special attention to the Coutts-Bank of Scotland relationship 
(Chapter 6) and the consolidated picture of the Smith group of banks (Chapter 7). Both of 
these allow the financial historian to observe ‘from both ends of the pipe’ the monetary 
flows generated by the key correspondent banking relationships between Country and 
London banks, and the consequences for the locus of credit risk. I complement these with 
case studies of other note-issuing Country banks in the South and South-West (Chapter 8) 
which allow a proxy test for the Real Bills hypothesis; and contrast these with banks in the 
North West which did not issue banknotes (Chapter 9). Some of these case studies were 
relegated to the Appendices to minimize word count.  
 
In the final Part IV I contribute to the history of money by constructing aggregated views 
of the data previously presented for the individual banks. After briefly review the better-
known role of the Bank of England (Chapter 10), in Chapter 11 I quantify how the 
London banks reacted to the changing institutional environment of the Restriction 
depending on which business model they followed, and identify three paths by which how 
they acted as accelerants to the Bank of England’s monetary expansion. In Chapter 12 I 
construct aggregated data series of total bank liabilities and draw implications for the two 
monetary policy paradigms and their respective hypotheses, and add a codicil in respect to 
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the ‘crowding out’ debate over government borrowing. I conclude with a summary of the 
findings. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
The Restriction and monetary theory 
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PART I 
The Restriction and monetary theory 
 
Chapter 2. The classical theories of Hume and Smith 
 
1. Introduction and section design 
2. Historiography and contribution 
3. The classical theories of money before the Restriction: Hume 
4. The classical theories of money before the Restriction: Smith 
5. The Real Bills Doctrine 
6. The Law of (micro) Reflux – the balance sheet liquidity axiom 
7. Smith on the anomalies and constraints of classical theory 
 
 
2.1 Introduction and section design 
 
The Restriction and the attendant debate has caught the attention of many illustrious 
scholars during the past century, all in some part attracted by the discovery of a theoretical 
debate that resonates with the monetary policy issues of their respective times. Different 
authors have focused on different stages of the debate depending on the issues most 
urgently felt at the time of their own writing. This thesis compares the views expressed by 
Ricardo and Bosanquet because they express best the polarisation of theoretical views on 
the role of money and banking at precisely the time when the data suggests the expansion in 
Bank of England discounting of private sector commercial paper was reaching a peak 
relative to real GDP.  
 
The Restriction period saw Britain transition from a monetary system perceived as being 
based on a commodity-money standard to one in practice based predominantly on paper-
based circulating IOUs. The shock of the Restriction Act led to profound changes in both 
the practical workings of the banking system as well as the way political economists thought 
about money and monetary policy.  The Restriction Act of 1797 suspended the right of 
holders of Bank of England banknotes to exchange them for gold coin at a fixed parity, and 
other note-issuing banks soon followed. This was a momentous change for Britain’s 
monetary system that had been on a de facto gold standard since 1717 and dominated by a 
central note-issuing bank (the Bank of England) at the centre of an embryonic set of entities 
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(London and Country banks) with only a limited capacity to endogenously expand the 
supply of credit. Prior to the Restriction, classical theory of money similarly reflected 
assumptions about bank balance sheets that had been shaped by a century of operating on a 
gold standard. Banks were viewed as merely intermediating the flow of real resources from 
savers to ‘projectors’, or as the agency through which an appropriate quantity of banknotes 
were substituted into the circulating media for an equal quantity of metallic money that 
would rightfully circulate within the real economy. After 1797, political economists had to 
contend with money potentially being printed without limit because no longer constrained 
by the contingent requirement for the Bank of England and other banks to redeem 
banknotes into precious metals (”cash”/”specie”) at a fixed parity.  
 
During the Restriction, the question as to whether the expansion in the supply of banknotes 
was deficient, excessive, or just right relative to the needs of Britain’s war economy became 
the subject of a heated debate amongst political economists divided into Bullionist and anti-
Bullionist camps, respectively opposed to or in favour of the Restriction, as they reacted to 
the unusual economic and financial events they observed, enumerated in the previous 
chapter (section 2). The central argument amongst political economists was whether the 
depreciation of the pound was caused solely by a monetary disturbance in the form of 
excessive issuance of paper money or by a real-economy disruption to international trade 
patterns due to the war with France. In debating the merits of these two opposing causal 
directions, political economists exposed a number of unresolved aspects of classical 
monetary theory that previously had been hidden from view by the gold standard’s binding 
together of the extrinsic exchange value of money and its intrinsic value, conceptually 
associated with its gold content, gold being seen as the standard of value. 
 
This section employs the analysis of original texts of classical economists in order to 
investigate the challenges they faced in applying classical quantity theory of money to the 
new environment ushered in by the Restriction. While assuming the reader is broadly 
familiar with the original texts of David Hume and Adam Smith, in this chapter I first 
provide a critical summary of the key components of the classical quantity theory of money 
handed down by them prior to the Restriction. In the next Chapter I focus on the 1809-10 
texts of David Ricardo (for the Bullionist lobby) and Charles Bosanquet (for the Anti-
Bullionist lobby) in order to explore the key aspects of the theoretical debate around the 
time of the Bullion Report produced by the Parliamentary Committee of 1809. I explain 
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how the theoretical debate ignited by the Restriction led to a bifurcation of classical theory 
into two competing paradigms each supporting antithetical policy goals, respectively for the 
relative abundance or scarcity of money relative to the volume of exchange transactions 
(real GDP). I show that, in their attempts to make sense of the monetary economy during 
the Restriction, the two new lobbies variously adopted or rejected the different potential 
anomalies to this body of theory already identified by Smith a generation earlier, but which 
had been lost from the ‘headline’ summaries handed down by political economists. I find 
their challenges lay within the same three areas that have caused problems for contemporary 
monetary theorists: innovation in financial products and processes; the role of credit and 
‘fringe’ banking entities; and the precise rationales behind banker actions. In subsequent 
sections of the thesis I investigate the empirical evidence to analyse how accurately their 
respective choice of assumptions reflected actual events in the monetary system.  
 
 
2.2 Historiography and contribution 
 
The Restriction constitutes what Rosselli (2013) called the dividing line marking the end of 
the peaceful coexistence under the ancien regime of a ‘heavy money’ (specie) used for cross-
border trade and exchanged for its intrinsic value, and a ‘light money’ (paper-based 
instruments) used for domestic trade and exchanged at its socially-defined extrinsic value 
measured in terms of the unit of account. In subsequent chapters I investigate the presence 
of this dividing line in the empirical evidence from bank balance sheets, but in this section I 
focus on the dividing line in the development of monetary theory. I do this so as to frame 
the questions to be asked of the empirical data, and to better juxtapose how contemporary 
political economists were ‘modelling’ monetary policy with what was actually happening 
within the banking system. 
 
I set the dividing line in the development of monetary theory between, on the one hand, 
classical monetary theories that ignored the role of banks (because they were of relatively 
little importance before the 1770s) or at best viewed them as mere intermediaries of real 
resources and, on the other hand, monetary theories after 1797 that were forced to 
recognise the banking system’s potential capacity to endogenously create money. Hume’s 
classic quantity theory of money forms part of the first category. Smith’s writings in the 
1770s evidence a period of transition based on his observation of Scotland’s earlier 
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adoption of a paper-based money and the Ayr Bank crisis. And finally in 1809 Ricardo and 
Bosanquet form part of the second category, obliged to address the rapid expansion in the 
number of British banks and their balance sheets, and the growing understanding of their 
influence on real economic outcomes -- although the two writers reacted to events in 
markedly different ways.  
 
Most historians of economics begin with the seminal work of Jacob Viner (1937) who 
provided the first comprehensive review of ‘the English currency and tariff controversies of 
the nineteenth century’ that he situated on the path of the historical evolution in the theory 
of international trade beginning with seventeenth-century mercantilism. Viner (1937: 125) 
believed the key question raised by the debate was: ‘what is the proper amount of currency a 
country should have?’ This question was echoed thirty years later by Cameron (1967: Chpts 
II and III) who, from the perspective of an economic historian asked: ‘what is the optimal 
growth of bank balance sheets?’ and made the only known attempt to answer it with a 
comprehensive, albeit not continuous quantative evidence specific to the period examined 
here.  While this thesis often implicitly asks the same question, its focus is on understanding 
how financial innovation, the growth in fringe banking, and private incentives can make it 
difficult for economists to answer that question with any degree of accuracy as it pertains to 
the times they live in.  
 
Viner divides his exposition into two chapters respectively called ‘The Inflation Phase’, 
which includes the period of the Ricardo-Bosanquet debate, and a subsequent ‘Deflation 
Phase’ after 1816.  In reviewing the Bullionist and Anti-Bullionist arguments during the 
Inflationary Phase, Viner’s (1937: 130) interest (like that of this thesis) is focused on the 
banks’ freedom to alter their cash reserve ratio and the consequent effect on the velocity of 
high-powered money. However, Viner did not quantify these ratios from archival evidence. 
Furthermore, Viner takes his cue from the historical literature, which is mostly concerned 
with the attribution of blame for the high price of gold to either the Bank of England or the 
Country banks (because they were the sole issuers of banknotes), and as a result most of the 
discussion on the reserve ratio refers to that of the Country banks, and is largely silent on 
the London banks.  
 
Viner (1937: 158) is alive to the possibility of banks varying their gearing to high-powered 
money, and makes the important criticism that “It is this assumption of constancy in the 
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country bank reserve ratios […] which is the vulnerable point in the Bullionist argument”. 
Viner (137: 168) is aware of the possible differences in the velocities of money, and 
identifies that “It is likely … that the funds resulting from the commercial discounts had a 
greater velocity of circulation, and consequently, pro rata, a greater influence on the level of 
prices, than advances to the government.” Viner’s (137: 168) underlying agenda is to 
question the accepted notion that a wartime economy needs monetary inflation in order to 
achieve the required reallocation of resources, and states that “… business had developed 
during this period [before the Restriction] outside the Bank of England both in London and 
in the provinces, and its by no means clear that there was any longer any urgent need, as far 
as the nation’s commerce and industry were concerned, for the Bank to grant any genuinely 
‘commercial’ discounts at all.” However, he does not provide any data on London or 
Country bank lending. This thesis adopts the same focus, but in contrast to Viner, after 
examining the data available, is less critical of this channelling of the monetary expansion 
via the London and Country banks, rather than directly to the Treasury, the effect of which 
probably ensured private sector demands for credit were satisfied, if not before, then in 
parallel with those of the government for war financing – at least at first. 
 
Silberling (1924b)4 was the first to attempt to construct continuous annual estimates of 
monetary data for 1792-1830. These were limited to the Bank of England’s balance sheet 
and the value of Country banknotes in circulation from 1805-30, based on figures for the 
amount of stamp duty paid. However, he chose to include only £1 and £5 notes and, 
curiously, treated the annual issuance numbers as the equivalent to the total in circulation, 
when accounts from that time explain that notes had an average life of three years. This 
attracts Viner’s criticism, who offers alternative estimates drawn from the appendices to the 
Report by the Lords Committee on the resumption of cash payments of 1819 (which I also use in 
Chapter 12). Viner (1937: 158) is also sceptical of the author’s apologist conclusions 
exonerating the Bank of England of any blame for the weakness of the pound, and prefers 
to focus on the Bank’s lack of temperance in discounting of private sector bills. 
 
Over a decade prior to Viner’s book, Acworth (1925) discussed the monetary debate as part 
of his book describing what he called the financial reconstruction of England. Acworth sees 
this ‘reconstruction’ as synonymous with the belaboured process of achieving the return to 
                                                
4 Viner (1937) references Silberling (1923) and Silberling (1924a) that do not appear to include the data he refers to, 
but it is in the paper Silberling (1924b). 
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a full gold standard between the end of the war and 1821/2, which he believes was needed 
to rebuild confidence in the holders of the greatly enlarged government debt. Perhaps 
influenced by the contemporary experiences of hyper-inflation after the first World War, 
but not yet the deflationary consequences of clinging to a gold standard at the wrong parity 
that Viner would observe later, Acworth (1925: Chpt VI) argues that “With the 
[Napoleonic] war over, the need for a credit-system, the only merit of which was its extreme 
elasticity, was gone […]”. He argued the return to gold could have been achieved earlier in 
1816 were it not for the government ‘meekly’ agreeing to withdraw the income tax, 
(imposed in 1798 to help fund the war), as well as the Bank’s partially bungled efforts to 
respond to the public outcry against “austerity” and the resistance to it provided by “the 
new movement of credit [that was now] carried forward by the Country Bankers” 
(Ackworth, 1925: 76-8). 
 
Six years later Feavearyear (1931) published his history of English money. Feavearyear 
organises his account into two chapters, like Viner broadly divided into an inflationary and 
deflationary phase separated by the Bullion Report, and an additional chapter on the 
aftermath of the 1825 crisis that he calls the development of credit control - terminology 
that resonated with his contemporaries. His book reflects an interest in interweaving the 
debate on policy with monetary events. However, at a time when national statistics were not 
yet common, the only continuous quantified evidence is once again only of the Bank of 
England, and he bases his analysis of the theoretical debate predominantly on that occurring 
within Parliament.  He was kinder to the Bank than Acworth, but shared the latter’s 
criticism of Vansittart, and went so far as to argue that the failure to return to convertibility 
sooner had been entirely due to Vansittart’s large borrowing requirement to meet the 
government’s obligations under the Sinking Fund.  
 
Feavearyear’s book is filled with legal and practical explanations of what circulated as 
currency at any point. His approach helps to highlight how legislation and social habituation 
intertwine to alter the character of the money unit of account during three distinct phases in 
this period of financialisation of the British economy: a money unit of account viewed as 
affixed to, either a nominal artefact used in exchange (the banknote), or to a metallic 
substance employed as a store of (real) value (the guinea coin).  During the first phase, 
before the Restriction, the 1775 and 1777 Acts had prohibited the issue of banknotes under 
£1 and required those below £5 to be endorsed and payable to order (and not to the 
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bearer), effectively “destroying for all practical purposes their negotiability and therefore 
their character as currency” (Feavearyear, 1931: 162). Combined with the re-coinage of gold 
coin in 1773-7, which brought the coin in circulation back to its full legal bullion content, 
the Acts had the effect of pushing the monetary system back to operating with ‘money’ as a 
unit of account affixed to a physical artefact, containing metal of intrinsic value equivalent 
to the legal standard of value. Then, in a second phase beginning a generation later, the 
series of Restriction Acts of 1797 unwound this status quo ante. Sequentially, the Acts 
permitted the Bank of England to issue bearer banknotes under £5; then allowed any bank 
to do so; then all banks to issue notes for less than 20 shillings. Then in 1811 Lord 
Stanhope’s Act enshrines in law the principle that “no one should pay more for guineas 
than their face value, that no one should receive or pay Bank notes at less than their face 
value” (Feavearyear, 1931: 191-2) – effectively making Banknotes legal tender in all but 
name.   
 
In the first phase, one pound was Locke’s ‘one pound in gold’; in the second phase, one 
pound was a banknote with a nominal face value of one pound. Stanhope’s Act redefined 
money as the product of a contract struck between consenting adults, not an immutable 
lump of metal. Feavearyear (1931: 171) adds: “[…] the public accepted the notes because 
there was nothing else and because they served the purposes of trade for the time being as 
well as gold.” 
 
The third and final phase is that of the gradual return to a gold standard in 1816-21: another 
generation had passed, and a series of legal provisions restored the fixed parity between the 
extrinsic value of the money unit of account and its intrinsic value at the Mint. However, 
habits had changed (Chapter 12) and the Bank’s first attempt in 1816-7 to buy back notes 
under £5 in exchange for gold coin largely fails: “their customers would not have it. They 
took the [new] guineas back to the banks and asked for notes, which they found much more 
convenient” (Feavearyear, 1931: 200-1). 
 
Before all these publications, Ludwig Von Mises (1934)5 penned the core tenets of the so-
called Austrian theories of ‘sound’ money and credit. His book did not focus on the 
Restriction debate per se, but is of interest because he traces the origins of his theories to the 
classical theory of the Banking (Anti-Bullionist) and Currency (Bullionist) Schools of the 
                                                
5 The book was first published in 1912 in German. 
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1820s and 1830s, and places his views of money within an antithetical framework similar to 
the Abundance-Scarcity framework used here (see Chapter 3). He is both aware of the 
ephemeral, socially constructed nature of what is ‘money’, making the drivers of the 
demand and supply of money interdependent; and simultaneously he advocates for not 
allowing its unfettered creation. “The process, by which supply and demand [for money] are 
accommodated to each other until a position of equilibrium is established and both are 
brought into quantitative and qualitative coincidence, is the haggling of the market. But 
supply and demand are only the links in a chain of phenomena, one end of which has this 
visible manifestation in the market, while the other is anchored deep in the human mind” 
(Von Mises, 1934: 153). Because ‘money’ is whatever the collective human mind decides it 
is, financial innovation within the banking sector means  “None of the many systems of 
limiting the note circulation has proved ultimately capable of interposing an insurmountable 
obstacle in the way of further creation of fiduciary media” (Von Mises, 1934: 410).  A 
nation can always expand the supply of money by creating new contingent claims over the 
stock of high-powered money, however previously defined, and then treating those claims 
as new reserves within the fractional banking system (Von Mises, 1934: 430). 
 
Von Mises’ best-known follower, Fredrik Hayek (1929) wrote an account of the Restriction 
just before the Depression. Hayek’s paper is predominantly a historical account of events, 
which he begins with an account of the theories of Hume and Smith, followed by 
contrasting Ricardo to Thornton. It distinguishes itself by placing relatively more focus on 
the earlier Parliamentary investigation of the excess issue of banknotes by the Bank of 
Ireland, which occurred six years earlier and during which its directors had been more 
forthright in stating that the Restriction had led them to use entirely different principles 
when deciding how much to discount. Given his ‘sound money’ preferences, Hayek (1929: 
181) refers to “The development of the so-called country banks [as] the most noteworthy 
event of that time” which he contrasts to Boyd’s and Thornton’s ‘doctrine’, later taken up 
by Ricardo, that “the country banks could not possibly have indulged in an over-issue of 
notes” based on Smith’s early version of the Law of Reflux (Hayek, 1929: 192). Hayek 
(1929: 194) lauds Thornton’s rebuttal of the Real Bills Doctrine as exploring “more fully 
than any previous author or any author many decades after him, what circumstances 
determine the differences in velocity of circulation of the various types of money and the 
fluctuations therein.” 
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More recently, Thomas Humphrey (1993) published a collection of essays in the history of 
monetary thought, a number of which reach all the way back to the eighteenth-century 
when searching for the roots of theories current during the 1980s. In the essay on the Real 
Bills Doctrine, Humphrey (1993: 29) echoes Blaug (1978: 56) in calling it one of the 
“longest-lived economic fallacies of all times”. If John Law was the originator of the idea of 
an “output-governed currency secured by claims to real property and [thus] responding to 
the needs of trade” (Humphrey, 1993: 23), then Adam Smith re-applied this notion to a 
currency secured on short-term, self-liquidating bills of exchange. For Humphrey (1993: 
27), Thornton provided the best explanation of  “the error … of imagining that a proper 
limitation of bank notes may be sufficiently secured by attending merely to the nature of the 
security for which they are given.” Bosanquet is not mentioned, and his Law of Reflux is 
described by Humphrey (in my opinion, incorrectly: see Chapter 3) as a mere ‘renaming’ of 
the Real Bills Doctrine, the use of which by Bosanquet would presumably tar him with the 
same brush as Law and Smith (Humphrey, 1993: 29).   
 
In a separate essay, Humphrey juxtaposes Ricardo to Thornton on the issue of what is the 
appropriate monetary response to a supply shock, at a time when this was a burning 
question for policy makers following the OPEC oil price shock. Humphrey describes the 
choice as pivoting around beliefs regarding money’s neutrality. Ricardo, being a strict 
believer in money’s long- and short-run neutrality with respect to output and employment, 
argued that the external drain of gold should be allowed to contract the money stock so as 
to reverse the price rise caused by the supply shock (in his case, the capital outflows 
required to pay for the Napoleonic Wars). By contrast, “Thornton, a believer in money’s 
short-run non-neutrality, opposed monetary contraction and argued instead that the money 
stock should be held constant” [rather than] “put the economy through the wringer of 
monetary contraction” (Humphrey, 1993: 265, 267). Whether it was in the power of the 
body politic to actually determine ‘the money stock’ was rarely fully discussed (before the 
Banking and Currency School debates a generation later; a definitive answer remains open 
to this day, as pointed out by Goodhart (2015) below). The issue contained two different 
questions: is the ‘money stock’ intended as all instruments acting as circulating media, and if 
so, did its quantity move in a stable relationship to what the body politic considered ‘high-
powered money’? And secondly, was the banking system able to independently shift the 
dividing line between official ‘high-powered money’ and what was actually operating as their 
balance sheet liquidity reserve? 
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As Hayek had pointed out, from Boyd to Thornton to Ricardo, the ‘Bullionists’ simply took 
it that the balance sheet policy of the Bank of England determined the overall stock of 
money. For the Anti-Bullionists it was a moot point since the money stock was viewed as 
endogenously adjusting to the demand for money. This they based on what Humphrey, in a 
third essay, described as Adam Smith’s ‘monetary approach to the balance of payments’. 
Humphrey attributes the ‘major mystery’ of why Smith did not incorporate Hume’s Price-
Specie-Flow Mechanism into his theories to Smith’s proposition that “the monetary 
authorities can determine the composition but not the total of the money stock. [As] prices 
are determined in world markets by the world money supply […] money flows in through 
the balance of payments to support or validate the given price level” (Humphrey, 1993: 348-
9). This was somewhat different from the quantity theory as postulated by Bullionists, 
whereby [as Humphrey explains in a fourth essay] “the nominal stock of money [is] non-
demand determined [and the] nominal M[oney stock] is the independent causal factor 
governing P[rices]” (Humphrey, 1993: 79). As explained later in this chapter, the implicit 
assumption of the Bullionists, and one that was largely operative amongst central banks in 
the post-WW2 era, was that it was possible to pin down at any time what was functioning as 
‘the money stock’, and that its gearing to the stock of ‘high-powered money’ was stable, 
which implied a stable income-based velocity of the ‘money stock’ - however one wished to 
define it.  
 
In 1797 such considerations of the banking system’s gearing to the stock of high-powered 
money were not yet fully debated. Both Clapham (1970) and Fetter (1965) speak of a 
recognition beginning to emerge only after the 1793 crisis that the banking system, and the 
country banks’ note issue in particular, could act as an accelerant to an internal monetary 
contraction. In fact, Humphrey (1993: 4-6) argues that even the simpler notion of the 
deposit multiplier in a system of fractional banking was only fully explained in 1826 by 
James Pennington, “a British currency expert […] in a memorandum to the English 
statesman and financier William Huskisson”. 
 
David Laidler (1991) published The Golden Age of the Quantity Theory which allows students of 
the 1809-10 debate to ‘pick up the story’ in the 1870s and observe how it travelled forward, 
but does not explore the genesis of the argument during the Restriction. Laidler (1999) 
returned to the Restriction debate with a succinct paper that extends through to the 
subsequent phases up to the Bank Act of 1844. In it, he acknowledges a heavy reliance on 
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the work of Viner and Fetter and, like them, primarily juxtaposes Ricardo to Thornton, with 
no mention of Bosanquet. In a perspective later shared by Arnon (2010), Laidler highlights 
how Thornton, being more pragmatic and centrist in his views, evolved his preferred policy 
in light of how actual events unfolded in a way that acts as a barometer of how the 
monetary environment was perceived during the Restriction period. For Laidler (1999: 16), 
Thornton “always regarded the maintenance of the gold price of sterling as the ultimate goal 
of monetary policy.” More conscious of the costs of deflationary adjustments, Thornton 
favoured monetary accommodation in 1802, trusting the Bank of England to achieve the 
right amount, but “by 1810 he and his colleagues could have no such confidence in the 
Bank” (Laidler, 1999: 16), 
 
Laidler (1999: 2-3) describes “a single British monetary system, centred on the Bank of 
England, which in turn held its reserves mainly in the form of gold bullion” while English 
country banks and Scottish joint-stock banks “held a substantial part of their reserves in 
claims on deposit-taking private banks located in London”, but provides no primary or 
secondary evidence of either, and does not distinguish between the behaviour during and 
after the Restriction period. Perhaps with an eye to the deregulation espoused at the time he 
was writing, Laidler notes how the Real Bills doctrine is a rule that has proved seductive to 
central banks ever since (he cites the Reichbank during the Weimar Republic and the 
Federal Reserve during the Great Depression), despite this theory having been convincingly 
rebutted already by Thornton. Laidler (1999: 13) makes regular links between the 
Restriction debate and subsequent economic thinking, pointing out how Ricardo’s ‘hard-
money’ view of the balance sheet adjustment to supply shocks has “never quite disappeared 
from the literature” and that Thornton’s discussion of the impact of the expected rate of 
(nominal) profit relative to the (capped, usury) borrowing rate (on discounted bills) was “the 
genesis of all those ‘two-interest rate’ models, which has ever since been appearing, 
disappearing and reappearing in monetary economics” (Laidler, 1999: 10). Chapter 11 
provides quantified evidence of how this ‘two interest-rate’ environment acted as an 
incentive for newer London banks to expand their off-balance-sheet lending.  
 
Ricardo’s work on monetary matters was more considerable than Bosanquet’s single 
pamphlet, and has been thoroughly studied, in no small part thanks to Sraffa (1951) work 
compiling it into an easily accessible format. More recently, the Cahiers d’economie politique 
(1994) devoted a whole volume to a fascinating set of papers on the subject of “Monnaie et 
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Étalon Chez David Ricardo” (Money and the Standard in David Ricardo) and a further set 
of papers are due to be published from this year’s SOAS Conference to commemorate Two 
Hundred Years of an Economical and Secure Currency.  As the title suggests, and perhaps 
stimulated by the growing discussions at the time over the ECU and the possibility of 
creating the EURO, the 1994 papers focus more on the question of the money standard, 
which leads them to be less concerned with the role of the banking system. As described by 
Deleplace (1994) in his introduction, these papers privilege the role of money as the unit of 
account, and the money standard as a normative guide to monetary policy, both notions 
that have largely disappeared from, respectively, general equilibrium modelling and 
monetary theory. These distinctions, I believe echo the passage in Adam Smith that analyses 
the need for long-term (rental) contracts to be indexed to price changes to ensure equitable 
treatment of creditor and debtor, and how corn would make a better standard of money 
because it is the key staple for most of the population – were it not subject to such volatile 
exchange price relative to other goods. 
 
The distinctions may not be directly related to the banking system, but they help understand 
how there can co-exist differentiated cognitive perspective of what money is or should be; 
and how the banking system is the agent by which the money unit of account attaches itself 
to the preferred means of payment. As discussed in Chapter 5, in 1797 these differentiated 
cognitive views were reflected in both the theoretical writings of political economists and in 
the business models adopted by banks. One view of the money unit of account saw it as 
inseparable from the standard of value, taken to be gold; the alternative view saw the money 
unit of account as affixed to whatever money instruments are acting as the means of 
payment. In a perceptive article, Courbois (1994) argues, in an echo of Heywood (1812), 
that the true unalterable relationship exists between the unit of account and debt, making 
the unit of account principally the ‘standard of deferred payments’. For Courbois, confusion 
arises because the ‘unit of account’ is both a socially constructed concept and something 
‘carried’ by whatever is the means of exchange preferred by the society of users. Deleplace 
(1994: 14-5) notes the difficulty in unpicking Ricardo’s treatment of the unit of account. By 
investigating Ricardo’s writings, Courbois argues that the unit of account is the attribute of 
‘money’ that is the true circulating element, and that it is always carried by whatever 
instrument is most used as the means of payment, even if it trades at a discount to the 
standard of value. Before 1797, the convertibility of the paper pound into a gold pound hid 
this basic truth.  
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Deleplace (1994:15) identifies how this important interpretation of the Restriction debate 
raises the question (equally topical today) of what, if any, is the role of the standard of value 
in the ‘formation of the social consensus around the acceptability of the unit of account’, 
and whether such a role is necessary for monetary stability? This question has been skilfully 
taken up mostly by sociologists of money. Although not central to its remit, this thesis 
provides evidence that already during the Restriction the faster growing part of the banking 
system was active in the higher-speed short-term trading of money as ‘the unit of account 
for deferred payments’ and that banks have the capacity to fabricate such money in the 
form of transferable bank liabilities as long as the public absorb them, which often required 
communal public expressions by local merchants of the social consensus supporting such 
paper monies. By inference, the thesis also suggests that the existence of a ‘social consensus 
around the acceptability of the unit of account’ is not synonymous with long-term monetary 
stability.  
 
Most recently, Goodhart and Jensen (2015) remind us how the current debate over the 
appropriate way for banking regulation to respond to the most recent financial crisis, and 
whether and how to ring-fence pure deposit-taking banks, can trace its origins to the 
debates in the 1930s between the Currency (Bullionist) and Banking (Anti-Bullionist) 
Schools that followed those of Ricardo and Bosanquet. “In so far as there is a current 
analogue to the 1930s failure of the ‘real bill’ doctrine, it probably lies in the failure of bank 
regulation to prevent the prior boom and subsequent […] bust in 2008/9” (Goodhart and 
Jensen, 2015: 11). The new and old ‘Currency School’ propose separating credit creation 
from the creation of (high-powered) money, and imposing rules upon the latter so as to 
constrain its supply to some fixed definition of what is appropriate. The new and old 
Banking School propose a more passive approach to the supply of money, perceived as 
endogenous, combined with some form of Thornton’s flexible control over credit creation 
that ‘leans against the wind’.  Goodhart and Jensen (2015: 5-6) neatly highlight how the 
never-resolved problem for the Currency (Bullionist) School is the assumption that there is 
always a “hard and fast, distinction between ‘money’ and ‘near-money’.” During the 
Restriction, this meant the distinction between, on the one hand, gold coin and on the other 
Banknotes, London bank deposits, and perhaps Country banknotes. The evidence offered 
in this thesis shows this distinction was far from ‘hard and fast’. Similarly, the never-fully 
resolved problem of the Banking (Anti-Bullionist) School is that the market rate of interest, 
being a nominal rate, is insufficient to ensure that only the appropriate quantity of credit is 
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afforded to the economy if “borrowers and banks tend to behave pro-cyclically, getting 
over-excited and over-optimistic in booms and too risk averse in busts” (Goodhart and 
Jensen, 2015: 10). The thesis examines the interest rate incentive for banks to expand their 
bill discounting (Chapter 11) and its methodology highlights the asset and liability matching 
of the banks, recognising that for “the Banking School the essential requirement [for a 
stable endogenous response of the supply of money to the demand for it] is that the quality, 
i.e. maturity, risk, etc., of an intermediary’s assets should match that of its liabilities” 
(Goodhart and Jensen, 2015: 12). 
 
Set against the considerable insights of previous scholars of the history of economics during 
the Restriction, I make only the modest claim to offer a new classification of the arguments 
expressed during the debate, tightly framed by a focus on the antithetical 1809-10 views of 
Ricardo and Bosanquet regarding the functioning of the banking system – specifically 
regarding the three critical areas of change: financial innovation, the role of credit, and 
private incentive mechanisms. This classification of the analytical differences amongst 
political economists enables their views to be tested against the empirical evidence of bank 
balance sheet behaviour that is the main contribution of the thesis. In the next chapter I 
offer a logical Genus for classifying the arguments over ‘money’ that is located within a 
political economy framework, arguably closer to the traditions of its original participants6. I 
argue that this two-paradigm framework makes more explicit the underlying (normative) 
objective of each side of the argument and is better suited to allow the implications to 
‘travel’ forward in time.  
 
More recently Arnie Arnon (2011) reviewed some of the same material in the excellent 
Monetary Theory and Policy from Hume and Smith to Wicksell and eloquently demonstrated that 
examining the history of economic thought structured around time-insensitive labels is both 
possible and useful. Arnon prefers to use three labels that classify the arguments in relation 
to the monetary policy-setting process and its organization, whereas in this thesis I prefer to 
use the more antithetical structure of two labels that describe the polarization of the 
monetary debate around the consequences and outcomes they seek. This has the further 
advantage of being more readily matched to a quantifiable variable measured by the rate of 
growth of total bank balance sheet liabilities relative to that of nominal GDP (Chapter 12), 
                                                
6 Fetter (1978: 23) also stated that the ‘emerging controversy’ strictly speaking “falls within the field of political 
science rather than economics. But politics and economics never can be completely separate in practice”  
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thus making it possible to match the epistemic debate against the empirical evidence of the 
concurrent changes in the banking system.  
 
The two categories of monetary theorising are best viewed as political lobbies, seeking to 
influence monetary policy in order to promote different economic interests and achieve 
their respective preferred ends, i.e. their respective desired state of affairs in the monetary 
economy, rather than differences over the means of pursuing them, believing the former to 
be the primary influence shaping participants’ argumentation. The two political lobbies go 
beyond representing different academic paradigms about monetary policy, being promoters 
(overtly or not) of the primacy of one or other role of ‘money’ in preference over another – 
‘money’ as a means of exchange or as a standard of value. The two lobbies are informed by 
different theories regarding (1) the role played in credit creation by innovation in 
instruments, processes and bank business models; (2) the endogeneity of credit; and (3) 
private incentives. 
 
 
2.3 The classical theories of money before the Restriction: Hume  
 
At the end of the eighteenth-century, monetary theory was arranged around two 
foundational tenets: the Price-Specie-Flow mechanism of David Hume (1711-1776) and the 
Real Bills Doctrine ascribed to Adam Smith (1723-1790). It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to review the entire body of classical thought of Hume and Smith, but here I provide 
a critical summary of the key aspects as they pertain to the quantity theory of money and 
how they were subsequently debated during the Restriction. Compared to Hayek (1929), 
Viner (1937), and Arnon (2011), my main contribution is to highlight Smith’s subtle early 
opening to the possibility of a variable income velocity of specie, as well as the qualifications 
he made to the Real Bills Doctrine, both frequently lost in accounts of this period.  
 
Hume’s Price-Specie-Flow theory is an early expression of the quantity theory of money 
that he adapts to an open economy incorporating Say’s Law of One Price. Shaped by an 
economy consisting of agriculture and small-scale manufacture, economic analysis was 
conducted in real terms. All goods including gold have a ‘natural price’ equating to their 
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long-term factor costs, the largest component of which is labour7. Money is the means of 
exchange and unit of account operating neutrally to the real economy, but it is also a 
commodity subject to the same self-equilibrating process as all other goods. An exogenous 
increase in the supply of specie in a country would raise the domestic price of goods relative 
to gold, causing gold to be exported in search of cheaper goods abroad, until the resulting 
shrinkage in the domestic gold stock caused all relative prices to revert to their ‘natural’ long 
term factor costs of production. Economic agents do not suffer from money illusion except 
in the very short term, and so in the long-term changes in the supply of money are neutral 
to the real economy, causing no change in the underlying network of production and 
consumption relations defined by ‘natural’ long term average factor costs of production. An 
active monetary policy was unnecessary and potentially counter-productive and, by the same 
argument, the banking system was best left to compete freely.  
 
“we find, that, in every kingdom, into which money begins to flow in greater abundance 
than formerly, every thing takes a new face; labour and industry gain life; the merchant 
becomes more enterprising; …”. But after some time “… the money circulates thorough 
the whole state, and makes its effect be felt on all ranks of people” eventually returning all 
activity to “a just proportion with the new quantity of specie [i.e. metallic coin] which is in 
the kingdom. In my opinion, it is only in this interval or intermediate situation, between the 
acquisition of money and rise of prices, that the encreasing quantity of gold and silver is 
favourable to industry” (Hume, 1752: 37-8).  
 
Hume did not consider possible self-reinforcing feedback effects during the period the 
economy adjusts nominal prices to the new quantity of money. Hence, such effects were 
not allowed to influence the state of confidence, such that would have brought about 
changes in the broad money supply by encouraging banks to expand their balance sheet 
gearing to the stock of specie. This was a reasonable ‘model’ assumption to make at the 
time given the small size of the banking sector. Hume also did not consider the possible 
permanent distributional effects left behind by different short-run price elasticities of supply 
and demand of individual goods – what is today referred to as the Cantillon Effect in 
honour of Richard Cantillon (1734) who had already treated the issue.  
 
                                                
7 The others are the rent of land, costs of transporting to market, and the natural rate of profit for the producer and 
distributor. 
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“It is indeed evident, that money is nothing but the representation of labour and 
commodities, and serves only as a method of rating or estimating them. When coin is in 
greater plenty; as a greater quantity of it is required to represent the same quantity of goods; 
it can have no effect, either good or bad, taking the nation within itself” (Hume, 1752: 36-
37). 
 
Writing a generation later, Smith (1776: 382) would include a near-verbatim re-statement of 
Hume’s quantity theory, only this time extended to expressly include paper money: 
 
“The whole paper money of every kind which can easily circulate in any country never can 
exceed the value of the gold and silver, of which it supplies the place, or which (the 
commerce being supposed the same) would circulate there, if there was no paper money.” 
 
In Hume (1752: 35-6) ‘money’ is only specie; banknotes are “counterfeit money”. Hume 
was a priori sceptical of banks and all paper money, “entertainin[ing] a doubt concerning the 
benefit of banks and paper-credit” because nations that grew wealthier already had the 
“inconvenience” of needing to work harder to remain competitive, and “there appears no 
reason for encreasing that inconvenience by a counterfeit money, which foreigners will not 
accept of in any payment, and which any great disorder in the state will reduce to nothing”. 
To Hume, the best kind of bank was the bank that “locked up all the money it received, and 
never augmented the circulating coin, as is usual, by returning part of its treasure into 
commerce” via the discounting of bills or establishing lines of credit. A strict reading of this 
passage would have Hume saying that the best form of bank was a bank that acted a mere 
purveyor of safe-deposit boxes, and not an institution conducting financial intermediation 
between lenders and borrowers. It was tantamount to recommending the end of all 
fractional banking and a return to the early goldsmith ‘banks’ that acted as mere custodians 
of people’s valuables. 
 
In summary, in the strong form classical theory there is no separate role for changes in the 
availability of credit, and no endogenous capacity for the monetary system to create or 
destroy the supply of broad money. Hume’s mechanism assumed that, in the medium- to 
long-run (over a vaguely defined full production cycle), both the demand for transaction 
balances in gold coin was stable and that the public’s marginal rate of substitution of paper 
banknotes for gold was zero. ‘Money’ is only specie; it has evolved as the primus inter pares 
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commodity to be used as the means-of-exchange because of its qualities (durability, 
divisibility and portability) in order for the economy to escape the inefficiencies of barter 
and the problems created by the double coincidence of wants. This is essentially the 
idealised anthropology of money still used in today’s undergraduate economic textbooks. 
Like those textbooks, political economists during the Restriction subsequently struggled to 
take adequate account of money created endogenously via changes in the banks’ lending 
and influenced by the ‘state of confidence’.8 
 
 
2.4 The classical theories of money before the Restriction: Smith 
 
Smith (1776: 378-9) is writing a generation later from his home in Scotland, where the 
introduction of paper money had been successfully – but not painlessly - accomplished 
during the previous 25 to 30 years  “by the erection of new banking companies in almost 
every considerable town, and even in some country villages”, and he is less inclined than the 
older Hume to ignore paper money or to dismiss its advantages. Smith devotes six pages to 
expounding the advantages that Scotland gained from introducing paper money, albeit with 
evident qualifications regarding the possible ‘unexceptionable conduct’ that might arise: 
 
“The business of [Scotland] is almost entirely carried out by means of the paper of those 
different banking companies, with which purchases and payments of all kinds are 
commonly made. Silver very seldom appears except in the change of a twenty shillings bank 
note, and gold still seldomer [sic]. But though the conduct of all those different companies 
has not been unexceptionable, and has accordingly required an act of parliament to regulate 
it; the country, notwithstanding, has evidently derived great benefit from their trade. …. 
That the trade and industry of Scotland, however, have increased very considerably during 
this period, and that the banks have contributed a good deal to this increase, cannot be 
doubted.” 
 
Evidently the long-term marginal rate of substitution of banknotes for specie amongst the 
Scottish public was not zero.  
 
                                                
8 E.g. Mankiw, G. (2007: 646-7, 655, 663-4 and 779-81) and then contrast that to (2007: 643-5). 
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Smith locates the starting point for his discussion on money within his earlier description of 
a micro-economy of production where goods have a natural supply-side price set (in all but 
the short-term) by the sum of three factors of production: the labour content, the rent of 
land, and the natural rate of profit for the producer (and distributor, where relevant). In the 
workshop economy of the ‘pin-factory’ prior to the Industrial Revolution, economic activity 
is driven by the self-interested pursuit of personal comparative advantage (e.g. in making 
arrows rather than breeding cows) by individuals engaged in atomized artisanal tasks that 
have been broken down into distinct specializations. Compared to Hume, in Smith (1776: 
365) the combination of money and new technologies allow the capture of something closer 
to what today we recognise as productivity improvements: “The intention of the fixed 
capital is to increase the production powers of labour, or to enable the same number of 
labourers to perform a much greater quantity of work.” For Smith (1776: 19) these 
processes naturally aggregate up to produce, not an optimal allocation of resources, but a 
“universal opulence that extends itself to the lowest ranks of people” (akin to today’s ‘trickle 
down’ effect) and a matrix of market prices that equate to the long-term natural prices of 
commodities, defined as their respective unit costs of production including a profit for its 
producer (and distributor). Lastly, this move away from barter shrinks distances between 
economic agents, leading to the dilution of local monopolies and the emergence of a wider 
marketplace9 exposed to what Smith called “a competition”, signifying free entry and exit of 
participants (and not the theoretical preconditions of perfect competition, as this notion has 
since been idealized by economists). All the above implies the existence of an equally 
atomized means-of-exchange that embodies the unit of account.  A monetary economy was 
a necessary precondition for Smith’s economic system to escape the inefficiencies of barter 
and the problems created by the double coincidence of wants. 
 
 
Smith on velocity 
 
Smith has sometimes been interpreted as reaching the superficially similar conclusion that 
paper money is merely a temporary substitute for specie over the production cycle (see 
citation on p.34), but a deeper reading reveals how he identified a crucial distinction in the 
concept of money, as well as numerous potential constraints on the assumed self-
equilibrating nature of classical theory.  
                                                
9 It is unlikely that Smith conceived the British economy of 1770s as yet representing a unified national marketplace. 
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In Smith’s careful micro-economic analysis he makes the crucial distinction that money is 
both a ‘stock’ and a ‘flow’, and therefore has both a intrinsic-value (as a commodity) and an 
extrinsic-value (as a nominal unit of measurement and a means of payment in market 
exchange). By using these two distinct contrast backgrounds, when Smith equates 
(commodity) money to a ‘stock’ just like any other fixed capital investment, money has an 
associated annual deadweight cost – which provides a much stronger case than Hume for 
using some paper money. Conversely, when Smith identifies money as an unusual type of 
‘stock’ with a special role to play within the flow mechanisms of the economy, Smith’s 
description goes to the heart of the concept of monetary velocity. An individual perceives 
the money he receives for his work (or produce) as ‘his’, but at the aggregate level of society 
more than one person will have perceived that money as ‘theirs’ over any set period of time. 
Even in an economy utilizing only metallic coin, we need to make the distinction between 
the use-value of a specific stock of metallic coin at a single instant in time and the total 
exchange-value or “purchasing power” that the same stock of metallic coin can represent over 
a series of moments in time.  
 
A corollary of Smith’s analysis is that, even in a pure specie system, changes in the velocity 
of gold coin, e.g. as a result of an increase in the banks’ loan-to-cash gearing, would create 
changes in the total exchange-value that each unit of specie could represent during a year. In 
other words, Smith’s analysis already opens up the possibility of variations in the income-
based velocity of specie. By extension, this perspective leads Smith to qualify Hume’s Price-
Specie-Flow by identifying two important ways in which paper money may usefully increase 
the GDP-based velocity of a given stock of specie.  Firstly, banknotes could function as a 
substitute for gold that is being exported to finance the purchase of foreign goods intended 
for re-export, in which case the net profit thereby generated would add to national income. 
Secondly, the exported gold may not be entirely spent to “purchase goods that are likely to 
be consumed by idle people who produce nothing”, i.e. consumption goods, but might 
instead go to import investment goods that will make the country more productive: 
  
 “[to] purchase additional stock of materials, tools and provisions, in order to maintain and 
employ an additional number of people  … [which] promotes industry; and although it 
increases the consumption of society, it provides a permanent fund for supporting that 
consumption … The gross revenue of the society … is increased by the whole value which 
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the labour of those workmen adds to the materials upon which they are employed” (Smith, 
1776:374-5). 
 
2.5 The Real Bills Doctrine 
 
In spite of Smith’s more nuanced theories of money and its income-based velocity, it is the 
‘headline’ form of his Real Bills Doctrine that found the greatest longevity during the 
Restriction (and to this day) as an argument for allowing the banking system to self-regulate, 
based on the assumption that the rational exercise of self-interest by individual merchants 
and bankers would bring the supply of money to endogenously and appropriately adjust to 
its demand emanating from the real economy. This was indeed a most optimistic view of 
human nature and the socio-economic system. Rational bankers looking after their own 
self-interest and benefitting from all the necessary information, would not knowingly act in 
ways that would endanger the solvency and liquidity of their bank. The Real Bills Doctrine 
was an ex ante and asset-side constraint on banks’ balance sheets, acting upon their selection of 
loans in such a manner as to prevent the excess supply of money. A banker would only 
want to lend to a venture that he believed had good prospects of generating an excess 
return over its costs sufficient to enable its promoter to pay both the interest and the 
capital. Hence the supply of money – whether metallic coin or paper – could not exceed the 
rightful quantity of money demand as long as banks only discounted bills that represented a 
genuine transaction in the real economy. In Smith’s original formulation, banks would lend 
only for working capital purposes, ensuring that the borrower had invested in the business 
adequate equity capital from his own resources to cover the fixed capital requirements of 
the enterprise; this ensured his account was consistent with the notion that any paper-based 
credit had a life cycle that matched the production cycle before it was extinguished and 
returned to its gold form. Hence, if banks exercise responsible behaviour, there can be no 
excess money in circulation. In the often-quoted passage, Smith (1776: 387-8) says: 
 
 [Assuming that] “What a bank can with propriety advance to a merchant or undertaker of 
any kind, is not either the whole capital with which he trades, or even any considerable part 
of the capital; but that part of it only, which he would otherwise be obliged to keep by him 
unemployed, and in ready money for answering occasional demands [… then] “When a 
bank discounts to a merchant a real bill of exchange drawn by a real creditor upon a real 
debtor, and which, as soon as it comes due, is really paid by that debtor; … The payment of 
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the bill, when it becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what it had advanced, 
together with interest. The coffers of the bank, so far as its dealings are confined to such 
customers, resemble a water pond, from which, though a stream is continually running out, 
yet another is continually running in, fully equal to that which runs out; so that, without any 
further care or attention, the pond keeps always equally, or very nearly equally full. Little or 
no expence [sic] can ever be necessary for replenishing the coffers of such a bank.”  
 
The assumption was that a bank would never be induced (by the incentive of a higher 
marginal return) to expand its gearing to cash, funded by an increase in its note issuance, in 
order to extract a ‘rent’ from the public’s willingness to hold its notes.  
 
 
2.6 The Law of (micro) Reflux – the balance sheet liquidity axiom 
 
In the often-cited quote above, Smith extends the Real Bills Doctrine to its logical 
implications for the management of bank balance sheet liquidity and its implications for the 
overall banking system. Smith hypothesised that, under a classical gold standard regime, at 
the aggregate level, if there was an excess supply of paper money it would automatically flow 
back to the issuing banks in the form of requests to be exchanged for specie. In 1810, 
Bosanquet was to elaborate on this assumed mechanism of flow-back, in what became 
known (in a rather unhappy choice of words) as the Law of Reflux (see next chapter). 
Smith’s hypothesis postulated two incentives that operated to balance the monetary system 
by encouraging bankers to prudently restrict the supply of banknotes to match the demand 
from the real economy. These incentives operated ex post to the act of lending, in contrast to 
the Real Bills Doctrine that acted ex ante to it. The incentives were formulated in relation to 
the bank’s entire balance sheet and its profit and loss, rather than in terms of the merits of 
the individual loan. They are described here because subsequent chapters will show 
evidence of how practices amongst banks for the retention of specie reserves and general 
liquidity management changed during the Restriction. 
 
The first ex post incentive acted via the profit and loss account: a bank had a profit incentive 
to react to even a mild acceleration in the flow back of their banknotes if this was sustained 
for a period of time. This was because, in order to satisfy the bearer of the returning 
banknotes, the bank would be obliged to repeatedly buy-in additional gold coin, typically 
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from their London correspondent bank, by paying with a bill of exchange or draft, which 
involved high transaction costs in the form of a deduction of interest on the discounted bill, 
plus the costs of transporting and insuring the coins sent to it from London. The longer a 
bank insisted on issuing the same excessive amounts of banknotes, so the assumption went, 
the greater the number of times it would find itself buying gold coins only to immediately 
hand them out to customers, and hence the greater the loss of profitability. Smith (1776: 
384-5) provides an example:  
 
“Let us suppose that all the paper of a particular bank, which the circulation of the country 
can easily absorb and employ, amounts exactly to forty thousand pounds; and that for 
answering occasional demands, this bank is obliged to keep at all times in its coffers ten 
thousand pounds in gold and silver. Should this bank attempt to circulate forty-four 
thousand pounds, the four thousand pounds which are over and above what the circulation 
can easily absorb and employ, will return upon it almost as fast as they are issued. For 
answering occasional demands, therefore, this bank ought to keep at all times in its coffers, 
not ten thousand pounds only, but fourteen thousand pounds. It will thus gain nothing by 
the interest of the four thousand pounds excessive circulation; and it will lose the whole 
expence of continually collecting four thousand pounds in gold and silver, which will be 
continually going out of its coffers as fast as they are brought in to them.” 
  
The second ex post balance sheet incentive postulated that bankers would not want to risk a 
run on the bank: 
 
“Should the circulating paper at any time exceed that sum [of gold and silver which would 
be necessary to transact the annual exchanges] …. There would immediately, therefore, be a 
run upon the banks to the whole extent of this superfluous paper, and, if they shewed any 
difficulty or backwardness in payment, to a much greater extent; the alarm, which this 
would occasion, necessarily increasing the run” (Smith, 1776: 383). 
 
 
2.7 Smith: the anomalies and constraints of classical theory 
 
During the Restriction, Bank of England directors and political economists opposed to a 
return to the gold standard paraphrased Smith as having hypothesised that banks and 
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bankers had a set of incentives to limit the velocity of their own banknotes relative to their 
stock of gold coin, and that the resulting behaviour would ensure that the aggregate supply 
of ‘broad money’ (coin plus banknotes) did not exceed the demand for real money balances 
emanating from a real economy consisting of ‘real’ ventures. During the Restriction, 
simplified versions of Smith’s two axioms became the central tenets of the Anti-Bullionist 
lobby that employed them to strengthen the assumed self-equilibrating nature of the 
classical quantity theory and to deny the possibility of an over-issuance of paper money. 
This subsequent idealization of the monetary system contrasted with Smith’s attention to 
the practical functioning of the micro-economy of banks that led him to describe a number 
of potential frictions that impeded the smooth functioning of the classical quantity theory. 
Had his younger colleagues paid more attention to these, they might have been more 
circumspect in their interpretations of subsequent events and policy recommendations 
during the Restriction.10   
 
Although Smith’s (1776) Book II, Chapter II Of Money considered as a particular Branch of the 
general Stock of the Society, or of the Expence of maintaining the National Capital can be criticised as 
three different and un-reconciled formulations, a proper reading reveals a quite different 
message that is far from simplistic or naïve. Of the 58 pages, Smith devotes little more than 
a paragraph to the Real Bills Doctrine and over 20 pages to describing examples of where 
the Doctrine might not work in practice. He illustrates many of these with a detailed 
account of the catastrophic failure of Scotland’s Ayr Bank in the 1770s.11  
 
During the Restriction, the (Bullionist-leaning) Report from the Select Committee on the High Price 
of Bullion (1810: 50) rejected the Real Bills Doctrine: 
 
“That this doctrine is a very fallacious one, Your Committee cannot entertain a doubt. The 
fallacy, upon which it is founded, lies in not distinguishing between an advance of capital to 
Merchants, and an additional supply of currency to the general mass of circulating medium” 
 
                                                
10 Lest we should think ourselves to be beyond such mistakes, this argument was still widely used to justify the wave 
of bank deregulation in the 1980s, only to be retroactively rejected by its chief implementer: see Alan Greenspan, 
cited in Radia (2011)  in my Conclusion.  
11 For an interesting recent account, see Kosmetatos (2014). 
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Bosanquet’s anti-Bullionist lobby countered with the market clearing mechanism of the Law 
of Reflux, but this never fully explain how Smith’s limitations to the doctrine might cause it 
to be less effective during the Restriction and the absence of a fixed convertibility into gold. 
 
Smith’s qualifications of the Real Bills Doctrine can be grouped into six key constraints. 
Firstly, Smith (1776: 396) identified the key point that the bankers’ willingness to lend is 
sensitive to the state of confidence shaping expectations over the future. Bankers and 
entrepreneurs alike may suffer from over-confidence when formulating expectations as to the 
prospects of the economy and/or the venture being financed by the banker’s loan.  
 
“The projectors [i.e. the entrepreneurs], no doubt, had in their golden dreams the most 
distinct vision of this great profit. Upon their awakening, however, either at the end of their 
projects, or when they were no longer able to carry them on, they very seldom, I believe, 
had the good fortune to find it.” 
 
The issue of how the state of confidence might affect the broad supply of money was still 
causing problems for Ricardo’s ‘model’ forty years later (see next chapter). Smith points to 
how the willingness to lend is sensitive to the state of confidence shaping expectations over 
the future (a theme taken up by J.M.Keynes (1936: Chpt. 12)), but Smith does not extend 
the analysis to its natural conclusion that the balance sheet velocity of specie will likely be 
volatile and cyclical. No attempt was made to link this potential source of instability to 
occasions when there was a temporary excess supply of paper money, as permitted by 
classic theory. Smith, like more recent DSGE models, does not consider the potential for 
self-reinforcing feedback effects whenever an initial increase in lending leads to an increase 
in economic activity, and how the associated perceptions of easy availability of the means of 
exchange could cause a further round of increased optimism. It was assumed that these 
potential sources of “over-shooting” would never prevented the economy stabilizing or ‘re-
equilibrating’. The possibility that these micro-economic forces might in certain 
circumstances become self-reinforcing accelerators of macro-economic instability was not 
fully considered except in the context of the third point below. 
Secondly, bankers may suffer from a combination of time-horizon myopia and willingness to 
play the ‘greater fool’ game. Because bills of exchange were of short duration and endorsed 
on a joint and several basis by each trader through whose hand it passes, the banker may at 
times be induced to relax the credit criteria he applied to the triage of bills to discount. This 
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would become a more serious problem the greater the role played by banks specialising in 
the discounting of bills of exchange relative to the traditional banks specialising on secured 
term lending [respectively, the ‘Discounter’ and the ‘Goldsmith’ business model – see Part 
II]. In Smith’s (1776: 395) wonderful analogy, the over-confident risk-seeking banker is like 
a weary traveller who may say to himself:  
 
“The house is crazy, … and will not stand very long; but it is a chance if it falls to-night, and 
I will venture, therefore, to sleep in it to-night.”12 
 
Thirdly, there may be information asymmetries. Collusion between borrowers in the form of 
artificial issuance of bills may further aggravate both the asymmetries and the over-
confidence in the ability to rollover existing borrowings. Information asymmetries might be 
further aggravated, Smith notes, by any cyclical changes in the perceived ease with which 
existing debts could be refinanced. A borrower may redeem a loan, not by using real cash 
flows from the real sale of goods produced by real ventures, as the Real Bills Doctrine 
supposed, but by taking out a new loan from another bank, which the first bank may be 
unaware of, thereby permitting the renewal of the first loan (“this expedient was no other 
than the well-know shift of drawing and re-drawing; the shift to which unfortunate traders 
have sometimes recourse when they are upon the brink of bankruptcy” (Smith, 1776: 393)).  
If a borrower uses only one bank, that bank is able to glean good information in regard to 
his creditworthiness by observing the overall pattern of the borrower’s cash flows over 
time: 
 
“But this discovery [process] is not altogether so easy when [the borrowers] discount their 
bills sometimes with one banker, and sometimes with another, and when the same two 
persons do not constantly draw and re-draw upon one another, but occasionally run the 
round of a great circle of projectors, who find it for their interest to [….] render it, upon 
that account, as difficult as possible to distinguish between a real and a fictitious bill of 
exchange” (Smith, 1776: 398). 
 
                                                
12 Compare this with the often-quoted statement by Chuck Prince (2007) shortly before the most recent financial 
crisis: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music’s playing, 
you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing”.  
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Smith’s warning is illustrated by the pattern of losses suffered by the Old Bank, Bristol on 
the credit extended to O’Keefe & Sons – described in Chapter 8. Any such ‘re-drawing 
upon one another’ will mean that: 
 
“though the bills upon which this paper had been advanced, were all of them repaid …. 
The value which had been really advanced upon the first bill, was never really returned to 
the banks which advanced it” (Smith, 1776: 397). 
 
Fourthly, bankers might come under political pressure to loosen their lending criteria. As with 
the Ayr Bank, this might cause bankers to lend against less liquid assets: 
 
 “The banks, [the traders] seem to have thought, could extend their credits to whatever sum 
might be wanted, without incurring any other expence [sic] besides that of a few reams of 
paper” (Smith, 1776: 393). 
 
To this day, this form of lobbying succeeds by conflating the problems faced by companies 
- the lack of demand for their goods - with the mantle of society-wide concerns. Smith was 
likely well informed about the Ayr Bank debacle from his protégé, the Duke of Buccleuch 
who he had taken on a grand tour of Europe and who was caught up in the bankruptcy. 
Smith perceptively and sarcastically describes the issue as follows:  
 
“Their own distress … they call the distress of the country; and this distress of the country, 
[the merchants] said, was altogether owing to the ignorance, pusillamity, and bad conduct of 
the banks, which did not give a sufficiently liberal aid to the spiritual undertakings of those 
who exerted themselves in order to beautify, improve, and enrich the country” (Smith, 
1776: 399). 
 
Fifth, the borrower may become too big to fail. And lastly, bank balance sheets may display asset-
and-liability mismatches.  
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PART I 
The Restriction and monetary theory 
 
Chapter 3. The bifurcation of monetary policy 
 
1. The historical context 
2. The debate of 1809-10 
3. Credit money and the “gold mine” analogy 
4. The bifurcation through the lens of Fisher’s equation of exchange 
5. Conclusion 
 
The Restriction caused a bifurcation of classical theory into the two competing antithetical 
paradigms representing different desired outcomes of monetary policy, and subsequently 
labelled ‘Bullionist’ and ‘Anti-Bullionist’ after the widespread adoption of the gold standard 
after 1870. Bullionists emphasised the need for a stable standard of value limited by scarcity 
and who lobbied for a return to the gold standard, and Anti-Bullionists emphasised the 
need for an abundant means of exchange and supported the Restriction (depicted in Exhibit 
3.1) – because, in spite of the Act being labelled the ‘Restriction’, in practice it called for 
more (paper) money to be created and circulated. Each lobby adopted and rejected different 
axioms of classical monetary theory. Which assumptions each political economist chose to 
retain, and hence which lobby he joined, reflected the way their personal experience led 
them to differently fashion the data selection and analysis.  
 
In this chapter, using the 1809-10 texts of Ricardo (Bullionist) and Bosanquet (Anti-
Bullionist), I give an overview of the bifurcation within a Fisherian conceptual framework, 
and identify how the two writers differed in their approaches to the three key issues: (1) the 
role of innovation in financial instruments, processes and the business models that support 
them, namely paper-based quasi-monies and the new bank business models that had 
emerged to service them; (2) the role of credit and ‘fringe’ banking, neatly encapsulated in 
the debate over Ricardo’s “gold mine” analogy; and (3) the rationales and incentives acting 
upon economic agents, particular when deciding how to regulate their note issuance. These 
are the very same issues debated by monetary economists following the latest financial crisis 
of 2008, and this chapter contributes to the ultimate purpose of the thesis to show how 
simplistic modelling of these three factors has been a regular source of policy errors at times 
when the institutional context is changing. In the final Section V of the thesis I contrast the 
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empirical evidence with the competing arguments over the continuing validity of the Price-
Specie-Flow, the Real Bills Doctrine, and classical views of GDP-based velocity of specie.  
 
In the previous chapter I examined the axioms and assumptions central to how the classical 
quantity theory of money ‘modelled’ the monetary system: Hume’s Price-Specie-Flow that 
synthesized the pre-Restriction monetary system as using only gold coin as numeraire and 
permitting no endogenous creation of broad money; and the ‘headline’ version of Smith’s 
Real Bills Doctrine, which assumed that the private incentives acting upon bankers would 
render any endogenous expansion in the supply of credit (such as that already seen in 
Scotland) to be always appropriately sized to the money-demand from the real economy. 
The Restriction, by suspending the fixed parity between money as banknotes and money as 
bullion, created problems for the classical monetary theory arranged around these axioms. 
The Restriction meant that banks were no longer legally obliged to redeem balance sheet 
liabilities (deposits, banknotes) with high-powered money (specie) – defined as monetary 
instruments that are legal tender or otherwise accepted in the payment of taxes. In the 
conceptual space of monetary theory, political economists faced the possibility that money 
was no longer necessarily a one-to-one representative of real resources. As a corollary, 
banks could no longer be treated as merely the passive conduit for the transfer of real 
resources between savers and borrowers. Instead, like theoretical economists today, political 
economists during the Restriction were obliged to explicitly confront the possibility that 
banks could be independent manufacturers of loanable resources, and hence that both the 
balance sheet velocity of ‘high-powered money’ and the supply of broad money could be 
volatile in the response to changes in the state of confidence. 
 
Smith had already expressed many a cautionary note in regard to the implicit assumptions 
required for the classical theory to hold in practice, but it was only after the Restriction that 
events became sufficiently dissonant with theory to cause political economists to address 
the anomalies. Crucially, Smith had already distinguished the use-value of gold coin from 
the notion of the total exchange-value it could represent during the course of a year, but 
this distinction only came to the fore after the Restriction broke apart the fixed link 
between the two notions. In an economy using paper money, specie still acted as a reserve 
within the banking system, but issuing banknotes could more readily finance additional 
lending, and hence the GDP-based velocity ratio of gold coin could become considerably 
greater than its physical velocity when used in exchange transactions. To the extent that the 
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state of confidence caused the banking system’s lending to vary for any given stock of gold 
coin reserves, then the GDP-based velocity of gold coin could also be unstable. 
 
 
3.1   Historical context 
 
The Bullionist paradigm has its earliest roots in the pamphlets of the banker Walter Boyd 
(1801) (1754-1837) and the Whig politician Lord King (1804) (1776-1833) during the early 
rounds of the debate conducted in 1800-1804. In 1802-7 Henry Thornton (1760-1815) 
contributed three editions of his masterly but poorly organised An Inquiry into The Nature and 
Effects of The Paper Credit of Great Britain. Early in 1809 the government appointed a 
Parliamentary Committee to “Inquire into the cause of the high price of bullion, and to take 
into consideration the state of the circulating medium, and of the exchanges between Great 
Britain and foreign parts” (cited in Bosanquet (1818:2-3)). The same year David Ricardo 
(1772 – 1823) entered the debate on money with three letters to the Morning Chronicle 
newspaper written between August and November, stimulated by the ripostes of his friend 
Hutches Tower. The latter chaired the said Committee, which in June 1810 published its 
Bullionist-leaning conclusions in the Report of The Select Committee on the High Price of Bullion 
(1810), known as the “Bullion Report”. Ricardo followed with a full pamphlet probably 
written during the last quarter of 1809 and published in four editions through to 1811, The 
High Price of Bullion, a Proof of the Depreciation of Bank Notes. Following the publication of the 
Bullion Report, Ricardo published further letters, this time stimulated by the anti-Bullionist 
arguments put forward by Bosanquet and Malthus (Sraffa (1951)). 
 
In November 1810 Charles Bosanquet (1769-1850) published what can be considered a 
manifesto for the Anti-Bullionist paradigm: a 110-page critique of the Bullion Report that was 
also a response to Ricardo’s letters. It was widely accepted as the most effective 
argumentation of the anti-Bullionist views, and Ricardo himself acknowledged this in his 
Reply to Mr. Bosanquet’s Practical Observations on the Report of the Bullion Committee (1811) in which 
he states, “Of all the attacks on the report of the Committee, however, that of Mr. 
Bosanquet has appeared to me the most formidable. He has not, as his predecessors have 
done, confined himself to declamation alone; and though he disclaims all reasoning and 
argument, he has brought forward, what he thought were irrefragable proofs of the 
discordance of the theory with former practice.” Both authors published second editions in 
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an attempt to address some of each other’s more valid points, but Bosanquet appears to 
have tired first.  In spite of Ricardo’s compliment, Bosanquet’s text is often bypassed by 
historians of economics who prefer to delve into the greater material offered by Thornton. 
 
 
3.2 The debate of 1809-10 
 
In the Introduction I showed the various symptoms of economic and monetary disruption 
observed during the Restriction when compared to the previous century – albeit mostly via 
proxy measures rather than our retrospective statistics. Boyd (1801) had put all of the blame 
on the Bank of England: the total money in circulation “must be greater or smaller, in 
proportion to the abundance or scarcity of Bank of England notes or specie, at any 
particular time.” In other words, it was the Bank of England’s balance sheet expansion that 
was entirely to blame for the growth in broad money.  In this chapter I focus on the second 
round of the debate in 1809-10 which revolved around what had caused the weakness of 
the pound on foreign exchanges and its mirror image, the high price of gold – both 
indicators being the most visible to contemporary observers. Was the wartime disruption to 
Britain’s cross-border trade to blame or was it the excessive issuance of banknotes by the 
Bank of England? Was it a disruption in the real economy, or a misalignment of the 
monetary system to the real economy? Did economic disruptions always and only clear 
through the flows of gold, or did the banking system endogenously supply other forms of 
non-gold money in order to clear real-economy disruptions to the supply of gold-money?  
 
As Fetter (1978: 27) identified, the debate spilled over into new questions about the 
functioning of the monetary system, the role of banks and credit creation, and the money 
standard. In this chapter I distil how Ricardo for the Bullionist view and Bosanquet for the 
Anti-Bullionist view adopted and rejected different components of classical theory as their 
core hypothesis, and reached different conclusions as to the cause of the weakness in the 
pound. In doing so, they exposed different perspectives of the role of the banking system 
and the objective to be set for monetary policy. In Part IV I contrast the position taken by 
these two lobbies to the empirical evidence and conclude that both lobbies relied on 
assumptions that were only partial representations of what was actually occurring in the 
banking system.  
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Exhibit 3.1 – The bifurcation of classical theory during the Restriction debate  
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Ricardo: the Bullionist arguments 
 
The Bullionist lobby (Ricardo) adopted Hume’s Price-Specie-Flow as a core hypothesis and 
rejected the Real Bills Doctrine as unrepresentative of banking practices in the absence of 
the constraints imposed by the gold standard. In essence this lobby upheld many of Smith’s 
limitations of the Real Bills Doctrine, but rejected those pertaining to the Price-Specie-Flow 
and the possibility of paper money playing a useful role in providing bridge financing for 
structural wartime current account deficits. This lobby continued to assume that the 
marginal rate of substitution between gold coin and paper money was zero in the medium 
to long-term, and that the liabilities of the whole banking system (London and Country 
banks) would automatically move in lock step with changes in the Bank of England balance 
sheet. This combination of assumptions allowed the Bullionists to view the economy as if it 
were still on the gold standard. Hence, the observed depreciation of the pound on the 
foreign exchanges was to be entirely blamed on an excess supply of Bank of England 
banknotes.  
 
Bullionists retained the assumption implicit in the Price-Specie-Flow that, over some 
vaguely defined complete cycle of production and trade, banknotes and other quasi-monies 
such as the bill of exchange are first issued and then fully redeemed out of the cash flows 
generated at the end of that cycle, and during that period of their existence they represent a 
mere temporary proxy in paper form for the high-powered commodity money they replace.  
 
“The Bank [of England …] while their notes were payable in specie on demand […] could 
never issue more notes than the value of the coin which would have circulated had there 
been no bank. If they attempted to exceed this amount, the excess would be immediately 
returned to them in specie” (Ricardo, 1810: 57). 
 
Ricardo follows Hume and Smith classical theory in assuming that the price of goods are 
based on long-run factor costs and the proportion of the global supply of specie allocated 
to each nation to be based on relative differences in their growth rates as determined by 
exogenous factor endowments. In such equilibrium:  
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“the exports and imports of all countries would balance each other; bills of exchange would 
make the necessary payments, but no money [i.e. specie] would pass, because it would have 
the same value in all countries” (Ricardo, 1810: 54).  
 
Buttressing his arguments with numerous quotes from Smith, Ricardo (1810: 53-4) re-states 
the classical arguments based on a world economic system using commodity-money (gold) 
where flows would react so as to bring about its equilibrium distribution across countries, 
thereby equating money’s (i.e. gold’s) extrinsic purchasing power over other goods to its 
intrinsic value as a commodity. A country’s share of the total gold supply depends on its 
“progress towards wealth”, by which he meant three factors: its resource endowment; its 
capacity to withhold part of its annual produce to act as fixed and working capital for the 
next cycle of production; and the “liveliness” of its international trade. In this classical gold 
standard regime, changes in the total supply of gold in the world only affect the exchange 
ratio between gold and other commodities, but have no impact on the underlying 
production relations in the real economy. Unlike Smith, Ricardo addresses the potential 
problem of the total global supply of gold, but only to dismiss it as irrelevant: 
 
“If the quantity of gold and silver in the world employed as money were exceedingly small, 
or abundantly great, it would not in the least affect the proportions in which they be divided 
among the different nations – the variation in their quantity would have produced no other 
effect than to make the commodities for which they were exchanged comparatively dear or 
cheap” (Ricardo, 1810: 53). 
 
The main difference in Ricardo’s reasoning compared to Hume and Smith was that the 
initiating catalyst for the equilibrating flows was not the desire to export or import gold, but 
rather the incentive to export or import more goods. As identified by Arnon (2011: Chpt. 
8), Ricardo used a Goods-Flow mechanism. Ricardo articulated this as a protective add-on 
to the cross-border version of classical theory: he hypothesised a domestic form of the 
Goods-Flow that operated across regional markets inside Britain. Excessive banknote 
issuance in any one region would raise nominal prices in that region, causing economic 
agents to transfer their purchases to other regions where prices were cheaper, thereby 
causing a reflux of the excess Country banknotes back to the banks in the region with 
higher prices.  
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“The money of a particular country is divided amongst its different provinces by the same 
rules as the money of the world is divided amongst the different nations of which it is 
composed. Each district will retain in its circulation such a proportionate share of the 
currency of the country, as its trade, and consequently its payments, may require, compared 
to the trade of the whole; and no increase can take place in the circulating medium of one 
district, without being generally diffused, or calling forth a proportionate quantity in every 
other district. It is this which keeps a country bank note always the same value as a Bank of 
England note” (Ricardo, 1810: 87). 
 
The result, however, was the same: as long as banknotes were convertible into gold, an 
over-issue of banknotes would cause domestic prices in Britain and/or one of its regions to 
rise relative to overseas and/or other regions, encouraging imports of goods and exports of 
gold, both between Britain and overseas and/or between regions within Britain. A number 
of assumptions were made in the above citation: that the demand for money was entirely 
for transaction balances, and this demand bore a stable and similar ratio to total (real) 
transactions both for the country and for individual regions. For Ricardo and the Bullionist 
lobby, there could not be any real-economy factors causing an increased demand for broad 
money; there was only monetary mismanagement causing an excess supply of broad money. 
The Bullionist lobby retained the a priori assumptions that money should act as the time-
invariant ideal standard of value, and that only commodity money (gold) could and would act 
as a sufficiently close proxy for that ideal standard. Specie was always the vix mediatrix by 
which the economic and monetary systems were brought back to their long-run balance 
dictated by long-run factor costs.  
 
 
Bosanquet: the Anti-Bullionist argument 
 
In contrast, the Anti-Bullionist (Bosanquet) lobby rejected the Price-Specie-Flow 
mechanism as invalid at times of war and Napoleon’s blockade of British trade, and relied 
for its core hypothesis on Smith’s Real Bills Doctrine plus a reinforcing ex post incentive 
mechanisms that came to be called the Law of Reflux. This combination allowed the 
Abundance lobby to reject both the Price-Specie-Flow and the stable-velocity assumption, 
but still retain the overall ‘model’ of a self-equilibrating monetary system even during the 
Restriction. In essence this lobby upheld many of Smith’s arguments that paper money 
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could play a productive role in some circumstances, but set aside Smith’s “Ayr Bank 
warnings” that the incentive mechanisms underlying the Real Bills Doctrine could fail and 
become destabilizing. The empirical validity of the Real Bills Doctrine acted as a focal point 
of the debate during the Restriction: its validity was a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the Anti-Bullionist paradigm, its rejection a necessary condition for the Bullionist paradigm. 
The 1809 Bullion Committee rejected its validity, leading Bosanquet to accuse it of having 
adopted the Bullionist views as a “syllabus”. 
 
In contrast to the Bullionist lobby that viewed frictional costs and financial innovations as 
temporary anomalies, Bosanquet and the Anti-Bullionist lobby saw these as sufficient 
reason to abandon the policy implications of the classical Price-Specie-Flow and embraced 
Smith’s examples of how paper money could have beneficial welfare effects. Bosanquet’s 
(1810: 86) main argument was that if, like Ricardo, one defines the appropriate (broad) 
money supply as that which has the right proportion to the value of commodities, you have 
a definition that is of no practical use in differentiating between an endogenous rise in the 
demand for money and an exogenous increase in its supply (caused by the Bank of 
England’s mismanagement). 
 
If Ricardo used his domestic inter-regional Goods-Flow mechanism to buttress the 
Bullionist adoption of the Price-Specie-Flow, then similarly Bosanquet (1810: 63-7) 
articulated the Law of Reflux to buttress the Anti-Bullionist adoption of the Real Bills 
Doctrine. Bosanquet’s Law of Reflux extended the type of micro-economic analysis that 
Smith had applied to a single bank’s circulation of its banknotes, and applied it to the aggregate 
circulation of paper quasi-monies. For Smith, private incentives were such that if an excess of 
banknotes were put into circulation, it would soon be returned to the issuing bank, 
generating high transaction costs that would dissuade the issuer from persisting. Bosanquet 
(1810: 54-7) argues that evolving practices and “other improvements in banking” ensure 
that similar processes operate across banks. Bosanquet lists four such improvements: (i) the 
intra-day netting of inter-bank payments (allowing average daily volumes of £4.7M to clear 
with just £220,000 of notes changing hands); (ii) London banks having repo-style accounts 
with the Bank of England giving access to emergency overnight liquidity13; (iii) the 
emergence of inter-bank brokers for intra-day funds; and (iv) the Bank of England now pre-
                                                
13 See Chapter 11 for a full analysis of this facility, which clearly some London banks used as more of a 
permanent source of additional balance sheet funding.  
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announcing at the start of the day the bills it expects to present for payment at each bank at 
4pm, and also accepting in “part-payment any draft on the Bank for discount, or otherwise, 
which the bankers may happen to hold instead of bank-notes.” 
 
“I have already shewn [sic] with what degree of rapidity money finds its level amongst the 
bankers in London, and it results, therefore, as a general inference, that, whilst there is 
money unemployed and to spare in the city, discounters of the first class will not present 
themselves at the Bank [of England]….So long as the amount of [bank]notes in the hands 
of the public is not more than the parties holding them are willing to retain in their hands 
unemployed, for the purpose of making their daily payments, there is obviously no excess of that 
description which influences the price of commodities” (Ricardo, 1810: 58) [my italics]. 
 
If Ricardo postulated that the medium-term marginal rate of substitution between 
banknotes and specie was zero, Bosanquet postulated the short-term marginal rate of 
substitution between all forms of circulating media was one.  
 
Bosanquet was not alone in viewing the Restriction Act as having unshackled the monetary 
system, allowing its natural inventiveness to respond flexibly to the demand for means of 
exchange by creating mechanisms that enabled the newly created IOUs to be netted off in 
the accounts of the banks.  Heywood (1812)14 repeats the same data regarding the volumes 
of intra-day netting of London inter-bank payments cited by Bosanquet, and goes further in 
highlighting how inland bills of exchange have become an important part of the circulating 
media. Heywood (1812: 10-1) believes that “less than 1-4th of the sum of existing bills of 
exchange, would at all times exceed the sum of all existing bankers’ notes” and that “the 
bulk of the amount of these bills of exchange is commuted and discharged without being 
paid in cash or bank notes.”  As we show in Chapter 11 and 12, Heywood (1810: 12) 
correctly foresaw that thanks to these netting mechanisms, “The whole sum of this private 
circulation may become, in fact, wholly independent of the Bank of England notes”.  In a 
section added to Heywood’s pamphlet (1812: 77-96), written “by a friend of the author”, 
the argument is made even clearer: the Restriction Act “has proved to be the most efficient 
measure on record” for establishing a sensible currency system in Britain consisting in “the 
                                                
14 This is most likely to be the same Arthur Heywood who held a 50% stake in the prominent Liverpool bank of A. 
Heywood & Sons (Chapter 9). 
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general use of ‘circulating individual credit’”. While admitting that paper instruments 
comport certain costs, the writer states: 
 
“The loss sustained by the community in the interest, excess, forgery, and casualties of 
notes, is however evanescent compared with the amount which it would have been, if the 
“fifteen hundred millions” annually “paid on the counters of the London bankers” had 
been notes circulated; in other words, if the system of Transfer and Set Off, introduced by 
Bills of Exchange, had not spared their use. It may be assumed as a certain fact, that three-
fourths of the business and money transactions of this greatest of all mercantile 
communities, are settled, that is, paid and discharged, without the use either of notes or 
gold” (Heywood, 1812: 79-80) [my underline] 
 
The monetary system, according to Bosanquet, already possessed efficient (intra-day) 
mechanisms that permit transactions to occur that cleared the market across the different 
quasi-monies. These process innovations render the monetary system efficient in both 
absorbing banknotes where they are needed, and returning any net overall excess, either (a) 
back to the Treasury for the payment of taxes, which effectively extinguishes the excess, or 
(b) back to the Bank of England in the form of a lower demand for discounts the following 
day.  Bosanquet is describing a monetary system with a hierarchy of instruments arranged 
according to the ease with which they can be liquidated for specie or swapped into a higher-
ranked instrument, e.g. a private sector bill of exchange into a government Exchequer Bill; 
an Exchequer Bill into Bank of England notes; Bank of England notes into specie.  
According to Bosanquet, this Transfer and Set Off machinery represented by the London 
money market allows the various marginal rates of substitution between different forms of 
money to equilibrate the supply and demand for each, and simultaneously allows the 
aggregate supply of broad money (in all its forms) to equilibrate to the demand for money 
from the real economy (the latter implicitly assumed to be exogenous). By the “ingenuity of 
artificers operating on things invented [… R]eceipts and payments are discharged by 
assignment or transfer [… such that all] will, by this medium, generally balance each other, 
leaving only such small differences as may be discharged by a comparatively trifling use of 
extraneous currency” (Heywood, 1812: 80-1).  
 
The Humean lakes and Smithian ponds have become interconnected micro-economic 
cisterns representing a more granular view of the monetary system; but the analogy remains 
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that of a self-equilibrating waterworks – albeit one that now functions using banknotes and 
bills.  The analogy allows Bosanquet (1810: 57-8) to make his core argument that this “… 
results, therefore, as a general inference, that, whilst there is money unemployed and to 
spare in the city, discounters of the first class will not present themselves at the Bank [of 
England]” and instead their bills will be bought up by the London banks, thereby absorbing 
the spare money.  
 
Bosanquet is making the quintessential ‘post-Keynesian horizontalist’ argument that the 
supply of money is a flat line in the credit-money and interest-rate space,15responding 
endogenously and fully to the demand for loans from creditworthy would-be borrowers: 
 
“So long as the amount of notes in the hands of the public is not more than the parties 
holding them are willing to retain in their hands unemployed, for the purpose of making 
their daily payments, there is obviously no excess of that description which influences the 
price of commodities. When the amount goes beyond this, the surplus instantly fastens on 
the best bills and most eligible government securities, chiefly on the first” (Bosanquet, 1810: 
58-9). 
 
This enhanced Law of Reflux operating at the level of the aggregate economy serves the 
Anti-Bullionist argument by buttressing the normative prescriptions of the Real Bills 
Doctrine operating at the micro-economic level: there can be no excess supply of money 
relative to the demand for money, for any such excess will “instantly” be used either by a 
discounter who owes money to a government department of the Bank of England, or 
travels intra-day from bank to bank, each receiving it in return for swapping out some of its 
bills; the bank that is ‘last in line’ to sell the bill at the end of the day will experience a net 
augmenting of ‘cash’ in the balance sheet, such that the following day that bank will 
proportionally reduce their demands upon the Bank of England to discount bills.  
 
Note how these arguments contain two implicit assumptions: firstly, that each bank targeted 
a stable gearing ratio of total assets to reserves of ‘cash’ and, secondly, that this target ratio 
was not impacted, in pro-cyclical manner, by bankers’ experiencing those very same changes 
in the ready availability of ‘cash’ and the perceived saleability (or ‘shiftability’) of their less 
liquid assets. Any absence of the first factor was problematic for the Bullionist hypothesis 
                                                
15 For an excellent summary, see Lavoie (2006). 
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of a stable balance sheet velocity of specie; but not a serious problem for the Anti-Bullionist 
paradigm because they believed the supply of the different alternative forms of money 
would endogenously adjust accordingly to the banking system’s desired composition of 
reserve assets. However, any failure of the second factor would be problematic for Anti-
Bullionists because it would negate the assumption that the demand for broad money was 
independent of its supply, and of its composition.  
 
In conclusion, Bosanquet’s position was diametrically opposed to that of Ricardo. For 
Bosanquet, at the margin, any excess supply of banknotes would be swapped for other 
financial instruments (bills) and so serve to extinguish lower-quality forms of credit-based 
quasi-monies. Bosanquet assumed the short- and long-run marginal rate of substitution of 
any excess supply of banknotes for goods was zero, and argued that the marginal rate of 
substitution of banknotes for specie was equal to one - with the total supply of specie and 
banknotes being determined by the demand for (real) transaction balances which, it was 
accepted, was not necessarily a stable ratio to total transactions (especially at a time of war). 
For Ricardo, by contrast, the (long-run) marginal rate of substitution of banknotes for 
specie was zero, and any excess supply of banknotes would be exchanged (first) for 
commodities, causing the nominal price of commodities (including bullion) to rise. For 
Ricardo specie was the sole vix mediatrix of the economic and monetary system, but he had 
to assume that the demand for specie was a stable function of real GDP; for Bosanquet, the 
demand for money was satisfied by a more fluid mixture of nominal monetary instruments, 
supplied via an efficient and flexible monetary system, but he had to assume that in the 
markets for money there were no feedback loops between the supply and demand for 
money, via changes in expectations or the real cost of borrowing.  
 
These differentiated views of the role of money can be matched to the different approaches 
taken in recent years.  Drawing upon Mehrling (2011), post-war economic discussion has 
been dominated first by the economics and then the finance view of money: both assumed 
that liquidity was a free good and this distracted attention from the older “money view” that 
emphasised nominal cash flow constraints and a policy aimed at a balance between 
disciplined scarcity (Ricardo) and flexible abundance (Bosanquet).  “On the one hand, we 
have the view of economics, which resolutely looks through the veil of money to see how the 
prospects for the present generation depend on investments in real capital goods that were 
made by generations past. On the other hand, we have the view of finance, which focuses on 
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the present valuations of capital assets, seeing them as dependent entirely on imagined future 
cash flows projected back into the present. The economics view and the finance view meet 
in the present, where cash flows emerging from the past real investments meet cash 
commitments entered into in anticipation of an imagined future. This present is the natural 
sphere of the money view” (Mehrling, 2011: 4). Ricardo’s strict Bullionist (Scarcity) approach 
retained the classical view that commodity money was the sole equilibrating force, and 
implicitly viewed the economy through the lens of real variables and assumed that there 
were never any non-price or liquidity impediments to the real economy when adjusting to 
the supply of specie. Bosanquet’s Anti-Bullionist (Abundance) approach emphasised 
flexible self-adjusting markets for the different forms of paper monies, and implicitly 
viewed the ‘cash flows emerging from the past real investments’ as able to smoothly 
equilibrate with the ‘cash commitments entered into in anticipation of an imagined future’ – 
the implicit assumption being that today’s cash flows would always closely match yesterday’s 
imagined future (the Real Bills Doctrine), with any short-term adjustment executed via the 
agency of a banking system always able to buffer any discrepancy between these two flows 
through the adjustment of their balance sheets. The implicit Bosanquet assumption was 
that, when making these adjustments, the banks could always rely on the saleability, or 
“shiftability” of different assets, especially government securities – a notion that Mehrling 
(2011: 7) shows was rekindled by the “well-meaning American economist” Harold Moulton 
in 1918 and became the intellectual support for the shift in monetary policy towards 
flexibility.  
 
In short, both Ricardo and Bosanquet assumed liquidity was a free good, but for very 
different reasons: Ricardo, because the flows of nominal quasi-money instruments did not 
form part of the mechanisms by which an economy re-equilibrated; Bosanquet, because the 
flows of nominal quasi-money instruments were unfailingly the pathway by which an economy 
re-equilibrated to an exogenous demand for broad money, and that demand for money 
reflected economic agents always able to imagine and assess accurately future cash flows. 
Both underplayed the “money view” that emphasises the inherent instability of credit as the 
key component of that buffer provided by the banking system, and in particular the role 
played by “fringe banking” - a view best expressed by Minsky (1986). However, as we 
explain in the next paragraphs, in 1809 Bosanquet did have a better appreciation of the 
relationship between broad money and credit.  
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3.3  Credit money and the “gold mine” analogy 
 
In his 1809 writings, Ricardo compared the creation of a new note-issuing bank to the 
discovery of a new gold mine. This is a highly contentious example, eloquently disputed by 
Bosanquet, which neatly captures the significant early lacuna in political economists’ 
understanding of the role of credit-money.  
 
Ricardo argued that under a gold standard, if the bank issued a large amount of banknotes 
by way of loans to either the private or public sector – and the Bank of England did both 
during the Restriction (Chapter 10) - this would have the same effect as the discovery of a 
new gold mine:  
 
“ If a mine of gold were discovered in either [of two countries whose bi-lateral trade is in 
balance], the currency of that country would be lowered in value in consequence of the 
increased quantity of the precious metals brought into circulation, and would therefore no 
longer be of the same value as that of other countries. Gold and silver, whether in coin or in 
bullion, obeying the laws which regulate all other commodities, would immediately become 
articles of exportation; […] If instead of a mine being discovered in any country, a bank was 
established, such as the Bank of England, with the power of issuing its notes for a 
circulating medium; after a large amount had been issued either by way of loan to merchants 
or by advances to government, thereby adding considerably to the sum of the currency, the 
same effect would follow as in the case of the mine. The circulating medium would be 
lowered in value, and goods would experience a proportionate rise. The equilibrium 
between that and other nations would only be restored by the exportation of part of its 
coin” (Ricardo, 1810: 54). 
 
This analogy is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it equates an increase in a nation’s stock 
of high-powered money (specie) obtained by the net sale of export goods to a new mine 
excavating gold. Secondly, it equates an increase in the supply of broad money (“circulating 
medium”, i.e. specie plus banknotes) to an increase in high-powered money (only specie). 
Bosanquet (1810: 52) provides an effective critique of Ricardo’s analogy of the gold mine, 
which he says has “not one point of analogy to the issues of the Bank of England.” In 
doing so, he gives the clearest explanation of why we should treat high-powered money and 
credit-based money differently. The critique makes three important points.  
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Firstly, Bosanquet (1810: 52-3) makes the key point that banknotes enter the monetary 
system as the simultaneous creation of an asset and a liability, whereas specie/gold enters 
the monetary system solely as an asset/commodity exchanged for another commodity. 
Banknotes are credit-based money because they are only issued when the Bank of England 
makes a loan to the government or discounts the bills of private sector merchants. 
 
“The principle on which the Bank issues its notes is that of a loan. Every note is issued at 
the requisition of some party, who becomes indebted to the Bank for its amount, and gives 
security to return this note, or other of equal value, at a fixed and not remote period, paying 
an interest, proportioned to the time allowed.”  
 
Bosanquet is describing banknotes as entering the economy in the form of a financial swap. 
This ‘swap’ carries an on-going cost for the counterparty taking on the liability side of that 
swap, to which Bosanquet adds the classical construct of a notional maturity corresponding 
to the end of the production cycle that the loan has helped finance. For Bosanquet, the 
combination of the cost and the notional maturity create natural incentives for the new 
issuance of banknotes (and other paper-based quasi-monies) to ultimately be extinguished if 
they are no longer needed by the real economy. While they are in circulation, the efficient 
engine of the London money market that supports the Law of Reflux would ensure that any 
excess supply of paper monies surfacing in any one Smithian pond would be conveyed to 
those ponds where it was scarce.   
 
Secondly, Bosanquet (1810: 52-3) points out that the gold produced by a new mine enters 
the monetary system only when the owners of the mine sell it in exchange for goods: only 
then will there be a depreciation of the [exchange] value of the circulating medium [relative 
to goods]: 
 
  “[…] gold produces no benefit to the holder as gold; … to render it useful, he must 
exchange it either for such things as are immediately useful, or for such as produce 
revenue.” 
 
Whereas, by contrast, when banknotes are issued as part of a bank loan: 
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“No note is issued in payment of any service, moral or physical, constituting the 
consideration for it, and there is therefore no analogy between the circumstances of the 
issues from a gold mine and those from the Bank of England.” 
 
Bosanquet then extends his attack on the gold mine analogy by returning to his Law of 
Reflux described above. An excessive supply of gold will cause its exchange price to ‘grow 
cheap’ relative to other commodities which ‘grow dear’, but this would happen gradually as 
the gold is minted into coin and then spent, and this change of relative prices has no pre-
determined end point. By contrast, an excess supply of ‘bank-paper’ would revert to the 
Bank of England the very next day via a reduction in the demand for discounts of bills. 
Bosanquet argument is that the mechanisms by which the supply and demand for gold are 
brought into balance with the real economy are both slow and partial, whereas those that 
bring into balance the supply and demand for credit-based paper money are ‘immediate’ and 
in full – because of the efficiency of the London money market in ‘hoovering up’ any excess 
issuance and conveying it to those agents with debts to extinguish or payments to make to 
the governments departments. Bosanquet is suggesting that the marginal rate of substitution 
between gold and new consumption of goods may be low in the short run, whereas the 
marginal rate of substitution between banknotes and other debt instruments (such as bills) 
is high and nearly instantaneous, once the supply of banknotes exceeds the demand for real 
money balances.  
 
Scholars of Ricardo such as Rosselli (2013) have argued that his true position on credit-
money and the income-based velocity of specie should not be judged by the gold-mine 
example, but by his Ingot Plan described in his Proposal for an Economical And Secure Currency 
published in 1816. The Ingot Plan proposed a gold exchange standard where the nominal 
unit of account was indexed to a fixed quantity of gold, but where the arbitrage mechanisms 
were so designed as to limit its access whilst allowing paper money to more readily act as a 
substitute for specie: “the Bank [of England] were obliged to deliver uncoined bullion in 
exchange for their notes at the mint price and standard [and] they were not under the 
necessity of purchasing any quantity of bullion offered them” (Ricardo, 1816: 67). 
 
It is indeed appropriate to cast Ricardo’s 1816 views on paper-based credit money and the 
effects of confidence as being more sophisticated than those he expressed in 1809, 
reflecting a more moderated view that addresses some of the Anti-Bullionist arguments 
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noted here. This change of perspective by Ricardo supports the argument made here, 
namely that at times of radical changes in the monetary system political economists only 
gradually learn how to appropriately adapt previous monetary theory to the new 
institutional environment. Ricardo-1816 benefited from an additional seven years of 
empirical observation, conceptual thinking and intellectual input from his peers. In Ricardo-
1816, his main objective emerges more clearly as an attempt to design a monetary system 
that builds a bridge between the ancien regime and the by then better-understood advantages 
of using a paper-based medium of exchange, whilst trying to retain the benefits of the fixed 
parity to a standard of value (gold), immune from political interference and from the Bank of 
England’s private incentives. However, this Ingot Plan was only very briefly sketched in the 
appendices of The High Price of Bullion; it was put forward fully only seven years later, by 
which time all commentators had had much more time to evaluate the new institutional 
context created by the Restriction and hence the opportunity, with greater understanding, to 
move away from more extreme positions.16 In this thesis my interest is in examining early 
reactions of political economists, at a time when the rapid changes in a monetary system 
were still freshest and bewildering, and juxtaposing those early theoretical responses to the 
evidence of actual concurrent banking practices. I have posed the question ‘How did the 
bifurcated responses in the way political economists ‘modelled’ the monetary system in 
1809-10 compare to actual concurrent behaviour of the banking system during the 
Restriction?’ I am not posing the narrower historical question of ‘How do political 
economists’ evolving views of money after the Bullion report explain why Britain decided to 
return to the gold standard in 1818 and not in 1809?’   
 
 
3.4  The bifurcation through the lens of Fisher’s equation of exchange 
 
In order to allow the perspective offered by this work to travel forward through time, I take 
a brief detour using Fisher’s well-known 1911 equation of exchange to specify “ahistorical, 
invariant, or generalisable” uniformities (Ashley and Orenstein, 2005: 241) that pertain to 
the two antithetical approaches to the modelling of money born in 1809 that run through 
the history of monetary policy debates. 
 
                                                
16 In this sense, one might say Ricardo learned more quickly than the modern central bankers quoted in the 
Conclusion to the thesis (Prologue section). 
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Writing a century after the Restriction, at a point neatly equidistant between today and the 
Restriction, Irving Fisher formulated the identity: MV = ΣpQ, which we abbreviate to:  MV 
= PQ as described in Chapter 1. Fisher states the equation is valid for a given ‘community’ 
over a given time period: institutional context, and the possibility of its change over time, is 
important. The identity is always true for any given definition of money (M). Let us accept 
the relatively unproblematic assumption that nominal GDP is an adequate representation of 
what Fisher meant by the right-hand variable PQ: the sum of the monetary value of all 
economic transactions during one year. Then every possible definition of ‘money’ (M) will 
generate a corresponding income-based velocity of ‘money’ (V) that allows the identity to 
hold. For the purpose of this analysis M encapsulates both high-powered money (M1) and 
other quasi-monies (M2) that are mediating market exchange, such that M = M1 + M2. 
Similarly, V is the blended income velocity of M1 and M2, such that M1.V1 + M2.V2 = 
PQ. 
 
As with all identities, Fisher’s provides no primary directional force of causality. Its elegant 
simplicity aids understanding by enforcing a balance through accounting equivalence. Being 
neutral to causal direction, it is available to both the Bullionist and Anti-Bullionist lobbies to 
differentiate them in terms of the direction of causality they each assume or impose upon 
the identity. The two lobbies are distinguished by the causal direction they impose upon 
Fisher’s identity, reflecting the monetary outcome their favour, respectively for the rate of 
growth of the supply of money to be at least equal to the growth rate of nominal GDP 
(“Abundance”), or for it to be equal or no greater (“Scarcity”). The Anti-Bullionist / 
Abundance lobby focus on money’s role as a means of exchange and view the primary direction 
of causality to run from nominal GDP to the transactions demand for money, such that: 
 
                                          ΔPQ  =>   ΔMV  
 
Hence, if the operation of the gold standard defines M1 as the stock of gold bullion and 
specie, and limits M2 to a fixed ratio of M1, and these limitations combine with wartime 
constraints to the real economy in preventing the adequate response by the total of MV to 
an exogenous change in PQ, then the Anti-Bullionist / Abundance lobby supported the 
Restriction because it loosened those constraints. That loosening can occur in two ways: (1) 
by way of a redefinition of what “a community” counts as its high-powered money (M1), 
thereby expanding what the banking system can use as liquidity reserves, or (2) by loosening 
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the contingent requirement to redeem quasi-monies (M2) with high-powered money (M1). 
Either or both of these allow V to increase and compensate for the inadequate supply of 
high-powered money, enabling the endogenous expansion of credit-based monies (M2) 
created within the banking system using the existing stock of high-powered money as 
reserves. In Part IV I show empirical evidence that point to both these factors being at 
work during the Restriction period. The implicit assumption of the Abundance lobby – 
described in the Real Bills Doctrine - is that private incentive mechanisms operating in free 
markets will ensure that all desired transactions, and any additional IOUs created to enable 
them, will have a positive net long-term welfare benefit. As von Mises (1934: 406-7) 
eloquently described a few years after Fisher, the Abundance lobby: 
 
“denies the possibility of an over-issue of banknotes and regards ‘elasticity’ as their essential 
characteristic [and hence] necessarily arrive(s) at the conclusion that any limitation of the 
circulation of notes …. must prove injurious, since it prevents the exercise of the chief 
function of the note issue, [namely] the contrivance of an adjustment between the stock of 
money and the demand for money without changing the objective exchange value of 
money”. 
 
The Bullionist / Scarcity lobby, by contrast, focus on money’s function as a store of value which 
they wish to see preserved in real terms, and hence its role as a standard of value, and view the 
primary direction of causality as running from the supply of money to the change in the 
price level: 
 
                                                        Δ(MV/Q)   =>  ΔP 
 
During the Restriction, this Bullionist lobby viewed a rise in the price level and its mirror 
image, a decline in the value of the pound on foreign exchanges, as prima facie evidence of an 
excess supply of high-powered money (M1), now defined as specie plus Bank of England 
notes. This required three assumptions: that Banknotes were fungible with specie when 
used as high-powered money (M1) in the banking system; that M2 was a stable ratio of M1; 
and that V was stable.  
 
The Scarcity lobby places as its top priority the preservation of money’s value in terms of 
other goods and services, and is therefore primarily concerned with indexing the money 
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unit of account to a credible standard of value (e.g. to gold at the time of the Restriction; or 
today, to an inflation index). Since a near-zero change in P is the primary outcome sought, 
then by implications policy should be aimed at a stable relationship between the change in 
the stock of broad money (M*V) and the change in the volume of real transactions Q 
(which is assumed to be exogenous). For the Scarcity lobby, a stable price ratio between the 
unit of account and all goods and services is assumed to produce the optimal long-term 
growth in the real economy. This lobby further assumes that the supply of broad money 
(M*V) is institutionally under our collective control. It assumes a stable demand for money 
function (k* PQ), and a stable relationship between the stock of high-powered money (M1) 
and the total supply of broad money (M*V). As V is assumed to be stable and real growth 
to be exogenous, then any increase in the price level must have resulted from the supply of 
high-powered money growing faster than the real economy - as Ricardo concluded in 1809. 
Hence, a rise in the price level or its mirror image, a decline in the value of the pound on 
foreign exchanges (relative to other currencies linked to a commodity standard, as occurred 
during the Restriction) is viewed as prima facie evidence of an excess supply of high-powered 
money (M1), and the responsibility for that rise in prices is placed at the door of the 
institution with the authority to create it. Again, in von Mises’ (1934: 456-7) words, the 
Scarcity lobby looks to a system of commodity- or commodity-like money as: 
 
 “render(ing) the determination of the monetary unit’s purchasing power independent of the 
policies of governments and political parties. Furthermore, it prevents rulers from eluding 
the financial and budgetary prerogatives of the representative assemblies. Parliamentary 
control of finances works only if the government is not in a position to provide for 
unauthorized expenditures by increasing the circulating amount of fiat money”.     
 
In summary, for the Abundance lobby, M*V should be allowed to respond endogenously to 
the demand for ‘money’ occasioned by the world of (real) transactions, and it is assumed 
that this response will always be necessary, suitable and proportional as long as private 
incentive mechanisms are allowed to operate unhindered (and unregulated). The Abundance 
lobby accepts that the income velocity of high-powered money (specie) varies endogenously 
to the change in its supply and is part of the mechanism by which the monetary system 
rationally adjusts to the demand for (all forms of) money. The Abundance lobby are less 
concerned by the mix of monetary instruments that form the total broad money supply 
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(M*V), as it is implicitly assumed that the same set of private incentives will produce the 
most efficient mix.  
 
By contrast, the Scarcity lobby view the supply of broad money (M*V) as something that 
needs to be managed exogenously. Such management may be exercised with varying 
degrees of freedom: by a fixed link to a real quantity (such as gold), or by use of rules, or by 
delegating to the discretion of an institution independent of government and with the sole 
task of achieving the Scarcity lobby’s primary policy goal of price stability. In all cases, the 
Scarcity lobby assume that the velocity of (centrally planned) high-powered money is 
sufficiently stable to bring the supply of broad money under the executive’s control.  The 
Scarcity lobby believe the banking system to have a limited ability to expand its balance 
sheet gearing to the stock of high-powered money, which it does by forming new banks or 
creating innovative monetary instruments at the fringes of the established banking system.  
 
Monetary economists of both persuasions have largely overlooked the porous nature of the 
distinction between high-powered money and the supply of broad money.  Fisher (1991: 
149) acknowledged that velocity is affected by the state of confidence, the attitudes to the 
extension of bank credit, and by technological innovation: “The velocities of circulation will 
be increased … by improvident habits; by the use of book credit; and by rapid 
transportation.” Ricardo and the Bullionist/Scarcity lobby assumed that the income-based 
velocity of high-powered money was stable in the medium and long term: what changed 
after the Restriction Act was that they no longer equated high-powered money to only 
specie, but now to specie plus Bank of England banknotes. In contrast, the Anti-
Bullionists/Abundance lobby overlooked the potential for changes in velocity to have 
performative feedback effects on the proper operation of the private incentive mechanisms, 
upon which this lobby relies for allowing total broad money to be endogenously determined 
by the banking system.  
 
Fisher’s identity highlights how the two lobbies view money from “opposite sides of the 
coin” (Hart, 1986). The two lobbies agree on what is represented by the right-hand side of 
the identity, PQ, but view the left-hand side of the identity (MV) as representing two 
antithetical concepts.  The two lobbies would agree that the product MV represents the 
total supply of broad money, although not on how it behaves. The Abundance lobby 
characterises MV as the notion of liquidity, which is seen as a beneficial lubricant for real 
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economic activity, while the Scarcity lobby views MV as the stock of financial debt, credit-
based quasi-monies that are (and should be) only temporary substitutes for high-powered 
money (specie) and are seen as open to excessive use, inflationary, and dilutive of trust 
amongst economic agents – and, more importantly, dilutive of the extrinsic value of money 
relative to the money standard (gold) that was thought to guarantee it role as a store of 
value - because it allows the polity to avoid fiscal and budgetary constraints. 
 
 
3.5  Conclusion 
 
Under a gold standard the two notions of extrinsic-value and intrinsic-value of money 
appeared as bound together by a fixed parity, plus or minus arbitrage costs; but in fact this 
was only true as long as one viewed them at a single instant in time. In Smith’s discussion of 
velocity in the previous chapter, the exchange-value of the stock of gold coin was intended 
as the total nominal value, measured over multiple instants in time, of all economic 
transactions intermediated by the stock of gold coin and any associated stock of banknotes 
and other quasi-monies which it supported. Hence, for Smith, the extrinsic exchange value 
of gold coin equals [(intrinsic-value) * (time)]. For Smith, extrinsic exchange value referred 
to the GDP-based velocity of gold coin in the same way as it is defined in this paper [V = 
PQ / M1] – a definition that would permit velocity, so defined, to change over time even 
before the Restriction. It would have been a small step to extend this definition of the 
extrinsic value of gold coin by including the operation of the banking system, such that it 
became: [(intrinsic-value) * (banks’ gearing to gold coin) * (time)]. 
 
After the Restriction, the two notions of value became free to diverge even at a single 
instant in time, and more visibly so whenever the price of bullion rose above its previous 
fixed parity. As Heywood (1812: 77-8) remarked, “One of [the Restriction Act’s] first 
consequences was, to weaken the association of ideas that existed in favour of a circulating 
medium possessing intrinsic value”. This could happen due to, inter alia, (a) changes in bank 
asset gearing, allowing London banks to expand lending with the same stock of specie and 
unchanged total liabilities; or (b) it could happen due to a change in the public’s acceptance 
of paper banknotes, allowing Country banks to exogenously ‘manufacture’ additional 
liabilities to fund a greater volume of credit with the same quantity of deposits. I show in 
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subsequent sections how the evidence points to material changes occurring in both bank 
asset gearing and note issuance. 
 
Hypotheses to be tested 
 
In Part II and III I analyse numerous case studies drawn from London and Country banks 
and their operating behaviour as revealed by their balance sheets, in order to identify the 
evidence for and against the two competing hypotheses underlying the contemporary 
theoretical debate: was the most stable relationship (A) between the creation of bank 
liabilities by London and Country banks, and the Bank of England’s balance sheet 
(exogenous money underpinned by the Stable Fringe Velocity), or was it (B) between bank 
lending and real GDP (endogenous money underpinned by the Real Bills Doctrine)? 
 
The Scarcity lobby’s hypothesis of a Stable Fringe Velocity postulated relationships between 
the balance sheet of London and Country banks and that of the Bank of England. The 
Abundance lobby’s Real Bills Doctrine postulated relationships internal to each bank 
between its note issuance and its lending activity (Smith’s ‘micro’ version of the Law of 
Reflux), as well as relationships between aggregate bank balance sheets and GDP 
(Bosanquet’s ‘macro’ version of the Law of Reflux).  
 
The latter relationships were conceived primarily at the level of the aggregate monetary 
system and the ‘average’ bank and its relationship to the whole economy. However, careful 
use of the sample case studies allows us to set up proxy tests of these hypotheses at the level 
of the individual bank without over-specifying what we would expect to find. The proxy 
tests, specified below, are a recurring theme in the way we investigate the case studies of 
London and Country banks. Questioning the micro-economic data this way allows us to 
build greater insight and confidence in assessing whether the broader hypotheses were an 
accurate reflection of how the banking system was actually functioning. Then in Part IV I 
conclude with an analysis of the observed behaviour of the aggregate data series.  
 
As I analyse each case study I am posing the following questions. If the Bullionists’ Stable 
Fringe Velocity had been an accurate description of Country banks’ balance sheet behaviour 
during the Restriction, what would we expect to observe?  
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1. The issuance by a Country bank of its own notes would have a stable ratio to its stock of 
specie and Bank of England banknotes [i.e. its Cash] 
2. A London and Country bank’s lending would be a stable multiple of its Cash reserves 
3. As a corollary, a Country bank’s net notes outstanding should be a stable ratio of total 
lending 
4. At the aggregate level, total London and Country bank balance sheets should be 
correlated to the Bank of England’s banknotes in circulation 
 
Any two of the first three imply the existence of the third and fourth, and are equivalent to 
postulating that the banks’ asset and liability matching strategies should be stable. 
 
If the Anti-Bullionists’ Law of Reflux had been an accurate description of interbank 
payment flows, what would we expect to observe? 
 
1. Most daily flows between the a London bank and its Country correspondent would be 
settled via offsetting accounting entries, with only a small part settled via physical transfer of 
specie or Bank of England notes    
 
If the Anti-Bullionists’ Real Bills Doctrine had been an accurate description of banks’ 
lending behaviour during the Restriction, what would we expect to observe?  
 
2. Banks would cut back on lending if faced with declining profit margins 
3. Banks should experience very small loan losses on their lending to private customers, 
and none beyond what they had previously reserved against such losses 
4.   At the aggregate level, total bank lending should be correlated to nominal GDP 
 
In order to investigate these, it is first necessary to identify the full taxonomy of different 
London bank business models operating in 1797 in order to lay the ground for 
understanding important differences in the way each would be affected by the changes in 
the institutional environment ushered in by the Restriction Act, and the way the London 
money market interacted with the growth in Country banks.   
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PART II  
Bank business model innovation: taxonomy and typology  
 
Chapter 4. The ‘Goldsmith’ and the ‘Discounter’ 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Methodology and relevant literature 
3. Data sourcing and contribution 
4. Accounting practices 
5. The four ‘Goldsmiths’ 
6. The four ‘Discounters’ 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Part II examines the emergence of two ‘business models’ amongst London banks during the 
early stages of the Industrial Revolution using newly collected longitudinal data on eight 
London banks17 for which adequate balance sheets records survive. It reveals the growth - 
amongst younger or recently re-articled banks - of a new business model dedicated to 
serving both the expanding use of bills of exchange and the needs of the growing number 
of Country banks, illustrating all three areas of change that this thesis has identified as 
regularly causing problems for monetary theorists: innovation in financial products and 
processes, the role of credit and fringe banking, and the rationales of bankers.  By 
identifying the innovations in bank business models that were already taking place before 
the Restriction, in subsequent chapters I am able to unpick how Britain’s decision in 1797 
to come off the gold standard impacted monetary transmission pathways and affected the 
supply of money. Although our ultimate objective is to understand the dynamic changes in 
the monetary system during the Restriction, this Section focuses on the structure of the 
London banking system that had evolved under a gold standard regime before 1797: it 
focuses on the layout of the kindling before the match was lit.   
 
Part II poses “large questions in small places” (Joiner (1999) in Vaara and Lamberg (2014: 
20)) by analysing the banks’ financial records from the technical and material perspective in 
                                                
17 The ninth bank, Coutts, is explored in detail in a case study in Chapter 6. 
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the manner adopted by both economic historians and business model scholars working 
within strategy management and practice research. I find that the composition of bank 
balance sheets can be arranged into a taxonomy clustered around two generic business 
models that form separate ‘strategic groups’ at the intermediate level of aggregation between 
the firm and the whole industry, in the tradition of Hunt (1972) and McGee and Thomas 
(1986). In this Chapter, I first outline the relevant recent literature and methodology and, 
second, following Baden-Fuller and Morgan (2010: 162), I arrange the eight case studies of 
individual London bank micro-histories into an empirical taxonomy of the two main business 
models inferred from their balance sheet composition, using financial analysis. I label these 
the “Goldsmith” and the “Discounter”; then in the subsequent Chapter 5 I provide 
evidence of such business model clusters and develop a typology of bank business models. I 
conclude by exploring the implications of this typology for the cognitive frames that lay behind 
the bankers’ strategy decisions, and infer linkages to the debate amongst political 
economists studied in the previous section. In doing so, I follow Porac and Baden-Fuller 
(1989: 398) in believing that at “the cognitive level, business competition must be analysed 
in terms of the mental models of decision-makers and how such mental models lead to a 
particular interpretation of the competitive milieu.” 
 
The pre-analytic approach was guided by my archival research and the simple intuition that 
our understanding of the behaviour of the British money supply at the end of the 
eighteenth-century could be improved by a micro-historical analysis of bank balance sheets. 
To date, our understanding of what a bank looked like and the functions it performed at 
this time have been dominated by the work of Temin and Voth (2005, 2006, and 2013) 
employing data from C. Hoare & Co, which they recently expanded to four other goldsmith 
banks in the century prior to the Restriction.  It was only during the collection of the 
broader archival data from the later period that important differences in balance sheet 
composition emerged: the clear patterns and clusters inferred from these empirical 
differences suggesting the presence of different business models. Joslin (1960) had glimpsed 
these emerging differences in a forgotten essay on London bankers during the war years of 
1739-84 (which he never developed into a fully quantified study).18  
 
My analysis “involved an iterative approach of moving back and forth between data, 
relevant literature and [strategy management and business model] theory. Theoretical 
                                                
18 I am grateful to Prof. Patrick O’Brien for bringing this to my notice. 
  
92 
propositions were not constructed prior to the research. They were developed through 
careful within-case analysis (Regnér, 2003: 64). Following Bates (1999: 13-7), I immerse the 
reader in many of the case studies so as to construct analytical narratives that are “logically 
persuasive and empirically valid accounts that explain how and why events occurred”. In 
doing so, like all analytical narrators, I “blur the conventional distinction between deduction 
and induction” and “stop iterating when we run out of testable implications.” While such 
categorisation is potentially open to the criticism by behavioural psychologists levelled at all 
historians’ use of pattern recognition, the argument made in this thesis does not require or 
purport to be a rationalization of some inevitable path, but rather for events to have been 
the consequence of certain (monetary) policy actions (e.g. the Restriction Act). By making 
explicit the interpretation of the narrative that emerges from these eight case studies, and 
recasting it into a formal set of business model types, I put the explanations at risk and 
expose them to the reader’s judgement.   
 
I find that prior to the Restriction, the Goldsmith-bank business model followed a low 
frequency transaction business with high gross and net margins, focused on secured 
lending. Conversely, the Discounter-bank business model followed a high-frequency 
transaction business with high gross annualised margins, but low per-unit nominal profit 
and higher unit costs, and focused on the discounting of unsecured paper-based IOUs: bills 
of exchange and (promissory) notes. These two types of bank business model captured 
different parts of the value creation occurring within banking; were exposed to a different 
mix of business risks; and constituted different monetary transmission pathways that would 
subsequently experience the changes brought about by the Restriction in quite different 
ways. A financial analysis of the two decades prior to the Restriction reveals a picture of 
idiosyncratic long-run trend growth for individual banks, driven by bank-specific success in 
growing deposits within a slow-growing total (under the gold standard), playing out within a 
dominant common cyclical aggregate outcome. Nevertheless, the patterns of year-to-year 
changes in balance sheet size already revealed a clustering around the two business models. 
The analysis of profitability - using Hoares and Prescotts as the main examples to illustrate 
the two respective polar extremes in business model – suggest that the business of banking 
in London had reached an approximate equivalence in the return on assets across business 
models, net of loan losses.  
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This status quo would be disrupted by the decision to suspend convertibility into gold coin 
and the subsequent credit boom fuelled by increased Bank of England discounting of 
private sector bills and notes. Part IV will explore how this had different consequences for 
the two business models; elicited different responses from bank owners; and exposed the 
dichotomy of views on money held by bankers and political economists alike. 
 
 
4.2  Methodology and relevant literature 
 
In recent years, the term “business model” has become ubiquitous in the everyday language 
of business practitioners, as the supply-side logic of the industrial era has given way to the 
more complex value propositions demanded by a world of greater consumer choice (Teece, 
2010). Gradually, the academic study of business models has also gained ground as an area 
of research in its own right within the wider body of strategy management and practice 
research (for a comprehensive review of the latest developments, see the Baden-Fuller and 
Mangematin, 2015). Furthermore, in the past year there has been a renewed interest from 
management schools for building bridges towards economic and social historians, or 
perhaps back towards the historical analysis found in the original work of Chandler and 
Mintzberg. Although the focus of this thesis is on the implications of these micro-economic 
changes on the monetary system as a whole, these chapters can be viewed as such a bridge 
from the shores of economic and financial history. 
 
In this Part II the analytical methodology is the longitudinal historical case study of the eight 
London banks for which we have sufficient data for the period prior to and during the 
Restriction of 1797. The longitudinal case-study methodology is well known to economic 
and financial historians, but it also has paradigm status when designing modern research 
concerning managerial activities (Vaara and Lamberg, 2014: 13) where the aim is – as in this 
thesis - to provide descriptive inferences and generate hypotheses in an insufficiently 
researched area (Regnér, 2003: 60-1). This work does not claim that the sample of London 
banks is a fully stratified sample of the 70 banks that existed in 1797. It only claims to be 
the first analysis of the complete sample of balance sheets remaining in the archives and 
that, supported by triangulation with archival material from the Bank of England (Chapter 
11), the sample is sufficient to allow us to infer the main business model types.  
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Criticism has been levelled at strategic management research that it “has lacked historical 
comprehension and sensitivity”; by historical embeddedness, strategy management 
researchers intend “the ways strategic process and practices and our conceptions of them 
are embedded in socio-historical environments and defined by them” (Vaara and Lamberg, 
2016: 3-4). In this thesis I place the historical embeddedness of strategy practices at the very 
forefront of the research design, using this section’s empirical analysis of the business 
models as the micro-economic foundations for our investigation of the Restriction’s impact 
on the aggregate monetary system. The thesis pursues analytically structured history, defined 
by Rowlinson and Hassard (2014) as an approach that “uses analytic constructs […] to 
search archival sources, enabling the construction of a narrative of structures and events 
that may not even have been perceived as such by actors at the time [and] driven by 
concepts, events, and causation.”  
 
In this Part II, I first adopt a material-technical, activity-based financial accounting 
perspective of business models, and then conclude by inferring the cognitive perspective 
associated with these models. The financial accounting analysis addresses the methods by 
which each of the two bank business model created and captured value; the subsequent 
inferences made regarding their different cognitive perspectives seek the links to the 
different framing of money by political economists, many of whom were or had also been 
bankers, or would regularly mix in the same circles. 
 
Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989) in their landmark study of Scottish knitwear 
manufacturers highlighted how competitive interactions can be analysed both at the 
material/technical level and the cognitive level. From the material-technical, activity-based 
perspective I analyse the London business models in the terms of well-researched concepts 
such as: barriers to entry (e.g. eighteen-century banks being limited by law to private 
partnerships of no more than 6 partners), product differentiation (secured lending versus 
bill discounting), pricing (e.g. mortgage interest versus the implied interest rate on bill 
discounting), relative average and marginal cost or margin curves (e.g. costs structure of 
high-frequency bill discounting versus low-turnover mortgage lending). From a cognitive 
perspective, a business model is a constructed conceptual template that represents the 
salient activities and features that distinguish one business model or strategy from an 
alternative one, where each ‘model’ entails significantly different choices in regard to the 
locus of the value capture, the product and service mix used to capture that value, and the 
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human and fixed capital resources required to generate it. When conceptualizing business 
models, Furnari (2015: 5) similarly distinguishes between ‘activity-based perspective’, which 
sees them as a system of activities that firms use to create and capture value (e.g. Zott and 
Amit, 2010; Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010), and a separate ‘cognitive perspective’ 
that sees the business model as “a cognitive instrument that represents those activities (e.g. 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013; Baden-Fuller and 
Haefliger, 2013)”. 
 
The majority of strategy management research seeks to understand the formulation, 
dissemination, and implementation of business models by living actors either within a firm 
or industry. However, business models when viewed as templates of generic strategy 
(Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010) are equally useful for the business and financial historian 
with no access to living actors. The business model as a cognitive tool can be seen as a 
scientific model subject to being manipulated independently of the empirical data that led to 
its initial design (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013) for the purpose of enabling inquiry 
and knowledge construction (Furnari, 2015)). In the case of the economic and financial 
historian, it is the researcher (and not the actor in the case study) who performs the 
manipulation of the conceptual business model. In this thesis, the author performs this 
manipulation of the conceptual ideal-types with the dual objective of improving our 
understanding of the impact of the Restriction on Britain’s money supply, as well as to 
construct cognitive connections between banking practices and the contemporary debate on 
monetary theory.  
 
 
4.3  Data sourcing and contribution 
 
Our understanding to date of the micro-economic practice of banking has been dominated 
by the story of the Goldsmith banks emerging in the early eighteenth century as recounted 
by Temin & Voth (2013: 47) based on the surviving data for five banks which relied 
“heavily on the continuous record of Hoare’s Bank [...] as it is by far the best we have.” At 
the end of the eighteen-century they estimated that there were 70 banks in London, 9 of 
which had roots in the London goldsmiths of a century earlier, plus 276 mostly smaller 
Country banks (Chapter 12). The Bank of England acted as a quasi-central bank, not by 
clarity of mandate, but by the nature of its relative size and operating privileges. Its balance 
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sheet was (I estimate here) some twenty times that of the two next largest banks; it had a 
monopoly of banknote issuance within a 65-mile radius of London; and it was the only 
joint-stock bank in London, while all others were limited to no more than six partners. 
 
By focusing on the period after 1780, usually associated with the early Industrial Revolution, 
I was able to discover and analyse a broader set of bank business models, using balance 
sheets reconstructed from over 11,000 newly collected data points for a dozen London 
banks. The ‘data contribution’ section of the Introduction provides a full explanation. In 
these Chapters 4 and 5 I investigate eight of these banks in the years preceding the 
Restriction, chosen because their records allow analysis of the subsequent balance sheet 
evolution during the Restriction. Coutts is the subject of a separate Chapter 6: although also 
a member of the ‘£1 million Club’ in 1796, it operated a hybrid business model that 
combined in equal parts the Goldsmith model, and the Discounter model closely connected 
to the Bank of Scotland.  To the best of our knowledge this is the first time such forensic 
accounting analysis has been done across a sample of London banks for the same or near-
same years.  
 
The analytical approach adopted was to first reconstruct each bank’s balance sheet from the 
archival records; analyse what story they reveal; and only then investigating the biographical 
stories told by historians of banking, thereafter iterating between the two in order to 
sharpen the understanding. In doing so I have drawn from a number of histories of banks 
cited in the description of the respective bank below.  These histories typically focus on the 
families of the partners, and only tangentially relate their story to any detailed examination 
of financial state of the business.  
 
 
4.4  Accounting practices 
 
In this section I explain what is meant by a bank balance sheet at the end of the eighteenth-
century.  
 
Prior to 1821, there was no statutory obligation to publish balance sheets or profit and loss 
statements. As banks were private partnerships limited to no more than six shareholders, 
there was also little incentive to do so. This was an era when the partners managed the 
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business, typically taking it in turns to be present in “the shop” to supervise daily activity 
and, as often as not, find polite and not so polite ways to say no to new requests for loans 
(but also regularly dispensing small charitable gifts to supplicants turning up at the door). 
Sometimes communications with clients were in writing, with a secretarial clerk transcribing 
a copy by hand to be kept in a “Letter Book”, and sometimes a viva voce, with a short note of 
the conversation written into a “Daily Book” by the partner in charge on the day, thereby 
allowing other partners to be informed of previous client discussions. Country banks would 
keep a separate book dedicated to recording communications with their London 
correspondent. Hence, managing partners were usually well acquainted with the essential 
state of affairs of the bank – at least those in charge of the London banks that survived the 
period under review, which almost all did.  
 
Where high-level annual (and sometimes semi-annual) balance sheet summaries exist, they 
appear to have been a form of ceremonial offering to the partners produced by the chief 
clerk as testimony to his (it was always a he) honesty, skill and diligence – and as 
justification for his annual salary, typically £180-200, or about ten times that of the junior 
clerks, and thirty times the £7 offered at the time to men who would enlist to fight 
Napoleon. These summary balance sheets were often reproduced and collated in a separate 
book [most grandly named by Hoare & Co as the “Anno Domini” book] and written with 
the tidiest and most ornate handwriting compared to that used in the detailed ledgers. This 
summary would be presented at the partners’ annual sign-off event, the chief purpose of 
which was for the partners to officially accept the division of the profit previously agreed 
over lengthy backroom discussions.19 The sign-off also served to record the partners’ joint 
and several responsibility over the contents of the balance sheet, including any bad debts or 
fraud, either known and as yet to be discovered (forcing a revision of past accounts). Only a 
few banks have such tidy summaries; many did not, or if they did, these do not survive. 
Where balance sheet summaries exist, they are usually too general to extract an adequate 
picture of the changes taking place, which must be uncovered by searching amongst the 
jigsaw puzzle of documents showing details of the underlying ledgers. Some banks left a 
full-blown treasure hunt, where the key ledger totals have to be hunted down across 
multiple pages filled with many different entries that mix client balances with securities 
holdings, and which then had to be cross-checked against surviving draft summaries and/or 
                                                
19 We sometimes get a glimpse of those backroom discussions hidden in the voluminous legal language with which 
new partnership agreements are drawn up. 
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for equality between total assets and total liabilities. In some cases, years of crisis such as 
1797 and 1825 left a visual representation in the form of a marked dishevelment of the 
accounting – and, no doubt, of the accountant – when compared to the previous year.  
 
All banks broadly followed the same system of double-entry bookkeeping, although each 
bank had its own idiosyncratic style for laying out its balance sheet in conformity to the 
main thrust of its business or what its partners saw as the best way to represent the key 
drivers of it. The typical balance sheet books begin with the liabilities (“Contra”), usually a 
list of the outstanding deposit balances for the individual clients, sometimes ordered 
alphabetically, but sometimes with less transparent logic. Discounters usually identified a 
separate “Country ledger” listing deposit balances from the Country correspondents. On 
the asset side (called “Debits”) the accounts listed the overdrafts of each client, the 
individual secured loans, and the outstanding bills discounted, finishing with the balance 
held in securities and in cash. In a page placed between the Debit and Contra pages we are 
occasionally rewarded with a summary page with the total assets and liabilities, the profit for 
the year and their distribution amongst partners, and (more rarely) the paid-up equity 
capital. Country banks would keep a separate “Note Book” to track their issuance of their 
own banknotes, how much had been returned and how many cancelled. Country banks 
would usually include under ‘cash’ not only specie and Bank of England banknotes, but also 
the stock of their own stamped banknotes not in circulation (and even small quantities of 
the banknotes of sister banks). This has the effect of inflating both sides of the balance 
sheet and exaggerating the true proportion funded from note issuance; in our analysis, 
wherever possible we compute a net balance sheet by subtracting the unused notes from 
both cash (on the asset side) and from notes issued (on the liability side).  
 
For analytical purposes, if there is a material difference in the accounting principles between 
banks, it is in the representation of the annual profit and/or the paid up capital of the 
partnership. In some cases these are shown as part of the liabilities, with the corresponding 
amount included in cash on the asset side; but sometimes the annual profit and/or the paid-
up capital is shown separately or not at all. For example, Hoares’ balance books do not 
show the paid up capital, but do show the annual profit; in the case of Childs, the capital is 
not identified separately, and the annual profit is included in the total liabilities until 1786, 
but shown separately thereafter. Different again were the balance books of Coutts and 
Barclays Bevan Tritton which clearly indicate the paid up capital for the whole period 1774 
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to 1845, but do not clearly separate out the annual profit. These different accounting 
practices restrict our ability to make confident comparisons of profitability across all the 
banks in the sample, but do not prevent the compilation of robust standardised balance 
sheets. We can safely assume that any paid-up capital was included in the total liabilities, and 
then adjust the balance sheet totals to account for whether they were drawn up before or 
after dividend distributions. Since for most banks, and most years, net profits represent 2-
3% of total liabilities, and were fully (or almost fully) distributed out to the partners, for 
analytical purposes these differences in accounting practice can be corrected, and any small 
errors introduced via differences between banks in the method (e.g. for the timing of bad 
debt write-offs) are almost always immaterial (at least for these surviving London banks).  
 
By contrast, when comparing profitability more care is needed, although it is possible to 
select sub-samples of two or three banks where we have sufficient information to make 
such comparisons. Where it has not been possible to clearly establish comparability, I show 
the readers more than one measure.   
 
Particular care needs to be taken on the comparability of treatments of accrued interest and 
capital gains. Hoares had the cleanest and most transparent method, which was as follows. 
Year-end interest income on term loans was made up of the interest received during the 
year, less that portion that had been booked as having already accrued at the previous year-
end, plus accrued interest on loans currently outstanding. Bills discounted would be 
recorded on the Debit side at cost in two columns: the first marked “to client X” to indicate 
who had tendered it, and the second “on company Y” to indicate the issuer of the bill; 
when the bill came due, the purchase cost was recorded on the Contra side as “by bill on 
company Y” and the discount earned was recorded separately alongside as “by client X”. At 
year-end the total of the discounts earned was transferred to the profit and loss account. 
 
 
4.5  The four ‘Goldsmiths’ 
 
For each bank I first summarise the highlights of their history drawn from Orbell and 
Turton (2001) and any relevant individual biography as cited; I then focus on the 
comparative analysis of the balance sheet reconstructed from the primary archival sources 
listed in the Bibliography.  
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For ease of comparison, the balance sheet composition of each of the four Goldsmith 
banks and the four Discounter banks in the year immediately preceding the Restriction is 
shown pictorially in Exhibit 4.3 below.  
 
 
C. Hoare & Co.  
 
For economic historians, Hoares Bank is the iconic London bank of the early Industrial 
Revolution due to the research based on its financial records conducted by Temin and Voth 
exploring the presence of non-price credit rationing (2005); the early fractional reserve 
banking (2006); and the emergence during the eighteenth-century of a British banking 
system built around the London goldsmiths (2013). Hoares is the iconic example of a bank 
with goldsmith roots that continued to pursue the ‘Goldsmith’ business model throughout 
the period examined in this thesis – and can be said to still do so successfully to this day. 
Here I give only a brief summary of the early history of C. Hoare & Co. prior to 1797, 
drawing upon the biography of the family partners recounted by Hoare (1955)20, and 
juxtapose this with a comparative analysis of the bank’s balance sheet data collected from 
the original records and which are mostly complementary to that shown in Temin & Voth 
(2013) who focused on the period before the Restriction years.  
 
Hoares traces its roots to the goldsmith Richard Hoare who in 1673 inherited the business 
of his master, Robert Tempest, and today is the longest surviving privately held family-run 
bank in Britain. Originally located in Cheapside, in 1690 Richard moved the business to its 
current location at 37, Fleet Street prompted by a desire to be within walking distance of 
London’s most desirable residential districts. As a result of this remarkable continuity in the 
bank’s ownership and physical location, the bank has retained a veritable treasure trove of 
archival materials.21 Until his death in 1718, Richard Hoare led the transformation of the 
business away from the custody of silver, pearls, gold and diamonds to that of a bank 
making monetary loans. The holdings of gold plate etc. declined rapidly after 1700, from 
about half the assets to less than 10% (Temin and Voth, 2013: 68). Upon the death of Sir 
Richard, the business was carried on by his sons Henry and Benjamin, and has remained 
                                                
20 Especially Chapter 5: “Messrs. Hoare, 1718-1929”. 
21 I am extremely grateful to Jeremy Marshall, CEO and the Hoare family for allowing me extensive access to the 
balance sheet records from 1772, and to Pamela Hunter, archivist, for her patient assistance in exploring the 
different accounting books. 
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under the family’s direction to this day, more recently adding a growing wealth management 
service to the historic banking activity.22 By 1787 the bank traded under the name Henry 
Hoare & Co, until 1828, when it changed to Henry Hugh Hoare & Co until the end of the 
period reviewed here.  
 
Before 1797, typically two-thirds of Hoares’ balance sheet assets consisted of secured 
lending, with the remaining one-third held in cash and short-term government paper.  
Balance sheet funding came from the deposits of a large array of private clients. In the 
twenty years from 1778 until 1797, Hoares maintained a high liquidity reserve: the stock of 
cash and government securities was always between 30% and 40% of assets. Of the total 
secured lending, the longer-term commitments in the form of “money lent on mortgage, 
bond, etc” accounted for the majority and, consistent with the slower run-off of such loans, 
the absolute amount was relatively stable between £350,000 and £420,000. The rest of 
secured lending was accounted by “Loans undischarged on Personal Securities” which 
included lending collateralised with either personal indemnities or customer holdings of 
government securities. The latter component, being associated with shorter-term lending, 
was naturally more volatile. In the years running up to the Restriction, the balance sheet had 
been shrinking every year from a peak of £1,036,012 in 1791 to a low of £663,815 in 1797, 
and as a result the proportion dedicated to the longer-term lending secured on mortgage or 
bond had become the majority of all lending. This downward adjustment of the balance 
sheet was implemented through a reduction in lending against personal securities and most 
of all through liquidation of the holdings of government securities - in a pattern of 
behaviour prevalent amongst all banks at this time. The latter fell from a high of £215,873 
(1791) to an average of £67,337 in the final three years before the Restriction Act (at one 
point reaching a low of £9,085 in 1793). Conversely, during the Restriction years, these two 
latter components would account for most of the balance sheet growth to £1.5 million by 
1817-8, while loans secured on mortgage or bond would remain within their previous 
bounds (£330,000 to £400,000).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 Today’s 14 members of the Board include 8 partners, all of whom are family members.  
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Child & Co. 
 
Childs traced its roots to the goldsmith shop of William Wheeler and Robert Blanchard in 
the Strand. Like Hoare’s, Child’s had transitioned to a banking business in the first two 
decades of the eighteenth-century, and its holdings of silver, gold, diamonds and plate had 
declined from over half the assets (Orbell and Turton, 2011: 147). By the 1740s these assets 
accounted for less than 3% of the balance sheet at both Childs and Hoare’s, and both banks 
were already making monetary loans accounting for approximately 60% of their total assets 
(Temin and Voth, 2013: 68).  
 
At the time of the Restriction Act in 1797 the balance sheets of the two banks were of 
similar size (£719,936 versus £663,815). Childs operated with an even more risk-averse 
liquidity ratio: it held a similar cash reserve to Hoare’s, in the range of 30% to 40%, but kept 
a larger buffer of government securities. Childs grouped all holdings of securities together 
with other secured lending, but a painstaking inspection of the sub-ledgers allows an 
estimate of the year-end holdings of government securities (Exchequer bills, Navy & 
Victualizing bills, Short & Imperial annuities, and East India bonds) to be carved out. The 
combination of these traded securities and cash accounted for one half or more of the 
balance sheet. This liquid portion of the balance sheet would rise further to three-quarters 
during the Restriction years, mostly driven by a predilection for investing in East India 
bonds (from nothing in 1797 to £300,000 by 1822). The latter behaviour ran counter to the 
tendency observed at other banks to move away from such bonds as the years progressed, 
but is explained by Childs’ reputation for catering to the banking needs of the East India 
Company executives (Uglow, 2014: 91).  
 
On the liability side, like Hoares, Childs relied on the deposits of a large aristocratic 
customer base; it also attracted many from the legal profession. In its ledgers it goes a step 
further than Hoares by distinguishing between deposits from “Nobles” and the rest of its 
deposits. “Noble” deposits had been a growing proportion of total liabilities, reaching 20% 
on the eve of the Restriction, and remained there throughout the Restriction. Childs had 
issued its first printed note in 1729 and the first printed cheque in 1762, and evidence 
suggests they used these more than Hoares. Childs separates out its notes and cheques in 
circulation in the summary accounts, but the accounting method changes in the mid-1780s 
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and again in the early years of the new century; however, we can estimate these accounted 
for 10-15% of total liabilities both before and during the Restriction.  
 
 
Drummond & Co. 
 
Drummonds story is recounted in the amusing biography by Bolitho and Peel (1967) that 
focused on the Drummond family; I summarise the highlights and juxtapose these to a 
comparative analysis of the bank’s balance sheet data they report in the appendix. 
  
The bank was founded in 1712 by the Scotsman Andrew Drummond who traded as a 
goldsmith in the Angel Court area of Charing Cross in London, until recently still the home 
of venerable banking houses such as JP Morgan, but now site of one of London’s latest 
spectacular mixed-used skyscrapers. Within a few years Drummonds’ banking business 
came to dominate in spite of its share of hiccups and frauds. Andrew Drummond was 
initially seen with suspicion in some quarters of London despite there being little evidence 
that he shared his brother William’s ‘ardent Jacobite sympathies’. His brother had been 
“among the first to join the standard of the Old Pretender in the Jacobite rising of 1715” 
and again under Price Charles Edward’s ill-fated attempt to install a Stuart king over Great 
Britain in 1745, dying in the battle of Culloden (Bolitho and Peel, 1967: 23-4). Soon after, 
Sir Thomas Winnington, Paymaster-General of the Forces had a warrant issued for the 
seizure of the bank’s papers for the purpose of finding evidence that the bank had supplied 
funds to the revolt. But Andrew Drummond fought back and he was eventually fully 
exonerated by the Cabinet (1967: 40-1).  
 
By 1765 the bank’s clients included “six Dukes, forty-three Peers and forty-two other titled 
persons [amongst] the 1290 separate accounts in the books” (1967: 70), and there are 
connections with the Royal household dating back to 1784, which eventually bloomed into 
George III transferring his account from Coutts in 1802, while his son the Price of Wales 
transferred in the opposite direction in 1800, when Drummonds was asked by the King to 
stop lending to his spendthrift son (1967: 80-7). The bank also had extensive links with 
artisans and craftsmen (similar to Ranson Bouviere & Co) including Sir William Chambers, 
who designed Somerset House in London and Dundas House in Edinburgh; John Christian 
Bach, the son of Johann Sebastian; Thomas Gainsborough; and Josiah Wedgwood, the 
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master potter (1967: 70-1).  Later clients included John Frederick Sackville, 3rd Duke of 
Dorset and patron of the game of cricket; the Duke of Wellington and his father; Pasquale 
Paoli, the Corsican patriot who was paid a £2,000 annual pension by Pitt’s government as a 
reward for making himself a nuisance to the French; and Henry Addington, later Viscount 
Sidmouth.  
 
In the run up to the Restriction, Drummonds balance sheet amounted to just under £1 
million, some 50% larger than both Hoares and Childs, making it the largest private bank in 
our London sample. The balance sheet structure of Drummonds is a close match to that of 
Hoares and Childs, although perhaps implemented with a more diverse and colourful client 
base. It shows all the same conservative approach to liquidity and a focus on secured 
lending, with little or no discounting of bills (just 1-3% of total assets). During the early 
Restriction years, Drummonds would allow itself to become more involved in discounting 
until it accounted for a peak of 7% of total assets in 1804, after which it plateaued. Secured 
lending (“money lent”) regularly accounted for 50% to 60% of total assets, with the rest 
held in cash and securities. However, the composition of this liquidity reserve as between 
cash and securities was more volatile than observed at its two peers: at the end of the 1770s 
Drummonds moved away from holding its liquidity reserves only in cash and began using 
more traded securities. Thereafter, in any one year, cash might represent all of the liquidity 
reserve or as little as one-quarter of the total reserve.  
 
After the founder died in 1769 the business was split between three branches of the family 
and the banking side continued to thrive, under the stewardship of William’s two sons, 
Robert and Henry. This success was in part due to Henry Drummond and Richard Cox 
being appointed Joint Paymasters of the Royal Artillery in 1766, in what must have seemed 
the ultimate example of having the last laugh when contrasted to events only a generation 
earlier. The appointment brought Treasury contracts for the payment of British troops in 
North America involving sums upwards of £200,000, as well the private accounts of 
numerous officers (Bolitho and Peel, 1967: 54-7). The latter explains the abnormally large 
drop of £274,180 (29%) in the size of the balance sheet in the two years following 1781, the 
year the American War of Independence came to an end.  
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Goslings 
 
The path taken by Goslings’ business is of interest because rather different to the other 
three Goldsmiths. Like some of the banks categorised as Discounters in our sample (see 
below), in the 1780s Goslings flirted with a shift away from its goldsmith roots towards 
adopting the Discounter business model, but unlike those banks, Goslings reversed course 
well before the Restriction. The highlights of the Goslings history and the changes in its 
partners are described in Orbell and Turton (2001: 234-5): by juxtaposing these to a detailed 
examination of the changes in the balance sheet, I reveal the more interesting facts for our 
thesis.  
 
Goslings was established in the middle of the 17th century by the goldsmith banker Henry 
Pinckney based in Fleet Street, London, where its sign still hangs today just a few doors 
down from Hoare & Co. Subsequently, “the Gosling family, in the form of Sir Francis 
Gosling, become connected [and] by 1750 the business was styled Gosling & Bennett.” Like 
the other banks in this group, Goslings had a distinguished list of clients including the 
aristocracy and other leading political figures. In 1779 Goslings was the most conservative 
of Goldsmith banks: it made secured loans accounting for a third of its assets (33%), and 
almost half of the assets (46%) was held as cash reserves. Its involvement with discounting 
bills was small, but this was about to change. 
 
After Robert and Francis Gosling took control in 1778, during the 1780s, Goslings was the 
Goldsmith bank most tempted into diversifying its business into the new field of bill 
discounting – without ever fully adopting the Discounter model in the way of Barclays 
Bevan Tritton or Barnett Hoare Hill & Barnett (see “The four Discounters” below). During 
the first decade under the direction of Robert and Francis Gosling, the bank took a more 
aggressive path, rapidly expanding into notes and bills discounting which rose from 7% of 
the balance sheet to a peak of 49% (in 1791). Cash reserves fell to a low of 16% (a level not 
seen again until the bull market days of 1808).  
 
A decade later this more aggressive business model was put into reverse. In 1786 the bank 
had welcomed William Gosling as partner with a 2/16 share, and in 1794 he and Francis 
took over as joint senior partners, each with a 22/48 stake, with Benjamin Sharpe joining on 
a 4/48 stake (later upped to 2/12 in 1810). It seems that William and Francis decided they 
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did not have the same taste or capacity to stay the course on becoming a fully-fledged 
Discounter, and in the following decade they steered the bank back to operating on a 
Goldsmith business model. By 1796, on the eve of the Restriction, the earlier strategic shift 
had been almost entirely reversed, although its discounting activity remained somewhat 
larger than other Goldsmiths, and (consequently) the bank tended to run a lower cash 
reserve compared to its peer group (Exhibit 4.3). On the eve of the Restriction in 1796, half 
of Goslings’ assets were again devoted to secured lending on mortgage or bond or other 
collateral. Goslings still had a larger activity in bill discounting than the other Goldsmith 
banks, matched by a more prominent share of its deposits attributable to its Country bank 
correspondents, but its discounting had fallen back to just 18% of assets.  
 
Goslings is included amongst the ‘Goldsmith’ banks because that is the business model to 
which its balance sheet is the closest fit on the eve of the Restriction, albeit about half the 
size (at £416,201) than the other names above, and because its balance sheet evolves 
thereafter in a way that most closely matches the other Goldsmiths.  Goslings continued to 
shun the discounting business during the boom in this business subsequent to the 
Restriction Act, such that by 1805-6 its share of the balance sheet had halved again to 9%, 
the same it had been in 1778. What is most different about Goslings is the particularly 
aggressive way the partners chose to direct the business towards a low-risk low-return 
model during the Restriction, moving a majority of the assets into government securities 
until the bank resembled more a government bond fund. We review this further in Chapter 
12 in the context of the ‘crowding out’ debate.  
 
On the liability side the notional equity of £48,000 constituted 11.5% of total liabilities in 
1796, but it had not been called. The notes to the “Heads of Articles of Partnership” 
suggest that the partners had not “brought in the said sums” and that – as with many other 
banks at that time - the notional capital was used primarily to establish the relative stakes in 
any profits (and the relative exposure to losses) of each partner in order to “obviate any 
demand by the Executors or Administrators” in the event of the death of one of the 
partners. However, the partners made deposits with the firm that reached a peak of 3.9% of 
the liabilities in 1797; this proportion was seen only once again in 1804, after which it went 
into steady decline, settling at 1% or less in 1840s. Only 2-3% of liabilities were deposits 
from Goslings’ correspondents in the Country.  
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4.6  The four ‘Discounters’ 
 
 
Prescott’s – the pure Discounter  
 
The Prescott story prior to the Restriction is summarised in Orbell and Turton (2011: 440-
1) and was briefly touched upon in the first of five anonymous articles printed in the 
National Provincial Bank Review (Anon, 1966), but these did not delve into the balance sheet 
data. I draw from these for the bank’s background history, and juxtapose it to an 
examination of the scant, long-but-narrow financial records left in the archives. Prescotts 
also left a long series of high-level profit and loss data that is analysed and contrasted to 
Hoares in the next chapter.  
 
Prescotts was founded in 1765 as (George) Prescott, (Andrew) Grote, (William) Culverden 
& (John) Hollingsworth and opened its doors on the 1st January the following year at No. 
57, Threadneedle Street, bought for the princely sum of £5,500 (shown separately in the 
books, at cost, until 1785). It later bought new premises at Sun Court, No. 62 Threadneedle 
Street. On the 1st January 1773 George William Prescott and Joseph Grote were also 
admitted into the partnership, taking the number of partners up to the legal limit of six. By 
1799 the name Culverden had been dropped. As with many other private banks, younger 
family members would be brought in as junior partners upon the death of an older partner, 
or earlier if time - and the father’s faith in at least one of his progenity - allowed for better 
succession planning. As junior partners spent more time with the business, their profit share 
would be increased each time a partner ‘quitted the business’ or died. Prescotts had a 
particularly difficult three years between 1787 and 1790 when Andrew Grote, John 
Hollingsworth and George Prescott all died (Hollingsworth was replaced by his son, also 
called John). However, unlike what occurred at Goslings and at Coutts, these difficult years 
did not induce a change in the business model at Prescotts, which maintained its focus on 
the discounting business throughout the 65-year period analysed here.  
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Exhibit 4.1 – Prescott’s: asset composition of a pure Discounter, 1780-1845 
 
 
The records reveal an entity with a balance sheet in 1796 of £374,610 - half the size of the 
three main Goldsmith banks - that operated with a business model diametrically different 
from the Goldsmiths: the bank devoted 60% to 70% of the balance sheet to the discounting 
of bills. In the first dozen years following the Restriction Act, Prescott’s cyclically volatile 
balance sheet grew rapidly, nearly tripling by the time it reached its peak in 1809 at the time 
of the Bullion Report. It remained concentrated on bill discounting until records terminate 
in 1845, and would become ever more highly geared to cash reserves (Exhibits 4.1). Cash 
reserves had been gradually declining from an average of 30% in the early 1780s to an 
average of 20% in the years just before the Restriction Act. Customer overdraft balances 
accounted for the rest of the assets and tended to be between 1/10th and 1/20th of the 
discount balances, but the difficult years of 1796-7 had pushed these to much higher levels. 
We observe this tendency for customer overdraft balances at Discounter banks to rise 
during times of economic recession, as analysed in the Coutts-Bank of Scotland relationship 
(Chapter 6) and within the Smith Group of banks (Chapter 7).  In the case of Prescotts, 
peak overdraft balances of £56,610 in the tight monetary conditions of 1796, equal to 15% 
of total assets, were not exceeded until the economic recession at the end of the war in 1815 
– the same year Thomas Coutts was complaining to the Bank of Scotland Treasurer about 
the size of its overdraft balance at Coutts.  
  
109 
Prescotts acted as the London correspondent of the Old Bank, Bristol that I examine in 
Chapter 8. In 1890, Prescotts and the Old Bank would eventually merge together in a 4-way 
tie up with two other banks and become Prescott, Dimsdale, Cave, Tugwell & Co. Ltd. The 
latter was subsequently absorbed into today’s Royal Bank of Scotland.  
 
 
Barclays Bevan Tritton - the fast growing, risk-augmenting Discounter 
 
I introduce my analysis of the balance sheet with a brief summary of the early history of the 
bank drawn from Orbell and Turton (2011: 83-4) and a History of Barclays Bank Limited by 
Matthews and Tuke (1926) in which a chapter is devoted to each of the sixty-two banks that 
eventually formed the modern bank, and where Chapter II is about the Barclays, Bevan, 
Tritton entity operating during the Restriction period. 
 
Barclays Bevan Tritton traced its roots to John Freame, a Quaker goldsmith who traded in 
Lombard Street, London. By 1698 the business was known as Freame & Gould, one of the 
five studied by Temin and Voth (2013) during its early years up to 1793 when it still 
followed a Goldsmith business model.  However, the bank was de facto re-formed in the 
decade after 1767 following the death in close succession of John Freame, James Barclay 
and Joseph Freame, after which the bank was re-orientated towards a Discounter business 
model, becoming one of its earliest adopters.  
 
James Barclay, Freame’s son-in-law, entered the partnership in 1736 and the first member 
of the Bevan family, Silvanus joined in 1767, shortly after which the Freame family 
withdrew. Silvanus Bevan (the third) was the product of the earlier marriage of Timothy 
Bevan and the daughter of David Barclay, the son of Robert Barclay, known as “The 
Apologist” having penned in 1676 the famous book “The Apology for the True Christian 
Divinity”, or what constituted the Quaker manifesto. The Bevan family was said to descend 
from Jestyn-ap-Gwrgant, the last Prince of Glamorgan (1030 A.D.) and the Trittons could 
similarly trace their lineage back to Norman times. Noteworthy is the addition of the 27-
year old John Henton Tritton to the partnership in 1783. Only the year before, Tritton had 
suffered the bankruptcy of his uncle’s bank where, to his misfortune, he had been admitted 
to the partnership only four years before. This may explain the testimonial by John’s loving 
nephew: “The early check to his youthful expectation, by failure of his Uncle’s house 
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(Brown and Collinson), gave him the fixed habit of never relaxing his attention to business 
and all that he undertook was most correctly and thoroughly gone through [and] he 
followed up the details of every part of our concern with minute particularity which kept all 
the clerks up to the mark” (Matthews and Tuke, 1926: 41). It appears that even during the 
Restriction, a workaholic and perfectionist attitude were often the hallmarks of a successful 
banker. From 1783, John Tritton and Robert Barclay (III) together held the controlling 
stake for the next thirty years and the bank - styled Barclays Bevan Tritton & Co – thrived 
more or less continuously until 1865. 
 
In 1796 Barclays Bevan Tritton operated with a balance sheet that was a de-risked version 
of the pure Discounter business model adopted by Prescotts, but subsequently experienced 
the fastest growth rate of all our sample banks. Barclays’ archival records are amongst the 
most complex to decipher and not all years contain the same set of ledgers, but their 
longitudinal length provide us with a worthwhile perspective of a bank that was the greatest 
beneficiary of the changes ushered in by the Restriction Act.   
 
In 1797 Barclays’ balance sheet was a relatively small £281,290 and it had barely grown at all 
during the previous decade, making it smaller than Prescotts and one-third to one-quarter 
of the size of the larger Goldsmith banks in our sample. However, Barclays would 
experience a remarkable period of growth during the Restriction. By 1818 its balance sheet 
(£1.6M) was nearly three times larger than its rival Discounter, Prescotts, and the same size 
as the three largest Goldsmiths. In contrast to Prescotts, Barclays continued to grow after 
1809 and also appears to have been a beneficiary of depositors’ search for safety after 1815: 
Barclays’ balance sheet grew 43% between 1815 and 1818, from £1,107,437 to £1,589,376. 
This growth was led by the liability side and not by the demand for credit – not surprisingly, 
given the deep recession that followed the end of the war. Almost half of that increase in 
the total balance sheet is explained by an increase in the deposits on the “Country ledger” 
from £366,285 to £574,993. The majority of the total increase is poured into government 
securities, which rise from just £82,248 in 1815 to £424,722 in 1817.  After 1817 Barclays 
appears to have decided it was time to redeploy this increased deposit flow into providing 
additional credit support to its customers by way of increased discounting: in order to 
support this, for the first time since 1789 it raises the paid up capital from £20,000 to 
£60,000.  
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This makes Barclays one of the main conduits of the ‘break’ we observe in the way 
aggregate London bank liabilities tracked the Bank of England balance sheet, as explored in 
the final Chapter 12.  
 
 
Barnett Hoare Hill & Barnett - the well-controlled Discounter 
 
 
The highlights of the background to Barnett, Hoare, Hill & Barnett (hereafter “BHHB”) are 
described in Orbell & Turton (2001: 96) and I have extracted some further detail of the 
partnership changes from the archival records. The bank traced its roots to John Bland, a 
goldsmith in Lombard Street, London. It began trading under the BHHB name in 1790, 
dropping the first Barnett in 1800 after the then senior partner Benjamin Barnett exited the 
business. Two years later George H Barnett joined as junior partner. By 1808, the bank was 
known as Hoare, Barnett, Hoare & Co after the second most senior partner, John Hill 
exited the business, replaced by Henry Hill with only a junior stake; at the same time Samuel 
Hoare the Younger joined his father. Samuel Hoare Senior [who was no relation to the 
partners of Hoares Bank] had become senior partner after Benjamin’s departure and he 
guided the bank through the major part of the Restriction years, until James Barnett was 
raised to the same level in 1812. Finally the bank’s name changed to Barnett, Hoare & Co 
following Samuel Hoare Senior’s first retirement (it appears from the records that the 
elderly Hoare Senior was brought back in 1833, perhaps to help steady the ship after the 
1832 banking crisis). The bank was eventually to merge with another Lombard Street Bank 
in 1864 and end its days in the Lloyds Bank group.  
 
The available data for the full BHHB balance sheet begins in 1798, so we use that year to 
compare the balance sheet to that of Prescotts and Barclays in 1796. At the start of the 
Restriction, BHHB operated with a balance sheet following the Discounter model and 
totalling £413,008, approximately the same size as Prescotts and making these two banks 
the largest Discounters in our sample behind Coutts (Chapter 6), but also the slowest 
growing Discounters. By the end of the Restriction period, both banks had balance sheets 
nudging £700,000, but BHHB distinguished itself for having achieved it in a well controlled, 
less volatile manner when compared to the more ‘boom and bust’ profile of Prescotts and 
Barclays. Like Barclays’, BHHB held one-quarter of its assets in reserve in the form of cash, 
and used 60% of the balance sheet to discount bills, with the residual held in securities and 
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overdrafts granted to Country banks (including holdings of their notes) and sundry 
customers. On the liability side BHHB operated with paid-up capital of £15,600 that it 
quickly raised to £20,000 by 1802, matching that of Barclays. Where BHHB differs from 
Barclays is in the accounting of their securities holdings. BHHB only recorded a small 
holding of Exchequer Bills and government bonds on their own books. However, BHHB 
shows a regular and large balance with Goldsmids & Son Co.; as the latter was the pre-
eminent government bond underwriter and broker, it seems likely that the account 
represents BHHB’s custody account for trading in (government) securities or possibly 
short-term (mostly overnight) lending secured against Goldsmids’ inventory of such 
securities.  Hoares would introduce the same accounting practice between 1810 and 1813. If 
we add the Goldsmith account balance to the direct holdings of securities, this leaves the 
BHHB balance sheet composition at the start of the Restriction as a close match to that of 
Barclays (see Exhibit 4.3).  
 
Exhibit 4.2 – BHHB: Country Ledger deposits, by location of depositor 1798-1818 
 
 
Even before the Restriction, all three Discounter banks had lively correspondent banking 
relations with Country banks. These were a net source of deposits: deposit balances from 
the Country banks exceeded the London bank’s exposure to them on the asset side.  Before 
the Restriction, net balances from the Country were typically 9% to 13% of BHHB’s 
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liabilities, but could be lower in years of monetary and economic stress when, as observed 
for Prescott and Barclays, many Country banks were forced to seek liquidity support from 
the London money market and run up their overdraft balances.  During the subsequent 
years of the Restriction this source of net funding for the London Discounters became a 
more important part of their total funding, reflecting the growth in the number of new 
Country banks as well as the flow of excess liquidity back into the London money market 
from the Country (as described by Bosanquet in Chapter 3 and discussed in Chapters 11, 
12). In the case of BHHB, net funding from the Country banks peaked at 24% of total 
liabilities in 1812. 
 
BHHB’s more consistently organised accounting of the Country ledger allows us to observe 
that the number of Country correspondent relationships it handled rose from 11 in 1798 to 
a peak of 28 in 1813.  Relying on Orbell and Turton (2001), it is possible to recognise the 
entities named in the Country ledger accounting for approximately three-quarters of the 
total balances: two aspects of the correspondent banking business emerge (Exhibit 4.2). 
Firstly, from a logistical viewpoint, BHHB did business with a geographically diverse set of 
correspondent banks. If there were any economies of scale in communication and transport 
costs, these were overshadowed by the judgement as to the reputation of the Country bank 
partners.  During the years 1798 to 1818, one third to one half of the balances from 
recognised entities came from banks in the Leicester-Norwich-Ipswich-Oxford quadrangle, 
but a further one-quarter to one-third came from Devon and Bristol, and 10-20% from the 
central counties of Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Pembrokeshire, Shropshire and Cumbria. 
Secondly, in each of these three broad regions BHHB had a core of one or two main 
correspondents with whom it was already doing business at the start of the Restriction and 
who continue to do so throughout the following twenty years. These core Country 
relationships had been formed mostly in the 1780s; as the Restriction progressed, in each of 
these regions BHHB built up new relationships with newly created banks. 
 
 
Herries Farquhar – the cross-border, innovating Discounter 
 
The story of Robert Herries’ bank has been pieced together by drawing from the summary 
in Orbell and Turton (2011: 269-70) and the relevant sections of Robert Rait’s (1930) 
biography of the Union Bank of Scotland, where possible making a judgement call on some 
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of his largely unreferenced material by juxtaposing it to the balance sheet data collected 
here.  
 
In 1796 Herries Farquhar was the youngest bank in our sample, and an innovator of 
financial instruments. It was in transition towards the Discounter model, gradually building 
up the degree of operating risk in a manner similar to Barclays, albeit with an idiosyncratic 
product mix. During the Restriction it would experience the second fastest growth rate 
amongst our sample banks (behind Barclays). 
 
Robert Herries formed the bank in the mid-1770s in the West End of London. Orbell & 
Turton report the date as “about 1770”, but it seems more likely to have been after 1776, 
the year Herries’ partnership contract expired with Forbes, Hunter & Co, a bank based in 
Edinburgh. When James and Thomas Coutts took over the reigns of Campbell & Coutts in 
London in 1761 (see Chapter 6) they resigned from the Edinburgh-based Coutts Bros. & 
Co, leaving their brothers John and Patrick to run it. It appears that Patrick was not terribly 
interested, so John did much of the running and brought in Robert Herries on a fixed term 
contract to help him. Herries was an experienced businessman who had worked for the 
prestigious Amsterdam bankers Hope & Co, and at the age of 23 had already set up his own 
business in Barcelona. When John Coutts died in 1761 the Edinburgh bank was left in the 
hands of its two most senior staff: William Forbes and James Hunter. Like many who find 
themselves inheriting a far greater wealth than they perhaps ever imagined, the two 
operating partners appear to have been particularly risk-averse: by 1776, having already 
agreed to extend his contract once, Herries had grown tired of having his partners constrain 
his more exuberant trading style and resigned,23 whereupon he was hired by the London-based 
Coutts to lead their City of London brokerage business under the name Herries, Cochrane 
& Co (Orbell and Turton, 2001: 269). This in itself is a good indication that Herries’ skills 
and interests lay in high frequency trading of short-term instruments; his subsequent 
innovation also supports this view.  
 
Herries is credited with the innovation of the Circular Note, considered the first traveller’s 
cheque. This innovative product began slowly, and until 1813 Herries’ business model was 
much the same as the emerging Discounters like Barclays, but running a lower risk profile 
than that of the fully matured Discounter (Prescotts): 90% of his liabilities were non-interest 
                                                
23 For a full and entertaining, but poorly referenced account see Rait (1930), especially Chapter 4. 
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bearing deposits (which he called by their French name “lodgements”), and these supported 
assets typically allocated 10% to client overdrafts, 20-25% to bills discounted, 20-25% to 
government securities, 5% to the premises and 25-35% in cash (in his case this included 
banknotes).  
 
Using his experience of banking on the Continent, Herries developed the “Foreign Note”, 
which he renamed the “Circular Note” from 1811. This was as a modified letter of credit 
which was payable ‘anywhere’ rather than in just one place, allowing those travelling outside 
Britain to change their itinerary at will and draw cash in flexible amounts. Later he added 
the Transferable Note, which could be endorsed rather like a bank cheque. Herries would 
make money on the free cash balances remaining with him between the date of issue of the 
Circular Note and the date it was returned to him by the foreign correspondent. The client 
would deposit cash with Herries and receive a Circular Note payable at any of Herries’ 
network of correspondents which he set up across the continent; when the client presented 
the note to one of these correspondents, the latter would pay out cash (in the currency of 
denomination of the note) and then return it to Herries for settlement. Herries invested 
these free cash balances mainly in Exchequer Bills and other government bonds yielding 
some 5% p.a..  
 
Herries took these ideas to the London-based Coutts brothers who found them wanting, 
whereupon he set up his own bank, apparently with some (tacit) support of his previous 
Edinburgh partners (Rait, 1930). The bank operated until 1893, when Lloyds Bank acquired 
it).  
 
By 1798 the young bank was still not fully on solid ground, with a balance sheet barely 
reaching £100,000. In response to the heightened challenges posed by the Restriction, 
Herries appears to have wanted to bolster the firm’s standing and capital, and brought in 
Thomas Harvie Farquhar as senior partner with a two-thirds share in the new capital of 
£24,000 (Herries holding the other third). Herries persevered with his idea of the Circular 
Note, but the accounts show that it took until the temporary peace of 1801-2 for it to really 
take off, only to then be hit by the resumption of war. Outstanding balances at year-end 
were still under £7,000 in 1799-1800, barely 5% of total liabilities. But following peace with 
France these jumped to almost £27,000 in 1802 (14% of liabilities) thanks to a rush of 
visitors to the continent, captured in William Wordsworth’s poem “Calais, Auguste, 1802”. 
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After war broke out again, Napoleon’s order in May 1803 that all adult Englishmen under 
the age of sixty were to be regarded as prisoners of war naturally killed off continental 
tourism, and the Berlin and Milan decrees further hampered any commercial travel, causing 
Herries’ balances of Foreign Notes to decline back below £10,000 for the next decade.  
 
The Restriction ultimately proved beneficial for Herries’ business: as Napoleon’s hegemony 
waned after 1813, Herries Circular Notes business once again took off, reaching balances of 
over £100,000 by 1828. Herries recorded the number of accounts opened and closed each 
year, and these show that his bank added net new clients every year from 1800 to 1847 with 
the sole exception of the financial crisis year of 1825.  
 
With travel to the continent resuming after 1815, there is evidence that the success of 
Circular Note was becoming a disruptive threat to the client relationships of the established 
Goldsmith-style banks that had hitherto shunned the instrument. In 1817 Thomas Coutts – 
having reject the product 30 years previously - writes to the Bank of Scotland: 
 
 “on the subject of Foreign Credits and Circular Notes – These last have never been issued 
by the Houses of Child, Drummond or Hoare [note: the implicit peer group is of the 
eminent Goldsmiths]  and we have felt a reluctance in taking up as it was a new Concern, 
but I think we should be wrong in persisting in this – in some situations they are certainly 
convenient to Travellers – Whether they may be generally considered so seems doubtful, 
but many of our Friends [i.e. clients] particularly of late have thought they are, and it is 
always our wish they should be accommodated – We do not expect any profit should result 
from the plan – what we rather aim at is the feeling that other Houses should not be able to 
afford to their Friends more facilities than we can do to ours – and besides I hope it will 
save us some trouble in the use of Letters of Credit which are attended with an immense 
detail of correspondence…”24 
 
This is one of many examples of how financial innovations either fail or finally become 
widely adopted by the mainstream banks, for two reasons: either reluctantly, for defensive 
reasons, to avoid losing clients; or more enthusiastically, because the mainstream recognises 
how the new product is able to save costs or otherwise increase profits.  
 
                                                
24 Coutts Special Letter Book: letter to Samuel Anderson Esq, Edinburgh dated 27 Aug 1817 
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Exhibit 4.3 – Balance sheets of the 4 Goldsmiths and 4 Discounters in 1796-9 
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PART II 
          Bank business model innovation: a taxonomy & typology 
         
                Chapter 5. Business model clusters and cognitive frames 
 
1. The ‘Goldsmith’ business model 
2. The ‘Discounter’ business model  
3. Balance sheet growth and business model clusters 
4. Profitability 
5. The cognitive frames of the business strategy-makers 
6. Conclusion 
                                                                     
 
In this chapter I examine signs of clustering by the London banks around two ideal-type 
business models defined by their balance sheet practices and shaped around a Goldsmith 
business model (typified by Hoares) and a Discounter business model (typified by 
Prescotts) in the run up to the Restriction period.  I then investigate and compare the 
individual patterns of growth in the balance sheets and the respective profit and loss 
experience in the early stages of the Restriction period. In Part IV, Chapter 11 these will 
form the starting point for our analysis of the impact of the Restriction upon Britain’s 
money supply. I conclude this chapter by inferring the differences in the cognitive framing 
of strategic decision-makers and postulate similarities to the views of money espoused by 
contemporary political economists. 
 
I find that London banks followed two different business models with distinct asset 
strategies and a differentiated degree of involvement with the provision of correspondent 
banking services to Country banks. The Goldsmith bank bore greater liquidity risk due to 
the maturity mismatch in its balance sheet, while the Discounter bank took on greater credit 
risk by lending short-term, mostly unsecured, to a larger number of counterparts, and by 
being more exposed to potentially rapid changes in the net exposure to bank-like entities in 
the rest of the country.  From the analysis of profitability, I find that in the decade prior to 
the Restriction the two London banking business models had plausibly settled into an 
approximate state of equivalence in their net return on assets, with bankers seemingly able 
to judge the credit and liquidity risks present in their respective operating environment 
under the gold standard. 
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This state of affairs was then disrupted by the systemic changes to that environment 
ushered in by the Restriction. Before 1797, long-run balance sheet change in London 
appears to have been predominantly cyclical, with little or no net growth except for the 
growth in deposits flowing down from Scotland. However, the evidence suggests that 
Goldsmith and Discounters were already subject to different underlying monetary 
influences within this slow-growing total: by 1795 the Discounter (Prescotts) had caught up 
with the smallest Goldsmith (Goslings). During the Restriction, banks converged more 
strongly around the two ‘ideal type’ business models, both in terms of the composition of 
assets and liabilities and the growth rates in total assets (Chapter 11). 
 
 
5.1  The ‘Goldsmith’ business model 
 
The “Goldsmith” business model focused on medium-term lending secured on real assets. 
In contrast to the “Discounter” model (section 5.2 below), the Goldsmith would undertake 
little or no discounting of unsecured short-dated commercial paper, and have little or no 
involvement with correspondent banking services to Country banks. The Goldsmith 
business model is best illustrated by Hoares’ balance sheet because of their unwavering 
focus on secured lending and their contrasting limited activity in bill discounting. Of the 
banks with historic goldsmith roots in our sample, Drummonds and Childs most closely 
followed Hoares’ balance sheet structure on the eve of the Restriction (Exhibit 4.3 above). 
All three banks were part of the exclusive “£1 million club” having balance sheets that had 
already surpassed that figure by 1791, the peak in the previous expansionary boom, when 
Childs and Drummonds were the largest banks, each with approximately £1.4 million 
balance sheets. All had shrunk below £1 million by 1796, having dipped quite severely 
during the prior tight monetary conditions. The Goslings balance sheet, although half the 
size of Drummonds and Childs, closely matched the Goldsmith model in 1796, but 
followed a somewhat different path both before and after the Restriction.25 Two other 
banks with goldsmith roots no longer followed the Goldsmith business model by 1796: 
both Barclays Bevan Tritton and BHHB had become Discounters after the late 1770s. 
 
During the eighteen-century a number of goldsmiths had made the successful transition to 
what we would recognise as a bank. This earlier evolution prior to the 1770s – the period 
                                                
25 Discussed in section 5.5 and also at the end of Chapter 12 in the context of the “crowding out” debate.  
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before that studied here – is fully recounted in Temin and Voth (2013) Prometheus Shackled: 
Goldsmith banks and England’s Financial Revolution after 1700. They estimate that this sector had 
experienced no new entrants after the 1730s, and regular net exits thereafter, with the result 
that of the 43 goldsmith “banks” that existed in London in 1700, only nine remained by 
1770 (2013: 41, 46).  On the evidence shown here, by 1796 at least three of those no longer 
pursued the undiluted Goldsmith business model (Barclays, BHHB and Coutts). A century 
earlier the goldsmiths had produced jewellery from bullion, acted as custodians for people’s 
precious effects, and lent bullion to individuals and to the sovereign. By the 1790s those few 
that remained had learned how to migrate the business to that of a financial intermediary. 
At least four of them [those studied here] adopted a conservative balance sheet based on 
the secured lending model followed by Richard Hoare. “Richard Hoare did not introduce a 
new spinning device, but he turned a relatively new idea – lending to private individuals 
financed by deposits – into a successful business” Temin and Voth, 2013: 43). In a touching 
reminder of their roots, the partners of Child’s in 1770 still reported in the annual summary 
statement a separate entry for a few hundred pounds of ‘Plate’ – referring to gold and silver 
artefacts – even when this represented less than 0.05% of the total assets. This nostalgic 
accounting practice was finally discontinued in 1826.  
 
The Goldsmith bank resembled the image of the bank presented in classical theory: an 
intermediary collecting real resources from savers (deposits of specie) and on-lending these 
to those requiring longer-term fixed capital. During the generation preceding the Restriction 
of 1797, the Goldsmith model consisted of taking deposits from a relatively small circle of 
aristocrats, landed gentry, high-ranking clergy and wealthy merchants (sometimes in their 
name, sometimes in the name of their commercial business), and making secured loans to 
other individuals from the same strata of society. Often clients on either side of the ledgers 
were Members of Parliament and the cabinet. The Goldsmith banker controlled medium-
term credit risk by lending on the collateral of real assets, and managed liquidity risk by 
maintaining a conservative balance sheet both in terms of loan gearing to cash reserves. On 
the liability side of the balance sheet, committed and paid-up equity was usually small, no 
more than 5% of total liabilities. However, partners often supplemented this low 
capitalisation level with additional deposits (on which interest was paid); and these firms 
were legally structured as unlimited partnerships, so the notional equity-at-risk for each 
partner was the partners’ entire wealth.  
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Three aspects of the Goldsmith business model most distinguished it from that of the 
Discounter: the Goldsmith mostly shunned the discounting of short-term commercial 
paper; undertook little correspondent banking with Country banks; and during the 
Restriction much of the growth in liabilities was deployed into government securities.  What 
distinguished the ideal-type Goldsmith business model was the near complete absence on 
the asset side of the balance sheet of the discounting of bills of exchange. Similarly, 
overdrafts were discouraged and often consisted mainly of allowing the partners to draw in 
anticipation of the annual dividend. By the eve of the Restriction in 1796, for banks 
following the Goldsmith model, bill discounting had typically shrunk to an even lower 
relative importance than two decades earlier. For Hoares it was a negligible 1% of total 
assets26 and Goslings had already reversed its experiment with greater bill discounting.  The 
Goldsmith banker viewed the growing activity in the discounting of bills of exchange as 
somehow unsafe, and perhaps only for brokers and upstarts. In particular it was the short-
term nature of such lending that was viewed as inappropriate, combined with its unsecured 
nature. Although bills might have passed through many hands, acquiring along the way an 
expanding list of signatories that were joint and severally liable for its repayment, these bills 
were not secured (on a senior basis) on real assets in the manner to which the Goldsmith 
banker had been accustomed to lend. This attitude is epitomized by Thomas Coutts – 
whose core activity, undertaken as principal rather than agent was akin to the Goldsmith 
model (Chapter 6) – when writing to the “young and rising” person of William Gilpin on 
the 6th Oct 1810, when he says: 
 
“… with respect to my House [i.e. Coutts bank] I have never wished to consent to their 
making any permanent Loan but on proper Security such at least as ultimately must render 
it perfectly safe independent of the success or fortune of the individual borrower. In 
temporary Loans for short times, They [i.e. the Discounter banks] have frequently advanced 
on Bills by discounting them and even upon the Notes at hand of the party as we have done 
for you – the last is a practice we do not much approve and never wish to see too often 
resorted to – desirous of all times that as Bankers the inclination we always feel to oblige 
should not induce us to go beyond the prescribed rules – experience has shown us is so 
necessary to be observed.”27  
 
                                                
26 To be visible, the placeholder appears somewhat exaggerated in the chart in Exhibit 4.3. 
27 Coutts Special Letter Book: letter addressed to William Gilpin Esq. dated 6 Oct 1810. 
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The Goldsmith’s gearing was very low by modern standards, although not quite the simple 
purveyor of safe-deposit boxes recommended by Hume in 1750s (which would have 
required a gearing of 1:1). Total lending was typically no more than 2 to 2.5 times the cash 
reserve. What direct lending did take place was secured on collateral. Mortgages would 
account for the bulk of total secured lending, mostly secured on private houses and landed 
estates. Lending on traded securities – almost exclusively consisting of government 
securities - accounted for perhaps one tenth. This type of lending – which today we might 
call ‘lombard loans’ – should not be confused with lending on ‘personal securities’, a term 
used by some banks at that time to refer to a third form of secured lending guaranteed by 
personal bonds, sometimes provided by third parties such as a relative, and which had the 
effect of raising the bank’s claim to that of senior debt. When lending was secured on 
(government) securities, the borrower (or guarantor) was required to issue a power of 
attorney in favour of the bank allowing it to sell the securities in the event of non-payment 
(or the market value falling below the amount of the debt outstanding).  
 
Importantly, the turnover in mortgage lending would be small. Taking Hoares as example, 
usually 7% to 20% of the mortgage balances at the start of the year would be repaid during 
the following twelve months. During the 50 years studied, in only five years did mortgage 
redemptions exceed 20% of the previous year-end balance, while in 22 of those years they 
were less than 10%; the average turnover was 13% and declining over time (Exhibit 5.1). 
This average turnover is composed of two types of mortgage loans: firstly, larger loans 
made to quality (noble) borrowers who were impeccable in their regular payment of the 
contractual interest, and were therefore allowed to keep their mortgage loan outstanding for 
many years, sometimes decades; secondly, smaller loans that would remain on the books for 
just one or two years.  
 
For example, Hoare’s lent £20,000 on mortgage to the Duke of Northumberland in 1794 at 
the rate of 4%, payable semi-annually.28 The rate was particularly favourable, being 1% 
below the maximum allowed under the cap of 5% imposed by the usury laws, and below the 
average yield on government bonds (4.5%) of that same year. Perhaps as a result, the Duke 
always paid on time; and so the rate was lowered to a most favourable 3.6% in April 1804 at 
a time when the market base rate was still 5% (Bank of England, 2016) and average 
                                                
28 Hoares Anno Domini book 1794-1805 (p.141) and then onwards, following the client’s account through 
subsequent books.  
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government bond yields were even higher at 5.3% (Mitchell and Deane, 1962: 455). The 
interest rate was eventually raised back to 4% in October 1816. Once the 1825 crisis had 
passed, during 1827-8 a further £53,000 was lent on bond to the Duke; this was done using 
three tranches that would be familiar to a modern banker: the blended rate was still 4%, but 
the smallest tranche of £13,000 carried a higher rate of 4.86% and was, not surprisingly, 
repaid within a year. The remaining total loan of £50,000 was still on Hoare’s books in 
1843, fifty years after the lending relationship first began.  
 
Exhibit 5.1 – The turnover in Hoare’s mortgage book, 1775-1823 
 
 
In summary, we can describe the asset composition of the ideal-type Goldsmith model as 
consisting of secured loans accounting for 50-60%, with the rest being made up of holdings 
of tradable securities (15-20%) and cash reserves (25-35%), plus a small residue of 
overdrafts and bills discounted accounting for 10% or less. For our purposes, the only two 
slight differences in the balance sheets of the Goldsmith banks were that Childs and 
Drummonds ran somewhat higher cash reserve ratios than Hoares, and that Childs does 
not record any bill discounting at all. Childs also held the highest cash reserves (35-45%). 
Securities holdings in the Goldsmith model would consist mostly of short-dated Exchequer 
bills – or their undated and higher-yielding equivalent, namely Navy and Ordinance bills 
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issued directly by one of the governmental agencies. There were also holdings in some 
longer-term government bonds (usually perpetual, irredeemable annuities called ‘Consols’).  
 
 
5.2  The ‘Discounter’ business model 
 
The alternative ‘Discounter’ business model focused on discounting various forms of short-
dated commercial paper. In contrast to the Goldsmith’s focus on medium-term secured 
lending, the Discounter lent on an unsecured basis, over shorter periods, by buying at a 
discount to their face value various bills of exchange and promissory notes prior to their 
final maturity date, which would be mostly within one to three months, but occasionally up 
to six months hence [Exhibit 5.2]. Many of these paper IOUs were sent from the rest of 
Great Britain for settlement in London. Hence, the Discounter was more connected to the 
network of Country banks compared to the Goldsmiths’ little or no involvement with the 
Country banks. The Discounter provided the Country banks with correspondent banking 
services, and its funding typically evidenced a greater reliance on inter-bank wholesale 
deposits stemming from those correspondent banks being required to maintain a positive 
net balance with the London bank. Consequently, the Discounter intermediated financial 
flows that were different from those to which the Goldsmith was exposed: more wholesale 
banking, more driven by trade and commerce, and more geographically dispersed. It should 
be expected, therefore, that the two business models would experience differently the 
changes brought about by the Restriction.  
 
Prescotts best evidences the Discounter’s typical asset-side balance sheet. Prescotts’ 
business was as single-mindedly dedicated to the discounting of bills of exchange and 
promissory notes, as Hoares was to secured medium-term lending. Exhibit 4.3 above 
compared and contrasts Hoares’ Goldsmith balance sheet with Prescotts’ Discounter 
balance sheet, both for 1796. On the asset side of the balance sheet, the Discounter 
business model was the opposite of the Goldsmith model. Two-thirds of the balance sheet 
of the ideal-type Discounter was tied up in bills discounted and an additional 5% was 
accounted for by overdrafts29, the latter mostly generated by its correspondents. The rest 
                                                
29 There was also a small ‘sundry ledger’ the contents of which is not visible in the Prescott records and may have 
contained some (government) securities, but more likely represented overdrafts granted to correspondents and 
partners. This ‘sundry ledger’ was immaterial in the early 1780s but had grown to account for 5-10% of the balance 
sheet on the eve of the Restriction. 
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was mostly cash held in reserve, typically lower than that of the Goldsmith and accounting 
for 15% - 25% of total assets.  
 
On the liability side of our ideal-type Discounter, the balance sheet was driven by the ability 
to grow its deposits, similarly to the Goldsmith model, but with the difference that the 
Discounter had a larger part of its liabilities composed of wholesale deposits. The 
Discounter model relied more on a correspondent banking structure for sourcing its 
deposits, whereby Country banks would agree to maintain a certain level of (minimum) 
deposit balances in order to finance the London bank’s ready purchases of bills and 
payment of drafts drawn on it by the Country bank’s clients. In principle a Discounter 
could expand its balance sheet faster than the average London bank by adding 
correspondent banking relationships with more Country Banks, or because the balance 
sheets of its Country correspondents were growing faster than London balance sheets. 
Unlike London banks, even before the Restriction, a Country bank was allowed to issue its 
own banknotes and hence, within the contingent limits imposed by convertibility, it could 
‘manufacture’ its own balance sheet growth independently of the growth of its deposits. A 
Country bank with a sound reputation and operating in a prospering region with an 
expanding loan demand could meet that demand by growing its banknote issuance, thereby 
creating a greater flow of bills and notes presented for discount at the offices of its London 
correspondent. If the latter chose to meet that greater flow and/or was able to easily re-
discount those bills and notes within the London money market, that London Discounter 
could grow faster than the average deposit base – a process best typified by the dramatic 
influence the Bank of Scotland’s correspondent business had on Coutts’ balance sheet 
(Chapter 6). All this means we should expect the total balance sheet (assets and liabilities) of 
any single Discounter to be more correlated to the state of business in the regional econmy 
where its correspondent banks were located, and less correlated to the average deposit 
growth of all London banks. We would also expect the Discounters as a group to be more 
correlated to nominal and real GDP – which is indeed what we find in section 5.3 below. 
 
Prescott’s business model was one followed to different degrees by banks that were set up 
in the later part of the eighteenth-century, in contrast to the older goldsmith banks, or by 
banks that had recently undergone a significant change in the ownership structure and in 
the families involved. Furthermore, it appears that the younger a bank was, the more it 
adopted a lower-risk version of the Discounter model, holding less bills and more 
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government securities, indicating that the Discounter model was perceived by bankers at the 
time as newer, less tested, and therefore riskier. This dichotomy in the services provided by 
the two ideal-types of banks, and the cognitiveilpin image of Discounting as a business 
conducted by the younger upstarts, was to endure well beyond the Restriction period. As 
late as 1833 Coutts bank, under pressure from the Bank of Scotland to pay better interest 
rates on idle balances sitting on its account at Coutts, proposes to act as the Scottish bank’s 
agent in setting up a relationship with Smith, Payne & Co, a full bloodied Discounter 
(Chapter 7) where it could employ that idle cash more remuneratively. Coutts justify 
themselves by explaining that: “Houses in the City have greater facilities in knowing when 
the common Transactions of the Country afford openness for discounts and short Loans, 
than the established Houses at this end of Town.”30 Although no doubt partly prompted by 
marketing considerations, it is nevertheless remarkable that in 1833 Coutts directors still 
referred to Smith, Payne & Co as a somehow inferior bank, despite it having been formed 
in 1758, merely because it focused on discounting (Country) bills – in the same way it had 
done in the letter to Mr. Gilpin in 1810 (p. 121 above).  
 
The Discounter took greater credit risk than the Goldsmith because its lending was unsecured 
and involved a wider set of borrowers which engendered higher information costs in order 
to continuously assess their respective creditworthiness. In contrast, the Discounter took 
less liquidity risk because its assets were mostly short-dated bills and notes, the majority of 
which reached their due date within the following month. In a typical example, on 
Christmas day 1775 the discount book of BHHB consisted of 431 separate bills and notes 
with a median value of £125 and totalling £114,776: of that volume, 1% was on demand, 
7% was due in the final week of the year, and 64% were due by the end of January (Exhibit 
5.2). This meant that in the hypothetical case that BHHB stopped discounting that same 
day, over the following five weeks 72% of its discount book would roll off and be paid up 
in cash, at no loss of interest income. With the typical Discounter employing at least 60% of 
its balance sheets in discounts, this would mean that over 40% of the balance sheet could be 
turned into cash within five weeks. Adding this to the typical cash reserves of 20% of total 
assets, this means that at least 60% of the balance sheet of Discounters was essentially 
‘liquid’. This was a liquidity profile that was quite different from that of the Goldsmith, 
where some 60% of the assets would be illiquid over a 12-month horizon.  
 
                                                
30 Coutts Special letter Book: letter to Archibald Bennet at the Bank of Scotland dated 11 July 1833 
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Exhibit 5.2 – Maturity profile of a Discounter’s discount book, Dec 1775 
 
 
The Discounter’s balance sheet was intrinsically more liquid:  it could be more easily turned 
into ready cash simply by cutting back on the daily volume of bills accepted for discount 
whilst allowing those previously discounted to mature. We should therefore expect the 
typical Discounter to hold lower average cash reserves, and this is indeed what we observe. 
In almost every year from 1774 until the Restriction Act, the average percentage cash 
reserve held by the Discounters in our sample was lower than the average percentage held 
by the Goldsmith banks in our sample (Exhibit 5.3).  In most years the cash reserve ratio of 
the average Discounter was at, or near the lowest reserve ratio observed amongst the 
Goldsmiths. 
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Exhibit 5.3 – Cash reserves of Discounters and Goldsmiths compared, before the 
Restriction, 1771 - 1797 
 
 
 
The outlier is 1784, which appears to be an outlier caused by an exceptionally high level of 
cash recorded at year-end by both Coutts (44% of total assets) and Barclays (40.6%), but 
not Prescotts (26.1%). Coutts is an outlier because its cash ratio was 10% the previous year, 
20% the following year, and averaged 21% for the 25 years prior to the Restriction; and 
never exceed 32% during that time except in 1784. The aberration that year appears to have 
resulted from a particular confluence in the timing of repayments on its loans secured on 
pledges; important liquidation of securities; and an increase in paid-up capital – all occurring 
near the 1784 fiscal year-end. The most likely cause was the large rise in bond yields. That 
year government bond yields averaged 5.4%, the highest seen since the early eighteen-
century and a level not seen again until World War 1 (Mitchell and Deane, 1962: 455), 
which would have pushed banks holding such medium-term securities to sell them and hold 
more cash instead. The hypothesis is supported by Barclays selling down nearly £40,000 of 
Bank [of England] stock that it had bought the previous year, equivalent to 17% of its total 
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assets; this was unusually large sale, as in no other year during 1780-1822 did Barclays 
change its non-government securities holdings by more 9% of total assets, and changes 
were usually in the range of 0% to 3% of total assets equivalent. The hypothesis is also 
supported by the fact that we do not see the same change in Prescotts, which did not hold 
medium-term securities. 
 
We can attribute the greater liquidity of the Discounter’s balance sheet merely to the shorter 
average maturity profile of its assets, even before we consider the additional option available 
to the Discounter of seeking to re-discount some of its holdings with the Bank of England. 
Before the Restriction, the Bank’s discount window was not large and only a small portion 
of the London bank’s holdings would have been of sufficient perceived quality to be eligible 
for discount at the Bank.31 As scholars of the Bank of England have long pointed out, at the 
time the Bank had no formal role as lender of last resort and was often criticised for 
operating solely as a privately owned commercial enterprise. Furthermore, given the Bank’ 
obligation to redeem its banknotes into specie upon demand, its ability to expand the 
volume of discounts (both of private and public sector paper) was constrained.  That the 
Bank did not see it role as lender of last resort is indicated in a letter dated 28th February 
1797, at the peak of the liquidity shortages. Sent from a partner at Hoares to Richard Stone, 
almost certainly one of the partners the substantial London bank, Stone & Co, in reply to 
what must have been a request for assistance, the letter states: 
 
“Your Letter gives me real concern and the more so as I fear it is not in my power to 
extricate you from the difficulty under which you labour, there is nothing that I would not 
do within my Compass to effect, for your House, who are all of them my old & particular 
Friends […] probably arose from our having lately had a much larger Demand for Gold 
than usual, consequently were obliged to replenish more frequently […] The Demand is 
now so great from all [Quarters] that it is impossible to calculate what Inventions People 
will have recourse to for procuring small Sums the effect of which we feel already and upon 
an application made by our House this Day to the Bank, requesting to know whether under 
the existing Circumstances they were authorised to assist Bankers with a Sum sufficient to 
pay the necessary Fractions, they answered certainly not, nor did they know when, if ever, they 
should be permitted to supply it as heretofore.”32 [my italics] 
                                                
31 This triage process is reminiscent of central bank asset purchase programmes undertaken since the most recent 
financial crisis of 2008. 
32 Hoares Private Letter Book 1795-1815, pp. 76-7: letter to R. Stone, dated 28th Feb 1797 
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Hence, prior to the Restriction period, we would expect the Bank’s discounting (as a source 
of liquidity) to have been a less important influence in the Discounter’s decisions on how to 
manage the liquidity risk of his bank, and to view the Bank of England at best as a 
contingent backstop in case of an emergency.  This would change radically after 1797 
(Chapter 11).  
 
What we observe is that, in respect to private sector discounts, before the Restriction the 
Bank of England’s balance sheet moved in a way that was the contrary of what would have 
been expected from a bank assuming the role of lender of last resort. The Bank tended to 
have raised levels of discounting in the same years that the Discounters had high cash 
reserves, and vice versa: between 1778 and 1797, I find a 25% positive correlation between 
the proportion of the Bank of England’s assets employed in discounting private sector 
paper and the average cash reserves held by Discounters (also as a percentage of total 
assets). The implication is that the Bank of England reacted independently to what it 
perceived as opportunities to safely and profitably increase its discounting activity in certain 
years, and this would leave less paper to be held by the rest of the London market, leaving 
Discounters with cash unemployed and the percentage of their cash reserves to rise.   
 
 
5.3  Balance sheet growth and business model clusters 
 
In the decade prior to the Restriction of 1797, London bank balance sheet totals on 
aggregate were growing at 2.1% per annum, in line with that of the Bank of England (1.8% 
p.a.) and no more than keeping pace with the growth of real GDP (1.9% p.a.) (Exhibit 5.5). 
However, analysis of Coutts’ balance sheet shows that most of this growth in deposits was 
attributable to the growth in net inter-bank deposits flowing down from Scotland, which at 
the time was experiencing better economic conditions than England. The latter makes a 
significant difference to aggregate London deposits, and is discussed in depth in Chapter 6. 
All this would change after the gold standard was suspended: for the next fifteen years until 
1811, during the phase of the Bank of England’s expansion of its discounting of private 
sector bills and notes (Chapter 10), the London bank balance sheets grew more than twice 
as fast (3.9% p.a.) and, unsurprisingly, all the Discounters (this time, with the exception of 
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Coutts) grew faster than the Goldsmiths. Individual bank growth rates, having been highly 
idiosyncratic before the Restriction, subsequently converged.  
 
Exhibit 5.4 – London banks: balance sheet totals before the Restriction, 1770-1797 
 
 
 
Prior to the Restriction, the four Goldsmith banks dominated by balance sheet size, but 
their total deposits had barely grown (0.6% p.a. between 1786 and 1797), if judged by this 
sample of banks (Exhibit 5.4). All four Goldsmiths (Hoares’, Childs’, Goslings’, 
Drummonds’) had balance sheets in 1797 that were no larger than twenty years previously. 
An earlier period of expansion in the 1780s was completely reversed during the troubled 
years of the 1790s. By contrast, the Discounter (Prescott’s) did a little better, being smaller 
and younger. The reversal in the balance sheet expansion observable across all banks after 
the 1791 crisis unravels with a different pattern in our model Discounter (Prescotts) when 
compared to that of our model Goldsmith (Hoares) as a result of the numerous succession 
issues described above. The only exception was Coutts, whose balance sheet shows no 
cyclical decline in either the 1770s or the 1790s. Coutts’ balance sheet was responding to the 
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Bank of Scotland moving its large correspondent banking business from other London 
banks towards Coutts, and this was occurring after the 1772 Ayr Bank crisis described by 
Smith, when Scotland’s economy was experiencing more favourable economic growth and a 
greater expansion of credit funded by a greater circulation of paper banknotes compared to 
England (Chapter 6). If we include Coutts’ business with the Bank of Scotland, then the 
hybrid-model Coutts had overtaken all banks by 1795.   
 
Prior to the Restriction, money was mostly specie, and deposits of it would have seemed 
mostly cyclical around a slow-growing long-run trend (probably perceived as related to 
Britain’s status in international trade). As a result, bankers appear to have acted mostly as 
reluctant lenders. The large archival evidence of daily correspondence books of Hoares, 
Childs, and Barclays Bevan Triton are a testimony to how bankers saw the extending of 
credit as a sellers’ market: demand exceeded supply. They saw as their chief task that of 
prudently lending out these deposits on good security or by discounting quality bills at 
interest rates that exceeded their (marginal) costs of funds. These books show them 
regularly resisting requests for new loans; verifying the quality of the references received on 
individuals to whom they did lend; devising ever more elaborate ways to rein in the 
spendthrift or disingenuous nobility who were late with their repayments; or finally 
attempting to secure title and control over the collateral of bankrupt borrowers through the 
courts. One of the many typical examples from Hoares’ Letter Book reads as follows: 
 
“We have received the Honour of your Lordship’s letter and lament exceedingly the 
Impossibility of complying with your Request, but your Lordship must be sensible that we 
have hitherto exceeded the Rules of Business by the payment of your Annuities in Advance 
which we must trust will prove the Attention we have wished to shew to your Lordship’s 
Accommodation. Your Lordship’s account is now overdrawn six hundred and one Pound 
8[s.] 4[d], the replacing of which will much oblige.”33 
 
An example from Childs’ Letter Book of what might be called a ‘final request’ letter to a   
Mr. John Marriot, resident at Braintree, shows how the language could be less deferential to 
non-aristocrats: 
 
                                                
33 Hoares Private Letter Book 1795-1815 [p.52]: letter addressed to Lord Arundell, dated 4th June 1795   
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“ Sir, We gave you notice to pay off the principal due to us on mortgage (being 7,000) the 
26 June 1795 not hearing from you since that further on the subject we must desire the 
principal & interest due thereon be paid us on the 17th May next and in failure thereof we 
must take such steps to compel the payment as will be very disagreeable to you as to [us].”34 
[A note to the letter specifies that the interest due is £350, corresponding to the usury cap 
of 5% p.a.]. 
 
London banks, especially Goldsmiths, did not pay interest on private deposits, suggesting 
that clients saw sufficient value creation in the banks’ services of safekeeping and paying 
agent for the settlement of bills. With usury laws capping loan interest at 5%, the banks – 
and Goldsmiths in particular - were dependent on such ‘idle balances’ for their profitability. 
The marginal cost of raising additional funds - by discounting bills in the wholesale market 
or selling down their stock of government bills and bonds – would frequently exceed 5%.  
Hence the bank-client relationship entailed an assumption that even an aristocratic client 
who borrowed from the bank (for longer periods, on mortgage) would run his idle 
‘everyday’ balances through the same bank, in the same way as was expected from Country 
banks and made more explicit in the bank-to-bank agreements (Chapter 6).  A letter from 
Childs to the Duke of Portland makes this clear: 
 
“Sir, As His Grace the Duke of Portland withdrew the management of his money affairs 
from our House without discharging the two sums of £8300 & £7700 due to us on 
Mortgage, we feel it necessary to apprise His Grace and His Trustees through your means 
that we expect the Principal & Interest due on those two Mortgages to be repaid at the 
Expiration of six months from this date.”35 
 
This delicate balancing act became an acute challenge at times of monetary stringency. A 
letter from Childs to a Mr. George Beauchamp, resident at Thetford, explains the bankers’ 
awareness of the government bill rate as the effective ‘shadow cost of funds’: if a 
(Goldsmith) bank misjudged the natural flow of deposit withdrawals and loan redemptions, 
e.g. because clients loans became overdue (i.e. the water level of its Smithian ‘pond’ began 
to fall), it would be forced to raise funds by selling its government securities, and hence 
                                                
34 Childs Letter Book 1762-1835: letter dated 21st March 1796 [RBS Archive ref: CH/229] 
35 Childs Letter Book 1762-1835: letter dated 15th August 1796 to John Heaton (trustee) [RBS Archive ref: 
CH/229]. Navy Bills were undated bills issued by the relevant government war department, but traded as short-
term securities. 
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their market yield was the bank’s effective marginal cost of funding. At times of monetary 
stringency, this placed the bank in the same situation as its clients to whom it had extended 
such ‘lombard loans’. The letter shows bankers were sensitive to exercising their right to sell 
the collateral lodged by clients, as this would similarly force clients to crystalize unrealised 
losses on their bond portfolio: 
 
“Sir, Mr. Walker some days since informed us of your wish to borrow a further sum of 
£1,000. When the former sum [£2,000 – see below] was lent it was on a transfer [to the 
bank’s collateral account] of Stock [government bonds] & on condition it should be repaid 
by sale of that Stock at the expiration of three moths. For a considerable time past we have 
lent no Money for a Longer time than three months & and then on the transfer of 
Government Securities with an order for sale at the expiration of that period – Bankers can 
have no Money to lend in the present unpleasant situation of public affairs. Navy Bills now 
afford a purchaser from 8 to 9 per Cent Int[erest] & you will readily believe they cannot 
with propriety sell Government Securities at a great discount to lend the produce at 5 per 
Cent. Your trustees I understand are enabled to satisfy you with £5,000, you will therefore 
allow us to request you will apply to them for the assistance you want on your own account 
as well as to discharge the £2,000 due to us. We have an order, you will recollect to sell 
Stock for that purpose, under the idea of its being repaid before this time[;] we have 
hitherto declined selling it.”36 
 
In the decade before the Restriction, although growth in the London bank balance sheets 
appears initially to demonstrate a common cyclical pattern, individual bank growth rates 
showed large idiosyncratic differences in both the long-run compound growth rate and the 
year-by-year growth rates (Exhibit 5.5). The variance between bank growth rates was ten 
times greater than what it was subsequently during the Restriction: it falls from 0.20% to 
0.02%. Such bank-specific differences in balance sheet growth are to be expected under the 
gold standard regime prevailing before 1797 under which any expansion in the monetary 
base formed of Bank of England banknotes had been small (see Introduction) and banks 
competed for a sum of deposits that appears to have grown in line with real GDP (both 
1.7% p.a.). In the first fifteen years after the Restriction Act, the total London bank deposits 
of our sample grew more than twice as fast (3.9% p.a.) and two-and-half times faster than real 
GDP (1.5% p.a.) – see Exhibit 5.5. 
                                                
36 Childs Letter Book 1762-1835: letter dated 15th March 1796 [archive ref: CH/229]. 
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Exhibit 5.5 – Bank balance sheet growth rates, by business model ideal-type, before the 
Restriction Act, and for the period thereafter coinciding with the expansion in Bank of 
England’s discounting. 
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Unable to issue banknotes, London banks could not ‘manufacture’ balance sheet growth 
like modern banks, but had to rely on growing their share of a slow-growing total deposit 
base. For Discounters with active correspondent banking services, growth of their deposits 
was significantly affected by the ebbs and flows of activity of individual Country banks for 
which each London bank happened to act as correspondent. Theses ebbs and flows would 
reflect the relative fortunes of the different economic regions where each London bank’s 
correspondents happened to be located, and their different industries – most notably in the 
case of Coutts and its large exposure to Scotland’s growing industrial economy.  
 
Exhibit 5.6 – Annual balance sheet growth patterns and the business model clusters 
 
 
Despite these idiosyncratic differences, if we take the additional step of dividing the banks 
into two groups based on their predominant business model, the evidence points to the 
younger Discounters already showing greater buoyancy than the group of Goldsmith banks 
prior to the Restriction. 
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Between 1786 and 1797, for the Discounters for which we have records, Barclays (1.8% 
p.a.), Prescott’s (3.3% p.a.), as well as our hybrid Coutts, with its Bank of Scotland 
correspondent business included (11.0% p.a.), all matched or exceeded the Bank of England 
growth rate (1.8% p.a.). By comparison, the three most established Goldsmith banks of 
Hoares’ (-2.8% p.a.), Child’s (-3.3% p.a.) and Goslings (-1.2% p.a.) all experienced shrinking 
balance sheets during that decade. Only Drummonds (2.1% p.a.) and Cocks & Biddulph 
(2.3% p.a.) showed balance sheet growth. After the Restriction Act came into force, 
growing the deposit base came to mean different things to the Goldsmith and the 
Discounter. During the period of rapid expansion in the Bank of England’s discounting of 
private sector paper, the Discounter gained additional tools for responding to changes in 
the demand for money (Chapter 11 and 12), resulting in the Discounters growing on 
average at the same rate (4.7% p.a.) as the Bank (5.0%), while the Goldsmiths on average 
managed little more than half that rate (2.7%). 
 
When viewed in the aggregate, these ebbs and flows of Country bank paper flowing into the 
London money market, to be discounted or simply settled, created strong enough forces to 
generate differences in the yearly growth patterns of the Discounters and the Goldsmiths 
respectively. Already before the Restriction the idiosyncratic differences point to a 
clustering around the two ideal-type business models, and this is confirmed by the 
correlation analysis shown in Exhibit 5.6 above. Between 1780 and 1796 the average 
correlation in the yearly changes in the balance sheets of just the Goldsmiths and just the 
Discounters was 0.84 and 0.77 respectively, while the average correlation between 
Goldsmiths and Discounters was only 0.45. On this evidence, Coutts is confirmed as 
belonging to the cluster of banks behaving most like the ideal-type Discounter model: its 
yearly balance sheet changes are three times more strongly correlated with other 
Discounters (0.68) than with the Goldsmiths (0.21).   
 
If the higher average growth rate of the Discounters’ balance sheets, and their clustering 
around a similar pattern of year-on-year changes, was due to their stronger and more direct 
links with the note-issuing Country banks, then we would expect Discounter balance sheets 
to be more highly correlated to monetary conditions in the rest of the Country, and hence 
to the year-on-year changes in nominal GDP. During the gold standard period of the 
eighteenth-century, there had been little noticeable difference in the medium term growth 
path of nominal and real GDP (see Introduction), and even the Bullionists believed that the 
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Real Bills Doctrine was a somewhat effective constraint on Country bank note issuance 
under a regime where banknotes were convertible back to specie. Hence, if Country assets - 
bank lending and balances with London – had already found some capacity to grow faster 
than the stock of specie thanks to their ability to ‘manufacture’ new paper money, then 
prior to 1797 we would expect the year-on-year growth in those assets to be dependent on 
the year-to-year growth of nominal GDP; and hence for the year-on-year changes in 
Discounters’ balance sheets to be more highly correlated to year-on-year changes in 
nominal GDP.  
 
Exhibit 5.7 – London Bank liabilities and nominal GDP: Goldsmiths vs. Discounters,  
1776-1811 
 
 
Consistent with this hypothesis, prior to the Restriction the ebbs and flows from the 
Country banks into London caused the balance sheets of the Discounters to be (on average) 
six times more highly correlated with nominal GDP (0.68) compared to the balance sheets 
of the Goldsmiths (0.11). Exhibit 5.7 shows how, prior to 1797, the 3-Discounter balance 
sheet total traced out the growth in nominal GDP in ways that the 4-Goldsmith series 
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clearly did not. This result strengthens the support for the existence of two separate 
business model clusters, and that already before 1797 the flows of specie and the flows of 
paper-based quasi-money instruments has begun to follow different monetary pathways and 
were subject to different velocity characteristics.  
  
 
5.4  Profitability 
 
In this section I investigate and compare the profit and loss account of the ideal-type 
Goldsmith business model (using Hoares) and the ideal-type Discounter business model 
(using Prescott) in the run up to and during the Restriction. Understanding the profit 
dynamic of the two business models helps to investigate the relative incentives that London 
banks had to act the way they did during the Restriction (Chapter 11).  
 
I find that, prior to the Restriction, the London banking business had plausibly settled into 
an approximate state of equivalence in the net return on assets between the two business 
models. After the initial marketplace disruption caused by the entry of numerous 
Discounters during the 1770s and 1780s, London bank numbers had stabilized at around 70 
banks, and bankers had seemingly learnt to judge the credit and liquidity risks present in 
their respective business models when operating under the gold standard. The Goldsmith 
typically held higher non-interest bearing cash reserves to manage the liquidity risk; the 
Discounter typically held lower cash reserves, but invested part of the interest-bearing assets 
in government securities in order to reduce the credit risk, and was more likely to reserve a 
portion of annual profits against unexpected future losses. It is therefore possible to argue 
that bankers, whichever of the two business models they pursued, actively calibrated their 
balance sheet strategies in order to aim at a net return on assets of approximately 3% p.a. 
Accounting practices for these private partnerships with unlimited liability do not reveal the 
true equity in the business, but if we treat Thomas Coutts’ capital strategy (regularly 
adjusting the paid-up capital, not letting it fall below 5% of assets, and then topping it up to 
10% - Chapter 6) as indicating the true capital perceived as being at risk, then we can infer 
that implicit equity-at-risk ratios averaged 7.5% of total assets; which meant the target 
return on equity was approximately 40% per annum. This state of affairs was then disrupted 
by the systemic changes to that environment ushered in by the Restriction.  
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Exhibit 5.8 - Example of bank trading in Exchequer Bills: Childs, fiscal year 1796-7 
 
  
The Goldsmith bank charged borrowers between 4% and 5% p.a., the latter being the 
maximum permitted under the usury laws. Interest was usually debited annually or semi-
annually, but sometimes it was a mixture (even for the same loan) and in yet other cases 
there were no fixed payment dates at all. The bank did not appear to have levied late 
payment charges, nor did it calculate compound interest in cases when interest was paid at 
the end of, say, two years. Consequent to these practices, the average gross interest 
effectively earned on mortgages would be around 4.5% p.a. The gross interest earned on 
securities holdings, by contrast, would be closer to 5% and sometimes even exceed this 
level. This was because the available yields in the secondary market for government bonds 
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often exceeded 5% in the period up to the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, and the 
usury laws only applied to the nominal coupon rate. Many banks were also active traders of 
these securities, moving in and out of the same security, arbitraging between different long 
bonds, and between bonds and Exchequer bills. Exhibit 5.8 shows an example of how, 
during 1797, Childs successfully traded a total turnover of  £187,415 in Exchequer Bills, 
beginning and ending with no net position, with a weighted average entry price of 99.39 and 
exit price of 102.14, earning an annualized total return on average capital employed 
equivalent to 6.85%. 
 
Exhibit 5.9 – Gross margin on non-cash assets of Goldsmith and Discounter 
 
 
When combining loans and securities, before the Restriction the average gross interest 
margin on all interest-bearing assets averaged 4.7%. It continued at that level until 1815, 
after which it went into steady decline averaging less than 3% after 1830. Little or no 
interest was paid on deposits: this was the main mechanism by which Goldsmiths were able 
to capture the value added they created. We must infer that, in a world where the price level 
was taken to remain flat in the long run, depositors were willing to forego the opportunity 
cost of a 5% real return or more on government securities in exchange for the combination 
of various services: the secure physical custody of their gold money; the convenience of 
writing bills and drafts against those deposits, as well as having the bank act as its agent for 
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the execution of other daily monetary transactions; as well as obtaining contingent access to 
loans when and if the need arose. This was how London banks – especially Goldsmiths – 
created value and captured that value.  
 
Operating expenses (staff and the banking hall) for the Goldsmith were low, taking out no 
more than 18% of gross interest earned (compared to today’s typical bank ratio of staff 
costs to total revenues of 60%). Losses, including errors and sundry deductions, would vary 
considerably from year to year, taking out on average a further 5% of gross interest income 
(but never more than 11%). Taking these components together, at least three-quarters of 
the gross interest margin was retained as net profit, leaving a typical net margin on lending 
assets of a little below 4%. This translated into an average net return on total assets (“RoA”) 
of 2.9% p.a. once non-interest bearing cash reserves are taken into account, and was highly 
volatile (4.1% in 1785-6, 1.7% in 1793). During the Restriction years, average RoA was 
similar 3%, but became much less volatile (ranging from 2.7% to 3.4%). After 1815 RoA 
gradually declined to 2% per annum, where it stayed for the rest of the century. Data from 
other Goldsmiths (Drummonds, Childs) and BHHB, the more conservative Discounter, 
closely match these levels and their pattern of change (Exhibit 5.9). 
 
The profitability of the ‘Discounter’ business model prior to the Restriction (based on 
Prescotts’ data) was similar to, or somewhat lower than that of the Goldsmith model after 
all costs are taken into account. By contrast, after the Restriction Act, some Discounters 
such as the more risk-seeking Discounter (Prescott) suffered consistently lower returns net 
of loan loss reserves. 
 
The top-line gross interest margin earned by the Discounter on its discounting of bills was a 
more attractive 6.5% p.a. compared to the 4.7% p.a. earned on average by the Goldsmith 
bank on its mortgage lending and government securities. (Based on the Old Bank in Bristol, 
gross margins of Country banks following the Discounter model outside London may have 
been somewhat lower before the Restriction). By way of comparison, I estimate that at this 
time the gross margin earned by the Bank of England on its discounting activity averaged 
4.6% on average balances,37 suggesting that the better quality paper tended to be offered for 
discount at the Bank. Although not legally pari passu, the Bank of England was counting on 
                                                
37 Figures available for 1800-1819: Bank of England archives, ref: C36/6 & C36/14. See Chapter 11 and Exhibit 
11.4 for a full explanation.  
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discounters of bills giving it de facto status of senior lender because of the dire consequences 
of being seen to default to the Bank (Chapter 11). 
 
The gross interest margin of the Discounters grew to exceed 7% during the Restriction and 
remained high until the banking crisis of 1825. The estimates from Prescotts are consistent 
with the more detailed numbers we have for BHHB for the shorter period 1807-1817. By 
contrast, the gross margin of the Goldsmith (Hoares) remained steady at around 4.7% 
throughout the period until the 1825 crisis (Exhibit 5.9).  
 
Although usury laws capped interest rates at 5%, the practice of discounting the face value 
of a bill, combined with its short-date maturity, made the effective interest rate charged less 
visible because, as with the mortgage interest arrangements of the Goldsmith, there were no 
adjustments for compound interest effects. If the interest rate charged on bill discounting 
was computed as 5% p.a. pro rated arithmetically over the relevant life of the bill, then a 
stable volume of discounting of, say, 1-month bills would have produced a full-year 
effective gross lending margin of 6.1% p.a. (on the assumption that interest income was re-
invested in the business throughout the year) and close to the 6.5% observed. Furthermore, 
we know that the Bank of England, when discounting bills, would oblige the seller to 
relinquish the whole interest over the full term of the bill: hence it is possible that the 
Discounter banks at times practiced the same method. Finally, as shown in Coutts’ letters 
(Chapter 6), and corroborated by the more detailed revenue records of BHHB (which begin 
only in 1803), Discounters usually earned fees from Country correspondents in addition to 
the net interest margin. These fees were charged either as percentages of the paying agency 
volumes handled and/or for providing what amounted to a revolving credit facility – a 
practice already in use in Scotland since some years previously (as described by Adam 
Smith). However, these fees do not seem to have become a material amount of revenues 
until a decade after the start of the Restriction. 
 
While the Discounter enjoyed these higher gross margins than the Goldsmith, it also had to 
bear a number of offsetting higher costs.  
 
Firstly, the Discounter suffered from the lower gross margins available on the wholesale 
correspondent banking business where, being an agency business not involving principal 
risk, fees were lower and overdraft interest rates negotiated in bulk. The costs side of the 
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Prescott accounts shows an item entitled “Expense and interest”, suggesting the Discounter 
paid some interest on the wholesale deposits or drafts that composed its liabilities. 
Unfortunately the Prescott records only break this out for five years after 1817:38 for those 
years the interest costs varied between 0.8% and 1.3% of total liabilities, and averaged 1%. 
The latter is corroborated by the interest rate of 4% p.a. that Coutts assumed in its 
correspondence with the Bank of Scotland that the latter could have earned on its positive 
overnight balances during 1813-15 had it been using a London bank that paid interest on 
such balances. If we assume that the Discounter paid the same interest costs before 1817 as 
it did afterwards, then we can deduct 1.0% from that headline margin to reach a comparable 
gross margin of 5.5% for the Discounter – still a full 0.9% greater than that of the 
‘Goldsmith’.  But there were other costs for the Discounter. 
 
Secondly, the records reveal that the Discounter business model engendered higher 
operating costs. The operating expenses of the Discounter absorbed around 25% of the net 
interest revenues compared to a typical 15% for the Goldsmith. This pushed the typical net 
margin of the Discounter model down to 4.1%. These higher unit costs were to be expected 
given the more labour-intensive work of handling the higher turnover rate of the bill 
discounting activity. The typical bill of exchange was issued for maturities of one to three 
months: hence we would have expected the lending assets of the Discounter to turn over at 
least 500% during a year, compared to the average turnover of mortgages of just 10%. 
Although the documentation costs per transaction were higher for mortgages, this did not 
offset the difference in the frequency of transactions. The Discounter’s operating costs 
appear to have been between two and five times greater than the Goldsmith per £1 of 
assets, depending on the precise asset composition. Comparable continuous figures for 
1799-1827 show that in the years before the Restriction, Hoares (the Goldsmith) had 
average annual operating costs of 0.44% of total assets, while Prescotts, already a full 
Discounter, had a cost ratio averaging 1.91% of assets. In 1803, BHHB, whose business was 
still in the process of moving towards the fully-fledged Discounter, operated with a cost 
ratio similar to Hoares (0.53%). As BHHB moved its balance sheet composition more 
towards that of a full Discounter during the Restriction (see Chapter 11), the cost ratio 
doubled to an average of 1.09% over the following twelve years, even when excluding 
interest paid to partners and the annuity paid to Mrs. Barnett (the cost ratio averaged 1.75% 
if including them). Similarly, over the same twelve years, Prescotts’ cost ratio deteriorated 
                                                
38 For the years 1817-19 and again in 1835-1845 
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further to an average of 2.90% - six times that of Hoares, whose cost ratio barely changed, 
averaging 0.52% (Exhibit 5.10). 
 
During the monetary expansion (Abundance phase) of the Restriction, the Goldsmith 
model typically did better than the Discounter model in terms of net operating profits 
because its cost dynamic was less sensitive to balance sheet growth. The Discounter’s high-
frequency transactional model was generating incrementally higher costs, including higher 
stamp duties, while the typical Goldsmith reinvested the increased deposits into 
government securities (Chapter 11, 12) that entailed lower unit costs compared to executing 
longer-term secured loans to individuals. As the Restriction’s monetary expansion 
progressed, the Discounter was taking on more credit risk to a wider set of counterparties, 
while the Goldsmith was taking less credit risk on average per pound of assets.  
 
Exhibit 5.10 – London banks: operating costs as percentage of total assets, 1789-1827 
 
 
Against a backdrop of total “shop expenses” at Hoares that were nearly unchanged between 
1803 and 1818, both Discounters saw large costs increases coinciding with the timing of 
when they embraced the boom in discounting – and before they took steps to correct their 
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business model when faced with deteriorating returns. Prescotts (Discounter) embraced the 
expansion immediately upon the Restriction being imposed and grew its balance sheet at 
10% p.a. after 1803 until it peaked in 1809 at just below £1million; during that period its 
costs more than doubled. By comparison, over the same six years, Hoares was able to grow 
its balance sheet at 5.6% per annum with no increase in costs. Over the period 1803-1818, 
the balance sheet of BHHB (the other Discounter) grew by a relatively sedate 2.1% p.a., half 
the rate of growth managed by Hoares, and yet already by 1813 BHHB’s costs were three 
times greater than they had been a decade earlier. 
 
Lastly, the Discounter suffered higher loan loss write-offs. In this regard, Discounters 
adopted a different accounting method to Goldsmiths: both Prescotts and BHHB did not 
distribute the entire annual profit, instead opting to book a (variable) portion to reserves. 
We interpret this as indicating that the managing partners of the Discounter accepted ex ante 
that the Discounter business model would generate a certain amount of credit losses each 
year. There is further evidence of on-going adaptive behaviour in adjusting these reserves to 
the loan loss experience. Loan losses would rise considerably after 1797, but for the two 
decades prior to the Restriction they had averaged a modest 0.6% of loan assets. [This loan 
loss rate can be compared to the 2.8% average rate experienced by the UK banking sector 
over the past 25 years.39]  
 
Loss write-offs prior to the Restriction reduced the more cautious, slower-growing 
Discounter’s comparable net margin to a little below 4% and approximately the same as 
that of the Goldsmith.  Arguably, the Discounter should have turned this net margin on 
interest-bearing assets into a higher net RoA - a premium for the higher volatility of 
earnings compared to a Goldsmith model – by being able to hold a smaller idle cash 
balances as reserve, justifying this on the basis that the Discounter’s main asset - bills of 
exchange – enjoyed greater liquidity relative to longer-term mortgage loans. However, this 
effect was marginal as Discounters on average held only 4-5% less of their balance sheets in 
cash compared to Goldsmiths. As a result, the net RoAs of the two business models were 
similar, approximately 2.5 to 2.6% p.a. (Exhibit 5.11).  
 
 
 
                                                
39 Standard & Poors report in Dunkley (2015).  
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Exhibit 5.11 – Return on Assets of London banks, 1781-1845 
 
 
Exhibit 5.12 – Goldsmith vs. Discounter: Return on Assets, experience during the 
Restriction period, 1782 - 1818 
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During the Restriction, RoAs improved for the Goldsmith bank, but more selectively for 
the Discounter: Goldsmiths often achieved somewhat over 3% p.a., but for the Discounter 
it depended on avoiding increased loan losses. In our sample, it seems BHHB succeeded, 
while for Prescotts the Restriction Act marked the beginning of a deteriorating loan loss 
experience, and its RoA fell to 2% (Exhibit 5.11, and 5.12). 
 
In conclusion, to the degree of approximation permitted by the historical records, I find 
something like an equivalence in the average profitability of the two bank business models 
in the decade prior to the Restriction. Although the Discounter obtained higher top-line 
margins on its lending activity, the net margin was similar to that of the Goldsmith after 
accounting for the higher operating expenses required to handle the higher-frequency 
transactional business; the greater loan loss experience involved in taking on unsecured 
credit risk from a wider range of counterparties; and the higher costs of wholesale funding 
and/or lower margins earned on temporary net overdrafts run by wholesale bank 
counterparties located in the Country. After proper adjustment, before the Restriction, both 
the Discounter and the Goldsmith business models had net operating margins on their 
interest-bearing assets of approximately 4%; a return on total assets of approximately 2.5%, 
and an estimated return on capital at risk of 30-35%. 
 
During the easier monetary conditions after the Restriction Act, many banks experienced an 
improvement in return on assets to 3% p.a., but to achieve it the Discounters had to keep a 
lid on the escalating costs of supporting the growing high-frequency transaction activity in 
bill discounting, as well as avoid greater unexpected losses due to deteriorating average loan 
quality. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Discounter with the slowest rate of balance sheet 
growth (BHHB) succeeded, while the Discounter with the fastest growth failed to do so.  
 
For any given bank directorate, the choice between the two business models appears to 
have lain partly on when they were founded, and hence where the founders could see the 
profitable opportunity. Under a gold standard regime the demand for medium-term loans 
secured against the existing slow-growing stock of specie was already well catered for by the 
older banks that had pursued the Goldsmith model; a younger bank was more likely to seek 
a competitive space by serving the new and faster-growing instruments such as the bill of 
exchange. Or, as in the case of Herries, seek competitive space by developing an entirely 
new instrument. However, the choice of business model also depended on the temperament 
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of the partners and the nature of the daily activity they enjoyed and on their perceived 
informational and marketing capacity, as well as the cognitive frame of money that they had 
built up from their previous experiences. As was the case for Barclays Bevan Tritton and for 
Goslings, a significant change in the principal partners could lead to equally significant 
changes in capabilities and appetites for handling the new instruments, and hence in the 
business model pursued. After the Restriction Act, Discounters also had to choose how 
aggressively they would embrace the easier monetary conditions in order to expand the 
balance sheet.  
 
 
5.5  The cognitive frames of the business strategy-makers                                                                         
 
Up to this point in Part II I have employed the material, technical, activity-based approach 
to parse through the empirical evidence and identify the salient patterns of bank strategy 
behaviour. I close this chapter by inferring from these patterns a conceptual understanding 
of the cognitive frames of the owner-managers of Goldsmiths and Discounters, informed 
by the insights of modern ‘strategy cognition’ research.   
 
Since the 1990s, strategy management research (both process and practice) has included a 
growing contribution from scholars taking a cognition perspective, or what is referred to as 
‘strategy cognition’. This part of the chapter borrows from the insights of strategy cognition 
research to draw inferences regarding the cognitive framing of late eighteen-century bankers 
as revealed by the balance sheet policies they pursued, and so offer connections with the 
framing of monetary theory by contemporary political economists discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3. I argue that the divergent cognitive framing of money by political economists, 
respectively espousing the Bullionist or Anti-Bullionist policy goals, was not something 
present only in theoretical debate, but rather reflected divergent perspectives present 
amongst the population at large. Since most of the ‘political economists’ of the Restriction 
were also bankers and merchants, it would seem unlikely that these two perspectives of 
‘money’ were present only in the domain of theoretical ‘modelling’ - as if political 
economists operated in a vacuum separated from the broader society and its concerns.  
 
The cognitive perspective seeks “the meanings and meaning structures which actors 
maintain about the components of the business model” (Tikkanen et al, in Furnari, 2005: 5). 
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We cannot interrogate directly the mental models of eighteen-century bankers, but we can 
infer them from the strategic actions revealed by their balance sheets. While balance sheets 
do not speak directly of the ex ante beliefs and intentions of bankers, balance sheets do not 
lie about the choices that were made by bankers as revealed ex post by the actions they 
actually took (in contrast to the ex ante verbal statements they might have made describing 
those beliefs and intentions).   
 
The strategy cognition approach focuses on the linkages between ‘cognitive frames’ and the 
strategic decision-making processes and implementation (Porac and Thomas, 2002; Regnér, 
2003: 59). This paper uses the term ‘cognitive frames’: the limiting boundary conditions 
imposed (usually involuntarily) upon strategic decisions by the accumulated experience of 
the actor and decision-maker. Cognitive frames are the relatively stable mental maps that 
individuals and groups form as heuristic devices in order to make sense of the external 
environment and economize on everyday information gathering when making decisions 
about how to act in that environment. They are the knowledge structure that informs the 
template that individuals impose on the information environment to give it form and 
meaning (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Walsh, 1995), thus acting as the ‘filtering mechanisms’ 
(Narayanan, Zane, and Kemmerer, 2011: 309) for what strategy managers pay attention to 
and consider relevant for strategy formulation (Huff, 1982). 
 
As suggested in the introduction to this thesis, the Restriction is a natural experiment for 
observing what happens to both the monetary system and monetary theory when “zero 
bounds” imposed by out-dated cognitive frames are swept away by a radical change in the 
environment and its operating rules. In the strategy management literature, business models 
can be viewed as either the product of the strategist’s own cognitive framing, or as a 
cognitive tool created by the strategist for the purpose of communicating a vision of the 
business to others (Baden-Fuller & Morgan (2010)). Both perspectives are useful 
complements to this economic history essay because they can be matched to the theoretical 
‘models’ of the political economists: the latter can also be viewed as either the product of 
the economist’s cognitive framing, or as his cognitive tool created for the purpose of 
communicating a vision of the monetary system – and lobbying for the outcome sought. 
Porac, Thomas & Baden-Fuller (1989: 398) in their landmark study of Scottish knitwear 
manufacturers were perhaps the first to recognise the “important link between group-level 
and firm-level competitive phenomena [played by] the mental models used by key decision-
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makers to interpret the task environment of their organisation.” Here I argue that the 
mental models – not of what knitwear is for the consumer, but of what is the role of 
‘money’ in the economy - were as different amongst the key decision-makers inside the 
Goldsmith bank and the Discounter bank as they were amongst political economists. This 
led bankers to pursue and persevere with different business models, with different 
consequences once the external environment changed after 1797: Discounters took on 
more credit risk because they perceived an increase in the ‘shiftability’ (Chapter 3) of their 
monetary assets, while Goldsmiths took on less risk and reinvested most of the increased 
deposit base into government securities because they perceived an inflationary dilution of 
monetary assets. 
 
Cognitive strategy research is of interest here because – unlike the mainstream of 
institutional theory - it accepts that the bankers’ individual mental maps may have differed 
as regards what money was, and therefore they could disagree, as political economists did, 
on what was the principal force, or the “vix mediatrix” underpinning the functioning of the 
monetary system.  The cognitive perspective allows for each banker’s decision-making to 
have been shaped by the different way in which each experienced the monetary world, and 
hence to display different rationales when conducting their business.  Cognitive strategy 
research focuses “on cognitive representations of [the] environment and [the] organisation, 
while fully acknowledging the role of cognitive biases and heuristics” (Narayanan et al, 
2011: 307). This perspective further allows for causation to run in the opposite direction: 
“managers can be expected to focus their attention on environmental changes that are most 
salient to, or offer support for, their current mental models, while other potentially 
important changes in the environment may not be recognised” (Barr, Stimpert and Huff, 
1992). Similarly, in the domain of political economist, Ricardo-1809 and other strict 
Bullionists ‘framed’ money as metallic coin embodying the standard of value, and not as a 
unit of account that could become detached from the physical coin; as a result, they focused 
their attention on the high price of gold which their cognitive filter interpreted exclusively 
as the measure of the over-issue of banknotes.  
 
The approach also accepts that information costs were non-trivial for bankers at the end of 
eighteen-century, so they would initially proceed experimentally. Once they had settled on a 
business model that was viable and profitable, those same costs would have encouraged 
them to triage new information through the lens of what this meant for the continued 
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exploitation of the essential operating environment as imagined by their previously 
constructed mental image of it. The initial choice of business model for both newly formed 
Goldsmiths banks in the early eighteenth century, and newly formed Discounters in the last 
quarter of the century, was informed by the perception of where lay the competitive 
opportunity at the time. Once invested in one particular business model, the sunken costs 
involved in constructing the related customer and information capacity acted as a 
disincentive to change. This cost-based disincentive to changing business model was 
reinforced by the two divergent cognitive frames regarding money, created by the equally 
divergent everyday experience of their respective transactional environment. Discounters 
focused their attention on the high-frequency trading of paper instruments, thereby 
reinforcing their cognitive frame of money as a nominal unit of account for debts, while 
Goldsmiths focused their attention on the low-frequency loan transactions secured on real 
assets, thereby reinforcing their cognitive frame of money as a scarce real asset acting as a 
standard of value over the medium- to long-term. Only when there was a complete change 
of the partners within a short time (as with Barclays and Goslings) did the business model 
change to reflect new human capital and cognitive frames.  
 
Strategy cognition research has contributed three areas of insight that are of particular 
interest here. Firstly, the influences played by the cognitive frame of the individual on his/her 
strategic choices made within a specific strategic context. Secondly, the influence played by 
diverse cognitive frames upon the formation of strategic clusters within the industry.  And thirdly, 
it has identified the presence of strategy inertia in organisations (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 
1994; Roger and Palmer, 1996; Hodgkinson, 1997). Regnér (2003) refined the strategy 
inertia concept as the product of a dynamic struggle between the deductive thinking at the 
centre of a firm or industry and the inductive thinking at the periphery of a firm or industry. 
All these three cognitive influences upon business model choice help to shed light on the 
decision-making preferences of late eighteen-century London bank owner-managers and 
support the conclusions in this chapter. 
 
Regnér’s (2003: 65) dichotomy in mental maps between a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’ set of 
firms resonates strongly with any current practitioner of business, and closely aligns with 
what was observed in the technical analysis of the two bank business models prior to the 
Restriction: a set of more established, usually larger Goldsmith banks at the core of the 
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London banking system; and a set of newer, usually smaller, faster growing Discounter 
banks at the ‘periphery’.  
 
Regnér defines the periphery in terms of both the organisational hierarchy internal to the 
firm, but also – importantly for this paper - in terms of “remoteness from dominant 
practices and beliefs.” Using two comparative longitudinal case studies40, he argues 
persuasively from the evidence that decision-makers in the ‘core’ of an industry exhibit 
forms of deductive thinking using historically based decision-making frames orientated 
towards the exploitation of a known and well-rehearsed business model. The ‘core’, more 
established firms – like the Goldsmiths - had built businesses based on practices and beliefs 
that, by definition, had become the dominant cognitive framing of the available opportunity 
for creating value. Hence these ‘core’ banks were focused on refining the existing methods 
by which they captured the value they created, and how they could best exploit the 
associated resource endowments and the sunken costs of previous investments in fixed 
capital or human capital. By contrast, decision-makers in the ‘periphery’ exhibit forms of 
inductive thinking using more explorative decision-making frames that look outwards towards 
new markets and new technologies – because they have to in order to develop profitable 
niches. Newer ‘periphery’ banks like the Discounters had less intellectual and financial 
capital invested in following the existing dominant practices and beliefs, and instead – like 
Herries Farquhar, for example - were orientated towards depicting products as solutions to 
(newer) customer needs discovered through contact with different clienteles.  
 
Applying Regnér’s insight to our body of evidence from the second half of eighteen-
century, and especially after the 1780s, we see how the Discounters at the periphery of the 
industry grew by embracing the new ‘technologies’ of the bill of exchange and other quasi-
monies that were one step removed or ‘remote’ from specie-money. Gradually they learned 
a new set of practices for the profitable handling of these new instruments - practices that 
were shunned by, and remote from the dominant model operated by the older and larger 
Goldsmith banks. For example, one prominent banker, Thomas Thompson, the managing 
partner of a leading Country bank, would write stating that “I am confident that it will be 
much more prudent to relax in charging discount than to lend money” (Chapter 7 – The 
Smith Group); by contrast, Thomas Coutts, brought up as a Goldsmith, would describe 
Discounters as operating a more risky unsound business model based on short-term lending 
                                                
40 His case studies were of Ericsson and Pharmacia in 1978-1998, and Couplet and AGA in 1988-98.  
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(Chapter 4). In order to compete, the more recently formed or re-articled Discounters had 
to display a more experimental, agnostic approach to the increasing use of paper-based 
instruments, similar to that displayed by Bosanquet when formulating Anti-Bullionist 
monetary theory, or like Heywood (1812) and his friend who embraced the expanding use 
of inland bills as a great benefit to the nation (Chapter 3). By contrast, the more deductive 
thinking revealed by the Goldsmith banker recalls that of the Ricardo and the Bullionist 
arguments which derived their policy conclusions by starting with a theoretical assumption 
based on eighty years of experience under a gold standard, namely that specie was the only 
vix mediatrix by which the monetary system adjusted to shocks.  
 
The Goldsmiths formed the ‘core’ of the London banking system and had grown up in the 
mid-eighteenth century monetary environment that favoured Hume’s view of money as 
only specie. Of the 44 goldsmiths present in London in 1677 (Orbell and Turton, 2001: 4), 
by 1750 some 13 to 18 had transformed into (and survived as) Goldsmith banks (Temin 
and Voth, 2013: 46) and they dominated by size the estimated 30 London banks. However, 
Goldsmith banks were not set up to respond flexibly to changes in the demand for money. 
While fractional banking had been practiced for many centuries already, London banks did 
not issue banknotes, so the only way they could respond to such changes in the demand for 
money was to alter their asset gearing of loans to their reserves of specie. Doing so was 
risky as some 60% of the Goldsmith’s assets came due after twelve months and any deposit 
withdrawals had to met by paying out specie. This research shows that the aggregate ratio 
for all London banks – both Goldsmiths and Discounters - remained high from the 1740s 
until 1780, with typically one-third of assets kept as cash reserves. Outside London it is 
thought no more than a dozen Country banks existed (Orbell and Turton, 2001: 5), and 
hence there was little demand for correspondent banking services. Until the 1770s London 
bank numbers grew slowly, and although the number of Country banks saw regular growth 
from the very small base, their aggregate importance remained relatively small until 1785 
(Chapter 12: Exhibit 12.6). At the same time the Bank of England had no mandate to 
provide liquidity and only did so in extreme situations (such as the Scottish banking crisis of 
1772), so there was no easy route for Discounters to access additional funding; and the 
Bank’s issuance of banknotes was limited to large denominations, subject to being 
converted into specie on demand, which constrained such issuance to modest levels relative 
to economic activity (Chapter 10). As a result, at the time Hume and Smith were writing, 
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the London money market was indeed principally driven by the supply of specie and the 
dominant bank business model reflected this.  
 
By contrast, the use of bills of exchange – the instrument that was to foster the growth of 
the Discounters - was still relatively embryonic, and the Bank of England’s activity in 
discounting these bills, which went hand-in-hand with its banknote circulation, was still 
small (Chapter 10). Since the founding of the Bank, discounters had accepted payment in 
banknotes, and this formed the route through which additional liquidity was injected into 
the London money market. However, banknote issuance and discounting were both 
sluggish in the middle of eighteen-century compared to what was to come at the end of the 
century and during the Restriction. As Clapham (1970: 128-9) states, “it is enough to say 
that in the [seventeen] thirties, forties and fifties there were no important changes in the 
average size of [discount] operations; and that in spite of the growth of national wealth 
during the Walpole era, operations were sometimes curiously small. From 4 August to 15 
December 1750, for example, the maximum day’s business was only £19,212. 4s. 5d; days 
with less than £1,000 were not uncommon.” To put this in context, by 1809 the Bank of 
England’s daily discount operations were averaging £63,000.  
 
The London banks could not independently expand lending by increasing banknote 
issuance, and had every incentive to operate with high reserves of specie as they could not 
count on being bailed out by the Bank of England or obtaining emergency liquidity by 
discounting a greater proportion of their paper assets with the Bank. In this environment 
the London bankers’ cognitive frame was constructed using the same concept of ‘money’ as 
that which was employed in classical quantity theory, namely that money was a commodity, 
and banknotes only a temporary one-for-one substitute for specie.  
 
The London Goldsmith bank operated much like classical (and neo-classical) theory would 
have us conceptualize banks: as a simple intermediary for loanable funds, i.e. real resources 
(specie) made available by savers through the agency of banks for use by non-financial 
investors. All London bank lending activity was constrained by the net inflow of deposits of 
specie, but this was especially so for the Goldsmith banks that had less correspondent bank 
business and did not use the facility offered by the Bank of England for discounting of bills 
– meagre though it was in the years prior to the Restriction. The Goldsmith bank may have 
viewed any such use of the discount facility as equivalent to requiring “assistance” from the 
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Bank of England, and hence representing a weakness in their operating model. As late as 
1825, in material found by the Drummonds’ biographers, there are letters exchanged with 
the bank’s broker (Messrs Smith & Payne) during the financial crisis of that year in which 
John Drummond states that they had never sought to discount paper directly with the Bank 
of England and “that the only assistance the House had ever had was about 30 years ago 
when they borrowed of the Bank [through Smith, Payne & Co] £50,000” (Bolitho and Peel, 
1967; 155, my italics).  
 
The London Goldsmith bank of the final decades of eighteen-century had succeeded 
because of the careful and persistent exploitation of a well-rehearsed business model that 
had first emerged almost a century earlier. Business strategy decisions were framed by an 
understanding of the monetary and banking environment that had solidified within that 
business model after more than half a century of exploitation under a gold standard. The 
Goldsmith saw the primary value proposition as the organised safekeeping of specie 
deposited by the wealthiest individuals in Britain, combined with paying agent services to 
meet the day-to-day expenditures of their depositors and, more selectively, creating liquidity 
for customers’ extensive land and real estate assets by lending out (over longer terms and 
secured on those real assets) that part of the bank’s stock of specie not required for 
everyday payments. The Goldsmith operated a low-frequency transactional model and those 
transactions involved mostly real assets: movements of specie and loans secured on land 
and real estate. The Goldsmith’s business involved fewer exchange transactions, and both 
inflows and outflows were conducted almost exclusively in “caish”, which in turn served to 
reinforce the cognitive framing of money as a real commodity. Their daily physical and 
tactile experience acted to reinforce their cognitive bias towards viewing money as a 
commodity in its physical aspect, in addition to the functional aspects.  
 
The computational environment of the Goldsmith bank’s daily transactions did not 
encourage a cognitive focus upon money’s alternative function as the nominal unit of 
account. Until 1797, for eighty years, that nominal unit of account lay stamped onto the surface 
of the pieces of metal coin just as it lay printed on paper-based monetary instruments; both 
types of money were indivisibly linked to the money standard (£1 = 7.3 grams of gold) in a 
symbiotic union underwritten by the legal right to convert nominal paper money into gold 
coin on demand at the official Mint parity. Like John Bull in the sketch presented in the 
Introduction of this thesis, the banker was aware that, although linked symbiotically, there 
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were contingent risks associated with paper money that meant that specie ranked higher 
than banknotes in the hierarchy of monies; but, like political economists using the classical 
Price-Specie-Flow ‘model’ before the Restriction, the Goldsmith had little reason to 
mentally prise apart the two aspects of money.  As Heywood’s friend (1812: 77-8) stated, 
“one of the first consequences [of the Restriction Act] was, to weaken the association of 
ideas which existed in favour of a circulating medium possessing intrinsic value”. 
 
By contrast, the Discounters were more recent entrants to the industry in the period 1765-
1775, who had built a business primarily on the discounting of bills, or had recently become 
converts to bill discounting following a radical change in ownership. Prescott was founded 
in 1765. Herries Farquhar in 1770. Barclays had begun life as the goldsmith Freame & 
Gould, but the original families had entirely withdrawn by 1767 and the direction passed to 
the Barclays and Bevans. Similarly, BHHB had roots back to the goldsmith John Bland, but 
the ownership structure went through a complete change in 1772 after Samuel Hoare joined 
the partnership and at the same time the last of the Bland family withdrew; Samuel was an 
experienced banker formerly with the Gurneys in Norwich and hence familiar with 
banknote issuance by Country banks. By 1790 Samuel was the senior partner and remained 
so throughout the Restriction period from 1799 until 1825. Lastly, Coutts traced its origins 
to the goldsmith James Campbell, but by the 1790s the drivers of the bank’s business had 
been re-shaped into those of a Discounter by the Scottish connections of Thomas Coutts 
who had become the dominant partner in 1775.   
 
The Discounter, out of necessity or different previous experience, held a more outward-
looking mental map of money that looked towards new markets, new customers and was 
readier to experiment with new ‘technologies’ of money. The Discounter’s high-frequency 
transactional business in turn brought him into more frequent contact with paper-based 
forms of ‘circulating private credit’ (bills of exchange and promissory notes) that served to 
reinforce the cognitive framing of money as a nominal unit of account, rather than 
commodity-money embodying the standard of value and acting as a store of value. With its 
lending assets having an average life of less than five weeks, the Discounter was less 
concerned with money’s store of value function compared to the Goldsmith, whose lending 
assets had an average life of multiple years. For the Discounter, the function of money as a 
store of value linked to a commodity standard was subordinated to its function as a means 
of exchange linked to the nominal unit of account. The Discounter was less concerned by 
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money as a derivative representation of specie because the informational capacity of his 
business was built on the ability to manage those contingent credit risks through the use of 
maximum liquidity or ‘shiftability’.   
 
In short, a banker’s particular view of money was related to the function that money played 
in their respective business. Even before the Restriction suspended convertibility, the 
Discounter grew more easily habituated to the notion of money being an indirect and nominal 
claim upon a metallic coin with an underlying commodity (gold) content – a claim 
intermediated through the agency of an institution in whose name the claim was issued 
(such as one of its Country bank correspondets). The Discounter was more exposed to 
money functioning as a nominal unit of account with only an indirect link to Ricardo’s standard 
of value. And the Discounter was more familiar with how that link was contingent upon the 
creditworthiness of the intermediary agent because the loan loss experience in his business 
was already greater than of the Goldsmith, and sufficiently material to justify regularly 
reserving a part of the net profit. The Goldsmith experienced almost no loan losses before 
the Restriction and did not reserve against that possibility. The Discounter’s mental map 
was one that expected a regular portion of its paper-money assets to fail. Even before the 
Restriction, the Discounter expected the extrinsic value of the nominal money unit, used to 
account for paper-money assets, to diverge from money’s intrinsic standard of value (gold) 
due to the friction costs generated by the agency risks involved in arbitraging between the 
two types of money (paper and coin).  
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The empirical data reveals the London banks followed two main business models. The 
“Goldsmith” model was used by some (but not all) of the banks with older roots dating 
back to the goldsmith businesses established in the early eighteenth-century; this was a low-
frequency, low-gross margin business model focused on the direct gathering of non-
interest-bearing deposits from wealthy individuals and lending these out secured against 
collateral, mostly longer-dated mortgages on houses and landed estates. In this way the 
Goldsmith bank limited its exposure to credit risk, and managed its liquidity risk by 
maintaining high cash reserves typically amounting to a third of its balance sheet. By 
contrast, the typical “Discounter” bank dated back only a generation and had staked out a 
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competitive position by meeting the growing demand for the discounting of bills of 
exchange, i.e. short-term commercial paper with maturities mostly under one month. This 
was a high-frequency, high-gross margin, but higher per-unit cost business model focused 
on lending unsecured via transactions in paper-based monetary instruments, and involving 
the partial use of interest-bearing wholesale deposits from correspondent banks outside 
London. The Discounter was exposed to relatively low levels of liquidity risk, and managed 
its credit risk by distributing only a part of its net profits, reserving a portion against losses. 
The more recent start-ups would look somewhat different in the early years, using lower-
risk balance sheet configurations as they explored their way towards the preferred 
sustainable balance sheet structure, but I have shown how these can be viewed as transition 
stages.  
 
As we shall explore in Part IV, after 1797 the Goldsmith grew its core lending business by 
placing most of the balance sheet growth in government securities, while the Discounter 
grew its core discounting and correspondent banking business by using the expanding Bank 
of England discount window. By 1814 all banks in the sample had increasingly clustered 
around either the ideal-type Discounter or ideal-type Goldsmith business model, with fewer 
and fewer differences between banks located within each cluster. 
 
The growing use of bills of exchange reflected the expanding business of London and 
Britain’s international trade; but it was also fuelled by the increasing role of small Country 
banks in the intermediation of financial flows outside London, their number having risen 
from an estimated dozen in 1750 – when David Hume was elaborating the early classical 
theory in Of Money – to an estimated 250-300 by 1796. The Discounter provided ‘wholesale’ 
correspondent banking services to this growing “fringe banking sector” of banknote-issuing 
Country banks located more than 65 miles outside London, acting as their paying agent in 
London, collecting or making payment against bills sent to London for settlement. As a 
result the Discounter’s liabilities typically show a larger proportion of deposits coming via 
its agents and correspondents. Part III explores the nature and mechanics of these 
correspondent banking relationships and the behaviour of Country bank balance sheets.  
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PART III 
Case studies of Country banks 
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Preface and historiography 
 
 
The primary intent of the thesis is to quantify available balance sheet evidence in order to 
reveal how bank business practices compared to the theoretical perspectives of the political 
economists. In this chapter I use a set of longitudinal case studies of Country banks, where 
records are less complete, in order to quantify key aspects of their actions and infer some 
early implications for Britain’s broad money supply; these are explored in more depth in 
Chapter 12.  
 
Any work on Country banks during the Restriction must pay tribute to the exhaustive 
history put together by Pressnell (1956) in Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution. The 
book provides a wealth of insights into the functioning of the banking system in the years 
of the Restriction, and I draw from his deep understanding of many historical details 
recounted in the first nine chapters that deal with banking instruments, practices, and what 
constituted the circulating media. Not benefitting from the decade Pressnell needed to 
collect all his material, I have also taken from him the balance sheet data for Leyland Bullins 
& Co, Liverpool and Barnard & Co, Bedford without independently verifying the archival 
records.  
 
Data for the following Country banks were collected from original archival records: the five 
Smith banks; the Bank of Scotland; the Old Bank, Bristol; A. Heywood & Sons; Locke, 
Hughes, Saunders & Co; William, Jones & Hughes; and Stephens, Harris & Stephens. 
 
The analytical approach focuses on reconstructing each bank’s asset and liability matching, 
this being a suitable operational definition of the Real Bills Doctrine espoused by the Anti-
Bullionists. Further analytical focus on a bank’s cash reserve management practices, and the 
nature of the flows between a Country bank and its London correspondent, are used to test 
the Bullionist assumption of a Stable Fringe Velocity versus Bosanquet description of the 
Law of Reflux (see Chapter 3 for an explanation of these hypotheses). 
 
After initially analysing the business practices revealed by the balance sheets, I sought 
corroboration from the biographical stories told by historians of banking, thereafter 
iterating between the two. I have drawn from a number of histories of banks cited in the 
description of each bank below. These histories typically focus on the colourful stories of 
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the families of the partners, and only tangentially relate their story to any detailed 
examination of financial state of the business. The main exception was the book by 
Leighton-Boyce (1958), Smiths the Bankers which not only collected some useful (partial) 
balance sheet data that has since gone missing, but also inferred from the data an 
understanding of the state of the business which he wove into the story of the partners. 
Another notable historical work is Saville (1996) Bank of Scotland: A History, 1695-1995 
which recounts much that is relevant to analysing the Bank of Scotland-Coutts relationship, 
as well as some information relevant to the founding of Herries Farquhar, although there is 
no attempt to fully analyse the balance sheets. The Bibliography includes additional works, 
especially Cave (1899) for the case study of the Old Bank, Bristol. 
 
 
Asset and Liability matching analysis – an explanation 
 
Bank strategies are analysed through the lens of their revealed approach to asset and liability 
matching. The principal aspects of asset and liability matching are the expected maturity, the 
credit risk, and the average cost or return (respectively paid on liabilities or received on 
assets). Because the three criteria would not always give the same ranking of asset and 
liability components, and because there is no hard and fast rule about how to match assets 
and liabilities, it was decided to proceed as follows.  
 
The best starting point for the purposes of relating the bank behaviour to the theoretical 
debate was to use a risk-averse interpretation of the asset and liability strategy for Country 
banks recommended by Thomas Thompson (Chapter 7). This is then adapted to each 
particular case study to reflect each bank’s individual matching strategy inferred from the 
pattern of year on year changes. A pro forma example is explained below.  The most 
effective way to illustrate a bank’s approach over multiple time periods is by using a stacked 
chart showing the few major components of liabilities overlaid onto the more numerous 
asset components. The asset components are shown as stacked coloured bands; the liability 
components are stacked as thick black lines and overlaid over the asset bands. 
 
Assets are stacked beginning with those whose maturity is the longest (secured loans) or 
most unpredictable (overdrafts). Following these are the shorter-dated interest-bearing 
assets that can be liquidated at the bank’s discretion, ranked in decreasing order of their 
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implicit credit risk: bills discounted, balances with the London correspondent, and short-
dated government paper. To these are added any longer-term government securities on the 
basis that they are also liquid, interest-bearing and low credit risk, but they carry maturity 
risk and therefore are expected to be held for longer, albeit still at the bank’s initiative. And 
finally, assets that are non-interest bearing and/or totally illiquid and that, for different 
reasons, a bank would be expected to match to paid-up capital: investments in the equity of 
other firms, bad and doubtful debts, and cash.  
 
Exhibit P.1 – example of a chart showing a bank’s asset and liability matching strategy 
 
 
The stacking of liabilities is organised as follows: at the bottom, customer deposits, as these 
are stable but costly (for a Country bank); then the bank’s own banknotes in circulation, 
which have very low cost, but whose balances are assumed to be more uncertain and 
unstable; and finally the paid-up equity capital, taken to be the most permanent liability and 
not needing a fixed return, at least conceptually (in practice some banks treated this as a 
form of deposit with a minimum fixed interest, but this was only a contingent obligation 
that was suspended at times of financial difficulty).   
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The legend on the right shows, starting at the bottom, the first category of liability shown at 
the base of the liability stack, followed by the second, and so forth. Above the three 
liabilities, the legend lists the various asset categories, once again starting with the asset 
category placed at the base of the asset stack. Each asset category band indicates the colour 
of the band used to represent it. As total assets and total liabilities in a balance sheets are 
equal, the top perimeter of the asset bands and the top perimeter of the liability bands will 
usually match; however, in some cases they may not, when small miscellaneous items are 
omitted in order to limit the number of bands and ensure the chart remains manageable.  
 
In this fictional example, for most of the period 1796-1819 this fictional bank has a small 
total lending activity  - overdrafts (purple), secured loans (blue), and bills discounted 
(electric green) - that grows from approximately £100,000 to £750,000 by 1815. This 
lending is always more than adequately funded by customer deposits of around £1.5 million 
(lowest black line). Deposits drop to £1 million during the first five years of the Restriction, 
and then recover to their pre-1797 levels. Excess customer deposits – i.e those that are not 
lent out to customers in one of the three methods above - are placed with this bank’s 
London correspondent (teal) and, after 1812, increasingly in short-dated government bills 
(brown). Except for the difficult year of 1803, the bank was successful in expanding the 
quantity of its own banknotes in circulation (middle black band) pretty much continuously 
up to 1811, after which the amount remains flat. Throughout, the bank re-invests this 
funding derived from banknotes approximately one-third into cash (yellow) and two-thirds 
into long-dated government bonds (khaki green), perhaps matching the perceived worst-
case reflux in their notes. During the peak expansion of their balance sheet, created by the 
recovery in customer deposits and the simultaneous expansion in their banknote issuance, 
the bank places a portion of this extra funding into short-dated government bills (brown) 
and the remainder with its correspondent bank in London (teal).  Equity capital (top black 
band) is matched to its own equity investments (azure), and doubtful debts (light blue).   
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PART III 
Case studies of Country banks 
 
Chapter 6. The Bank of Scotland and Coutts 
 
1. Historical context 
2. The nature of the Coutts – Bank of Scotland correspondent banking 
3. The Coutts asset and liability business model: a hybrid Goldsmith-Discounter 
4. Growth and stagnation of Coutts – Bank of Scotland correspondent banking 
5. The Bank of Scotland asset and liability business model: implications 
6. Turnover rates, the transactional environment and the balance sheet velocity of specie 
7. London banks’ credit exposure to ‘fringe’ Country bank risk 
 
The records for Coutts and the Bank of Scotland, and those of the Smith group in the next 
Chapter, are the only ones that allow the financial historian to investigate the monetary 
flows between London and the Country from ‘both ends of the pipe’, i.e. as evidenced in 
the accounts of both banks over the same period of time. In this chapter I explore the 
interplay of these two large London and Edinburgh banks operating under different 
corporate structures, and triangulate their balance sheet behaviour in order to reveal insights 
into: (a) the correspondent banking relationships between the country and the London 
banks; (b) the way the Scottish bank managed its assets and liabilities following the Ayr 
Bank crisis of 1772-4; (c) what the detailed daily flows between Coutts and the Bank of 
Scotland tell us about the balance sheet velocity of specie and the extent to which this met 
the criteria of Smith (1776: 403) idealized ‘pond’ with balanced inflows and outflows of 
paper money closely matching “what the circulation of the country could absorb and 
employ”; and (d) the potential for credit and liquidity risks to rapidly shift between banks 
situated near the ‘core’ source of liquidity in London and the banks located in the ‘fringe 
banking’ sector outside London. We conclude by relating these to our broader interest in 
the behaviour of Britain’s money and banking at the time of the Restriction.    
 
On the eve of the Restriction in 1796, Coutts & Co. was already a member of the “£1 
million Club” within the London banks: following a multi-year period of rapid growth its 
balance sheet had reached £1.4 million. It owed this to the growth in its correspondent 
banking business with the Bank of Scotland, the pre-eminent bank in Scotland under the 
control of Henry Dundas and for whom Coutts acted as sole London agent from 1793. The 
Bank of Scotland balance sheet already exceeded £2M. Viewed together, the two banks 
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almost certainly constituted the largest London-and-Country monetary hub, ahead of the 
Smith group. As a London bank, Coutts could not issue its own banknotes and was 
constrained in its corporate form to using a private partnership with a maximum of six 
partners; by contrast the Bank of Scotland enjoyed both limited liability and the freedom to 
issue its own banknotes, making it closer in form to the Bank of England. In contrast to the 
more constrained London banks that were more exposed to the cyclicality of the flows of 
specie under the gold standard, the Bank of Scotland used its greater freedoms to 
successfully increase its capital and expand its balance sheet throughout the 1780s and 
1790s. Conversely, after 1800 when, unleashed by the Restriction, the London banks were 
experiencing their fastest growth, the Bank of Scotland’s lending and balance sheet 
stagnated.   
 
This asynchronous growth in Scottish balance sheets prior to 1797 explains why Coutts & 
Co. balance sheet grew faster than other London banks prior to the Restriction. By 1797 
Coutts’ correspondent banking business with Scotland had grown to account for almost 
half its balance sheet, causing it to operate with a hybrid business model combining in equal 
parts the Goldsmith and Discounter profiles adopted by other London banks (Chapter 4, 
5). The core business involved direct deposit-taking and secured-lending relationships with 
individual customers, in keeping with the Goldsmith model; alongside, Coutts had a large 
wholesale correspondent banking business that is an example of the Discounter model.  
 
 
6.1  Historical context  
 
I begin by summarizing the origins of Coutts’ and the Bank of Scotland as outlined in 
Orbell & Turton (2001: 170-1 and 76-7) and in Saville’s (1996) full biography of the Bank of 
Scotland, before focusing on a new analysis of their balance sheets.  
 
Coutts traced its origins to the goldsmith John Campbell who traded in the Strand, London 
from 1692, and the bank has been based at No. 59 since 1739. James Coutts, husband to 
John Campbell’s granddaughter, joined the business in 1755 when the business became 
known as Campbell & Coutts. John Campbell died in Italy in 1750, followed by his partner 
George Campbell in 1760, and at that point Thomas Coutts joined his brother James and 
together they took over the business, trading under the name J. & T. Coutts. After James 
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retired in 1775, Thomas went on to lead the business (now named solely after him) for 
nearly fifty years until his death in 1822, becoming a leading eminence grise of London banking 
circles.  
 
The Bank of Scotland was created by an act of the Scottish parliament of 1695, a year after 
the Bank of England, and given the right to raise capital under limited liability; it began with 
136 proprietors in Scotland and 36 from London subscribing a total of Scottish £120,000 
(Orbell and Turton, 2001: 76). From early on an important part of its business was the issue 
of paper currency in the form of transferable bills or (interest-bearing) promissory notes 
(Saville, 1996:76). After the union of Scotland with England in 1701, a royal charter in 1727 
permitted the founding of a second bank, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and a period of 
competition followed, soon enjoined by the creation in the 1730s of the first private bank of 
John Coutts & Co. The latter subsequently become Sir William Forbes, James Hunter & 
Co. when Thomas and James pulled out, deciding to concentrate on the London business 
[see connections with Herries Farquhar & Co in Chapter 4]. This competition expressed 
itself primarily in battles to have each bank’s notes accepted by the population in preference 
over those of its competitor. However, in 1772-4 Scotland experienced the Ayr Bank crisis 
described in detail by Adam Smith (Chapter 2). Kosmetatos (2014: 5), drawing on Hoppit 
(1986), describes it as Great Britain’s first “major endogenous financial [crisis] caused by 
growth itself, rather than war or government policy”. The lessons learnt from that crisis 
regarding the management of paper money were still visible in the differentiated behaviour 
of the Bank of Scotland balance sheet at the time of the Restriction.  
 
Henry Dundas (1742-1811), later the 1st Viscount Melville, was an Edinburgh lawyer and a 
controversial Tory politician who became the major political force representing Scottish 
banking interests following the 1772 Ayr Bank crisis. The Ayr Bank (Douglas, Heron & 
Co.) was established in 1769 “with the support of prominent landowners, merchants, and 
professionals throughout the Lowlands, and the express purpose to provide the capital that 
the chartered Edinburgh banks would not, and could not, supply themselves” (Kosmetatos, 
2014: 5) or as Adam Smith (1776: 399-400) describes, “for the express purpose of relieving 
the distress of the country” [i.e. Scotland] whose local capital was insufficient to finance the 
growing sugar and tobacco trade with the Americas (Hamilton, 1963). Amongst the 
subscribers was the Duke of Buccleuch whom Adam Smith had taught and taken on his 
‘grand tour’ of Europe. The Ayr Bank stopped payment in 1772 when Alexander Fordyce, a 
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Scotsman and senior partner in the London bank of Neale, James, Fordyce & Down ran 
away to the Continent in June 1772 after suffering large losses on trades in East India 
shares. The Ayr Bank collapsed with over £1.2 million of liabilities (Checkland, 1975: 124-
5), a huge sum in the context of contemporary banking, equivalent to one-fifth of the Bank 
of England’s balance sheet and one-and-half times larger than the largest London bank. The 
potential contagion risk was great and, “like a company connected by an electrical wire”, 
spread a series of cascading failures such that “people in every corner of the country have 
almost simultaneously received the same shock” (Boswell, 1773 cited in Kosmetatos, 
2014:5).  
 
The Ayr Bank crisis and the resulting credit shortages lasted for two years and were 
eventually resolved when in 1774 Parliament agreed to a scheme put forward by Dundas in 
his capacity as Solicitor General of Scotland: refinance the bank’s redeemable annuities 
(which carried a crippling yield of 15%) with a special issue of 5% bonds to be treated pari 
passu with East India bonds (Saville, 1996: 165) – a scheme which effectively rescued the 
creditors of the Ayr bank by socialising its debts and buttressing its creditworthiness with 
the tax base of the entire country. Reflecting this growing role as the champion of Scottish 
interests, later that same year Dundas was elected MP and thereafter represented Edinburgh 
without interruption until 1802, when he was made a peer.  In 1774 Dundas was also 
appointed Deputy Governor of the Bank of Scotland, as the fallout from the crisis moved 
public opinion in favour of his advocacy of greater centralised control and regulation of the 
banking system to protect against “over-trading”. By 1778 he and a group of close 
associates representing Tory interests had also taken control of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
placing his friend the Duke of Buccleuch as Governor, arguing that it was “for the 
substantial good of both banks [that they should] co-operate on a larger scale but not … 
[formally] unite” (Anon, 1778 in Saville, 1996: 175). The two banks formed an oligopoly 
that controlled the monetary and credit system in Scotland and could impose a framework 
independent of the Bank of England.  
 
Dundas was a close ally of William Pitt, and by the eve of the Restriction “Henry Dundas 
was at the zenith of his political power. In 1794 he was appointed Secretary of [of State for] 
War; he already had his India office [President of the powerful India Board of Control since 
1793] and the Treasurership of the navy, and in 1800 he was made Keeper of the Privy Seal 
of Scotland. In the elections of 1796, his interests won thirty-six of Scotland’s forty-five 
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seats” (Saville, 1996:195-6). As Treasurer to the Navy, Dundas appointed Alexander Trotter 
as Paymaster General; using his power of attorney, Trotter controversially moved 
substantial sums to an account at Coutts bank where Alexander’s brother, Robert Coutts 
Trotter had been a partner since 1794 (The Naval Chronicle, 1806: 505). Ostensibly this was 
for the convenience of having a bank closer to the Navy Pay Office after it moved from 
Broad Street to Somerset House, but this contravened an Act brought in 1785 that obliged 
all Navy funds to be kept at the Bank of England, and excluded the Paymaster from 
benefiting from the interest on any idle funds (Hamilton, 2011: 28). After a naval 
commission of enquiry censured Dundas in April 1805, his enemies brought impeachment 
charges a year later, and these events appear (below) to have had an impact on the Bank of 
Scotland. He was eventually cleared and restored to the Privy Council and died in his sleep 
in 1811.  
 
 
6.2  The nature of the Coutts – Bank of Scotland correspondent banking  
 
Contractual structure, credit limits, and pricing policy 
  
A series of letters in the Coutts files provides a useful window into the typical wholesale 
arrangements made between a London Discounter bank and their Country correspondents: 
these cover transaction fees, average balances and interest thereon, and overdraft limits.  
 
The London banks would offer to act as the Country bank’s paying agent in return for a fee 
calculated as a percentage of total volumes transacted, plus a minimum average balance that 
the Country bank should leave on its account.41 Some, but not all London banks paid credit 
interest on those positive balances, at rates well below the ‘market rate’ of 5%. The London 
bank might also stipulate a maximum overnight overdraft limit to cover exceptional deficits 
created by timing differences in how bills were presented for payment, and on which 
interest was charged.  
 
Around 1786, Coutts and the Bank of Scotland put in place an omnibus agreement. Coutts 
acted as the London paying agent for all the Bank of Scotland’s business in bills, in return 
                                                
41 “Payment is sometimes made by a deposit – sometimes by a fixed Salary – but in whichever way made the 
sum allowed must be equal to the trouble and risk.” Coutts archive: letter to George Sandy dated 8 June 1816 
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for a single fee structure. Thomas’s letters to the Edinburgh Treasurer indicate that Coutts 
monitored the account balance at the aggregate level, suggesting he viewed the credit risk as 
being to a single entity.  There was a master agreement under which Coutts maintained 
separate sub-accounts for each of the Bank of Scotland’s agents in the Scottish burghs as 
well as one in the name of the bank’s Treasurer, representing the bank’s central treasury. 
These Bank of Scotland agents were traders and lawyers who were not formally employees 
of the Bank of Scotland, operating more as franchisees in the different Scottish burghs: they 
swore an oath of allegiance to the Bank; their contract specified an annual fee plus a 
commission, but they were liable for all their losses on bills of exchange; and were expected 
to follow a set of standard practices which grew longer with time (Saville, 1996: 179). 
Initially Thomas Coutts must have been impressed by what he observed of the financial 
behaviour of these agents, for in 1793 he suggested to the Bank of England that they imitate 
it (Saville, 1996: 184); twenty years later he had probably revised his opinion (see below).  
 
In the early stages of the relationship, when the Bank of Scotland still dealt with other 
London banks, the fee was set at ¼% of annual turnover, but three years later it was 
changed to a flat fee of £600 p.a. It was perhaps Coutts’ willingness to accept a flat fee that 
influenced the Bank of Scotland’s decision in 1793 to focus all its business with them, 
which Coutts took on whilst increasing the fee to £1,400 p.a.. By 1815 Thomas Coutts 
appears to have regretted that fee model. Based on Thomas’s letters, his initial intention had 
been that half of that flat fee would cover the expected costs of paying the Clerks employed 
to transact the business, plus the relevant share of “Rent, Taxes, Stationary and other 
Charges incident to every Business and referable to the Bank [of Scotland]’s Concerns.”42 
The other half of the £1,400 fee, plus the interest Coutts earned on any idle balances would 
make up Coutts’ profit: “the remaining £700, with the advantage of the surplus Balance, 
forms our compensation for the care and responsibility of managing Transactions requiring 
great accuracy.”43 In other words, he expected “the general Tenor of the account, except on 
particular Occasion, was understood as being left to be conducted as Bankers accounts 
usually are”44, i.e. to remain in credit. 
 
However, the Bank of Scotland did not always follow the principle behind Coutts’ charging 
model. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars Coutts was taking significant credit risk on the 
                                                
42 Coutts Special Letter Book, (Coutts archive): letter to George Sandy Esq. of 8 June 1816. 
43 Ibid, letter dated 19 Aug 1815. 
44 Ibid, letter to George Sandy dated 14 Aug 1815. 
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Bank of Scotland (see section 6.7 below) in return for a fee that no longer covered his direct 
costs of operating the business. A letter dated 27 March 1816 from Coutts to the Bank of 
Scotland Treasurer reveals how Coutts’ effective rate was still too low despite greater 
competitive pressure amongst London banks during the Restriction having halved fees. The 
going rate in the London market for correspondent banking services had halved from ¼% 
to 1/8% as a result of the booming volumes of bill discounting and the greater ease of 
rediscounting at the Bank of England. Indeed, in 1813 Coutts had proposed a similar, but 
smaller correspondent banking arrangement to Yarborough & Co with a fee of 1/8% and a 
minimum balance of £2,000.45 Coutts states that a “commission of one eighth per Cent [is] 
the rate usually paid” for paying agent services, yet the preferential flat fee of £1,400 was 
just 1/11th of one percent (sic) of the 1794 volume of £1.5 million of bills, “although we do 
not know that any rate as low as this was ever acted upon.”46 By 1815 the volumes handled 
by Coutts had grown further to “within a few thousand pounds of Four millions,”47 
reducing Coutts effective fee to just 1/30th of one per cent.  
 
Accounting practices and the offsetting inter-bank flows  
 
Until 1815, Coutts recorded transactions relating to the Bank of Scotland on both the debit 
and credit side of its summary end-June General Balance under the name of the Secretary of 
the Bank of Scotland, James Fraser (until 1802) or Robert Forrester (1803-1814), as well as 
the names of the 24 individual agents of the Bank of Scotland located in the Scotland. After 
1815 it recorded the aggregate balance as a single line item, matching the practice used 
throughout by the Bank of Scotland in its annual balance sheet.  
 
The Bank of Scotland recorded all its transactions with Coutts through one account, for 
which we have the daily detail from 1812 to 1816, and the annual end-March balance for 
the years 1796-1822. The accounting methods revealed in the daily book are consistent with 
those described in Samuel Smith of Derby’s daily letters to its London correspondent 
[analysed in the next Chapter 7].  Individual transfers and payment orders were recorded 
individually on the day they were notified or instructed by the customer, and then signed off 
in the margin when confirmation of their execution was received from Coutts a few days 
later. These would include a wide range of transaction types: money paid into Coutts in 
                                                
45 Ibid, letters to Coutts Trotter dated 6 Sept and to Mssrs. Yarborough & Co dated 15 Sept 1813. 
46 Ibid, letter to George Sandy Esq. of 17 March 1816. 
47 Ibid, letter to George Sandy Esq. of 17 March 1816. 
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favour of a Bank of Scotland client or, vice versa, sums paid out in London by way of debit 
to the account of a Bank of Scotland client; the London customers of Scottish companies 
settling their bills (invoices) by paying into Coutts; sales and purchases of securities by the 
Bank of Scotland or its customers and settled at Coutts; dividends on securities received at 
Coutts in its role as the bank’s London custodian.  
 
The majority of these transactions were settled through offsetting accounting entries. Only 
very occasionally, the Coutts account at the Bank of Scotland would be credited for 
quantities of silver and Bank of England banknotes sent by Coutts to the Bank of Scotland. 
 
In addition to these individually specified payments, every week the Bank of Scotland would 
credit the Coutts account for all drafts that the London bank had paid out on its behalf (a 
one-line entry called “By Drafts due since [date] inclusive”), and debit the account for all 
the bills due to the Bank of Scotland that had been settled in London by paying into Coutts 
(a one-line entry called “To Bills due since [date] inclusive” or “To Bills paid and Returned 
since [date]”). The credit balances resulted from Coutts cashing in (or re-discounting) bills 
drawn on London and owned by the Bank of Scotland. These were bills drawn on the 
account with a London bank that the Bank of Scotland or its agents had bought (i.e. 
discounted) from clients in Scotland who needed the money before the date at which those 
bills became due. The Bank of Scotland would then send these bills to Coutts. “On receipt 
[of the bill] in London, a (junior) member of the [Coutts] staff sought the drawee’s 
endorsement for later payment. When that day arrived, the [Coutts] staff collected 
banknotes or a note against an account at Coutts” (Saville, 1996: 188). The note served as 
an instruction to debit an account at Coutts (what, today, would be a cheque made out to 
cash).  As explained by Bosanquet in his version of the Law of Reflux (Chapter 3), against 
these daily wholesale credit balances, Coutts paid out banknotes or gold coin to other 
London banks only when there was a net amount owing on bills travelling in the opposite 
direction for which it acted as the Bank of Scotland’s paying agent: i.e. bills payable at the 
Bank of Scotland, but sent to London and presented to Coutts for settlement.   
 
Through correspondent banking relationships such as the one between Coutts and the Bank 
of Scotland, Bosanquet’s Transfer and Set Off machine in London was extended to support 
the circulation of paper quasi-monies outside London: it economized the use of high-
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powered money, but clearly was labour-intensive for the banks that engaged most actively 
with these new paper instruments (see sections 6.6 and 6.7 for a fuller analysis). 
 
 
6.3  The Coutts business model: a hybrid Goldsmith-Discounter  
 
Under Thomas’ direction during the 1790s, Coutts had only a core part of its balance sheet 
that matched the Goldsmith model. Alongside this core business, Coutts had come to 
absorb a large correspondent banking relationship with the Bank of Scotland (and smaller 
ones with the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Aberdeen Banking Co.) that operated like the 
‘Discounter’ model (Exhibit 6.1).  
 
There was one difference between Coutts’ large correspondent banking activity and that of 
the pure ‘Discounter’ model practised by Prescott’s (Chapter 4) insofar as the work of 
prospecting for clients for the discounting service was done entirely by the banks in 
Scotland, where the locus of the client relationship remained. Coutts acted solely as the 
outsourced client-servicing bureau in London; other London Discounters mixed wholesale 
correspondent banking with an offer of discounting services directly to non-bank end-
clients. By contrast, Coutts’ direct client business seems to have principally involved the 
secured medium term lending typical of Goldsmiths.   
 
A static analysis of the Coutts balance sheet in 1796 places it in the hybrid half-Goldsmith 
half-Discounter business model. However, for the purpose of our dynamic analysis of the 
London money supply, I include Coutts in the Discounter business-model cluster (Chapter 
5) because the growth dynamic of its balance sheet is dominated by (the changes in) its 
handling as agent of the discounting business of the Scottish banks for whom it acted as 
correspondent. By 1814, Coutts had total assets of £2,948,702 of which £1,517,558 were 
balances due from the Bank of Scotland and its agents; of the remaining assets of 
£1,431,114, only £90,949 were bills discounted directly by Coutts as principal.  
 
This dynamic categorisation finds additional justification when analysing Coutts’ holdings of 
government securities as a proportion of (a) total assets and (b) only the assets outside the 
Bank of Scotland accounts. When judged by the former, Coutts’ behaviour is closest to 
other Discounters; when judged only by the assets outside the Bank of Scotland 
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relationship, Coutts is a Goldsmith. Already prior to the Restriction Coutts held a larger 
part of its assets in traded securities compared to other Goldsmiths: this is because Thomas 
Coutts had acquired an early understanding of the usefulness of liquid securities in 
managing the volatility of the daily calls upon its core reserves of gold coin created by the 
growing Bank of Scotland business - as he had already explained in his letters to them in 
1785. Then, during the Restriction, Coutts did not ramp up these holdings of government 
securities like other Goldsmiths, if viewed at the level of the whole balance sheet. However, 
if viewed solely through the lens of its non-Bank-of-Scotland assets, during the Restriction 
Coutts nearly doubled the proportion of government securities like other Goldsmiths, from 
9.6% to 18.4% (see Chapter 11).  
 
Exhibit 6.1 – Coutts & Co: a hybrid balance sheet structure, 1796 
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Coutts’ asset strategy appears to have imitated, or perhaps supported Dundas’ politically 
motivated strategy of holding stakes in numerous banks of importance to the Scottish 
banking system, and especially the Bank of England – something rarely seen in other 
balance sheets. It appears to have been a practice amongst bankers with a Scottish 
background to regard holdings in Bank of England stock as an appropriate way to invest 
surplus liquidity, in addition to government securities. Indeed, the Bank of Scotland held 
£178,163 of Bank of England shares at the time of the first available balance sheet on 27 
March 1796 and these more than doubled to £378,730 by 1822. Similarly, Coutts’ holding 
of Bank stock nearly quadrupled during the Restriction, reaching a peak of £184,000 in 
1818.  
 
 
6.4 Growth and stagnation of the Coutts – Bank of Scotland business 
 
Growth in Scottish banking before the Restriction 
 
In the years following the 1772 Ayr Bank crisis there was a substantial expansion in the 
Scottish economy matched by growth in both the number of banks and in the Bank of 
Scotland’s lending. Thomas Coutts in London was able to tap into this period of growth 
thanks to his Scottish connections, and in particular with Dundas. 
 
In the seventy-seven years between the creation of the Bank of Scotland in 1695 and the 
1772 crisis there were 16 banks formed in Scotland. The subsequent years up to the 
Restriction saw the formation of almost twice as many banks in a third of the time: 16 new 
private banks and 11 new provincial banks Saville, 1996: Table 15.1). Unlike in England, 
this period prior to the Restriction was the most fertile for the deepening of the Scottish 
banking system. In Scotland the Restriction years did not match this rate of bank formation, 
but nevertheless produced an expansion in the broad money supply by encouraging a 
second wave of new provincial banks (Exhibit 6.2). These new entrants were also less likely 
to have retained the lessons from the Ayr Bank collapse.  
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Exhibit 6.2 – New bank formations in Scotland, 1695-1832 
 
 
 
Growth of the Bank of Scotland and Coutts before the Restriction 
 
It was during this period prior to the Restriction that the Bank of Scotland’s activity grew 
substantially and it began opening a network of branches and agencies that extended to 
eighteen in 1793. Although we do not have balance sheet records for this period, the 
growth can be estimated from the revenue records that show them growing from £8,920 in 
1772 to £93,063 by 1797, and net profit growing from £6,857 to £76,284, both 
compounding at annual rates of 10% (Saville, 1996: table A.2). This growth in the Bank of 
Scotland’s lending was supported by a substantial increase in its capital - steered through 
Parliament by Dundas. The permitted paid-up capital was raised from a maximum 
permitted of £80,000 in 1772 to £400,000 following the 1793 crisis, then £650,000 by 1796, 
and finally to £1 million just ahead of the Restriction being introduced – although the 
March 1797 records show that only £164,409 of the last increase had been paid up.  The 
remaining £196,441 - contrary to the advice of Adam Smith following the Ayr Bank crisis - 
was treated either as a loan to the proprietors or as due on partly paid shares. Although by 
March 1800 this last capital increase was fully completed in cash terms, this time it did not 
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lead to a continuing expansion of the balance sheet. The reasons for this are discussed in 
(iii) below. 
 
The records show that in 1779 Coutts began a correspondent banking relationship with the 
Bank of Scotland. Until the banking crisis of 1793, the Bank of Scotland maintained two 
London correspondents, the other being Kinloch & Hogg, and during that time its deposits 
represented 3-12% of Coutts’ total liabilities. In 1793 the Bank of Scotland closed the 
Kinloch account, and thereafter we observe a rapid increase in its balances with Coutts. On 
the eve of the Restriction they accounted for 40% of the Coutts balance sheet, and they 
remained at that average level until 1814 (Exhibit 6.3). This rapid growth of the Scottish 
economy and the Bank of Scotland’s lending in the years immediately prior to the 
Restriction had a corresponding favourable impact on Thomas Coutts’ bank (Exhibit 6.4) 
and enabled him to grow the balance sheet at an 11% compound annual growth rate, 
considerably faster than the average of his London peer group, much faster than the Bank 
of England, and faster than nominal GDP (see Exhibits 5.6 and 5.7 in the previous 
chapter).  
 
However, after 1800, for the following decade until the Bullion report, Coutts’ balance sheet 
continues to grow, but this cannot be so clearly attributed to the Bank of Scotland. The 
Bank of Scotland’s reported balance sheet – contrary to the experience of London banks - 
stagnated during the Restriction (Exhibit 6.4). During the period of fastest expansion in the 
Bank of England’s discounting of private sector commercial paper between 1800 and 1809, 
the Bank of Scotland’s net balance sheet (after extracting offsetting (non-cash) items) 
actually shrunk by 20%. By contrast, Coutts’ balance sheet – whether including or excluding 
the Bank of Scotland accounts – was able to keep growing at 3% p.a., albeit at a rate that 
was the slowest amongst our sample of Discounters, being little more than half the rate of 
growth of the Bank of England’s balance sheet, and more akin to the growth rates displayed 
by the Goldsmith banks over that period. 
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Exhibit 6.3 – Bank of Scotland deposits with Coutts, as a % of Coutts’ total liabilities 
 
 
Exhibit 6.4 – Growth of the Bank of Scotland and Coutts, 1774 - 1822 
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Bank of Scotland lending stagnates during and after the Restriction  
 
Scotland’s monetary system did not seem to respect the Bullionist hypotheses: before the 
Restriction, notional convertibility of banknotes into specie did not impede its largest bank 
from expanding its balance sheet and note circulation some five times faster than the Bank 
of England. The Bank of Scotland balance sheet is that of a note-issuing joint-stock 
company and hence differs from those of other private banks in England. If the Bank of 
Scotland ‘pushed out’ its notes in order to fund an expansion of credit in Scotland, it did so 
mostly before the Restriction. By March 1801 total gross lending assets (all secured lending, 
plus bills discounted, plus lending balances out to its agents, but excluding overdraft 
balances on the accounts of Coutts, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and its Newcastle bank 
correspondents, as well as all (public sector) securities holdings) reached £1.5 million; that 
level was only slightly exceeded during the years of the Restriction’s main credit boom, 
peaking at £1.6 million in 1810.  
 
After the Restriction Act, if judged by the period of maximum expansion in the Bank of 
England’s circulation of banknotes by 155% between 1797 and 1814, that expansion could 
not be blamed for having induced an increase – let alone a proportionate increase - in the 
Bank of Scotland’s note circulation, which declined 23%, nor in the Bank of Scotland’s total 
net lending to the private sector – gross lending minus the portion self-funded by “contra” 
balances owing on the accounts of agents – which grew by just 1% in total. If judged by the 
period of maximum expansion in the Bank of England’s discounting of private sector bills 
by 206% between 1797 and 1810, the result is similar: the Bank of Scotland’s net lending 
grew by just 32% (Exhibit 6.5). 
 
Seen through the prism of the Bank of Scotland balance sheet, the Scottish experience 
during the whole Restriction period does not justify the notion that there was a generalised 
shortage of funding relative to the demand for credit. Instead, it points to a demand-driven 
credit market or one where the supply of credit was constrained by other factors such as the 
perceived availability of suitable borrowers – where the suitability criteria applied to 
borrowers may have encompassed the need to be a supporter of the Tory interests 
espoused by Dundas and the directors of the two leading banks.  
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Exhibit 6.5 – Bank of Scotland gross and net lending to the private sector, 1796-1822 
 
 
To understand this we compare the bank’s total lending to the private sector to its total 
non-equity funding. Total lending to the private sector is defined as the sum of secured 
loans, overdrafts, loan balances out to the agents, plus the stock of bills discounted, but not 
including holdings of government securities and equities of the Bank of England (or of the 
Bank of Scotland’s own shares). Total non-equity funding is defined as the sum of its call 
and time deposits, promissory notes, credit balances due to the agents plus their drafts 
payable by the treasurer, and all notes in circulation, but not including equity capital (which 
the bank called by the wonderful name of “Adventurers”). For the periods 1797-1805 and 
1812-22 the Bank of Scotland’s total non-equity funding always exceed total lending to the 
private sector (Exhibit 6.6). Even during the 1802 crisis the bank was able to maintain 
unchanged its total non-equity funding. Then, from 1810 until 1819 total non-equity 
funding grew strongly and yet total lending fell throughout the same period. Only during 
1806-1811 does total lending outstrip total non-equity funding, but this did not prevent 
total lending from experiencing its only period of continuous sustained growth, providing 
further support for the hypothesis that lending to the private sector was demand-led.   
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Exhibit 6.6 – Bank of Scotland: total net lending to private sector vs. non-equity funding,  
1796-1822 
 
 
The analysis of the Bank of Scotland’s balance sheet partly supports the argument made by 
Richard Saville (1996), the bank’s biographer, that the bank - and the state of Scottish credit 
markets - flourished while Pitt and Dundas were in power, up until the first peace treaty 
with Napoleon was signed in 1802; thereafter the bank never fully recovered from the 
combination of the 1803-4 recession and Dundas’ impeachment and loss of political power.  
Prior to 1802, Dundas’ various offices had enable Scotland’s businesses to benefit from 
Britain’s wartime contracts for the purchase of food, cloth and iron. Firms such as Carron 
& Co. operating out of Falkirk in Stirlingshire became the largest ironworks in the country 
and features regularly in the bank’s daily cashbook with large transfers to and from London. 
This appears to have rendered the Scottish economy particularly sensitive to the ebbs and 
flows of wartime spending. The peace at Amiens brought substantial cuts in government 
expenditure by the incoming Whig government of Lord Addington, which induced an 
economic recession that was felt hardest in Scotland. In its wake came a wave of 
bankruptcies and loan write-offs.  
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Saville (1996) blames the 1802-3-credit crisis in Scotland on Parliament’s unwillingness to 
bring assistance to the Scottish banks, which induced the Bank of Scotland in May 1803 to 
impose a cap on total lending by their agents. But a careful analysis of the balance sheet 
suggests the main catalyst for the credit crisis lay elsewhere and occurred earlier. Saville 
argues that with Pitt out of office since February 1801 and Dundas partially side-lined into a 
peerage, the cause lies in the Whig government’s rejection in 1803 of the Bank of Scotland’s 
request to repeat the remedy that had worked so well in the 1793 credit crisis (Saville, 1996: 
206-10). As in 1793, the proposal consisted of placing a special issue of Exchequer Bills 
with manufacturers on the security of their inventory of unsold goods, and the 
manufacturers would in turn use the Exchequer Bills as security for the repayment of their 
outstanding bills held by the banks, or simply discount them.  
 
The refusal of assistance from London obviously did not help the Scottish money market, 
but the timing of the first cutback in the Bank of Scotland’s lending precedes the refusal by 
over a year. It is the balance sheet as at March, 1802 that shows the first sharp cut in total 
net lending, from £976,793 a year earlier to £603,405. The likely reason for this was the 
discovery during 1801 that the bank’s “late agent” at Haddington, a Mr. Hay Smith, had left 
£130,984 of bad and doubtful debts – equivalent to 5% of the bank’s total assets and 
enough to wipe out nearly 12% of its capital and reserves. Such losses would certainly have 
induced a spirit of caution in any bank director.  Indeed, Saville recounts how the discovery 
of these losses led to strict new measures of control being imposed over agents from June 
1801, with accountants brought in to draw up weekly accounts and others conducting 
unannounced inspections (Saville, 1996: 214-5). Two years earlier the bank had begun to set 
aside what it called “funds to answer losses”, a reserve of profits against future bad debts, 
but the initial sums reserved were a paltry £700, just 0.06% of total net lending. In March 
1802 the bank wrote off £7,000 and increased the reserve to £20,000; the following year it 
wrote off £15,000 specifically against the Haddington agency loans, followed by even larger 
sums each year until 1806. When the year 1805-6 finally brought a 15% jump in gross 
revenues, the bank took the opportunity to take the Haddington bull by the horns: it wrote 
off £35,200 of losses, partly offsetting the hit to the P&L by drawing down its reserve 
against bad debts from £35,000 to £15,000. The better environment also helped with 
recoveries and the outstanding Haddington bad debts were more than halved from 
£107,974 to a more manageable £47,391.  
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6.5  The Bank of Scotland asset and liability model: implications  
 
The banking system at the end of eighteenth-century could expand the broad money supply 
through three avenues: pushing out more banknotes, or raising the asset-side gearing to 
cash reserves, or by increasing the number of banks helping to re-circulate the deposit base 
through additional lending. Analysis of the Bank of Scotland’s balance sheet highlights a 
mix of these factors different from those present in English banks. Analysing the balance 
sheet in both gross and net terms from 1796 to 1822 reveals a systematic and prudent policy 
towards asset and liability management – which has implications for our understanding of 
Britain’s broad money supply and the balance sheet velocity of cash. The bank’s operational 
oversight of its agents’ transactions may have been caught out by the Haddington agent 
debacle, but a generation after the Ayr Bank collapse the management of its overall balance 
sheet still reflected a better understanding of the lessons learned compared to many of the 
new English start-ups.  
 
The lessons from the 1772 Ayr Bank crisis led to two lasting biases amongst the Scottish 
banks operating at the time: an asset-side bias against secured term lending, such as was 
conducted by the Goldsmith banks in London, and a liability-side bias against the excessive 
use of banknotes relative to the capital base. The Ayr crisis had brought home to Scottish 
bankers both the real-world limitations of the Real Bills theory, and also real-world 
weaknesses of the assumption that profit and loss incentives would induce the Smithian 
‘ponds of money’ to self-equilibrate. 
 
As described in Chapter 2, Adam Smith had carefully enumerated the lessons learned from 
the collapse of the Ayr bank. He used these as real-world examples of the caveats to the 
theoretical propositions of the Real Bills Doctrine and as a warning against taking its 
normative implications too literally. His analysis was subsequently validated by the 
conclusions of the official report into the collapse (Anon, 1778b). One of the main lessons 
learned was the importance of assets having adequate liquidity to match that granted to the 
bank’s creditors. The Ayr bank’s failure was attributed primarily to excessive lending against 
illiquid real assets. In Adam Smith’s (1776: 400) words: 
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 “It was the avowed principle of this bank to advance, upon any reasonable security, the 
whole capital which was to be employed in those improvements of which the returns are 
the most slow and distant, such as the improvements of land.” 
 
The mistake was to confuse the long-term value of the underlying collateral, taken by the 
bank as security against its loans, with the capacity of that collateral to be converted into 
short-term liquidity in the form of a money-instrument (‘cash’) that was acceptable for the 
extinguishing of the bank’s liabilities.  It is a mistake made throughout history: confusing, 
on the one hand, the degree of solvency based on a bank’s net worth, when this is 
calculated using estimated asset values as a going concern (or, even worse, the risk-weighted 
equivalent value of those assets), and on the other hand the bank’s capacity to meet its 
immediate obligations to redeem or repay its liabilities. Again in Smith’s (1776: 403) words: 
 
“At the first setting out of this bank, it was the opinion of some people, that how fast 
soever its coffers might be emptied, it might easily replenish them by raising money upon 
the securities of those to whom it had advanced its paper [notes]. Experience, I believe, 
soon convinced them that this method of raising money was much too slow to answer their 
purpose; and that coffers which were originally so ill filled [i.e. the bank had always been 
under-capitalised], and which emptied themselves so very fast, could be replenished by no 
other expedient but the ruinous one of drawing bills upon London, and when they became 
due, paying them with other draughts upon the same place with accumulated interest and 
commission.” 
 
As shareholders in the Ayr Bank, Dundas and his friends had bitter experience of the bank’s 
collapse and brought these lessons with them to the two main oligopolistic banks: the Bank 
of Scotland and the Royal Bank. The balance sheet of the Bank of Scotland reveals these 
biases – at least during the first decade of the Restriction – and behaves in different ways to 
other English banks. There is no evidence of an enhanced effort to ‘push out its notes’ after 
1797 and the asset-side gearing to cash does not inflate until after 1805; when it does, it 
serves only briefly to expand lending until 1810. Following the decline in the demand for 
credit after 1810, the additional non-cash assets are invested in government bonds. And 
there is strong evidence that the bank worked hard to apply a consistent policy of matching 
assets and liabilities by their degree of liquidity and the degree of control that the bank had 
over their redemption or other form of realisation into cash.  
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Exhibit 6.7 - Bank of Scotland: asset and liability matching, reported gross view 1796-1822 
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Exhibit 6.8 - Bank of Scotland: asset and liability matching, net view 1796-1822 
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By re-ordering assets by the degree of control and overlaying the liabilities re-ordered by the 
degree of permanence or ‘stickiness’, this consistent policy for asset and liability 
management is revealed in the two charts (Exhibit 6.7 and 6.8) on the previous pages, 
together with the related example (Exhibit P.1) and the explanatory notes in the Preface to 
Part III. 
 
 
Asset & liability policies compared 
 
Compared to contemporary English banks, capital and reserves played a far more important 
role in the balance sheet of the Bank of Scotland, accounting for 35 – 49% of the total 
reported balance sheet. The joint-stock company form made it possible to raise larger 
capital sums by appealing to large numbers of shareholders, while the lessons learned from 
the collapse of the under-capitalised Ayr Bank provided the incentive for Scottish bankers 
to use that capability. As a corollary, call and term deposits from clients – the mainstay of 
funding for most English private banks - played a relatively minor part in the total funding 
of the Bank of Scotland, accounting for just 10% of gross liabilities in 1796, of which 
almost two-thirds came via the bank’s agents in the burghs.  
 
Reflecting conservative banking practice, doubtful debts were matched to (a small part of 
the) equity capital, and the rest was consistently invested in liquid assets (Exhibit 6.8). In 
addition to cash itself, these liquid assets consisted of government bonds, Exchequer bills 
and Bank of England shares; all assets for which the timing of any redemption into ‘cash’ 
was under the control of the Bank of Scotland and could be relied upon to be executed 
quickly and continuously. 
 
Use of banknotes 
 
Beyond the large capital base, the remaining funding came from the Bank of Scotland’s 
issuance of notes. The substantial equity cushion supported a note-issuance that was already 
well developed before the Restriction, accounting for 51% of the reported gross liabilities in 
1796 (Exhibit 6.9). By comparison, well-managed and well-established private Country 
banks in England typically did not rely on note issuance to fund more than one-quarter of 
their balance sheets before 1796 (Chapters 7, 8, 9). Even Smith Ellison & Co in Lincoln, the 
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Smith group’s main engine for pushing out notes, only stretched its funding from 
banknotes to similar levels of 50-53% of assets after the Restriction Act (Chapter 7). 
 
However, in contrast to London banks, after the Restriction Act the Bank of Scotland’s 
note-issuance steadily declined as a proportion of total funding. From accounting for half the 
balance sheet funding before the Restriction, notes declined in importance to less than one-
quarter (23.3%) of the total funding by the time Britain decided to return to the gold 
standard in 1818 and remained at that level thereafter. After 1800 the Bank of Scotland 
notes in circulation also declined in terms of their total face value and the composition 
changed as the decline was mostly in the smaller denominations.  
 
Exhibit 6.9 – Bank of Scotland note circulation: total, composition and importance,  
1796-1822 
                  
 
It is possible that this change in composition away from smaller notes was at the bank’s 
own instigation as a reaction to the (failed) 1804 attempt by Vansittart, Addington’s 
Chancellor to prevent banks from re-using the notes presented for encashment, which 
would have made the stamp duty charges on issuing new small notes prohibitive. However, 
as the decline in small notes began earlier and continued throughout the Restriction, the 
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more likely catalyst is that after the 1802-4 crisis the ‘ordinary man’ in Scotland was less 
willing to hold paper money, while the wholesale merchants continued to use the higher 
denominations to transact their business.  In 1796 two-thirds of the notes in circulation 
were made up of what the bank called “small notes”, namely One Pound and One Guinea 
notes; “large notes” of £5 or more accounted for only one-third. By 1816 the two types of 
notes accounted for equal shares of the circulation.  
 
Funding strategy after 1811 
 
After Dundas died in 1811 the funding strategy changed in response to increasing 
competitive pressures, with more emphasis put on interest-bearing deposits. Until 1811, 
non-interest bearing deposits lodged at Edinburgh accounted for just 0.5% to 4% of total 
liabilities although the bank also issued a small amount of promissory notes paying between 
3% and 4% interest, but these accounted for no more than 2% of total liabilities. From 
1811 the bank felt obliged to react to the increasing local competition for deposits 
stemming from the growth in new banks. In 1810 the British Linen Bank, the third public 
bank created by royal charter in 1746, succeeded in obtaining permission to raise its capital 
from £200,000 to £500,000. Furthermore, ten of the twenty-three new banks to open in 
Scotland during the whole Restriction period did so in the period 1805-10, culminating in 
the creation of the important Dundee Union Bank (1809) and the Commercial Bank of 
Scotland (1810) – see Exhibit 6.1. The latter, a joint-stock bank, was created with a nominal 
capital of £3 million and the express purpose of expanding the credit available to the Whig 
interests in Scotland.  
 
In order to compete, the Bank of Scotland expanded its promissory note programme to 
include ‘deposit receipts’ paying 4%; this term was used by other country banks and referred 
to what we would call term deposits. Then in 1814 the bank began paying between 3% and 
4% on all deposits. As a result, total deposits (excluding balances from agents) grew from 
just 1% - 5% of total funding prior to 1810, to over 20% by 1819. As can be seen in Exhibit 
6.8, this strong growth in deposits drives an equivalent increase in the total balance sheet, 
but coincides with a decline in total lending. As a result the additional funding ends up 
almost entirely invested in Exchequer Bills. 
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Asset gearing 
 
The Bank of Scotland did not boost its balance sheet by pushing out more of its banknotes 
on the liability side, but it did expand its asset gearing during the Restriction, although not 
immediately after 1797, as the London Discounter banks did. On the eve of the Restriction 
in 1796-7, the Bank of Scotland kept a similar cash reserve ratio (17.7%) to Coutts (18.8%). 
But in contrast to Coutts, for the first seven years of the Restriction until 1804 it held the 
ratio almost constant at an average of 17.4%, while by 1805 Coutts’ ratio had fallen to a low 
of 6.4%. Only from 1805 the Bank of Scotland began increasing it’s gearing and by 1809 it 
had brought the cash ratio down to the same level as Coutts (10.2% versus 9.8%) – Exhibit 
6.10. 
 
Exhibit 6.10  - Comparing the cash reserve ratios of Bank of Scotland and Coutts,  
1796-1822 
 
 
This expanded gearing meant that, ceteris paribus, a larger proportion of its total funding 
(equity, deposits and notes) was being put back into circulation rather than held back as a 
cash reserve. However, everything else did not remain the same. At first, between 1805 and 
1810, the increased gearing allowed total private sector lending to recover to its 1800 level, 
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offsetting the headwind created by the declining circulation of the bank’s notes. After 1810, 
on a backdrop of a decline in both total lending and notes in circulation, the bank’s 
continuing adoption of higher levels of gearing now meant it was investing a greater 
proportion of its excess funding in higher-yielding government securities rather than cash 
(Exhibit 6.8). Because a portion of this excess funding was now generated from customer 
deposits on which the bank had begun paying 3% and 4% interest, being able to invest in 
interest-bearing government securities rather than zero-yielding cash would have been an 
important part of maintaining adequate profitability during the post-war economic slump. 
The bank rightly surmised that having started to pay very competitive rates of interest on 
deposits, those deposits could be considered more stable, thereby justifying continuing with 
the lower cash reserve ratio (higher gearing).   
 
 
6.6  Turnover rates, the transactional environment and the balance sheet 
velocity of specie 
 
The high total value of transactions flowing between Coutts and the Bank of Scotland points 
to the high balance sheet velocity of bank cash balances during the Restriction. Specie – and 
even Bank of England banknotes - played only a minor role. Within the banking system, the 
majority of transactions did not involve transfers of specie or even Bank of England 
banknotes, but rather were executed by offsetting accounting entries using other forms of 
quasi-money instruments.    
 
Inspection of the cumulative monthly transaction volumes from the perspective of Coutts’ 
account at the Bank of Scotland (Bank of Scotland archive ref: 1/103/8, and Exhibit 6.11 
below) confirms Thomas Coutts’s analysis: in the year to March 1816 a total of £3,965,812 
was credited to the Coutts account and £3,901,593 was debited. That same year the Bank of 
Scotland median month-end balance with Coutts was £22,926. This can be assumed to 
reflect a deposit of specie initially made by the Bank of Scotland to ‘anchor’ the account, 
and to approximate to the target balance expected by Coutts. We know this because in 
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additional] ten thousand pounds of Gold specie  … and we have placed the amount to the 
Bank’s Credit.”48   
 
Hence, The Bank of Scotland’s average deposit balance of specie with Coutts was 
supporting total annual monetary flows 170 times larger.  
 
This particular Smithian ‘pond of money’ was almost entirely filled, not with specie, but 
with paper-based forms of quasi-money representing book entries in the accounts of the 
Bank of Scotland and Coutts. These different forms of paper-based I.O.U vouchers 
representing book-entries in the accounts of one or the other bank would travel around the 
country and largely offset each other whenever they came to rest, requiring little change in 
the underlying stock of specie. On the surface, this ‘pond of money’ appeared calm and its 
level constant: of the near £4 million credited and debited by the Bank of Scotland to the 
Coutts account during the fiscal year 1815-16, only four entries totalling £8,600 constituted 
Bank of England notes sent up to Scotland, and a further six entries for transfers of silver 
totalling £1,800. During the entire four years of daily records examined (1812-16), of the 
total credited to the Coutts account of £14,439,604, only 0.16% constituted specie (£7,300 
of silver) and Bank of England notes and “tokens” (£15,709) sent up from London. 
Travelling in the opposite direction were £5,000 of gold sent from Edinburgh to Coutts on 
11th Oct 1813 and £10,000 of Bank of England notes in December 1814.  
 
Liquidity management and the reliance on London  
  
This pond of quasi-money was ruffled only to the extent of 0.04% per annum by the need 
to execute two-way transfers of specie and Bank of England notes, but below the surface it 
experienced some dramatic seasonal and structural currents. These major imbalances in the 
flows in and out of the pond were offset by sales and purchases of government securities. 
As with other Country banks, it was government securities that acted as a proxy for reserves 
of specie.   
  
                                                
48 Coutts & Co Archive: Coutts Letter Book, Thomas Coutts’ letter of 19 & 25 Oct 1811 to George Sandy requesting, 
and the Bank of Scotland agreeing to send an additional £10,000 in gold “by the Waggon”.   
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Exhibit 6.11 – Analysis of Bank of Scotland’s account at Coutts, as kept by the former, 
1812-16 
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Examining the daily records of the Coutts account with the Bank of Scotland between May 
1812 and March 1816, and stripping out the transactions in government securities, reveals 
that the underlying inflows and outflows could run up substantial imbalances (Exhibit 6.11 
and 6.12).  Computed this way (red line in Exhibit 6.12), even during the calmer period 
prior to mid-1814, month-end balances on the account varied from a positive balance (as 
required by the contractual agreements) of up to £96,551 to an overdraft in excess of 
£100,000, i.e. twice the agreed contractual maximum.  
 
This pattern in the net balance between the two banks deteriorated after the autumn of 
1814. A record Bank of Scotland credit balance with Coutts of £205,742 in November 1814, 
just two months later became a record overdraft of £170,002 (January 1815). Thereafter the 
overdrafts also became more persistent: from December 1814 through to January 1816 
there were only two months when the balance was in favour of the Bank of Scotland. In a 
telling reaction to these changing dynamics, in December 1814 the Bank of Scotland 
accountant begins to draw up a net position every week instead of just monthly.  
 
Exhibit 6.12 – Bank of Scotland view of their account at Coutts, and net securities trades,  
1812-1816 
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With the war with Napoleon petering out, the ensuing economic slump led to a deflating 
stock of paper-based quasi-money and a corresponding outflow of liquidity from the 
Country ‘fringe’ banking network and towards the core London banks. An analysis of the 
Bank of Scotland-Coutts net flows are an important litmus test for the ensuing pressures 
bearing down upon any less well-managed Country bank that was either under-capitalised 
or over-geared to its cash reserves. Without the bank of Scotland’s ability to call upon sales 
of its large holdings of government securities (matched against its equity capital), during 
fiscal year 1815-16 (March to March) the underlying customer flows between Coutts and the 
Bank of Scotland would have caused Edinburgh to have to send a net £205,517 to London 
in order to settle the payments imbalance. The imbalance was equivalent to 8% of the Bank 
of Scotland’s net balance sheet, 18% of its net capital and reserves, and 68% of its 
underlying cash reserve (actual balances of specie and Bank of England notes, minus the 
overdraft with Coutts). If, like the Ayr Bank, the bank had had a smaller paid-up equity 
capital, or had invested that equity in illiquid assets, then it would likely have had to stop 
payment by Oct 1815. Even assuming a best-case scenario where the Bank of Scotland was 
able to meet the obligations in London at least in part with transfers of Bank of England 
notes and not just with specie - thereby making all of its cash reserves effective for this 
purpose - the Bank of Scotland would have been relying on cash reserves of £302,578 to 
meet a net drain of £205,517. In such circumstances it would have struggled greatly to 
retain the confidence of its customers and avoid a run on the bank at a time when its net 
note circulation had already been shrinking for some years.  
 
It is not surprising that in 1815 Thomas Coutts was concerned at the creditworthiness of his 
largest client. Fortunately in 1785 Coutts had sought and obtained that the Bank of Scotland 
use some of its capital to hold government securities as an additional liquidity buffer, and to 
place these in custody with Coutts who would have the power of attorney to sell them in 
the event it became too uncomfortable with the size of the net overdraft balance49. In effect 
Thomas Coutts was accepting that the volume of business now justified overdrafts in excess 
of the agreed line of credit, but was requesting that the Bank of Scotland collateralize any 
such excess. The records show that the Bank of Scotland used its stock of government 
securities to offset both temporary and longer-term structural imbalances in the net flows 
with its London correspondent. It would sell Exchequer Bills (and sometimes government 
Consols) when the account went into overdraft and buy them back when the account was 
                                                
49 Coutts & Co Archive: Coutts Special Letter Book, 8 Apr 1785 
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back in surplus. What the records do not show is whether this pattern of behaviour reflects 
Thomas Coutts’ prompt exercise of his power of attorney, or the Bank of Scotland’s active 
liquidity management.  
 
Exhibit 6.13 – Bank of Scotland: revealed liquidity management function,  
May 1813 – Mar 1816 
 
 
Whoever was the initiator, the records over this period reveal a tightly defined reaction 
function (Exhibit 6.13). Every £1 overdraft (credit) balance on the account would cause 
£0.77 to be realised from the sale (spent on the purchase) of government securities. The 
‘target’ balance appears to have been zero net of the flow of interest payments accruing to 
the Bank of Scotland on its average stock of those securities (The regression shows: y = 
£2,627 [t=0.72] + 0.771 [t=16.03] * x, with adjusted R-sq. = 0.85, and where y = net 
monthly sum realised from sales (used to purchase) government securities, and x = net 
month-end overdraft (credit) of the Bank of Scotland on the Coutts account. The 
statistically insignificant constant of £2,627 is nevertheless approximately in line with the 
expected inflow of interest on the Bank of Scotland’s average stock of government 
securities at an average yield of 4.3%.). We interpret this as both banks adopting the rule-of-
thumb whereby approximately one-quarter (i.e. one minus 0.77) of any net monthly balance 
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was assumed to be “noise” caused by random differences in the timing of bills being 
presented plus the delays in communication between the two cities, and hence likely to be 
quickly reversed within a matter of days and not warranting the expense of buying or selling 
securities to cover it.  
 
Transactional environment of correspondent banking vs. the Goldsmith business model 
 
We don’t know what proportion of the bills bought by the Bank of Scotland ended up in 
London for settlement, and some doubtless were never sent down to London and instead 
settled locally across clients of the same agent, or regionally across clients of different agents 
of the Bank of Scotland, or lastly across clients of different Scottish banks. However, we 
can analyse the volume of transactions flowing between the Bank of Scotland and Coutts 
from 1812 to 1816: these flows were large, and contained many small ‘retail’ amounts. 
Analysing the number and value of the transactions flow allows inferences regarding the way 
the transactional environment influenced the bankers actively involved in correspondent 
banking; the balance sheet velocity of specie; and the instruments that were acting as 
proxies for ‘money’ in specie.  
 
The high number of transactions flowing between Coutts and the Bank of Scotland reveals 
the operating mind-set of the bankers that followed a Discounter business model. In a letter 
from Thomas Coutts to the Bank of Scotland he states that in the year to March 1816 “The 
amount that has passed through our hands [when acting as agent of the Bank of Scotland] 
has been about Four Millions received in about ten Thousand different amounts and paid 
away in Eight Thousand”.50 Calculated over a full year of 6-day weeks, Coutts handled 
almost 60 transactions every day for the Bank of Scotland alone. By comparison, I estimate 
that over the same period Hoares bank, following a Goldsmith business model, handled no 
more than two equivalent transactions per day.  Hoares’ value of bill discounting was little 
more than one-tenth the size, and it was of a less ‘retail’ nature, being received in just 200 
amounts and paid out in 275. In other words, the volume of transactions handled by Coutts 
for the Bank of Scotland alone was forty times the total volume of discounts handled by 
Hoares on behalf of all its customers. Such wide discrepancy between the Goldsmith and 
the Discounter banks in the volumes of transactions, each involving the swapping of specie 
                                                
50 Coutts & Co Archive: Coutts Special Letter Book, letter from Thomas Coutts to George Sandy dated 27 March 
1816. 
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and Bank of England banknotes for other forms of IOUs acting as quasi-money, induced or 
reinforced an equal discrepancy in the bankers’ respective cognitive perception of what 
constituted ‘money’. In particular it encouraged the Discounter to think of ‘money’ 
primarily in terms of the means of exchange represented by the different monetary 
instruments he was exchanging so frequently, each ‘carrying’ the nominal unit of account 
called ‘a pound’ (and to be less concerned by any divergence between the extrinsic value of 
each of those instruments and the standard of value in the form of specie, since in most 
cases he was exchanging different paper money instruments between themselves rather than 
for specie).  
 
In fact specie appears to have played a minor part of these intra-regional flows and many of 
transactions were completed within the banking system as offsetting book entries.  The 
contrast between these two daily experiences of ‘money’ can be compared to the differences 
that exist more recently between bankers inside, say, building society mutuals, handling low-
frequency money in the form of cash, deposit passbooks and mortgages, and on the other 
hand ‘bankers’ on trading desks inside investment banks, handling high-frequency electronic 
artefacts representing only second- and third –order derivatives of the monetary values of 
underlying assets.  
 
 
6.7  London banks equity capital and credit exposure to the ‘fringe’ 
Country bank risk 
 
Thomas Coutts managed his net exposure to the Bank of Scotland in such a way as to 
contain it to some approximate equality to Coutts’ paid-up capital. This ensured that the 
ever-growing gross throughput volume of bills always generated a growing return on 
capital-at-risk without the latter becoming so large as to put Coutts’ survival at risk in the 
event of the failure of the Bank of Scotland. This two-pronged risk management strategy - 
controlling net credit exposure and calling up more equity capital as the business grew – was 
sensible practice and demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of credit risk, both intra-
day and over the medium term.  
 
Coutts had set the daily net overdraft limit at £15,000 in 1777, approximately equal to the 
average deposit balance of the Bank of Scotland during the early years after the relationship 
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with Coutts became exclusive. In the same year Coutts increased its paid-up capital from 
£12,000 to £24,000.  
 
Exhibit 6.14 – Coutts’ net credit exposure to the Bank of Scotland credit risk, 1805-1815 
 
 
Then, having once again increased the paid-up capital of the bank to £42,000, in 1794 
Coutts raised the Bank of Scotland’s credit limit to £50,000. But this barely kept pace with 
the expansion in the total volumes flowing through Coutts: we know from Coutts letters 
that the total volume of bills it handled on behalf of the Bank of Scotland was £1.5 million 
in 1794, whereas by 1816 volumes had grown nearly two-and-half times, and yet Coutts was 
attempting to operate the account with an unchanged overdraft limit of £50,000. To make 
matters worse, the Bank of Scotland was no longer maintaining a regular net positive 
balance on its account at Coutts. The net daily overdraft appears to have been highly 
volatile and often exceeded the agreed limit: the year-end snapshots available for 1805 to 
1814 show a net balance ranging from -£55,575 in 1807 to +£79,510 at the end of June 
1810 (Exhibit 6.14). In 1815 Thomas Coutts had to write to the Bank of Scotland 
complaining that the net overdraft had run up to -£126,150. 
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From 1813 to 1816 the Bank of Scotland’s net flow of funds deteriorated sharply and the 
overdraft became near permanent, and the financing of it was putting pressure on Coutts 
balance sheet.  We have confirmation of this from Coutts’ review of the Bank of Scotland 
account conducted in 1816 in support of its attempt to raise fees. It showed that “in the 
first seven years [after 1794] the average charge of Interest on advances did not exceed 
£300; last year [1815] it was £1,200; this year it is £1,300 and in point of time the advance 
you will remark has continued for nearly two thirds of the whole year.”51 Shortly thereafter 
Coutts run an estimate of the interest that the Bank of Scotland would have earned if it had 
been with a different London correspondent that paid interest (at 4%) on all positive 
balances, which they estimate would have generated just £456 p.a. for the Bank of Scotland 
over the previous three years. Hence, between 1813 and 1815 the weighted average 
overdraft balance was some three times the weighted average of any positive balances. 
 
The safety net of collateralizing the excess credit risk was (and is to this day) a difficult one 
to implement: when the client was such a large proportion of Coutts’ overall business, 
enforcing the sale of the client’s best quality and most liquid collateral is unlikely to enhance 
the future relationship, especially as the need to do so often occurs at times when systemic 
problems in the money markets have pushed that collateral to a discount to face value. As 
the business continued to grow after 1793, Coutts first raised the paid-up capital to £56,000 
at the start of the Restriction, and then in 1805 began to capitalise a portion of each year’s 
profits until 1821, by which time equity had reached £200,000 or 10% of its balance sheet, 
making it perhaps the best capitalised private bank in London. It seems that after 1793 
Thomas Coutts decided to leave the ‘contractual’ overdraft limit at £50,000, conscious that 
it had become merely a moral stick to wave at his best client, and instead prudently 
continued to call up additional capital so as to provide a matching second line of defence in 
case the collateral should fail to cover the excess overdraft in the event of a failure of the 
client.  
 
The Coutts- Bank of Scotland evidence highlights how, at times of monetary expansion, the 
locus of credit risk becomes more volatile as the banking system’s gearing to high-powered 
reserves increases. The deflationary deleveraging that ensued after 1815 generated 
substantial liquidity pressures on the banking system, and Country banks unable to call 
                                                
51 Coutts & Co Archive: Special Letter Book, letter to George Sandy dated 27 March 1816 
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upon the support of well-capitalised London banks became extremely vulnerable to 
collapse.   
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PART III 
Case studies of Country banks 
 
Chapter 7. The North Midlands and the Smith group  
 
 
1. The importance of the Smith banking group 
2. The family history and connections 
3. The integrated business model and profitability 
4. Organic growth: Smith’s policy on capital and profit distribution 
5. Cash management and the daily flows between London and Country 
6. Policy on banknote issuance 
7. Balance sheet and liquidity management  
 
In this chapter I investigate the balance sheet practices of the important Smith banking 
group, and its noteworthy business model that integrated London and Country banks under 
the control of one family, for evidence that behaviour was consistent with the views and 
hypotheses expressed by contemporary political economists. For the historical background, 
I draw on Leighton-Boyce’s (1958) masterly account of the Smith family bankers, and focus 
my contribution on quantifying and analysing the actions revealed by the balance sheets. 
 
 
7.1  The importance of the  “Smith Banking Group” 
 
 
Samuel Smith’s group of banks is of particular interest because it is the closest to an 
integrated banking group operating across the country, comprising a London bank and four 
Country banks in Nottingham, Lincoln, Hull and Derby linked by common shareholders. 
What I have chosen to call the “Smith Banking group” comprised the following, in 
chronological order of when they were founded: 
 
1. The original Nottingham bank, Thomas Smith & Co.: founded in 1658, it was called 
Samuel Smith & Co during the Restriction and owned for 2/9th by Samuel Smith III 
(1754-1834), 1 ½ parts each by the latter’s younger brothers George Smith II (1765-1836) 
and John Smith II (1767-1842), and for 4/9th by Rene Payne; Samuel acted as the resident 
partner, although he split his time between there and London 
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2. The important London bank, Smith, Payne & Smiths: [hereafter “SPS”] founded in 1758, 
at the time of the Restriction Act it was owned by the same partnership as Nottingham, 
with Rene Payne as the resident managing partner 
3. The Lincoln bank, Smith, Ellison & Co: founded in 1775, in partnership with Richard 
Ellison who was already a partner in an other local bank (Ellison, Cooke, Childers & Swan 
of Doncaster) and Henry Ellison 
4. The Hull bank, Smiths & Thompson: founded in 1784, the partnership was reorganized at 
the same time as London’s, and during the Restriction it was owned for 29.2% by Samuel 
Smith III, 16.7% each by George and John Smith, and 37% by Thomas Thompson, who 
was the resident managing partner. 
5. The Derby bank, Samuel Smith & Co: founded during the restriction in 1806 by way of 
the acquisition of the local firm Richardson & Co. 
 
The Smith banking group was a substantial component of Britain’s banking system. I 
estimate52 the group entered the Restriction in 1797 with total assets in excess of £1.5 
million, making it approximately the same size as the largest English bank in our sample 
that year (Coutts). The Smith group soon outgrew Coutts during the Restriction: total assets 
reached £2.8 million in 1810 at the peak of the Bank of England’s discounting boom; and 
£3.6 million in 1818 when Britain returned to the gold standard [Exhibit 7.1]. In 1813-14, 
the two years for which we have balance sheets for all five of the group’s entities, total 
assets were just shy of £3 million. This makes the Smith banking group 50% larger than the 
largest London banks except Coutts during the Restriction and, together with the Bank of 
Scotland, the largest banking group in Britain behind the Bank of England. By 1818 the 
Smith group had become the largest banking group, controlling assets that were one and 
quarter times larger than either the Bank of Scotland (including branches) or Coutts, whilst 
remaining a tightly controlled private partnership. Unlike the Bank of England and the Bank 
of Scotland which were joint-stock banks owned by scores of shareholders, the year Britain 
returned to the gold standard the Smith group remained under the control of just seven 
partners. Three members of the Smith family had majority control of all the entities except 
Lincoln, and four other partners spread across the different entities supported them. 
Amongst these, just one man, Samuel Smith II, had a pivotal stake across all five entities 
(albeit not a controlling one) and (I estimate) held some 37 – 40% of the entire group’s 
paid-up capital.  
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Exhibit 7.1 – Smith group banks: total assets, 1795 – 1832 
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Archival data for Nottingham and Hull is no longer to be found, but summary balance 
sheets are recorded in the appendices of Leighton-Boyce (1958); conversely, balance sheet 
data has come to light that extends the Lincoln data for the whole of 1808-1832, and for 
Derby for all years from its formation in 1806 through to 1832. In addition, the RBS 
archivists located a set of loose pages showing the general balance of Smith Payne & Smith, 
London for most years between 1812 and 1829. When juxtaposed with those for 1797-8 
originally available to Leighton-Boyce, these represent important additional pieces of the 
jigsaw puzzle that allow us to estimate the workings of the whole group through the 
Restriction and its immediate aftermath.53  
 
Exhibit 7.2 – The Smith Group: balance sheet growth rates, 1797-1821 
 
 
Individual balance sheet growth rates varied considerably across the Smith group entities 
(Exhibit 7.2). However, the pattern of growth for SPS, London was similar to that of other 
                                                
53 These are marked “2nd draft” or “3rd draft” and by their dates appear to have been completed by the end of 
January. We can be confident these represent accurate final balances because in years where we have more than one 
trial, totals vary only by a few hundred pounds – the exception being the year-end 1814, where the 2nd trial totalled 
£1,236,873 and the 3rd trial £1,381,566; but the latter is dated 18th Feb 1815, and we suspect relates to a request to 
draw up a new general balance in February when conditions were changing rapidly as the Napoleonic Wars 
approached their climax.  
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London banks (Chapters 5 and 11) when calculated over the time periods determined by 
the need to use reference years that contain the maximum amount of Smith data. In the 
Country, the banks in Lincoln and Derby were the main beneficiary of the Bank of England 
monetary expansion between 1797 and 1813 and initially survived the contraction in Bank 
of England discounting during 1813-18. Thereafter the Lincoln balance sheet shrunk back 
in proportion to the Bank of England during the preparation for the return to the gold 
standard in 1818-1821.  
 
A holistic analysis of the surviving records provides insight into the costs and benefits of 
their unique business model that vertically integrated London and Country banks under the 
control of one family. The analysis here - like that in the previous chapter of the Coutts-
Bank of Scotland relationship - provides insight into what is central to our investigations: 
the connections between Country bank issuance of banknotes; the use of specie and Bank 
of England notes as reserves; the relationships with the London money market; and the 
ebbs and flows of the various regional economies. The experience of the Smith group 
serves to highlight the importance of the correspondent banking relationship between a 
Country bank and its London agent. When functioning well, in a climate of trust 
underpinned by the aligned incentives of common ownership, this allowed the Country 
bank to more profitably deploy surplus resources by transferring them to London and, 
conversely, provided a lifeline from London when local monetary and credit conditions 
became unsettled. In doing so, the banks within the Smith group were putting into practice 
Bosanquet’s macro-level Law of Reflux (Chapter 3). The records also allow critical insight 
into the revealed rules-of-thumb by which Country bankers managed their balance sheets, 
their banknote issuance, and their liquidity reserves, and to what extent these were 
consistent with the views expressed by political economists at the time. We analyse each of 
these in turn. 
 
 
7.2  The family history and connections 
 
The family’s banking success recounted in Leighton-Boyce (1958) reflected its adopted 
motto, the ambiguously secular “tenax in fide” (‘tenacious faith’).  The Smith Group dated 
its origins back to Thomas Smith (1631-1699), a mercer by trade and the first to open a 
‘bank’ in Nottingham – and perhaps anywhere - in 1658. His eldest son, Thomas Smith II 
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(1682-1727) had five daughters and no sons so, as was the practice of the day, bequeathed 
the business to his two younger brothers, Samuel Smith I and Abel Smith I, with the former 
operating as a goldsmith banker in London and acting as agent for the Nottingham bank. It 
was Abel’s eldest son, Abel Smith II (1717-1788) who became the driving force behind the 
Nottingham bank’s expansion after the 1750s following the death of both his father and 
uncle within a few years of each other. The bank grew to include the important London 
bank of Smith, Payne & Smiths (founded in 1758) and the three Country banks. A portrait 
taken from a panel in the Royal Exchange shows a vigorous, physically fit young man, 
dressed smartly but not extravagantly, with a confident and penetrating stare standing in 
front of a busy port scene. The picture probably dates from his early working life as 
managing partner of the import-export merchant house Wilberforce & Smith, a position he 
had risen to after being apprenticed at the age of fifteen to the famous Russia merchant 
William Wilberforce in Hull (Leighton-Boyce, 1958: 20).  
 
In a reflection of the family’s wealth, influence and connections, all five of Abel Smith II’s 
sons entered Parliament as MPs. Following his death in 1788, the four surviving sons – 
Samuel Smith III (1754-1834), Robert (1752-1838) and their two younger siblings George 
Smith II (1765-1836) and John Smith II (1767-1842) continued to grow the business 
through and beyond the Restriction years.  Robert became the trusted friend of William Pitt 
the Younger (1759-1806)  – Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1783 to 
1801 – who elevated him to Lord Carrington in the year before taking the country off the 
gold standard Leighton-Boyce, 1958: 3). Further connections came from the Smiths’ 
partners in the London bank: John Payne was chairman of the East India Company; his 
brother Edward – who became a silent partner receiving half the profits paid to John and 
later to René - was a director of the Bank of England. In 1805, George Smith II was also 
appointed deputy-chairman of the East India Company. The Smith group thrived 
throughout the nineteenth-century and was progressively amalgamated into the Union Bank 
of London (1902), the National Provincial Bank (1918), National Westminster Bank (1968) 
and finally today’s Royal Bank of Scotland (2000). As late as the 1960s members of the 
Smith family were still represented on the board of the National Provincial Bank.  
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7.3  The integrated business model and profitability 
 
Before analysing the balance sheet behaviour and what it can tell us about monetary 
velocity, we need to highlight the integrated nature of the Smith group business model as 
certain features set it apart and help explain other Country bank data.  
 
The Smith group entered the Restriction with a balance sheet of similar size to Coutts 
(Chapter 6). Both banks were unusual in following a relatively conservative approach to 
managing the equity capital, frequently recapitalizing the paid up capital as their balance 
sheets grew. Furthermore, both had substantial correspondent banking business flowing 
through their balance sheets, but in different ways. The Smith group internalized the full 
extent of the monetary transactions flowing between a London bank and its Country bank 
correspondents; by contrast, Coutts had a more arms-length correspondent agreement with 
the Bank of Scotland. Although SPS acted as the London correspondent for other Scottish 
banks (Thistle Bank in Glasgow; the British Linen Bank, the Paisley Banking Co and 
Kinnear & Sons in Edinburgh), its correspondent business was dominated by its four sister 
banks in the northeast Midlands (the Smith’s bank in Derby had previously been its 
correspondent there, Richardson & Co.).  
 
Although differently structured, their size and business mix made the Smith group and 
Coutts natural benchmarks for each other – and it seems the Scottish banks were happy to 
share pricing information so as to play one London bank against another. At the time when 
Coutts was attempting to renegotiate its fee structure with the Bank of Scotland in 1813-15, 
SPS was attempting to do the same with the British Linen Bank whose annual turnover had 
risen to £3,781,000.  Its manager, E.F Gilcrist writes to SPS on 6th Aug 1813 that he has 
“endeavour’d more particularly to learn the extent and footing upon which the transactions 
of the Bank of Scotland are conducted by Coutts & Co [and] I find that ours exceeds theirs 
by about £300,000 p.ann. for which they pay £1400 receiving no interest for floating 
Balances…” (Leighton-Boyce, 1958: 113). But clearly the London banks played the same 
game, for eventually SPS suggests new pricing that mirrors the one Coutts was trying to 
agree with the Bank of Scotland, namely an increased flat fee of £2,500 combined with a 
power of attorney to enable the London bank to sell government securities held by the 
Scottish bank whenever the net exposure exceeded the agreed limit.   
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The different corporate structure of the two groups appears to have generated a difference 
in their profitability. I estimate that the Smith group entered the Restriction period with 
paid-up capital of just under £100,000, about twice that of Coutts despite having similar 
sized balance sheets. By 1815, estimated capital had risen to £228,000 at the Smith group 
and £164,000 at Coutts. I estimate Smith group profits in the same year were approximately 
£100,000, also about twice that of Coutts – in effect, on the eve of the Restriction both 
banks were earning approximately a 100% return on (paid-up) equity.  
 
Prior to the Restriction, by integrating its businesses, the Smith group needed to employ a 
ratio of paid-up equity to total assets that was twice as high as that of the arms-length 
business model of Coutts. This is because the Smith group was also internalizing all of the 
risks of transacting in the Country as principal, while Coutts was only acting as the Bank of 
Scotland’s agent. Coutts was taking only the credit risk of any net negative balance owed to 
it by the Bank of Scotland, but not taking the risk of the Bank of Scotland’s clients not 
repaying loans or not making good when bills came due. In effect, the Bank of Scotland’s 
capital protected Coutts from the default by the clients of its Country correspondent; by 
contrast, the Smith group was taking all of the credit risk of its Country clients and 
therefore felt obliged to put up more capital. However, importantly, having found an 
efficient way to carry the extra risk by diversifying geographically and aligning partner 
incentives internally, the Smith Group was able to generate the same percentage return on 
equity as Coutts, but on larger equity.  
 
 
7.4  Organic growth: Smith’s policy on capital and profit distribution 
 
The family had been the first Country bank to set up its own London bank, and along the 
way they had learned how to grow organically whilst maintaining a high rate of return on 
equity. Having done so, this gave them every incentive to adopt a high rate of reinvestment 
of profits. This likely explains the Smiths’ family policy of regularly delaying the distribution 
of profits from any new venture until total equity capital reached generous levels. The 
evidence points to a rule-of-thumb, adopted across all Smith entities, of not distributing 
profits until the capital ratio reached at least 15% of assets (net of any holdings of their own 
banknotes), and then not allowing the capital ratio to fall much below 10%. As early as 
1765, when René Payne took over from his father as Abel Smith’s partner in the London 
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business, the opening capital of the new firm (£16,963) was largely made up of retained 
profits (Leighton-Boyce, 1958: 71). The new bank in Derby capitalized all its profits for the 
first thirteen years of its existence, until it had reached a capital ratio averaging 15% for four 
years. The Hull bank capitalized all profits for five years after 1803 until it too reached a 
capital ratio of 20%, and then continued to reserve a quarter to a half of profits from 1812 
to 1815, apparently targeting a ratio of 11-13%. And finally, the Nottingham bank 
recapitalized at some point between 1798 and 1808, bringing the capital ratio back to 22% 
in 1808.  
 
The only exception – one that proves the rule - appears to have been the Lincoln bank, 
where paid-up capital remained at £21,800 throughout the Restriction in spite of assets 
almost tripling. The different policy of the Lincoln bank is explained by the fact that the 
Smith family did not have a controlling stake. Until 1828, non-family partners, Richard 
Wilson and Henry Ellison dominated the share ownership. The latter held the largest stake 
and was already in partnership in another local bank, and therefore would have had 
incentives less well aligned to those of the Smiths. When Wilson withdrew in 1811, Ellison’s 
son Henry took up his stake, thereby putting the Ellison family firmly in control and Samuel 
Smith in the minority. An other sign of non-family shareholders driving policy can be seen 
in the fact that throughout the Restriction period for which we have data (1808-1818) the 
Lincoln bank lent substantially smaller sums to SPS London than its sister bank in Hull. 
Lincoln preferred to keep excess liquidity invested in its own name in Government 
securities, and frequently used these to pay out dividends in kind.  
 
The Smith family policy on equity capital served to both project a sense of financial strength 
to customers and to generate excess capital in the group that became available to capture 
new opportunities for organic growth – e.g. to set up new banks in nearby cities. This 
business model was the brainchild of Abel Smith II, the Nottingham banker responsible for 
establishing SPS in London and later the banks in Lincoln and Hull. From a letter seen by 
the family’s biographer and written in Dec 1760 to John Payne, Abel’s partner managing the 
London bank, we have evidence of the large resources built up by the family thanks to this 
reinvestment policy  - as well as Abel’s personal ambition, confidence and ability to time a 
commercial opportunity. In the letter he exhorts René Payne to expand the business: 
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“You already know my sentiments in regard to making our business in London general and 
wish you had thought this a proper time to make a beginning, as I could bring a capital of 
£30,000 or £40,000 into the business if it should be wanted, that I think there would not be 
much hazard in making the experiment. The banking business was begun here before the 
Revolution [i.e. 1688], which has been carried on to this time with the greatest credit, that I 
am of opinion, with care and diligence, we should in a few years be equal in credit to the 
best houses in England” (Leighton-Boyce, 1958: 75). 
 
 
7.5 Cash management and the daily flows between London and Country 
 
One striking fact observed in the Country bank data is the minor role played by physical 
specie in the reserves of liquidity held at the bank. The empirical evidence points to these 
Country banks targeting a specific ratio of cash composed of specie plus Bank of England 
banknotes, as Ricardo argued. But it also points to Country banks managing a broader 
definition of liquidity, by setting a ratio that encompassed balances with their London 
correspondent, consistent with Bosanquet’s argument that the London money market acted 
as a powerful engine for the daily offsetting of quasi-monies issued as by-products of the 
extension of credit.  
 
The Smith group records for the four years 1806-1809 provide a detailed composition of 
what was contained in the General Balance entry called ‘cash’ or ‘cash and notes’.  These 
show that during the Restriction, specie accounted for no more than 1.5% of net balance 
sheet liabilities54 – a ratio not too dissimilar to that represented by what we consider ‘cash’ 
(coins and banknotes) in today’s bank balance sheets, and no economist today would argue 
that banks manage their liquidity in relation to such a minor part of their liquid assets. In the 
Derby Letter Book for 1807-09 (analysed below) there is not one request to SPS London to 
send specie; requests are only for Bank of England banknotes.  
 
The Smith banks differentiated ‘cash’ reserves into the following categories: specie, Bank of 
England banknotes, banknotes of other Smith group banks, banknotes of other local banks 
– all of which would be marked “in the Chest” (i.e. held at the bank). Not every bank in the 
                                                
54 The net balance sheet is calculated by subtracting from the total liabilities in the General Balance Books the value 
of the bank’s own notes held by the bank and included under ‘cash’ on the asset side. 
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Smith group identifies all these categories of cash separately in all years, but there is enough 
archival data to point to the paucity of physical specie. The Lincoln bank “specie in the 
chest” for 1808-12 represents a mere 1.1 – 1.4% of the total net55 balance sheet. After 1812, 
until the end of the Restriction this ratio increases to an average of 3.4%, but the accounting 
entry changes to “Specie and Bk Notes” indicating it now includes Bank of England 
banknotes. After the Restriction, the Lincoln bank’s holdings of specie and Bank of 
England notes are understandably somewhat higher, but still average only 4.4% of the 
balance sheet.  
 
Pressnell (1956) suggested that Country banks viewed the balance on their nostro account at 
their London correspondent as an integral part of its daily cash reserve management, and 
the Smith group data supports this. The Smith banks do indeed appear to have included in 
their cash management the  “balance of the cash book” consisting of the net balance of 
their account with SPS that acted as their London correspondent. This was especially valid 
for those Country banks like the Smith group who was able to obtain immediate value on 
their account for bills sent down to their London correspondent. General practice amongst 
London banks was to enter these as ‘short’ and only credit the Country bank when the bill 
matured and paid up. Presumably reflecting their cross shareholdings, SPS gave immediate 
value to its sister Country banks, and would subsequently return to them any bills that failed 
to be settled, and the Country banks would re-credit the amount to SPS London’s account 
in their own ledgers.56 If we add in the ‘balance on cash book’, the Lincoln bank kept a 
steady ratio of ‘cash’ to its total balance sheet (net of holdings of its own notes) that 
averaged 11.1% during the Restriction and 12.9% thereafter (Appendix E).  There was a 
spike in this ratio to 21.6% the year Richard Ellison died, when the bank was being 
supported from London and presumably kept a higher cash ratio for prudential reasons in 
order to demonstrate continued strength to its depositors. The ratio was also noticeably 
higher (14.8%, 14.5%) in the two years following the 1825 crisis.  
 
We can compare these ratios with those of the Derby bank for the years 1806-1809 when 
here too the accounts identify each category of money that makes up the general balance 
entry entitled “Cash” (or “Bills and Cash”). These include ‘London bills’, ‘Notes payable in 
                                                
55 The net balance sheet total is calculated by deflating the recorded total balance sheet by the bank’s holdings of 
their own notes; it is equivalent to the net liabilities of the bank owed to customers and partners (including paid up 
equity) 
56 SPS was not alone in offering these more advantageous terms: Pressnell (1956: 98) reports that Boldero & Co, 
London also offered such terms to the venerable Pease Bank of Hull.  
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Derby’, other third party Country bank notes, and finally other Smith group banknotes. In 
those four years, consistent with the Lincoln sister bank, specie represents just 0.3 – 1.2% 
of the total net balance sheet and never constitutes more than one-twentieth of what the 
bank classifies as ‘cash’. Adding Bank of England notes to specie, we observe the ratio of 
‘cash’ to total balance sheet is comparable to that of the Lincoln bank, and also becomes a 
relatively stable 4 – 5% of the total balance sheet, albeit declining gradually over the 4 years.  
Lastly, by adding in all other forms of what Derby treated as ‘cash’ except other Smith 
group banknotes, we reach a ‘top line’ cash ratio to the total balance sheet that averaged 
16.4% during the Restriction – similar to Discounters in London (Chapter 11) and, again 
not surprisingly, rose to 22.2% in the fourteen years after the end of the Restriction.  
 
The Derby bank (daily) Letter Book 
 
The Derby bank kept a Letter Book in which it copied in annotated form the near-daily 
correspondence with SPS London. Every one or two days the Derby bank would write to 
London acknowledging London’s most recent letter, and add: new client payment 
instructions; acknowledgements of customer payments received; request to send Bank of 
England notes or their own Smith notes (it appears Derby had theirs printed in London); 
powers of attorney to collect interest (“dividends”) on government securities on behalf of 
customers (mainly the previous owner, Mr. Richardson and his wife); plus a list of bills 
drawn on London that SPS should expect to be presented to its tellers for payment [what 
Thomas Coutts was still asking the Bank of Scotland to supply on a regular basis in 1815 in 
order to help Coutts manage the expected cash flows]. To these letters, Derby attached a 
number of bills and notes to be credited to Derby’s account with SPS in London. Two days 
later Derby would receive a reply from SPS London,57 although frequent delays with the 
mail would mean they received two on the same day. These letters reveal how the vast 
majority of the daily transactions executed with or for clients in London or Derby were 
settled via offsetting debits and credits passed through the SPS account with Derby (what 
today Derby would call a vostro account) and Derby’s account with SPS (nostro account). 
Each bank kept track of both accounts that – much as a reconciliation staff would do today 
- they would crosscheck at regular intervals to ensure they had the same totals. 
 
                                                
57 The archival records do not contain the letters received back from SPS London. 
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Analysis of the Letter Book provides prima facie evidence of a high income-velocity of 
specie, supported by Bosanquet’s powerful offsetting machinery in the London money 
market that the Country banks accessed via their London correspondent. This Country 
bank’s nostro account with its London correspondent was turning over 13.8 times in a year, 
and the total volumes transacted during a year were equivalent to 4.4 times its total balance 
sheet – all of this without any inter-group transfers of specie.  
 
As shown in the Coutts-Bank of Scotland correspondence (previous Chapter 6), the 
London correspondent ‘contract’ required the Country bank to keep a positive balance on 
its account in London that would more than cover the payments made by London on its 
behalf to customers presenting country notes or bills payable in London. In order to 
maintain the account balance, the Country banks sent to London a regular flow of bills and 
notes received or discounted by them in the country.  In the Derby bank Letter Book that 
survives (1806-9), a detailed comparative analysis shows that in the two months of April 
and May 1807 Derby wrote 29 letters enclosing 1,131 bills and notes worth £28,803; in the 
same two months of 1809, Derby wrote 31 letters enclosing 1,318 bills and notes worth 
£34,887. Every month in 1807, on average Derby was sending down to London paper worth 
the equivalent of more than one-third of its balance sheet, implying a very high turnover in 
the quasi-money (bills and notes) that formed part of the broad money supply during the 
Restriction, consistent with what was observed in the flows between Coutts and the Bank 
of Scotland. In the same period in 1809 – just before the Bullion report was issued – Smith 
Derby volumes had increased 21%. The monthly flow of paper instruments to London now 
represented only one-quarter of the Derby balance sheet, but the implied turnover rate of 
Derby’s account at SPS had remained at 13.8 times per year. The stream connecting the SPS 
London ‘pond of money’ with the SS Derby ‘pond of money’ was running as fast in 1809 as 
it had in 1807, but the Derby ‘pond’ had grown larger.  
 
In the Derby Letter Book there is not a single request for specie. All requests are for SPS 
London to send Derby “accepted Bank [of England] bills” (or, more rarely, “London 
cheques” or “Bank post bills”) and occasionally their “own notes” with the related paid 
stamps as evidence that the duty had been paid as required prior to issuing them to 
customers. In the two months of April and May 1807, on seven occasions Derby asks SPS 
London to send £1,000 of Bank bills, acknowledging receipt of them three of four days 
later; in the same two months in 1809, Derby receives five consignments of Bank notes 
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valued at £10,137. Bank bills are also regularly sent back to London (usually two halves sent 
in separate parcels on separate days), supporting the Ricardian hypothesis that bankers had 
an approximate target ratio of Bank of England notes (together with specie) as a percentage 
of the total balance sheet and that any excess was sent back to London. As we saw above, 
that target ratio was 4-5%. 
 
The Derby bank records show that the stock of Bank notes in the Derby balance sheet (£1,579 in 
1807 and £2,294 in 1809) on average was turning two to four times every month when 
taking the total flows in both directions (£6,369 for the two months in 1807 and £16,532 in 
1809).  The Derby bank was handling 25 to 50 times more Bank notes during a year than it 
held in stock: its managing partners and cashier would have had plenty of opportunity to 
observe subtle changes in their availability and adjust their behaviour accordingly, as 
Ricardo suggested. However, by comparing the net flow of Bank notes towards Derby 
(£3,055 in the two months of 1807 and £3,742 in 1809) with the net increase in the year-
end stock of those notes in the Derby balance sheet (+£430 and -£92 respectively), we can 
estimated that £17,900 and £22,544 of Bank notes flowed from London through the Derby 
bank and into the hands of the Derby bank’s clients in 1807 and 1809 respectively. By 1809, 
bank notes equivalent to 22% of the Derby balance sheet flowed the Derby bank without a 
significant change in the net inventory of those notes held by the Country bank: 
Bosanquet’s Reflux mechanisms appear to have been working well, and certainly as regards 
their content of Bank of England notes the Adam Smith ‘ponds of money’ were 
equilibrating well. These Banknotes flowing through Country banks must have circulated in 
the regions in a manner that was complimentary to the issuance of their own notes by the 
Country banks, seeing that during this period 1807-9 Derby was successfully increasing the 
proportion of its balance sheet funded by circulating its own notes from 26% to 31% 
(Appendix E).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
216 
7.6  Policy on banknote issuance  
 
When the Restriction was imposed in 1797 the Smiths asked Thomas Thompson for a 
report on the Lincoln bank. Thompson was a partner in the Hull bank and his expertise was 
trusted by the Smiths and was of sufficient renown for him to be invited to give evidence to 
the House of Commons in April that year. In a letter seen by Leighton-Boyce (1958: 161-3), 
on the 13th Dec 1797 Thomas wrote to Lord Carrington (Robert Smith) what amounts to a 
summary of best practice for Country banks and is here reproduced almost in full. 
Thompson confirms that experienced bankers managed the note issuance as Adam Smith 
had described: the aim was to minimize transaction costs and keep Smith’s ponds of 
banknotes in circulation at a constant level. However, Thompson recognizes that the 
Restriction offers an opportunity to expand the note issuance with less risk than in the past, 
as long as certain rules-of-thumb are followed in regard to the overall balance sheet liquidity 
and maturity mismatches. Thompson’s letter also reveals a particular cognitive perspective 
of medium-term (secured) lending (the Goldsmith business model) that sees it as illiquid 
and risky in comparison to the alternative business of discounting of bills with two to four 
weeks to maturity (the Discounter model). Thompson’s experienced had formed a cognitive 
bias aligned with that of the Discounters in London, in direct contrast to that of the 
Goldsmith bankers.   
 
“My Lord, 
I am inclined to think that the chief, if not the only business of the Lincoln house, should 
be the circulation of Notes: and in order to increase that, I am confident that it will be 
much more prudent to relax in charging discount than to lend money. Whether you ought 
to give 14 days or a month to the holders of bills when you exchange paper with them, 
must be determined by circumstances at the time, and if by marking the Notes and 
watching the channel through which they return for payment, Mr. Moore [the chief cashier] 
should find that he is imposed upon in a few instances the future remedy is easy and the 
present loss trivial.” 
 
Thompson is advocating testing the limits of the customers’ willingness to absorb their own 
notes believing that, if they should overstep that limit, corrective action can be taken quickly 
and, given the Restriction, at little cost. This would certainly have been true by 1806 when, as 
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shown above, the average stock of reserves of specie and Bank of England notes was 
turning over once every week.  
 
The letter reveals a strong cognitive bias against term lending. In stark contrast to the older 
London banks following the “Goldsmith model” who disliked bill discounting because they 
viewed it as a more costly business and a threat to the credit risk they bore (Section II), 
other bankers like Thompson instead disliked term lending because they saw as a threat to 
the appropriate liquidity position of a (Country) bank. In Thompson’ case, this trenchant 
cognitive bias seems to have originated in the searing experience of the banking crisis of 
1793: 
 
“The cry that the country ought to be accommodated by lending money should be entirely 
disregarded, both in war & peace. If what happened in the year 1793 has not convinced 
Country Bankers of the folly of such a system, nothing will and they must take the 
consequences. What Attorneys and such people say is not worth a moment’s attention.” 
 
Consistent with the notion advanced in the final paragraphs of Chapter 5 that cognitive 
frames can cause strategy makers to triage new information by selecting only that which is 
consistent with their cognitive bias, the same 1793 crisis that had induced the new partners 
of Goslings to reverse course and largely shun the discounting of bills, by contrast had 
induced Thompson to shun secured medium-term lending. Thompson later insists further 
with his prescription to avoid term lending, referring to the recent banking crisis in 
Newcastle – the same events referred to by Ricardo as the catalyst for Parliament’s decision 
to impose the Restriction [see Introduction] – which Thompson blames on their over-use 
of fixed term lending: 
 
“I firmly believe that the credit of the Newcastle Banks was ruined by their lending. They 
pursued the system so far that although the partners possessed large landed property they 
were utterly unable to stand against the effects of ignorant poplar rumour. Whether they 
can now get in the money owing to them or whether they will ever regain their former 
credit is very doubtful.” 
 
After advising on what policy to adopt towards agents, at the end of the letter Thompson 
returns to the subject of the appropriate policy on asset and liability management, and 
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suggests ‘pushing’ the Note issuance beyond the amount that would be issued when 
discounting only bills that came easily to the bank’s door. Thompson now elaborates on his 
views on liquidity management and the (Smithian) profit incentive for ‘pushing out’ notes. 
Such enhanced banknote issuance would expand the Country bank’s balance sheet beyond 
the sum of its customer deposits and its paid-in capital, whilst leaving more of those 
customer deposits to be transferred to SPS London, where they could be profitably and 
safely invested – without the loss of liquidity - in government securities, either directly or by 
lending overnight money on a secured basis to the bond brokers.  
 
“And although this business [operating through agents employed, but on commission] 
cannot be conducted without considerable exertion & expence it is certainly worth while, in 
these times, to use exertion and spend a little money to keep out [i.e. in circulation] £20,000 or 
£30,000 extraordinary in Notes when in reality there is less danger in being run upon for the payment 
of them than ever was since country Banks existed. By calling in all the money owing to S[mith] & 
T[homas in Hull] – by lending none, and by pushing out Notes, your Lordship will have 
observed that the Acct. in London [at Smith Payne & Smith] is from £30,000 to £40,000 
better than it was 12 months ago. Money in London is always within reach & yet may always be 
employed; and it is the greatest satisfaction to me to reflect that all S & T’s resources are in 
your Lordship’s hands, and not dispersed through the country” [my italics]. 
 
Thompson recognized that the Restriction was creating more favourable conditions for the 
issuance of paper money throughout Britain, and that the wisest way to maximize the 
profitability of that issuance was to channel a major portion of the corresponding asset-side 
growth into London, where the sister bank could earn high rates of interest without 
investing in illiquid secured term loans to Country customers.  This remarkable strategy 
allowed a Country bank to generate substantial net interest margins whilst avoiding the sort 
of maturity mismatch between its assets and liabilities that caused all the difficulties at times 
of crisis – but it was hardly the banking practice implied by the Real Bills Doctrine. It was 
an example of pure rent seeking: the bank was using its financial strength as perceived 
amongst its local customers in order to ‘manufacture’ additional near-costless IOUs that 
customers could use as the local means of exchange, but which the bank could largely invest 
through its London correspondent in government securities yielding in excess of 5% p.a.  
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Each of the three components of the strategy ensured that the average maturity of the asset 
was shorter than the average maturity of the liabilities used to fund them. Thomas’s balance 
sheet strategy can be understood as follows:  (a) offer a small amount of secured term 
lending at 5%, funded with the more permanent part of the bank’s customer deposits, on 
which it paid no more than 2% interest; (b) lend at 2-4 weeks by discounting bills on which 
it would earn average rates of over 5% compounded, financed by the issuance of Notes 
whose only cost was printing plus the stamp duty or, if it wanted to ‘exert’ itself more, the 
2% commission paid to contracted agents to expand its reach to more clients in smaller 
surrounding towns; and (c) channel the excess, shorter-term and interest-free deposits into 
SPS London where they could earn yields in excess of 5% in the securities market, without 
loss of liquidity.  
 
Exhibit 7.3 – Asset and liability strategy: Smith Ellison, Lincoln, 1808-1832 
 
 
This policy is closely reflected in the actual practice of the Lincoln bank observed in its 
balance sheet composition over the years 1808 to 1832 for which we have data. Exhibit 7.3 
above shows the asset composition as a coloured stack; superimposed over those are the 
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stacked black-line bands representing the sources of funding on the liability side as explained 
in detailed in the Preface to Part III. The latter start at the bottom with term deposits, then 
call deposits and finally the net amount of the Lincoln bank’s notes in circulation.58 We 
observe how term deposits (the stickier liabilities) more than covered term loans (the least 
liquid asset) throughout these 25 years except for a brief period in 1827-9. Furthermore, in a 
manner recalling the Bank of Scotland, in all years except 1811 and 1813, total lending  - i.e. 
term loans plus the discounting of bills – was held to a level less than the quantity of 
financing available from total deposits (i.e. fixed term deposits and call deposits). Whenever 
total deposits rose sharply, the excess was systematically lent to SPS London. These loans 
were then run down whenever deposits fell back. Finally, the net volume of its own notes 
that could be successfully ‘pushed out’ – and kept out – was used to invest in the 
government securities, or lent to SPS London in the years of peak balance sheet growth 
(1817-18, 1824-25, 1830).  
 
Exhibit 7.4 – Smith Lincoln: deposits and net notes in circulation, 1799 and 1808-1832 
 
 
                                                
58 For simplicity we do not show the equity component of liabilities, and this accounts for the marginal difference in 
heights in the chart. 
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The Smiths not only followed Thompson’ suggested strategy of “pushing out Notes”, but 
continued to expand it as the Restriction period was prolonged. Notes in circulation 
accounted for over half the Lincoln bank’s net balance sheet throughout 1808 to 1815, and 
the bank went from being a net borrower of £25,000 from SPS London in 1797 to being a 
net lender of £53,881 in 1801 (although, as noted above, during the Restriction it 
systematically preferred to place most of its excess liquidity directly into the government 
securities market). During this later period of the Restriction, the sister bank in Derby, 
although only formed in 1806, was already lending London £84,357 or 16% of its balance 
sheet - on the back of Note issuance that had expanded to £70-80,000 from £10-20,000 
before the Restriction.  Also during that period, the Hull bank (where Thomas was partner) 
was lending SPS London an average of £141,110, two to three times the average amount 
before the Restriction [Appendix D].  
 
Exhibit 7.5 – Smith Ellison, Lincoln: “excess funding” vs. lending flows back to London 
1808 - 1832 
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Presented with this picture, it is difficult to conclude anything other than that in this period 
it was not so much the growth in Country bank lending that drove the expansion in the 
supply of broad money, but rather that it was the public’s acceptance of the use of large 
quantities of banknotes issued by (the more trustworthy) Country banks that allowed Britain 
to finance the growing government debt – see Monetizing government debt in Chapter 12). 
Consistent with these strategy components, regressing the annual change in Smith Ellison’s 
lending to non-bank entities on the annual change in the sources of funds on the liability 
side, shows weak relationships with both the change in deposits and the change in net notes 
outstanding, but more strikingly the relationship is negative to the change in total deposits. 
There is also a separate correlation between deposits and the issuance of notes: note 
issuance expanded and contracted in ways that partially followed the expansion and 
contraction in deposits, whereby a £1 change in deposits was associated with a £0.36 
change in net notes outstanding (Exhibit 7.4). Broadly, when local real economy is doing 
well it generates a growth in deposits and the bank takes the opportunity to push out more 
of its notes despite a reduction in the demand for loans, and the excess deposit funding is 
reinvested through London. When demand for loans is high relative to deposits, the bank 
cuts back its note issuance at the margin and brings liquidity back from London to make up 
the difference. At least for the Lincoln bank, it seems its lending to the private sector was 
not driven by the supply of funds, but by the demand for loans and the bank’s judgments 
regarding the creditworthiness of the potential borrowers.  
 
The Restriction allowed the Smith bank to increase the average stock of its banknotes in 
circulation, but whenever customer deposits exceeded the demand for loans from the local 
creditworthy private sector, which was often, the excess was largely flowing back to London 
where it was used to fund the growing government debt, either directly or via its London 
bank (Exhibit 7.5).  The London bank in turn would first redistributed the excess funding 
towards any of the sister banks that were experiencing the opposite conditions, before 
investing the remaining part in government securities.  
 
Ricardo’s Goods-Specie-Flow was functioning not only through the “vix mediatrix” of the 
flows of goods, specie and Bank of England notes, but also through Bosanquet’s “vix 
mediatrix” of the Law of Reflux operating through the agency of the correspondent banking 
system.  
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This combination of incentives and capacity of Country banks to expand the note issuance 
relative to the flow of deposits acted as a powerful multiplier of the monetary expansion 
during the Restriction. It also acted as a multiplier of the contraction after 1818. Through 
the Restriction period, the Lincoln bank was able to expand its net note issuance faster than 
total deposits until it became the largest source of funds, with average levels 43% greater 
than deposits until the end of the war in 1815. As the return to the gold standard 
approached, at first net note issuance continued to grow, but more slowly than deposits, 
becoming a smaller source of funds forever thereafter. From 1818 net issuance began to 
decline steadily in absolute terms into 1832, with the short exception of the boom of 1824-5 
(Exhibit 7.4).  
 
 
7.7  Balance sheet and liquidity management 
 
In addition to the policy of building a strong (paid-up) capital buffer, the Smiths buttressed 
the low reserve ratio of specie with a policy of ensuring a strong overall liquidity position. 
They did this by concentrating into the London bank any excess liquidity generated by the 
different group entities in the Country – where “money was always within reach and yet 
may always be employed”, i.e. where money could be deployed in interest-bearing 
government securities that were easily turned into cash even at times of financial stress.  
 
At the start of the Restriction, the Smith banks in Nottingham and Hull have loans 
outstanding to SPS in London totalling £131,381, of which about half is coming from the 
original ‘parent’ bank in Nottingham, which is transferring no less than a quarter of its 
entire balance sheet to London. In spite of the Lincoln bank being a net borrower from SPS 
London in the first two years of the Restriction, on aggregate the Country banks within the 
Smith group were already funding the equivalent of 20% of the total lending undertaken by 
SPS London. This would rise to 25% during the Restriction despite the rapid growth in SPS 
London’s total lending (which grew at 4.5% p.a. compound from £609,924 in 1797 to 
£1,472,314 in 1817). Inspection of the individual ledger in Lincoln accounts shows these 
loans were usually for a fixed term for specific dates up to six months and secured on 
government securities held by SPS London: sometimes short Exchequer or Navy bills, 
sometimes longer dated Consols. In effect, the Country banks were delegating to SPS 
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London their cash management, and SPS was using that to trade in the government 
securities market, participate in new bond issues, and to finance any related inventory. 
 
By 1808, the year before the Bullion Committee and the only year we have explicit figures 
for all four Country banks in the group, loans to SPS London had more than doubled since 
the start of the Restriction, to £321,854, with the Nottingham and Hull banks contributing 
over 90%. The Derby bank was only two years old and not yet large enough to contribute 
large amounts, although it is already lending to London 20% of its small balance sheet. The 
Lincoln bank preferred to invest directly in government securities rather than place money 
with SPS London, consistent with the Smiths not having control. During the Restriction, 
the Lincoln bank was just as likely to be a net borrower from London (in 1811, 1814 and 
1815), but this may also have been because it was growing twice as fast as the rest of the 
Smith group: from 1797 to 1818 its balance sheet grew at 6.1% p.a. versus 3.4% p.a. for the 
rest of the group. Lincoln would become a major and regular net lender to SPS London 
only after 1817, after the war and towards the end of the Restriction. The records show that 
the same year Richard Ellison for the first time becomes a net creditor of the Lincoln bank, 
having been a borrower throughout the Restriction – it is therefore possible to speculate 
that in the midst of the post-war economic difficulties Richard Ellison decided the Smith 
group was, after all, a better credit risk than his other Lincoln-based bank. After the 
Restriction, at the peak of the boom and bust years of 1824-5, Lincoln lent SPS London the 
huge sum of £330,000, indirectly allowing SPS London to provide liquidity support to the 
Derby bank (a loan of £60,000, and net support of £31,601) and - the data suggests - at 
least one other of the group’s Country banks. Later in 1828, after the crisis had passed, it 
was the Lincoln bank that benefited from the ability to obtain support from London when 
there was temporary uncertainty following Richard Ellison’s death and before the Smith 
family could complete the acquisition, introducing as new partners (A.L. Melville Smith and 
Abel Smith) that left Richard Ellison (Junior) with only a minority stake.  
 
Comparing the 1808 Country bank data with the SPS London data for subsequent years 
recording the receipt by London of these loans from the Country entities (Exhibit 7.6), it 
appears that the flow of liquidity slowed down between 1808 and the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars, falling by 27% to £234,111 by 1814.  This occurred as the Bank of England sharply 
reduced its discounting of private sector bills and switched to buying government securities 
(Chapter 10). During this later part of the Restriction the Bank of England’s increased stock 
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of banknotes flowed into the British economy via the Treasury and the different military 
departments, which meant that the entry points for the additional monetary creation 
became less driven by the regions sending commercial bills for discounting at the Bank of 
England, and instead became more dependent on where the war departments chose to 
locate their wartime expenditure. Regions supplying more of the wartime food and goods 
experienced increased demand, paid for with Bank of England notes or government bills 
payable in London (e.g. Navy Bills, Ordinance bills, etc), while the rest of the economy 
would have experienced a shrinking ability to discount their bills of exchange. London 
banks would have experienced the shrinking willingness of the Bank of England to 
discount, but seen it compensated by the still-growing net inflow of Bank of England 
banknotes, as well as a greater liquidity injected into the government securities market in 
which they were more active participants than the Country banks. All of this will have had 
the effect of concentrating more of the country’s money flows into London, but until the 
end of the war in 1815 the overall effect on the Country banks was partly offset by the 
continuing improvement in the financial conditions of individuals and companies supplying 
the war effort with its needs. Judged by the internal flows of the Smith group, the net effect 
on the Country banks was nevertheless to reduce their excess liquidity – but this was merely 
transferring the rolling stock of government securities from the private Country bank 
balance sheets and onto the Bank of England’s balance sheet.  
 
After the end of the war, again judged by the flows within the Smith group, there is a 
renewed acceleration in the flow of excess liquidity from the Country into London, with 
total loans from the four Country banks rising to the peak of the period of £374,869 in 
1817. Here we have the first concrete evidence of why the London banks’ aggregate balance 
sheet stopped moving in synchronization with that of the Bank of England after the end of 
the war: there was a reflux of money from the Country back into the core of the banking 
system in London in search of greater safety in terms of both credit risk and liquidity. The 
broad money supply was shrinking, but as it shrunk it also flowed out of the Country back 
to London. In Chapter 12 we show that this shrinkage in the money supply circulating in 
the Country (deposits and banknote circulation) occurred in conjunction with a transfer of 
bank liabilities from the weaker to the stronger Country banks, leading to substantial 
bankruptcies. 
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Exhibit 7.6 – The Smith Group: inter-group lending 
 
 
  
227 
PART III 
Case studies of Country banks 
 
Chapter 8. The South and South West 
 
 
1. Case study: Old Bank, Bristol 
2. Case study: Barnard & Co, Bedford 
 
 
The Old Bank, Bristol is of particular interest as the only Country bank for which any 
significant data records exist for a number of years before and after 1797, albeit 
unfortunately not a continuous series. This case study reveals an example – perhaps typical 
of Country banks – that expanded lending during the Restriction failed to generate 
additional profits for the single bank, but merely increased business risk, a dynamic that is 
logically inconsistent with the Real Bills Doctrine. I begin with a brief summary of the 
history of the partnership, drawing on Cave (1899), before analysing the detail of the 
financial records.  
 
 
8.1  Case study: Old Bank, Bristol 
 
History of the partnership 
 
Old Bank was the first established in Bristol in 1750 and so named after a second bank set 
up a year later. The Old Bank became an important bank in the busy port area, eventually 
merging with another local bank with which there were numerous family ties, Miles, Cave, 
Baillie & Co.  When the Restriction began there were seven banks serving Bristol and, 
consistent with our nationwide data (Chapter 12), these were rapidly joined by numerous 
new entrants until the number peaked at 13 in 1811, declining back to five by 1826 (Cave, 
1899: I, 19 and II, 20-22). During this period Bristol was a major gateway for the 
importation of wine, sugar and tobacco, as well as the two-way trade in wool and corn 
(mostly with Ireland) and the transportation of servants, convicts and slaves to the 
plantation colonies. For example, in the year 1789, Minchinto (1957: 53) records 379 ships 
arriving in port (and 319 leaving), almost half of which came from Ireland, but others from 
all over the continent and as far a field as Africa (20), Newfoundland (23) and Turkey (3).  
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When the records begin in 1773 three of the original founders had died: Onesiphorous 
Tyndall, Thomas Knox and Matthew Hale. The latter had been the managing partner, a 
position that entailed a ‘carrot and stick’ pair of incentives: he lived above the banking 
house free of rent and taxes and received an annual salary of £250 in addition to his share 
of the profits, but was also contractually obliged “to make good [any] bad money and the 
balance of the cash” (Cave, 1899: 43). In 1773 the three other founding partners were still in 
place: Hartford Lloyd (great uncle of Joseph Hartford, who was to became partner of Miles, 
Cave & Baillie in 1786), Isaac Elton, and William Miller. The three were senior partners 
together with Thomas Tyndall, who had replaced his father in 1757. Each senior partner 
held a 4/18th share, with the rest held by two junior partners that had replaced Knox and 
Hale in 1764: Benjamin Gillam and John Edye (each with 1/18th share), keeping the total to 
the maximum permissible of six. John Edye had been promoted to partner from the 
position of clerk in 1764, thus initiating a practice of promoting from within – a practice we 
find little evidence of amongst the London banks. The Old Bank repeated this in 1790 with 
the appointment of his son, Joseph, and more notably in 1815 when it promoted two more 
of its diligent clerks, James Palmer and William Edwards, allocating them a 6% stake.  
 
Between 1788 and 1795 all six partners died or exited the business, and hence the Old Bank 
entered the Restriction led by five completely new partners, two of whom were gone before 
the Bullion Report. In 1797 each held an equal 20% share: Thomas Tyndal II (the 33-year 
old son of the founder, who had only taken over from his father two years previously), Sam 
Edwards (a 50-year old grocer by trade), Joseph Edye (the son of the first clerk to have 
been promoted partner, but someone who had already held the office of Sheriff of Bristol 
in 1794 and went on to be mayor in 1801), Isaac Elton II (the 26-year old son of the 
founder) and William Skinner. Tyndal II would die young in 1804 and his widow, Marianne 
was allowed to hold on to his share until their son, Thomas Tyndal III came of age and 
joined as partner in 1809.  Isaac Elton II was to provide the only continuity throughout the 
Restriction, remaining as partner from 1790 to 1837. By the end of the Restriction in 1818 
he had become the senior partner with a 26% share; all other four partners from the 1790s 
had died or exited, replaced by Hugh Baillie, James Baillie, Thomas Tyndall III (each with a 
21% share), and James Palmer and William Edwards as junior partners (with 6% each).     
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Balance sheet strategy 
 
Both before and during the Restriction, the Old Bank followed a balance sheet management 
policy similar to that advocated by Thomas Thompson at the Smith group. Before the 
Restriction, the bank made few term loans or overdrafts, and the longer-term deposits 
always more than covered these.  
 
Before the Restriction, total lending - including the much larger activity in bill discounting - 
tracked closely the available supply of all deposits (Exhibit 81). In the few years where 
deposits fell short of total lending, the amount financed by the note issue was de minimis. 
The quantity of their own notes in circulation was never more than 22% of the net balance 
sheet and almost always matched entirely to their holdings of the most liquid assets, namely 
a combination of cash, their nostro balance at their London correspondent (Prescott Grote 
& Co – see Chapter 5), and occasionally some government securities.  
 
Exhibit 8.1 – Old Bank, Bristol: asset and liability composition, 1779 - 1820 
 
 
  
230 
After the Restriction, the Old Bank was able to contribute to an expansion in the broad money 
supply by allowing its balance sheet and its lending to grow more than its inflow of 
deposits, funded by ‘pushing out’ their own banknotes. When the Restriction came, total 
deposits seems to have not grown or even declined slightly, but total lending grew thanks to 
a larger volume of own notes successfully ‘pushed out’. In the five years 1801-7 total 
deposits averaged £235,850, down 10% from the five years 1786-1791; in spite of this decline 
in deposits, total lending (loans, overdrafts and bills discounted) grew 20% over the same 
period, from £252,176 to £302,822. How was this financed? By a major expansion in the 
quantity of the Old Bank’s banknotes in circulation that grew by 155%, from an average of 
£61,006 to £155,537 (Exhibit 8.2). During the Restriction over half of the notes in 
circulation were funding the discounting of bills and accounted for all of the increased 
volumes. 
 
Exhibit 8.2 – Old Bank, Bristol: total lending and how it was funded, 1773 - 1820
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Profitability  
 
The balance sheet policy should have generated a rise in profitability per unit of assets, but 
this was not the case for the Old Bank due to a significant rise in operating costs and a 
regular flow of loan losses and asset write-downs – although net profits did become more 
stable (Exhibit 8.3). Gross revenues grew faster than the balance sheet (the average for 
1801-10 was 53% greater than the average of 1783-91, compared to a 31% increase in total 
assets), but net returns to proprietors failed to keep pace (up 31%, the same as assets). As 
such, its revenue and cost dynamics were similar to that of its London correspondent 
Prescott & Grote that followed the Discounter model. The Old Bank’s business was also 
predominantly the discounting of bills, which during the Restriction accounted for 55-65% 
of its net balance sheet assets; 77-90% of interest-bearing assets; and generated 89-100% of 
its revenues, excluding the interest that partners paid to themselves on their own capital. As 
with the London Discounters, the gross profitability of bill discounting rose during the 
Restriction due to the accelerating velocity in the turnover of bills. Gross margins on the 
year’s average balance of bills rose from 5.46% in the five years 1787-91 to 7.58% in 1801-
06. However, also mirroring the London Discounters, three-quarters of this 208 basis point 
improvement in the revenue margin was offset by a rise in direct costs (“Disbursements”); 
the other one-quarter of the improvement was lost through deteriorating loan losses.59  
 
These direct costs included salaries, rent, legal costs, stationery and postage, coal and 
candles, builders and plumbers, glaziers and painters, insurance of the premises, travel costs 
to London, and taxes (including the wonderful “Lamp & Scavenger Tax”). The increase in 
these operating costs during the Restriction can be put down to the following chief factors: 
(1) salary costs in 1805-6 (£1,261 yearly) were as high as all direct costs had been in 1790-1 
(£1,267) because staff increased to eight; in an early example of what today is called the 
“double-hating” of employees, the Old Bank began paying up to £52 towards the costs of 
one of Prescott’s clerks in London who presumably was considered dedicated to 
maintaining the Old Bank’s nostro account ledger; (2) despite the positive balance shown at 
year end on the Old Bank’s account at Prescotts, the bank must have run substantial 
overdrafts during the year as it now paid interest to Prescotts of £1,713, although this 
declined to £354 by 1806; (3) the expansion in transaction volumes and the issuance of its 
                                                
59 Constructed from RBS Archive: ref. Miles, Cave, Baillie & Co (Old Bank) Bristol – MCB/1/1-4 
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own notes (subject to stamp duties) meant that ‘stamps’ and postage alone cost £1,063 in 
1805, 6% of gross revenues from discounts ; and finally (4) the bank was now paying 
interest on money deposited by a few corporate customers, chief amongst which was the 
associated family firm of E(van) Baillie & Son (Exhibit 8.3).   
 
These “disbursement” costs rose to absorb an average 31% of gross revenues compared to 
11% prior to the Restriction, which left the gross profit margin up more modestly from 5% 
to 5.5%.  However, the reported direct costs are not fully comparable between the two 
periods because the bank’s treatment of interest paid on deposits by partners and third 
parties is not entirely consistent. Hence the best comparison is made taking operating 
profits net of “disbursements” and “interest on deposits” in both periods. On this basis, 
gross profit margin after interest paid on deposits (but before write-offs) rose from 4.57% 
before the Restriction to 5.16% during the Restriction. In short, the Old Bank retained only 
60bp of net profit improvement from the 208bp gross improvement. The bank’s capacity to 
capture some of the rise in top line margin in the form of a higher net margins was due to the 
bank being able to issue more of its own notes, which reduced the relative proportion of its 
total lending funded by interest-bearing deposits from the partners and commercial 
customers. 
 
Unfortunately write-offs continued to be a problem during the Restriction in spite of the 
easier credit conditions, and this on average left both the return on assets and the return on 
partner paid-up capital largely unchanged.  
 
Loan write-offs and the Real Bills Doctrine 
 
During the Restriction, the average return on assets rose just 0.05% to 2.17%, but the 
average return on paid-up capital actually fell slightly from 37.3% to 35.3% when making 
the more conservative comparison that includes the large loss on T. Keefe & Sons suffered 
in 1788.  
 
The write-off experience of the Old Bank in the years 1783-1791 averaged 0.87% of the 
average stock of bills discounted when including the 1788 loss (0.49% p.a. if excluding it) 
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and 14.7% (8.7%) of average annual revenues.60 In the Restriction years for which we have 
records (1801-6), write-offs were 0.79% p.a. of average discounts and 10.0% of average 
annual revenues.  There is no clearly specified rate of write-offs on bank lending that 
defines the boundary between what is acceptable statistically noise consistent with the Real 
Bills Doctrine and what is sufficiently high to contradict that hypothesis; however, 
persistent annual write-offs (even when leaving out major frauds like that of Thomas Keefe) 
equivalent to 9% to 10% of revenues are difficult to describe as mere noise.  
 
Exhibit 8.3 – Old Bank, Bristol: profit and loss components, 1783 - 1820 
              
 
The comparison before and during the Restriction is hampered by a near-fatal loss suffered 
by the Old Bank in 1788. The details recorded in the balance sheet of that year provide a 
still image, like a photograph, of a typical network of monetary transactions as if frozen at 
the instant in time when the local merchant Thomas Keefe & Sons went bankrupt. The 
partners had unpaid debts of £9,650 due from the merchant, equivalent to over half the 
                                                
60 In order to observe the true underlying profitability of the business, when calculating the return on equity we 
include the interest paid to the partners on their paid-up capital; by contrast, when calculating the write-off 
experience we divide total write-offs (on and off balance sheet) by the total revenues excluding the interest paid to 
the partners on the paid-up capita 
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paid-up capital of the bank. Either the bank had made one of the oldest mistakes in banking 
– relying on the collateral security of the loan rather than the creditworthiness of the 
borrower – or it was the victim of one of the oldest challenges in banking: how to avoid 
allowing the true exposure to a failing borrower to build up rapidly and surreptitiously in the 
final days before the demise.  
 
The proprietors of the bankrupt firm appear to have run off to Ireland, and the Bristol 
courts were still calling upon them to appear at a meeting of the creditors in May the 
following year. The Old Bank records show the debt outstanding was made up of 28 
different bills for amounts ranging from £196 to £1,000; 24 of these were drawn by 9 
different companies located in Waterford, Liverpool, Dublin, and Porto, mostly upon a 
certain James Roje, and all endorsed by the bankrupt firm. The remaining 4 bills were both 
drawn and endorsed by Thomas Keefe & Sons, a form of circular bill frowned upon by 
Adam Smith (Chapter 2). The Old Bank wrote off £8,126 of these debts, as they were only 
able to recover £1,524. Of this, just £24 came from the balance on Keefe & Sons’ account, 
and the remaining £1,500 from three Notes of £500 due from different individuals, payable 
in London and Ross (near Waterford, Ireland), endorsed by Thomas Keefe & Sons and 
deposited with the Old Bank as “Security for such payments as we shall have made on Bills 
placed in our Hands & discounted.”61 Given the round sums of the three notes, these 
probably represented contingent capital loans extended to Keefe & Sons by silent partners 
and /or its trading counterparties in Ireland.  In effect, Old Bank had partially collateralized 
the discounting of Keefe & Sons’ bills – paid in its own banknotes - using the security of yet 
more IOUs issued by third parties. Such credit expansion based on increasing the supply of one form of 
quasi-money collateralized on another form of quasi-money is how the lung of ‘fringe’ banking expands.  
 
The loss wiped out almost an entire year of the Old Bank’s net profit. It was a stark 
reminder of the risks borne by bank proprietors operating under unlimited personal liability, 
and probably explains why in the following year the partners took the painful decision to 
call for an increase in paid-up capital from £18,000 to £30,000.   
 
With so many different parties involved in the financial arrangements of Thomas Keefe & 
Sons, all of whom had an interest in monitoring the latter’s creditworthiness, such a collapse 
into bankruptcy with so little in the way of compensating assets, cannot be viewed as consistent with the 
                                                
61 Miles, Cave & Baillie archive records, General Balance for Midsummer 1788, p.11 
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‘simplistic’ form of the Real Bills Doctrine, but rather with Adam Smith’s warning that the 
information “discovery [process] is not altogether so easy when [the borrowers] discount 
their bills sometimes with one banker, and sometimes with another, and […] occasionally 
run the round of a great circle of projectors, who find it for their interest to .... render it, 
upon that account, as difficult as possible to distinguish between a real and a fictitious bill 
of exchange” (Smith, 1776: 398). 
 
For the Real Bills Doctrine to have been an active constraint, we would expect to find 
relationships between, on the one hand, profitability or the incidence of write-offs, and on 
the other hand total lending or the issuance of the bank’s own notes. I find there is the 
expected negative relationship, both before and after the Restriction, between the extent of 
the write-offs as a proportion of the average holdings of discounted bills in year t and the 
proportion of the net balance sheet funded with the banks own note issuance in year t+1, 
but the relationship is weak and the data insufficient to establish statistical significance. 
 
Exhibit 8.4 – Old Bank, Bristol: proxy test for the Real Bills Doctrine 
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What is more obvious is that the relationship went through a radical shift after the 
Restriction was imposed. As Ricardo postulated, the effect of institutional changes brought 
about by the Restriction upon the bank’s note issuance behaviour dominated the weak 
reactions to any change in the yearly loan loss experience.  
 
For any given write-off experience in year t, the proportion of the net balance sheet in year 
t+1 funded by the bank’s own note issuance was 15-20 percentage point higher during the 
Restriction than before it (Exhibit 8.4). In a hypothetical year after no write-offs were 
experienced, before the Restriction the bank could be expected to finance 19% of its 
balance sheet by issuing its own notes, but 42% after the Restriction began. Albeit based on 
these statistically insignificant coefficients, when managing its note issuance the Old Bank’s 
reaction function to a worsening of the write-offs was only half as strong after the 
Restriction. Any given deterioration in the proportion of gross profits lost to asset write-
offs engendered half the reduction in note issuance after the Restriction than it had before 
it. In summary, if the profit signal stipulated by the Real Bills Doctrine existed at all, it was 
(a) weak, (b) radically altered by the Restriction.  
 
 
8.2  Case study: Barnard & Co, Bedford 
 
The balance sheet records of Thomas Barnard & Co. represent the only complete data sets 
of Country bank collected by Pressnell (1956) and I use his data in the following analysis. 
The bank was the epitome of a conservative institution designed for ‘family and friends’.  
 
The Barnard family of Bedford established Barnard & Co in 1799 and, like so many 
Country banks, it was born with a small capital (£10,000) alongside their commercial 
interests, in this case in coal. The bank’s balance sheet management can be subdivided into 
three periods: the early fast growth during the Restriction up to 1818, funded by an 
expansion of the note issue, but with little change in lending to the public; a subsequent 
decade of no growth, during which note issuance remains a significant part of total funding; 
and a final period after 1828 when the balance sheet is growing again, but funded mostly 
with money from partners, while note issuance declines (Exhibit 8.5).  
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Exhibit 8.5 – Barnard & Co, Bedford: asset and liability management, 1800 - 1844 
 
 
In the years of the Restriction up to 1818 Barnard’s balance sheet expanded rapidly (6.4% 
p.a.), despite the wobble in 1816 (when it contracts by 18% in one year). This rapid growth 
matches that of the two fastest growing London Banks (Chapter 10), and was funded by the 
rapid growth in the quantity of banknotes it ‘pushed out’. In its first year of operation it 
issued £20,000 of notes, a relatively aggressive 50% of its liabilities, but this was made 
possible by its risk-averse asset policy that included a 31% cash reserve. The note issue 
expanded faster than the balance sheet until it reached a peak of £91,580 in 1811, 
representing 77% of liabilities. This increase in note issuance was not redeployed to expand 
advances, but was partly invested in government securities, with the balance placed with 
Barnard’s correspondent in London. This level is much higher than those seen amongst the 
other banks in our sample, but Barnard supported it by keeping a highly liquid asset 
portfolio and continuing to hold a third in cash. As the Restriction and the war progressed, 
Barnard matched an increasing portion of its note issuance to cash held at the bank, and 
deposited less with its London correspondent. It is possible that the accounting exaggerates 
the cash reserve: Barnard, in keeping with the other Country bank accounts analysed here, 
probably included a stock of its own notes on both sides of the balance sheet (under ‘notes’ 
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on the liability side and in the ledger called ‘cash’ on the asset side), but Pressnell data does 
not allow the unpicking of the two components.  
 
Up until the financial crisis of 1825, when Barnard & Co still functioned as a bank, its 
balance sheet size had a strong correlation to the aggregate balance sheet of the London 
banks in our sample (R-sq = 0.83, see Appendix I – as did the estimated aggregate of all 
Country bank liabilities, see Chapter 12). This relationship broke down after 1823. 
However, unlike London banks, Barnard fails to grow in the decade after 1818 as Britain 
returns to the gold standard. Between 1818 and 1828 its balance sheet shrinks by -0.5% per 
annum, more in line with the decline of the Bank of England’s of -1.5% p.a. The bank 
survives this difficult decade by shifting the balance sheet into what eventually became little 
more than a cash management service for partners (and their close associates). By 1828, 
equity and deposits from partners account for 30% of total liabilities, and note issuance has 
declined to 41% from its peak in 1811-2 when it constituted more than three-quarters of all 
funding. On the asset side, more than 80% of the balance sheet is held in cash. By 1838, the 
bank had essentially ceased to be one, with partner funding accounting for half the 
liabilities, note issuance down to 18% of liabilities, and over 90% of the assets held in cash 
or government securities. By 1838 Barnard & Co. had become David Hume’s (1752: 35-6) 
favourite type of bank: one that “locked up all the money it received, and never augmented 
the circulating coin”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please note that an additional case study of Locke, Hughes & Saunders, Devizes from the Bristol area has 
been placed in Appendix N.  
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PART III 
Case studies of Country banks 
 
Chapter 9. Leyland & Bullins and the North West 
 
1. Case study: Leyland & Bullins, Liverpool 
2. Case study: A. Heywood, Liverpool 
 
 
In this chapter I investigate the remaining records of three banks in the northwest region of 
Lancashire where banks did not issue their own notes. The region was centred on the major 
port of Liverpool and Manchester, the two largest towns after London each with a 
population of approximately 80,000 in 1801. Little remains in the way of continuous 
records with the exception of the important bank of Leyland & Bullins. Together with those 
of Barnard & Co of Bedford (Chapter 8), this data were the best records collected by 
Pressnell (1956) and my contribution is limited to analysing his data from the perspective of 
what it can tell us about the behaviour of the money supply.  Some minor additional 
evidence was obtained from the original records of A. Heywood & Co, Liverpool and from 
Williams, Jones & Hughes in Chester.  
 
 
9.1  Case study: Leyland & Bullins, Liverpool 
 
I begin with a brief history of the bank drawing principally from Hughes (1906), before 
analysing the balance sheet data.  
 
History of the partnership 
 
The bank of Leyland & Bullins [hereafter “LB”] was formed in 1807 by the prominent and 
wealthy self-made merchant, Thomas Leyland (1752-1827) and two of his nephews, Richard 
and Christopher Bullins: the first joined from the start, and the second in 1815 (Orbell and 
Turton, 2001: 322). Leyland had served as the town’s mayor in 1798 and did so again in 
1814 (apparently under protest) and 1820 (Crick and Wadsworth, 1958: 408-16). The bank 
remained in private hands until 1901 when it was amalgamated into the North and South 
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Wales Bank62. For five years prior to founding the bank, Thomas Leyland had been a 
partner in Leyland, Clarkes & Roscoe. The latter descended from “William Clarke, banker 
and linen draper” that was the first to be called a ‘banker’ in the Liverpool Directory of 
1774 (Hughes, 1906: 2). William Clarke’s wife died in 1781 and the same year he took the 
decision to sell his linen business and concentrate on banking together with his two sons, 
William II and John. The bank survived the 1793 crisis, but had the misfortune of losing its 
founder on the 5th February 1797 just as it faced a change in the ‘rules of the game’. The 
historian John Hughes (1906) writes that at the time the bank’s London correspondent, 
Esdaile & Co., held some £200,000 of Clarke & Sons’ paper and were concerned that the 
business might fold; so they brought back from retirement a 44-year old local attorney, 
William Roscoe,63 to audit the bank and act as the London bank’s independent eyes and 
ears.  Roscoe did such a good job that the Esdaile partners insisted – against his wishes – 
that he become a permanent partner or they would put the business into bankruptcy. 
Thomas Leyland joined as partner in 1802, but left at the end of 1806, just ten days before 
he set up as Leyland & Bullins. Hughes makes the reasonable suggestion that Leyland’s 
abrupt departure was due to Roscoe being elected as local MP, standing on a ticket in 
favour of the abolition of the slave trade, whereas Leyland had for many years been active 
in that trade (Hughes, 1906: 58-64). 
 
The newly formed Leyland & Bullins thrived during the Restriction: already in 1814 the 
balance sheet reached £1 million just seven years after being founded. Thomas Leyland 
made the ideal banker of the day, being a prominent and wealthy local merchant. Already in 
1793, when the Mayor of Liverpool called a meeting of the Special Council to discuss what 
actions could be taken to relieve the credit crisis, Thomas Leyland was one of the ten men 
appointed to the joint “Committee of Merchants and the Council” charged with finding 
solutions. It was this Committee that hatched the plan to have the Corporation of Liverpool 
borrow £100,000 from the Bank of England, and when this failed, the successful plan to 
seek Parliament’s permission for the Corporation to issue its own notes up to a value of 
£300,000 collateralized on the Corporation’s revenues and assets (mostly unbuilt land).   
 
 
 
                                                
62 The bank was eventually absorbed into the Midland Bank and then today’s HSBC Bank.  
63 William Roscoe was a man with many talents, with interests in art and architecture, and there is still today a 
“Roscoe Professor of Architecture” named after him at the University of Liverpool 
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Balance sheet strategy and Stable Fringe Velocity 
 
The Liverpool banks did not issue their own banknotes. In 1807, the year LB began 
operating, the Liverpool Advertiser wrote what amounts to a re-statement of Adam Smith’s 
warning on why the Real Bills Doctrine might not work, but made the warning apply only 
in the case of banks able to issue their own notes: 
 
“We have been of the opinion (and our opinion is justified by daily experience) that the 
circulation of provincial bankers’ paper is highly injurious to the public interest, because it 
enables speculative, designing, and often penniless men to create a false capital, and thereby to enter into 
schemes which too frequently involve thousands in ruin; for, having nothing to lose themselves, they 
run, neck or nothing into the wildest and most extravagant adventures, careless of the 
consequences. To the honour of Lancashire be it known, not a single note is issued by any 
banking house in the county; and notwithstanding the magnitude of its manufactures, 
commerce, and population, nothing is current but Bank of England paper and sterling 
specie: nor is the least inconvenience experience in consequence of this wise regulation” 
(Hughes, 1906: 110) [my italics] 
 
Without the possibility of expanding the bank’s funding by ‘pushing out notes’, LB’s 
lending during the Restriction closely followed the flow of deposits (Exhibit 9.1). In this 
sense lending was supply-driven and the bank was not manufacturing broad money at an accelerating 
rate; it was merely one of the cogs that contribute to the credit multiplier of fractional banking. In the four 
years 1812-15, total lending to the public (advances plus bills discounted) was kept at a 
steady 63-76% of deposits from the public (51-63% of total deposits including those from 
partners). This cautious strategy meant that one-third to one-half of the deposits were 
invested in liquid government securities or held in cash or as balances with the London 
correspondents.  
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Exhibit 9.1 – Leyland & Bullins, Liverpool: deposits and lending, 1812 -1832 
 
 
In the five years that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1816-20) this relationship 
changed in ways that are more consistent with lending to the public becoming driven by the 
demand for loans. At first loans declined despite a significant rise in deposits, and 
subsequently increased despite a decline in deposits. Finally, after the Restriction ended in 
1821, and until Thomas Leyland’s death in 1827, the original relationship was re-established, 
only now typically 100% of deposits from the public were re-lent out. After 1826 the bank 
was contributing to a modest rise in the velocity of money compared to the Restriction 
period by the operation of the fractional banking multiplier. After Leyland’s death the 
composition of deposits changes, with a much larger share made up of deposits from 
partners, but the relationship between total deposits and total lending remained close to a 
ratio of 1:1.  Between the end of 1826 and the end of 1828 partner deposits rose from 
£136,567 to £634,794: the most likely explanation is that after his death Thomas Leyland’s 
fortune was gradually consolidated into the bank, the increase of some half a million being 
consistent with the total assets of £736,531 recorded in his personal books a few months 
before his death,  a quite extraordinary sum for that time (Crick and Wadsworth, 1958: 413). 
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Cash management and Stable Fringe Velocity 
 
The LB balance sheet is the only Country bank to show for all years 1812-1845 a separate 
line item on the asset side for both specie and Bank of England notes – in keeping with the 
region’s preference for having only these two types of money circulating. The LB records 
therefore give us the longest insight on the holdings of these two types of ‘cash’.  
 
Here the records once again reveal that during the Restriction specie played almost no part 
in bank balance sheets. Between 1812 and 1820, specie accounted for no more than 0.1% of 
total assets. Consistent with other Country banks, Bank of England notes played a more 
important part of total ‘cash’, but nevertheless the sum of specie and Bank of England 
notes together accounted for between 0.5% (1813) and a maximum of 1.5% (1816) of total 
assets. As with other Country banks, the cash reserve was very small if compared to the 
reserves kept by the London banks (Chapters 6 and 11).  
 
The balance sheet velocity of specie was neither low nor constant. However, consistent with 
one possible interpretation of Ricardo’s texts, the average balance sheet velocity of the 
reserves of specie plus Bank of England notes combined, although also low, did not change 
significantly during the 1812-32 period. Not surprisingly, the return to the gold standard in 
1821 caused the bank to hold a larger stock of specie, but still de minimis: 0.6% of the 
balance sheet compared to 0.1% during the Restriction. The balance sheet ratio of the 
combined stock of specie plus Bank of England notes was also higher after the Restriction, 
but the change in the average level remained small, from 0.9% to 1.6%. When measured as 
a ratio of specie plus notes relative to total lending to the public, the change was still 
insignificant, from 1.8% to 1.6%. The main effect of returning to the gold standard was to 
make the ratio of total cash to total assets some five times more volatile,64 suggesting it was 
more of a residual to the core activities, rather than their driver, as postulated by the Stable 
Fringe Velocity hypothesis proposed by the Bullionist/Scarcity lobby.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
64 Variance 1812-20 = 1.23178E-05; variance 1821-32 = 6.08334E-05 
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Exhibit 9.2 – Leyland & Bullins: cash ratios, 1812 - 1832 
     
 
Because the Liverpool banks did not issue their own notes, they had less means to expand 
their balance sheets independently of the supply of specie and Bank of England notes. 
Hence we would expect the Liverpool banks’ management of their balance sheet liquidity to 
have been more dependent on their access to the rediscounting of bills with their London 
correspondent, and therefore their balance sheets to behave more like Ricardo’s hypothesis, 
namely to be more correlated to those of the London banks. Between 1812 and 1832 the 
LB balance sheet shows a 0.82 correlation to the six London banks with data over the same 
period, similar to that of Barnard & Co, Bedford. Perhaps more surprising given LB’s mix 
of business, the correlation is higher with the London Goldsmith banks (0.75) compared to 
the Discounter banks (0.43) – see Exhibit 9.3.   
 
The inference is that amongst Country banks there was (with the exception of Scotland) 
one monetary pathway for the issuers of banknotes and another for Lancashire where banks 
did not issue their own. In particular, there was one monetary pathway for banks like LB 
and the Goldsmiths that relied on deposit growth to determine their asset growth, and 
another pathway for those banks that had acquired an element of (endogenous) discretion 
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to ‘manufacture’ new bank liabilities (banknotes) and invest them in liquid forms of lending 
to either the private sector (bills) or public sector (government securities).  
 
Exhibit 9.3 – Leyland & Bullins: correlations with London business model clusters,  
1812-32 
 
 
 
9.2  Case study: A. Heywood & Sons, Liverpool 
 
This is an important private bank established in Liverpool in 1773 by Arthur Heywood, an 
international merchant, which appears to have traded continuously under that name until 
the Bank of Liverpool acquired it in 1883 (Orbell and Turton, 2001: 272).  Only semi-
annual balance sheets for 1787 to 1790 survive. These show the bank had already reached 
sizable total assets of £371,773 in June 1787 and was still growing fast, reaching £542,163 
three and half years later, making it as large as Prescott in London and almost as large as 
Goslings. One remaining balance sheet for 1845 shows that by that year it had grown to 
£2,218,729, making it twice as large as the two London banks and the same size as Hoares.  
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This limited window into the bank’s balance sheet nevertheless yields some corroboration 
of the evidence from other case studies:  
 
1. Even at this early date prior to the Restriction this Country bank held small reserves of 
‘cash’ of just 0.5% to 2.8% of total assets; in 1845 it was little different at 2.9%. 
 
2. The bank was a major lender to businesses, not just individuals, and it typically did so by a 
combination of loans and overdrafts (two-thirds of its assets) and one-third by discounting 
bills. By 1845, with bills of exchange now ubiquitous components of the supply of quasi-
money, the mix of business had inverted and the discounting of bills dominated two-thirds 
of the assets.  
 
3. In June 1788 Heywood recorded “dubious debts” of £7,042 or 2.1% of total lending. 
 
4. Like the Smith group of Country banks, Arthur Heywood followed a policy of each year 
capitalizing (a portion) of the profits, thus increasing paid up capital from 3.6% to 6.5% of 
total liabilities in just this short period. By 1845 paid up capital had risen to a very 
conservative 18% of liabilities, almost double the 10% ratio targeted by Thomas Coutts in 
London.  
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PART IV 
The Restriction, the banking system, and monetary theory 
Chapter 10. The Bank of England and the Restriction 
 
 
1. The postulates of the theoretical debate 
2. Data construction 
3. How could bank behaviour affect the income velocity of specie? 
4. First order effects: the Bank of England 
5. How did the Bank’s balance sheet change after 1778? 
6. How did the Bank finance the large increase in its balance sheet? 
7. Bank of England asset gearing to cash 
 
In Part IV I contribute to the history of money by constructing aggregated views of the data 
previously presented for the individual banks. It brings together the firm-level analysis of 
individual London and Country banks presented in Parts II and III with the better-known 
Bank of England data, and recent GDP data, in order to assess how the 1809-10 debate 
amongst political economists described in Part I reflected and interpreted Britain’s changing 
banking and monetary system. Parts II and III  ‘looked for big things in small places’; Part 
IV constructs inferences about ‘big things’ from the evidence found in those ‘small places’ 
and compares those inferences to how contemporary political economists theorised about 
them. 
 
10.1  The postulates of the theoretical debate 
 
In Part I the critical analysis of original texts showed how classical monetary theory relied 
on the three tenets of the Price-Specie-Flow (quantity theory of money based on money 
being only specie), the Real Bills Doctrine (the supply and demand for credit are determined 
by economic agents blessed with accurate expectations about future real values), and 
Smith’s early micro-economic form of the Law of Reflux (individual banks have a profit 
incentive not to push out their own banknotes beyond he propensity of the public to hold 
them in preference to specie – and such propensity was ‘modelled’ as being, if not zero, 
then low and stable over a loosely defined complete production cycle). The banking system 
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was viewed through the Humean lens as a mere intermediary of real resources (specie) 
between savers and “projectors” (entrepreneurs) for the financing of working capital, and 
not as a potential independent ‘manufacturer’ of broad money supply in the form of IOUs, 
created through the provision of credit to projects that might fail (to meet expectations). In 
short, classical theory conceptualised the banking system as if it had remained unchanged 
since Hume’s times, and contained only banks that operated with a low-risk version of the 
Goldsmith business model, having low and stable gearing to cash reserves (Part II). 
 
After the Restriction Act, political economists responded by bifurcating the classical 
theories of money into two paradigm according to which monetary outcome they sought: 
the relative scarcity or abundance of money relative to the cumulative (nominal) value in 
exchange of all (potential) economic transactions occurring over a given period of time. Part 
I revealed more precisely how Bullionists advocated for the (relative) Scarcity of ‘base 
money’ and Anti-Bullionists advocated for the Abundance of ‘broad money’. The 
Bullionists postulated a stable relationship between Country banknotes and Bank of 
England notes in circulation, and advocated for a stable relationship between the Bank of 
England notes (and hence also Country bank notes) relative to real GDP. By implication, if 
the growth in the supply of all banknotes plus specie exceeded the growth in real GDP, then 
the resulting rise in prices could only be due to an excessive issue of Bank of England notes. 
By contrast, the Anti-Bullionists postulated an endogenously determined and stable 
relationship between the broad money supply and nominal GDP, and advocated for a laisser 
faire approach to the banking system based on the Real Bills Doctrine. They specified no a 
priori appropriate compositional mix of the broad money supply - between specie, Bank of 
England banknotes, Country banknotes or anything else that people chose to use as 
circulating media. Such compositional mix was said to be determined endogenously by the 
London Transfer and Set Off clearing system’s capacity to ‘instantly’ offset the supply and 
demand for each type of instrument and, implicitly, to also match any resulting net demand 
for specie to its available supply. By extension, for a given level of deposits, any increase in 
the banknote circulation could be assumed to reflect demand for additional lending and a 
matching willingness of the population to use the additional banknotes. 
 
This Part IV investigates the weight of the evidence for and against these two competing 
views of the functioning of the monetary system through the lens of bank balance sheets. 
As there is no reliable estimate of specie outside the banking system, I focus on the 
  
250 
contribution to changes in ‘the money supply’ made by the change in total bank liabilities. I 
am using total bank liabilities as the best approximation (see explanation in Chapter 12) of 
the observable change in what political economists at the time referred to as the stock of 
‘circulating media’. In the closing sections of Chapter 12 I return to the issue of specie 
outside the banking system.  
 
I first enumerate four possible mechanisms by which the banking system can contribute to 
changes in the income velocity of specie, and then examine the evidence pertaining to each 
in order to understand the changes that followed the Restriction Act. Chapter 10 examines 
the evidence pertaining to the balance sheet actions of the Bank of England. Chapter 11 
investigates the differentiated response of London Discounter and Goldsmith banks to the 
Bank of England’s expanded discount window. As a by-product of this analysis, I am able 
to establish confidence in the business model taxonomy. Finally, in Chapter 12 I use the 
sample bank balance sheet data to construct two consolidated data series that approximate 
the aggregate balance sheet of, respectively, the London banks and (more tentatively) the 
Country banks. The relation between these two data series and Bank of England circulation 
and recently published British GDP are examined in order to draw inferences regarding the 
questions posed by the theoretical debate between Ricardo and Bosanquet in 1809-10. The 
chapter concludes by drawing out some implications for the long-standing debate over the 
role played by the large government borrowing to finance the war with France in ‘crowding 
out’ the private sector lending demanded by the industrial revolution.  
 
 
10.2  Data construction 
 
In answering questions regarding the Restriction’s impact, I compare various bank balance 
sheet data series to the overall British economy. As the scalar, I use recently available data 
for British real and nominal GDP. Since the publication of annual GDP estimates in British 
Economic Growth, 1270-1870 by Broadberry et al. (2015) it is now possible to scale the 
different balance sheet data by real GDP, as well as to deflate them by nominal GDP, 
according to the question being investigated. The above authors construct their GDP series 
‘bottom up’ using a mixture of direct and proxy historical evidence to estimate the total 
output for agriculture, industry and services, with the respective shares of value-added 
estimated using nominal input-output shares for 1841, interpolated with those for six earlier 
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(distant) benchmark years (1801 being the one that falls during the period analysed here). 
The real values provided for GDP are converted into nominal GDP data using their base-
year estimate of £76.01 million for 1700 (Broadberry et al., 2015: 227) and adjusted using the 
related GDP deflator kindly provided by the authors. 
 
When normalising the bank balance sheet series constructed here and the GDP series (real 
or nominal), it is important to ensure the two categories of data are not derived from the 
same inputs, as this might pre-analytically create spurious evidence of co-movement. I have 
investigated the overlap in the construction of the GDP series and our balance sheet data, 
and found this to be immaterial. Broadberry et al. (2015: 172-3) explain that the share of 
“financial services” output is set at (only) 5% of total service sector output for the entire 
period analysed in this thesis, and hence equivalent to only “around 1.7% of GDP”. From 
the mid-seventeenth century onwards, the value added from this financial sector sub-
component of the GDP series is constructed from “an unweighted average of the number 
of country banks from Pressnell (1956: 11) and Pearson’s (2004: 374-5) fire-insurance series, 
interpolated using the drawing accounts of the Bank of England from Mitchell (1988: 658, 
665).” In subsequent verification, the authors have confirmed that they chose Bank of 
England circulation data as the interpolating factor in compiling their final series because 
drawing accounts are available as a separate series only until 1797.65 The Pressnell series for 
Country banks used in the GDP data is one of the independent variables investigated here. 
However, the fire-insurance series that makes up half the “financial services” output data 
does not form any part of the money supply measures constructed here. Hence, I estimate 
the overlap between the genesis of the GDP data and that of the bank balance sheet series 
constructed here is at most 1%. Furthermore, this is present only in comparisons involving 
either the Bank of England circulation or Country banks, but not those involving London 
banks. 
 
The data series for London and Country banks are constructed by drawing on the archival 
work analysed in Chapters 1,4,5,6,7,8, and 9 of this thesis. By contrast, data for the Bank of 
England has long been available through the work of Mitchell and Deane (1962) who drew 
on the work by J.H. Clapham (1970). Until 1777, asset data is only for bullion holdings, so 
the total balance sheet is estimated using the three available components of liabilities: 
                                                
65 For the same reason, drawing accounts are included in the circulation data used here (unless otherwise specified) 
in order to ensure better consistency with data after 1797. I am grateful to Prof. Broadberry for his clarifications. 
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circulation, drawing accounts, and the Rest (equity). From 1778, the series for ‘drawing 
accounts’ is replaced by the series for ‘total deposits’ that runs to 1844. On the asset side, 
the values for government securities and total securities become available from 1778, and a 
series for private sector discounts is constructed from the difference. Constructed this way, 
total liabilities equal total assets.  
 
 
10.3 How could bank behaviour affect the income velocity of specie? 
 
The income-based velocity of high-powered money is shaped by three factors that have 
repeatedly challenged monetary economists: financial innovation in bank business models, 
practices and instruments (including communications); the role of credit and the ‘fringe’ 
banking sector; and the nature of the incentives operating upon individual economic agents. 
These factors were all present after the Restriction Act of 1797, and here we assess their 
impact. Viewed through the accounting lens of bank balance sheets that has guided the 
analysis in this thesis, I investigate the following four potential mechanisms by which the 
banking system could contribute to changes in the income velocity of specie at the time of 
the Restriction Act: 
 
I. The Bank of England could (successfully) increase the proportion of its Banknotes put 
into circulation relative to its stock of bullion in reserve [investigated in this Chapter 10]. 
 
This could occur by way of accommodating more customer demands for credit (i.e. for the 
discounting of bills of exchange) or by buying more Exchequer bills, for any given stock of 
bullion held by the Bank. While such ‘manufacturing’ of broad money supply is the same 
process as the second factor below, the Bank of England’s actions are examined separately 
because of its relative size and the potential (highlighted by Ricardo) that its Banknotes, 
once redeposited into other (Country) banks, would be treated as reserves in lieu of specie, 
i.e. treated as high-powered money, and hence have greater multiplier effects. If this were 
so, as explained at the end of Part I, we would expect to see changes in the aggregate 
London and Country balance sheets being positively correlated to changes in the stock of 
Banknotes.  
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II. Other banks could increase their average balance sheet asset gearing to specie reserves, 
in the absence of any initial change in total balance sheet liabilities or their composition 
[investigated in Chapter 11]. 
 
Independently of what the Bank of England did, other banks could decide to hold lower 
specie reserves and lend out more of their deposits. This could result from a mix of any of 
the following: (a) a reduced need to meet withdrawals in specie, (b) use of Banknotes in lieu 
of specie reserves, (c) a perceived improvement in the ‘shiftability’ of other non-specie 
assets, such as bills of exchange and government securities, (d) a redistribution of existing 
British customer deposits towards banks already operating with lower specie reserve ratios. 
I show all these factors were present during the Restriction period. 
 
III. An increase in the number of banks (‘financial deepening’) [investigated in Chapter 12]. 
 
Each bank would have contributed additional equity capital to the system (paid-up or 
implied) used to support the lending out of previously idle cash balances over the 
accounting time period over which velocity is measured. At the level of the whole banking 
system, each new bank would add fresh capacity to absorb liquidity and credit risk, as well 
as additional capacity to gather more and better information about prospective borrowers.  
 
IV. Country banks could (successfully) increase the quantity of their own banknotes put 
into circulation [investigated in Chapter 12]. 
 
This would typically occur as the result of an increased accommodation of customer 
demands for credit, with such borrowers [and the public] accepting to be credited in 
banknotes. This was tantamount to ‘manufacturing’ an increase in the total balance sheet 
liabilities, thereby contributing to an increase in the income velocity of specie. However, it 
could also have resulted from the banks ‘pushing out’ more banknotes with unchanged total 
lending and total liabilities [i.e. pure rent-seeking]. This would have resulted in an increase in 
a bank’s stock of specie and Banknotes, which we have not observed during the Restriction, 
or an increase in the transfer of the same down to their London correspondent for investing 
in interest-bearing government securities, which we did observe (Part III). 
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10.4  First order effects: the Bank of England 
 
The first factor influencing the total supply of money during the Restriction is the expanded 
lending by the Bank of England financed by printing Banknotes. The Restriction proved to 
be the catalyst for an unprecedented expansion in the Bank’s balance sheet, and in particular 
its discounting of private sector commercial paper in the years up to 1810. The increased 
lending by the Bank led it to operate with a higher asset gearing to its reserves of bullion 
and hence, ceteris paribus, contributing to a higher income velocity of specie.  
 
Exhibit 10.1 – Bank of England balance sheet, scaled to real GDP, 1720-1842 
 
 
The Bank of England’s balance sheet played a pivotal (if not ‘central’) role in the banking 
system because of its relative size; its monopoly over banknote issuance inside a 65-mile 
radius around London; and because its Banknotes had the potential to act as high-powered 
money. The latter was due to the contention, at least partially accepted by both sides of the 
theoretical debate, that Country banks held its Banknotes as liquidity reserves in the place of 
specie – which Part III showed had been the case. By 1795, Mitchell and Deane (1962: 442-
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3) show the Bank of England balance sheet had grown to £22.5 million, backed by 
estimated capital and reserves of £3 million. Of the other £19.5 million of liabilities, just 
under half (£8.7 million) were banknotes in circulation. On the asset side it held 25% in 
bullion reserves, plus £16.9 million of securities, most of which were government debt 
(£13.2 million) and only a small component of discounted private sector bills and notes 
(£3.7 million). By comparison the largest London bank had reached approximately £1 
million of assets (Child & Co, Coutts & Co, and Drummonds), but the more typical size 
was still only a quarter to half a million (Chapter 4). Outside London (Part III), with the 
exception of Scotland (Chapter 6), only a few of the largest Country banks reached half a 
million in balance sheet (such as the Old Bristol Bank and Heywood & Sons in Liverpool, 
described in Chapters 8 & 9), and most are estimated to have been less than £100,000, 
supported by equity capital of £10,000 or less (Pressnell, 1956: 226-7).  
 
The removal of the legal constraint to redeem banknotes with gold coin upon demand, 
together with the ruling that even deposits by customers of specie could be returned one-
quarter in banknotes (Chapter 1), led to a significant increase in the Bank of England’s 
balance sheet assets and, on the liability side, in the quantity of its banknotes in circulation. 
The Bank’s banknotes entered into circulation in one of two ways: lending to the private 
sector via the London banks, or supporting the short-term “unfunded” government debt. 
Either the Bank bought private sector commercial paper presented for discounting by a 
London bank, or it exchanged its notes for Navy and Ordinance bills drawn on government 
departments by the suppliers of goods (mostly for military purposes). As described in 
Chapter 1, direct term lending to the Exchequer was prohibited under the terms of the 
Bank Act of 1797.  During the first part of the Restriction between 1796 and 1810, the 
Bank doubled the size of its balance sheet to £41.5 million, and yet there was almost no 
change in the Bank’s reserves of bullion (£3.3 million versus £2.6 million at the nadir of 
1797). Until 1810 the increase in assets was mostly accounted for by a major expansion in 
the Bank’s discounting (i.e. purchases) of private sector bills and notes, which increased 
from £5.1 million to a peak of £22.4 million (an 11.0% annual growth rate).  
 
The change can best be viewed through the long-run lens of the Bank’s total balance sheet 
normalised to British real GDP from 1720 (Exhibit 10.1). After some fifty years during 
which the size of the Bank’s balance sheet had maintained a relatively stable average of 7% 
of real GDP, after 1774 its nominal size begins a long period of expansion relative to the 
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size of the real economy that peaks forty years later in 1814 at 23% of real GDP. Similarly, 
during the Restriction, the volume of private sector discounting rises from 2-3% of real 
GDP to a peak of over 11% in 1810. Over the following decade the Bank’s balance sheet 
shrinks back to 11% relative to the real economy, eventually returning to a ratio of 7% in 
1840. By contrast, it takes just seven years after 1810 for commercial discounts to revert to 
2-3% of real GDP, and just 5 years between 1817 and 1822 for Banknotes in circulation 
(not shown) to return to their pre-Restriction norm of 7% of real GDP. Judged by the 
Bank’s balance sheet actions, this was indeed a long cycle of monetary Abundance, followed 
by a short and brutal retrenchment back to monetary Scarcity relative to the underlying 
volume-based measures of exchange transactions.  
 
 
10.5 How did the Bank’s balance sheet change after 1778? 
 
The Restriction period is distinguished by a rapid growth in the Bank’s discounting of 
private sector bills that account for more than three-quarters (£17,246,000 or 78%) of the 
rise in the total balance sheet (£22,109,000) from 1796 to 1810 (Exhibit 10.3). The table in 
Exhibit 10.2 shows the average composition of the Bank’s balance sheet on both the asset 
and liability side for the three five-year periods of 1781-5; just before the Restriction Act; 
and before the peak in the Bank’s private sector discounting. Viewed as 5-year averages, the 
composition of the Bank’s liabilities is relatively stable, with ‘capital and reserves’ (called 
“rest”) of 14%, and deposits stabilizing around one-third, and banknote circulation around 
one-half of total liabilities respectively. While Britain was on a gold standard, technically the 
Bank still acted in line with its original 1694 mandate. In the two decades prior to the 
Restriction, Banknotes in circulation were backed by bullion (or 27% on average and 
government securities for 53%), and hence the average ratio between the two oscillated 
around an average of 1:2. This was technically consistent with that originally legislated in 
1694, but already holdings of discounted private sector bills of exchange had become part 
of the Bank’s asset backing, although the latter oscillated between just £2 and £4 million 
(except 1796), compared to the peak levels of £22 million reached barely a decade later. By 
contrast to the liabilities, the composition of the assets goes through greater change during 
the Restriction period, and the proportion held in private sector commercial paper rises to 
nearly half the balance sheet (45%) in the peak period of 1806-10, more than double what it 
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was (18%) in the five years before the Restriction Act and also nearly double what it was in 
1781-5 (26%).  
 
This substantial change in the composition of the Bank’s assets towards private sector 
discounting during the first decade of the Restriction period, funded by a mix of liabilities 
that was largely unchanged since before the Restriction Act, points to a Bank enjoying 
greater demand for private sector credit and unruffled by any difficulties in having the 
increased (net) issuance of its banknotes accepted by those private sector counterparties and 
by the public. 
 
Exhibit 10.2 – Bank of England: composition of assets and liabilities, five-year averages, 
1781-1810 
 
At the peak, the ratio of nominal private discounts to real GDP rose to 11%, compared to 
an average of 2.4% before and 2.3% after the Restriction (Exhibit 10.1). Such a fourfold 
increase in short-term66 lending to the private sector relative to the underlying volume-based 
measure of exchange transactions was unlikely to be consistent with the Real Bills 
hypothesis, unless one or more of the following four attenuating circumstances were 
present (all other things being equal). First, the Bank could be increasing its share of an 
unchanged total bills discounted; in fact, as shown in Chapters 7-9 the opposite was true. 
Second, the economic mix of output could be shifting towards industries requiring more 
working capital per unit of output; given any reasonable estimate of working capital 
requirements as a proportion of total ‘sales’ (i.e. GDP), this would require an implausible 
                                                
66 The analysis of BHHB discount book in Chapter 5 showed that the typical average maturity of these bills was one 
month.  
Bank of England balance sheet
5-year average composition
1781-5 1791-95 1806-1810
Assets
private sector discounts 26% 18% 45%
government securities 58% 52% 40%
Bullion 16% 30% 15%
Liabilities
Circulation 46% 55% 54%
Deposits 40% 31% 32%
"Rest" (equity) 14% 14% 14%
Source: Mitchell & Deane (1961)
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degree of change in the economy in such a short period of time. It could have occurred to 
individual businesses experiencing longer delays in their accounts payable, but this can only 
happen on a net basis at the level of the whole economy if the payment delays affect 
exporters, but not the volume of their exports (which would reduce the denominator, real 
GDP); Bosanquet’s arguments concerned the inability to export, not delays in payment. 
Third, it could occur due to an exogenous increase in prices, requiring a greater amount of 
nominal working capital per unit of real output; this is possible, and I will return to it 
further below. Lastly, the private banks could be recycling part of the Bank’s increased 
private sector discounting into additional lending to the government; this is the favoured 
hypothesis following the analysis of the correspondent banking flows between the Bank of 
Scotland and Coutts (Chapter 6) and within the Smith banking group (Chapter 7).  Such 
backdoor financing of long-term government debt with issuance of Banknotes was 
indirectly doing the same as the issuance of the assignat had done in France, and not what 
was intended by the Real Bills Doctrine.  
 
Exhibit 10.3 – Bank of England assets: total and composition, 1780-1840
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10.6  How did the Bank finance the large increase in its balance sheet? 
 
No less than 75% of the increase in the Bank of England’s discounting was funded by a £13 
million increase in Banknotes in circulation. With the average London bank in our sample 
having a balance sheet of approximately half a million pounds in 1796, the increase in 
Banknotes in circulation represented the equivalent of 26 more banks or approximately 
40% of those actually in existence. It was this increase that concerned Ricardo and the 
Bullionists. Although he did not have the full data available, he had seen at least five data 
points given in evidence to the Bullion Committee by Mr. Pease of the Bank, which gave 
the broad outline of the increase since 1797 (see Appendix J); and Ricardo would also have 
developed a sense of this increased supply of Banknotes through his brokerage company’s 
dealings in the London securities market. The concern was understandable: such a large rise 
in the stock of Banknotes circulating at first in London where ‘money was always within 
reach’ could be expected to lead to multiplier effects to the extent that Country banks 
treated these Banknotes as potential reserves. 
 
Exhibit 10.4 charts this composite estimate of the Bank’s notes in circulation from 1770 to 
1840, distinguishing the three sub-periods before, during, and after the Restriction. After 
1797 there was acceleration in the trend rate of growth of Banknotes in circulation, from 
3.9% p.a. to 5.2% p.a., followed by a complete reversal once preparations began in 1818 for 
the return to the gold standard. During the entire expansionary period of Abundance, 
Banknote circulation increases by +4.9% p.a.; in contrast, during the entire contraction 
period of Scarcity it declines by -2.2% p.a. The expansion in Bank of England money during 
this period of Abundance can be broadly subdivided into three periods each lasting 7-9 
years, and separated by two pauses lasting approximately 4 years: 1785-1793 (paused in 
1794-7), 1798-1804 (paused in 1805-1808), and a final period of growth during 1809-1817. 
The first two phases are of similar strength (+7.6% and +7.9% p.a.), with a somewhat 
weaker growth in the final phase (+5.6%). When measured using the Bank of England 
circulation, the period of near-uninterrupted Abundance lasts 33 years (from 1784 to 1817). 
The subsequent period of Scarcity lasts 24 years and is subdivided into two periods of rapid 
decline in the Circulation lasting 6 years and 14 years, separated by a short reversal of 3 
years in the run up to the 1825 financial crisis.  
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Exhibit 10.4 – Bank of England: total (notes in) circulation, composite estimate, 1775-1840 
 
 
The stock of bullion was no longer a determinant of the way the Bank managed its balance 
sheet during the Restriction, while private sector discounts became a determinant of 
Banknote issuance. During the Restriction, until 1810 the Bank let its note issuance be 
driven by the demand for credit, which its directors justified to the Bullion Committee by 
invoking the Real Bills hypothesis. After 1810 its note issuance was driven by the 
government demand for unfunded short-term borrowing, reflecting the sharp rise in the 
government’s net annual borrowing requirement. I estimate the Bank bought 20% of the 
cumulative net new borrowing by the government of £69M during the four years after the 
Bullion Report (1810-14).67  
 
What did the large increase in Banknote issuance signify for the relationship between 
Banknotes and bullion postulated by classical theory and advocated by the Bullionist-
Scarcity lobby? 
                                                
67 See section on Monetizing war debt in Chapter 12. 
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10.7  Bank of England asset gearing to cash 
 
The Restriction enabled the Bank of England to achieve this monetary expansion by 
operating with a different balance sheet structure that was no longer influenced by the stock 
of bullion. The Bank’s average ratio of bullion reserves to total banknotes in circulation fell 
from 52% to 27% (Exhibit 10.5). From the perspective of monetary velocity, the balance 
sheet velocity of Banknotes in circulation relative to its bullion reserves doubled during the 
Restriction, from 2x to 4x. This change was only partially reversed in the twenty years after 
the decision was made in 1818 to restore convertibility into gold.  The banking system and 
the Bank of England had learnt to operate with a higher average gearing in relation to what 
was considered high-powered money prior to the Restriction.  
 
The gearing ratio of notes to bullion examined above appears to be stationary around its 
average when measured between 1775 and 1797. It is therefore possible to argue, as Ricardo 
did in his 1810 ‘weak form’ of the quantity theory, that already prior to the Restriction in 
“Britain so many means of economizing the use of circulating medium have been adopted” 
that the income velocity of specie had risen to a new, yet stable plateau measured over a 
complete economic cycle. But it is not possible to maintain the same argument after 1797. 
During the Restriction years of 1798-1815, the ratio of notes in circulation to the stock of 
high-powered bullion was on average twice that practiced in the twenty years prior, and the 
Bank’s stock of bullion stops being a significant factor in determining its new note issuance. 
Instead, note issuance becomes entirely explained by the changes in the discounting of 
private sector bills or additional short-term lending to the government. After the 
Restriction, at first the Bank makes a one-off reduction in its balance sheet and shifts its 
asset composition back towards bullion, but there is no return to the status quo ante in its 
dynamic balance sheet behaviour.  
 
Britain returned to the gold standard, but the monetary system now operated largely on the 
premise that the money unit of account when represented by a Bank of England note was 
backed mostly by a nominal unit of government debt: it was no longer possible to argue 
that it could be modelled as a temporary replacement for gold. As Heywood (1812: 78) 
noted, the ‘system of currency’ had become based on “circulating credit”.  
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Exhibit 10.5 – Bank of England reserve ratio of bullion to circulation, 1775-1840 
 
 
Nevertheless, if Ricardo was correct in saying that Banknotes were acting as the reserve 
asset for Country banks, this first-order effect in the form of the Bank’s large injection of 
such new high-powered money during 1797-1810, equivalent to nearly 3% of nominal GDP 
in 1797, and then switching in just two years to monetizing government securities instead, 
and finally fully reversing the entire ‘excess’ in three years - - could be expected to have had 
significant consequences for the rest of the banking system and the broad money supply.  
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SECTION IV 
The Restriction, the banking system, and monetary theory 
 
Chapter 11. The London banks and the Restriction 
 
 
1. Context, sample robustness and expected effects 
2. Exposure to bill discounting 
3. Cost and incentives to use the Bank of England discount window 
4. Asset gearing to cash 
5. Government securities as surrogate liquidity reserves 
6. Implications for balance sheet growth rates 
7. Conclusion: the divergent reactions to the Restriction 
 
 
In this chapter I analyse the differential response of London bank balance sheets to the 
changes brought by the Restriction. I use data collected for the core sample of nine London 
banks (see Data contribution in the Introduction) and a newly available document from the 
Bank of England archives to quantify three paths by which the London banks were 
impacted by, or acted as accelerants to the Bank of England’s monetary expansion. These 
were the expanded use of the Bank of England’s discount window; the adoption of lower 
specie reserve ratios, especially by banks following the Discounter business model; and the 
increased use of government securities to manage liquidity risk. These offer an opportunity 
to isolate the second-order effects of monetary expansion operating via the London private 
bank sector. 
 
 
11.1  Context, sample robustness and expected effects 
 
The previous chapter showed how, until 1810, the increase in the Bank’s balance sheet took 
the form of a major expansion in its discounting of private sector bills and notes, and how 
the associated £13 million increase in Banknotes in circulation represented a monetary 
injection directly into the London money market equivalent to adding 20 new large banks to 
the existing 70 London banks. It is hardly surprising that this monetary injection should 
produce significant change in the London money market that disrupted the status quo ante 
according to whether a bank followed the Goldsmith or the Discounter business model 
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presented in Chapters 5 and 6. This chapter answers the question: how did the additional 
Banknotes enter the monetary system and what impact this did have on the rest of the 
banking system?  
 
The empirical robustness of our analysis can be expected ex ante insofar as the total number 
of London banks did not change greatly during the Restriction, and is supported ex post by 
the triangulation with Bank of England data discussed further below. Clapham (1970: 1) 
estimated that the number rose from 69 in 1797 to 77 in 1808. The Bank of England 
records show it recognised 68 banks in 1809.68 We have a further point of reference for 
1814 from the records of the London bankers Cocks, Biddulph & Co. The records reveal 
how the bank’s partners were keen observers of the competition, asking their clerks to 
investigate the competitor volumes going through the London Clearing House and, most 
usefully for us here, keeping the relevant cuttings from the 1814 List of Bankers in London 
printed in Pigot & Co’s “London and County Directory”.69 Their record listed 75 London 
banks, but such directories often overstate the number of true and functioning entities with 
meaningful turnover. Hence, we can make the operational assumption that there were a 
constant 70 London banks during the Restriction and any expansion in that portion of 
Britain’s total money supply accounted for by the London banks will be observable almost 
entirely via the behaviour of their balance sheets and not in the expansion in the number of 
banks70. As a further advantage, we can exclude the presence of survivorship bias in our 
analytical sample.  The empirical robustness of our sample of banks is further supported by 
the triangulation of individual bank balance sheets with the Bank of England’s records of its 
dealings with London banks, as explained below.  
 
The London banks followed two business models, the Discounter and the Goldsmith (see 
Part II) with radically different balance sheet structures that we would expect a priori to react 
differently to the Bank’s monetary injection. Firstly, we would expect a Discounter’s balance 
sheet to have had a higher beta to any increase in the volume of Bank of England discounts, 
because of the higher proportion of its assets invested in the discounting of bills as 
compared to the proportion lent out in secured medium-term loans. Secondly, we would 
expect a higher proportion of any increase in deposits at a Discounter to be re-lent out 
                                                
68 See section 10.2 below. 
69 Barclays Bank archives, ref: 230/85. 
70 When constructing the longer data series in Chapter 12, we make one adjustment to account for the bank failures 
of 1825-6. 
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because Discounters kept a lower cash reserve against their lending due to the average 
maturity profile of their assets being shorter than that of Goldsmiths. Thirdly, the Bank’s 
monetary injection would enhance the ‘shiftability’ of all forms of (short-dated) quasi-
money instruments including the bills of exchange, rendering them suitable alternatives to 
holding liquidity reserves in cash, and inducing different reactions across banks in the way 
they managed their lending for any given level of deposits. We show below that all these 
were relevant determinants of a London bank’s contribution to monetary expansion. 
 
 
11.2  Exposure to bill discounting  
 
The records available show that the banks following the Discounter business model were 
the conduits to a very different monetary transmission pathway compared to the Goldsmith 
banks.  
 
Thanks to the kind assistance of the Bank of England archivists, one additional new 
document has come to light that corroborates the hypothesis of divergent business model 
responses, and simultaneously supports the view that our core sample of nine banks is a 
good proxy for the whole London money market. The document shows the quarterly 
balances of acceptances that the Bank held against each of the London banks from 1809Q2 
to 1826Q2 (except for seven missing quarters from the final three years).  
 
The document lists 68 names for which the Bank discounted acceptances and the holdings 
outstanding at the end of each quarter.  The five Discounters (Barclays, BHHB, Prescott, 
Herries and Coutts) and five Goldsmiths (Hoares, Childs, Drummonds, Goslings and 
Cocks & Biddulph) in the core sample together account for 12% (£10,296,834) of the total 
balances discounted by the Bank during the period (£88,712,627). This proportion is close 
to what we would expect from a nine-bank sample drawn from a whole population of 70 
banks if the combined behaviour of the former was a good representation of the combined 
behaviour of the latter. Furthermore, triangulation of the two sets of data suggests that our 
core sample of nine banks is a good proxy for all London banks.71 The log of the quarterly 
total balances for the sample banks taken together ‘predicts’ 93% of the change in the total 
                                                
71 In the subsequent analysis based on the aggregation of London balance sheets I exclude Cocks & Biddulph for 
whom we do not have continuous balance sheet data. 
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balances transacted with the Bank of England by all 68 London banks. This is an important 
finding, providing confidence that the sample of London banks, viewed in aggregate, 
reflects an accurate image of the behaviour of the London money supply, and supports the 
generalised inferences drawn in the next chapter.  
 
Exhibit 11.1 – Use of Bank of England discount window: Goldsmiths v Discounters, 
1809-1826 
 
 
The analysis further supports the taxonomy of business models presented in Chapters 4 and 
5. Within this sample total, the Discounters made significantly greater use of the Bank’s 
facility compared to those we classified as Goldsmiths. The data shows that during the full 
17 years the Discounters accounted for 97% of the quarterly balances of acceptances sold 
to the Bank of England by our sample banks. The Goldsmiths accounted for just 3% 
(Exhibit 11.1). Of the 69 quarter-ends, there are only two when the Discounter banks 
account for less than 86% of the balances held by the Bank against the full sample, and in 
24 of those quarter-ends the Discounters account for 100% of the sample banks’ total 
balances with the Bank.  
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Bank of England’s discount window as source of funding 
 
The Bank of England discounting was a central part of the funding model for some of (but 
not all) the Discounters, while it played no direct part in the funding model of any of the 
Goldsmiths. The Goldsmith banks maintained a regular trickle of acceptances discounted 
with the Bank, and this continued even after the return to the gold standard, suggesting that 
for these banks, the Bank’s discount window was used as a marginal or ‘emergency’ source 
of liquidity rather than as a central part of the business model. Comparing the average 
quarterly balance of acceptances sold to the Bank of England, with the year-end balance 
sheet of each Goldsmith, there was not a single year between 1809 and 1826 where this 
source of funding accounted for more than 1% of the total liabilities for any of the four 
Goldsmith banks in the sample.  
 
By contrast, discounting at the Bank became an important part of many Discounters’ 
funding model. During the Restriction years of 1809-1815, this source of funding on 
average accounted for 8% to 12% of the total liabilities of the three main Discounters: 
Prescott’s, Barclays and BHHB (Exhibit 11.2). For Herries Farquhar it only represented 1% 
to 2%. The Court of Directors of the Bank set credit limits for each London bank it dealt 
with, and the limit given to Herries as the youngest bank was likely small. However, a more 
likely reason is that Herries’ Circular Note scheme was paid in full up front by the customer, 
thereby creating a core source of funding that was not available to, say, Coutts who was 
regularly battling for its main Country correspondent not to go into overdraft (Chapter 6). 
Indeed the records show that Herries did not use the discount window at all between the 
end of 1813 and the last quarter of 1821, which corresponds approximately to the take-off 
in the use of the Circular Note (Chapter 4). Coutts was a substantial user of the Bank’s 
discount window, but volumes represented only 1-3% of its total liabilities. There is one 
exception, the final quarter of 1825, when Coutts’ balance is almost twice any previous 
usage and 4% of its balance sheet, suggesting that the banking crisis of that year hit Coutts 
relatively hard. This lower ‘headline’ usage is consistent with the hybrid nature of Coutts 
business model explained in Chapter 6: if computed solely against the portion of its 
liabilities associated with its correspondent business with the Bank of Scotland (i.e. to the 
portion of the balance sheet that followed the Discounter business model), then Coutts’ 
discounting at the Bank accounted for 3% to 5% of funding.  
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Exhibit 11.2 – Discounters v. Goldsmiths: Bank of England discounts as source of 
funding, 1809-1823 
 
 
There was a sharp reduction in the Bank of England’s accommodation during 1816-7, when 
the Bank switched to buying Exchequer Bills, and this reduced funding for our sample 
banks from quarter-end balances of nearly £400,000 to almost nothing a year later (Exhibit 
11.1). For all 68 banks, quarter-end balances fell from £3 million to almost nothing (Exhibit 
11.3). For the main Discounters (Prescott, Barclays & BHHB) this source of funding fell 
from 11% of their respective total liabilities in 1815 to just 1-2% from 1817 (Exhibit 11.2). 
The Discounters had to manage their liquidity risk differently after 1815; it seems the 
Goldsmiths were providing some assistance by placing more money (on a secured basis) 
with the London bond and bill brokers. For example, after regularly placing 3-5% of their 
balance sheet with Goldsmid, following the death and suicide of the two partners of that 
firm in 1808, Hoares converts the account to a “City account”, using multiple counterparts, 
and this grows to one-third of the balance sheet in 1817. 
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Exhibit 11.3 – Total Bank of England quarter-end balance of acceptances, 1809-26 
 
 
This data also illustrates clearly the change in the Bank of England’s policy after the Bullion 
Report of 1809 identified in the previous chapter. When the Bank shifted its market 
operations in 1810 to buying government debt, this removed accommodation equivalent to 
0.5% of nominal GDP from the stock of what was, according to the Bullionists, the new de 
facto high-powered money, and that had previously been available directly to London 
Discounter banks. As a result, the growth in London bank liabilities slowed, and there was 
an immediate effect on the number of Country banks, although it did not slow the growth 
in their estimated total liabilities (Chapter 12) because the Bank was still providing a 
growing monetary stimulus that was now flowing directly into the country via its direct 
financing of government expenditure. The Bank’s switch of strategy after the Bullion 
Report was a brutal change of the monetary pathways, but it may also have given the 
correspondent banking mechanisms (Part III) time to adjust prior to the even greater 
monetary stringency that was ushered in after the end of the war. While a small number of 
the weakest Country banks at the outer fringes of the monetary system began to fail after 
  
270 
the switch occurred (Exhibit 12.7), the inner core of strongest London and Country banks 
became more self-reliant (Chapter 12).  
 
A monetary system that Pressnell (1956) and Ricardo described as a concatenation of Bank-
London-Country, after the Bullion Report gradually became a monetary system with two 
different chains of co-dependence: a Bank-Treasury loop and a separate London-Country 
loop, the two communicating via flows of government expenditure.  Nevertheless, Exhibit 
11.3 also shows that during the 1825-6 crisis the Bank did assist the London banks and re-
established, albeit briefly, the Bank-London-Country pathway.   
 
 
11.3  Cost and incentives to use the Bank of England discount window 
 
This differentiated behaviour in the use of the Bank of England’s discount facility is also 
consistent with the different interest margins generated within the two business models. 
Using information on the principal value discounted by the Bank and the interest earned, 
included in the Cahier’s Department: Committee on Discounts – Analyses of 1800-184072, estimates 
can be computed of the effective interest it earned on its private sector discounts, and 
hence the effective cost to the London banks of using the Bank’s discount window.  
 
Allowing for the imprecision created by the average volumes outstanding during each year - 
being the average of two data points taken in February and August and not a time-weighted 
average - I estimate that during the Restriction years the Bank earned an average gross 
interest on its private discounts ranging mostly between 3.75% and 4.50% per annum 
equivalent (the actual yearly estimates range from 3.55% to 4.87% - see Exhibit 11.4 and 
related notes regarding the estimates for 1816-8).73 These effective rates on the Bank’s 
discounts were below the average government bond yield every year during the Restriction 
except 1809-10, and must therefore also have been below the shadow market rate for non-
government risk. Throughout the Restriction period, the Bank’s effective rate averaged 4% 
per annum equivalent, compared to an average yield on government bonds of 4.7%, 
meaning that on average banks using the discount window could access additional liquidity 
at an average cost 0.7% p.a. below the long-run ‘riskless’ government rate.  
                                                
72 Bank of England archive document ref: C36/6 and C36/4 
73 Bank of England archive ref: C36/6  
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Exhibit 11.4 – Bank of England: gross interest earned on discounts vs. bond yields,  
1800-1819 
 
 
The Discounter typically did not use this funding to buy government securities, and instead 
used it to leverage up its discounting of private sector commercial paper. The Discounter 
had a considerable incentive to re-discount with the Bank any commercial paper acquired 
from clients or from its Country correspondents, on which it was typically charging an 
effective average yearly equivalent rate of 6.5% p.a. (see Chapter 5). By accepting or co-
signing the paper, the Discounter retained the final credit risk of the paper; but by re-
discounting the paper at the Bank, the Discounter was able to move part of its assets off 
balance sheet whilst retaining approximately a 2% interest margin (pre any loan losses).  The 
analysis above shows the Discounter moved up to 10% of their assets off balance sheet this 
way.  
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By contrast, the Goldsmiths, whose average gross interest margin was only 4.6% (Chapter 
5), had a weaker profit incentive to use the Bank’s discount window, and in order to use it 
they would have had to first increase their involvement with discounting bills. The 
Goldsmiths could have used their access to the Bank’s monetary creation at below-market 
costs in order to leverage up their balance sheets by buying government securities at a 
spread of 0.7% p.a., but they opted not to do so because in order to access that Bank 
funding they would have had to first discount a greater volume of private bills. This would 
have required the Goldsmith to expand his involvement in the higher-frequency business of 
discounting for which he had less experience and informational capacity. Furthermore, by 
doing so, the Goldsmith would have increased the maturity mismatch in his balance sheet 
because the additional funding would have a maturity of no more than a month, whereas his 
lending was typically over many months.  
 
In summary, the Discounters moved their business into a higher-risk higher-return space (in 
gross terms, before losses); instead, the Goldsmiths chose to invest in government securities 
as an alternative to expanding their secured lending to customers, investing only the 
incremental customer deposits, and thereby moved their business in the opposite direction 
to the Discounters, towards a lower-risk space. This eventually also became a lower-return 
space after the Restriction period. The Goldsmith business model, being focused on low-
frequency secured lending to top quality customers, led them to prefer the attractive risk-
adjusted yields available on government securities, as these could be purchased in large size 
and with no investigation of the credit risk, which would keep down both the transaction 
frequency and their unit costs.  
 
 
11.4  Asset gearing to cash reserves  
 
The banks’ asset gearing to cash reserves is an additional factor to consider in the 
relationship between the stock of specie and the broad money supply. Asset gearing is a 
potential causal factor that can impact the income velocity of specie independently of any 
Bank of England monetary creation. For the single bank, the proportion of assets held in 
cash allows them to manage liquidity risk: the need to meet the demand for withdrawals 
from depositors not matched by the natural run-off rate of their assets. At the level of the 
aggregate monetary system, an increase in the banks’ average gearing is an income velocity-
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accelerating and money-creating device that had the potential to act as a second-order effect 
on the expansion in the supply of Bank of England banknotes. This could occur for a 
number of reasons: a change in bankers’ expectations of the timing of repayments by 
borrowers, associated with a change in the perceived economic climate; or a change in 
institutional arrangements that allowed certain short-dated assets to be more readily turned 
into specie or Bank of England banknotes; or because bankers observed a steady net inflow 
of new customer deposits and/or a slower than usual rate of withdrawals; or, finally, by way 
of a structural shift within the banking system in the allocation of aggregate deposits, away 
from Goldsmith banks carrying out longer-dated mortgage lending, and towards 
Discounters lending shorter through bill discounting or overdrafts.  
 
Exhibit 11.5 – London banks: lowest, highest and average cash/total assets ratio, 
1771 – 1844 
 
 
The possibility of increased gearing due to these endogenous and exogenous influences on 
bankers’ behaviour was poorly understood at the time, in part for doctrinal reasons. The 
implicit assumption of the strict Price-Specie-Flow hypothesis was that the medium-term 
ratio of banknotes to cash was zero, but also that bank asset gearing to cash was constant 
over a complete production cycle: there could be no permanent increase in the broad 
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money supply relative to the stock of specie caused by a structural change (reduction) within 
the banking system in the use of specie as the liquidity reserve: the latter would raise the 
money multiplier operating upon specie and lead to an increase in the total deposits in the 
banking system with the stock of specie remaining unchanged.  
 
An analysis of the surviving bank records permits the conclusion that such a structural 
change occurred during the Restriction (Exhibit 11.5). Because the natural run-off rate of 
the assets of Discounters was around five weeks (see Chapter 5), we would expect 
Discounters to operate with a higher gearing to cash than Goldsmiths. Hence, even if 
gearing ratios had not changed during the Restriction, the Discounters’ disproportionate 
capture of the Bank of England’s monetary injection would have led to a higher average 
London bank gearing to cash, and consequently a higher income velocity of cash.  
 
In the decade prior to the Restriction Discounters did indeed operate on average with a 
lower cash reserve ratio (22%) compared to the Goldsmiths (26%). In practice, the gearing 
of all London banks was already increasing prior to the Restriction, contrary to what was 
implied by Ricardo’s analysis. The cash reserve ratio oscillated around 33% during the 
1770s, and then began to decline in the early 1780s (Exhibit 11.5), coinciding with the start 
of the Bank of England’s monetary expansion funded with increased Banknote issuance. In 
the year of crisis just before the Restriction, these ratios rose to 30% and 25% respectively, 
but thereafter the Restriction ushered in an almost uninterrupted decline to a low of 16% 
for all banks in 1817.  
 
For the first few years of the Restriction, balance sheet behaviour did not change greatly, 
but from 1800 to 1805 the gearing of Discounters in particular fell rapidly to 16.1% 
(Exhibit 11.6). This coincides with the take-off in the Bank of England’s “excess” note 
issuance backed by private commercial paper highlighted above. As expected, the 
Restriction had a greater effect on the gearing of Discounters whose business involved the 
financial asset that was at the centre of the increased liquidity of the London money market. 
During the Restriction, the Discounters’ cash ratio averaged 18.3%, 4% points lower than in 
the 1790s, while that of the Goldsmith changed only marginally, falling by just 1% point. In 
almost every year after 1797 until 1842, the average Discounter operated with cash reserve 
ratio that matched that of the Goldsmith bank with the lowest ratio (Exhibit 11.7).  
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Exhibit 11.6  – Discounters v. Goldsmiths: asset gearing to cash, 1774 – 1844 [A] 
 
 
Exhibit 11.7 – Discounters v Goldsmiths: asset gearing to cash, 1770  - 1843 [B] 
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Not only did the Discounters act as conduits for the Bank of England’s balance sheet 
expansion to be channelled directly into the broad money supply, but their greater exposure 
to the associated enhanced liquidity of their typical assets led them to reduce their cash 
reserve ratio and so act as a further accelerant to that monetary expansion. 
 
In 50 years, the balance sheet gearing to cash specie in the London banking system had 
more than doubled from 3.0 to 6.2.  
 
Importantly, after the return to the gold standard is fully completed, the reserve ratio 
remains at these newfound low levels except for a short-lived up-tick as a reaction to the 
1825 banking crisis. For twenty years after 1818, in spite of a climate of Scarcity created by 
the Bank of England operating with much higher reserve ratios and shrinking its balance 
sheet, the average cash reserve ratio amongst the London banks oscillates narrowly in the 
high teens, and hence the balance sheet velocity of cash within the London banking market 
remains in the 5 to 6 range.  
 
It was only after the end of the Napoleonic wars that the Goldsmith banks sharply reduce 
their cash reserve ratio to a low of 17% in 1821. It may seem paradoxical that the banks 
with the greatest medium-term liquidity risk should be reducing their cash reserves in the 
very years when Britain was preparing to return to the gold standard, but this is explained 
by, and is a confirmation of the observed reflow of deposits back to the core banks in the 
British monetary system. These reflows were searching for the perceived safety and 
creditworthiness of London banks, and for their access to any remaining pools of liquidity 
still able to convert the weaker forms of IOUs into high-ranked forms of money.  
 
 
11.5  Government securities as surrogate liquidity reserves 
 
In addition to the expanded Bank discount window, an additional factor allowing the 
London banks to increase the balance sheet gearing to specie was the increased use of 
government securities as a buffer of liquid assets in lieu of specie. These were purchased at 
times when deposit inflows were high relative to the opportunities to lend, and could then 
be readily turned into cash when loan demand picked up or in the event of an unexpectedly 
high level of deposit withdrawals. The evidence shows that from the end of the 1770s 
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London banks following the Discounter business model used government securities 
predominantly for liquidity management purposes; banks following the Goldsmith business 
model more often established a ‘permanent’ core position within their total holdings of 
government securities, and this would only be sold in times of severe crisis of liquidity. 
During the Restriction this became the main asset strategy. In Part III we showed how 
Country banks also employed government securities for managing liquidity. 
 
In Exhibit 11.8 below, for each year from 1775 until the return to the gold standard was 
completed in 1821, I show the average proportion of the balance sheet held in cash, and in 
cash plus government securities, for the banks for which data is available in any given year. 
The sample includes only the five London banks for which it is possible to estimate 
holdings of government securities While such a data series constructed this way could not 
be used for regression analysis, it is an effective way to use the maximum amount of 
historical data to infer trends.  
  
During the 1770s the banks are adding positions in government securities to their already 
high reserves of cash. Until 1787, cash and government securities together account for 40% 
of the balance sheets on average. After that date, the holdings gradually decline in relative 
terms, but the positions in government securities absorb more of the year-to-year volatility. 
The degree to which London banks saw government securities as substitutes for cash can 
be observed in the variance of the two series, measured as the standard deviation divided by 
the median. The variance of the percentage held in government securities alone (0.387) is 
higher than that of cash reserves alone (0.302); more importantly, the variance of the 
percentage held in both cash and government securities combined is almost half (0.180).  
 
Discounters used government securities predominantly for their liquidity management as a 
temporary reserve in lieu of cash. This is vividly demonstrated by the balance sheet of 
Barclays Bevan Tritton (Exhibit 11.9), the Discounter that was already in the process of 
taking on more balance sheet risk when the Restriction began.  
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Exhibit 11.8– London banks: government securities and cash holdings, 1778-1821 
 
 
Exhibit 11.9 – Barclays Bevan Tritton: government securities and cash holdings, 1781-1821 
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Barclay’s cash reserve ratio falls gradually from 45% in 1784 to less than half that at the end 
of the Restriction. After an initial period of adjustment to the new operating conditions 
brought about by the Restriction, Barclays holds the cash ratio at a near constant 20% with 
rare exceptions. By contrast, the holdings of government securities are considerably more 
volatile: holdings fall to nothing in years of strain such as 1787-8, 1791 and 1820, and in 
other years such as 1817, when money was flowing back to London, they climb to as high 
of nearly one-third of total assets and equivalent to more than double the cash reserve.  
 
By contrast, banks following the Goldsmith business model increasingly used government 
securities as a major part of their lending strategy. Goslings, the more conservative 
Goldsmith bank, moved the largest part of the balance sheet permanently into government 
securities as soon as the Restriction began. We discuss this further in Chapter 12.10 
Monetizing war debt. 
 
 
11.6  Implications for balance sheet growth rates  
 
What did these three impact factors - exposure to discounting, asset gearing, and use of 
government securities - imply for the growth rates in the London balance sheets and hence 
for the broad money supply?   
 
The growth rates for each of the available banks in the periods before, during, and after the 
Restriction are shown in Exhibit 11.10 below, as well as two sub-periods within the 
Restriction, with the dividing line placed in 1811, the year after the peak year in the Bank of 
England’s discounting of private sector bills.  
 
In the decade prior to the Restriction of 1797, London bank balance sheets on aggregate 
were growing at 1.7% p.a., in line with that of the Bank of England (1.8% p.a.) and no more 
than keeping pace with the growth of real GDP (1.9% p.a.) – see Chapter 5. Over the whole 
Restriction period up to when the decision was taken to return to the gold standard in 1818, 
the average London bank balance sheets grew faster (4.1% p.a.) than the Bank of England 
(3.3%) and three times faster than real GDP (1.3%). In the decade following 1818 the 
average London bank is able to keep growing, albeit at half the pace, in spite of the Bank 
shrinking its balance sheet.  
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Exhibit 11.10 – London banks: growth rates before, during, and after the Restriction 
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For all banks, the Restriction period is defined as 1797-1818, the end-year being when 
Parliament first announced the intention to return to the gold standard. Although the return 
to the gold standard was later twice delayed and only fully implemented in 1821, we take the 
view that the banks could not have known ex ante of this impeding series of delays and 
would therefore have begun modifying behaviour from the date of the first announcement. 
The period before and after the Restriction is measured over a decade in each case, i.e. 
1786-1797 and 1818-1828. Figures are shown for each bank where the records allow; 
differences of up to two years in the available data are tolerated, and shown on the chart; 
otherwise no figure is shown. In each chart, the growth rate of the Bank of England balance 
sheet is shown first on the far left column.  
 
Exhibit 11.11 – Individual London bank balance sheet growth rates (where available),  
1786-1797 
 
 
As described in Chapter 5, before the Restriction, individual bank growth rates showed 
large idiosyncratic differences (Exhibit 11.11), and the variance between banks was five to 
six times greater than it was to be for the thirty years after 1797. Competition for deposits 
amongst London banks was a more important factor than the systemic growth in total 
deposits in determining individual growth rates. These were further differentiated by the 
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ebbs and flows of deposits from individual Country banks for which each London bank 
acted as correspondent, most notably for Coutts. During the decade prior to the 
Restriction, while the Bank of England balance sheet expanded from £16,511,000 to 
£20,137,000, the combined balance sheet of all London sample banks excluding Coutts was 
essentially unchanged at £3,775,875 (vs. £3,743,239 in 1786).  
 
However, within this stagnant picture, there were already signs that the younger 
Discounters were showing greater buoyancy than the group of Goldsmith banks. Between 
1786 and 1797, the Discounters for which we have records - Barclays (1.8% p.a.), Prescott’s 
(3.3% p.a.) - matched or exceeded the Bank of England growth rate. The hybrid Coutts’ was 
growing at an exceptional 11.0% p.a.. By comparison, three of the more established 
Goldsmith banks - Hoares’ (-2.8% p.a.), Child’s (-3.3%) and Goslings (-1.2%) - all 
experienced shrinking balance sheets during that decade. Amongst them, only Drummond’s 
(2.1%) and Cocks & Biddulph (2.3%) showed balance sheet growth approximately in line 
with that of the Bank of England. 
 
The new transmission mechanisms favour Discounter banks after the Restriction Act 
 
In the twenty-years Restriction period taken as a whole between 1797 and 1818, most 
London banks grow at a rate close to or higher than the Bank of England, and there is a 
strong convergence of individual bank growth rates, with the variance reduced by a factor 
of ten from 0.20% to 0.02%. In effect, the competitive environment became one in which 
the rising tide lifted all boats, similar to all periods of monetary expansion.  
 
However, this convergence hides the fact that the Bank’s discounting is enabling some of 
the banks pursuing a Discounter business model to achieve growth rates well above 
average: while 7 of the 11 banks grow at between 3.0% and 3.6% p.a., three Discounters 
grow at 4.5% to 7.4% p.a. (Exhibit 11.12). Discounters such as Barclays, Prescotts, and 
Herries are benefiting from the Bank’s expanding discount window and are able to grow 
faster. This is true whether they entered the Restriction with an already fully-formed 
exposure to bill discounting (Prescott) or a lower-risk version of the business model which 
was gradually substituting government securities for more discounting of private paper 
(Barclays, Herries).   
 
  
283 
Exhibit 11.12 – London bank growth rates, 1797 to 1818 
 
 
Exhibit 11.13 – London bank growth rates, 1818 to 1828 
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When the Bank of England changes behaviour and cuts back on discounting private sector 
paper after 1810-1, this causes renewed divergence in the experience of each bank. This is 
caused less by differences in their business models, and more by whether their clients 
(including Country correspondents) benefited from Bank’s notes now entering the economy 
via the government’s expenditure on the war paid for with Navy, Ordinance and Exchequer 
bills. The growth rate of the average Discounter and the average Goldsmith remain little 
changed in 1811-1818 compared to 1797-1811 (4.3% vs. 4.5%, and 3.4% vs. 3.4% 
respectively), but divergences open up within each business cluster.  
 
Amongst Discounters, Prescott is hit badly, shrinking by -3.6% p.a. whereas Barclays and 
Herries grow even faster. Similarly, amongst the Goldsmiths, Hoares and the non-Bank of 
Scotland business of Coutts grow faster, whereas Goslings slows. During this final phase of 
Abundance, the London banking system has already de-coupled from the Bank of 
England’s balance sheet behaviour and acquired a capacity to generate its own monetary 
expansion: the London banks became a separate source of higher velocity. By the time the 
London banking system entered the final phase of Abundance, bankers had thrown off 
some of their historic caution and embraced the new financialisation. 
 
Breaking away from the Bank of England after 1818 
 
Exhibit 11.13 shows the contrasting picture for the decade after the Restriction. This is the 
period of Scarcity that followed the return to the gold standard, during which the Bank of 
England shrinks its balance sheet by -1.5% per annum. In spite of this, all nine London 
banks experience positive growth over the decade (Barclays only barely). After the 
Restriction, in spite of this period capturing the significant banking crisis of 1825, the 
average London bank grows 3.3% per annum faster than the Bank of England. The London 
banks were capturing a larger share of the total deposits and attenuating the period of 
Scarcity ushered in by the Bank’s restrictive monetary actions.  
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11.5  Conclusion: the divergent reactions to the Restriction 
 
The Goldsmith and the Discounter banks responded quite differently to the suspension of 
convertibility, to the point where they formed two distinct monetary pathways. The 
Goldsmith banks grew no faster than the Bank of England and moved their business model 
towards a lower-risk composition of assets that placed the majority of the increased 
deposits into government securities. The Discounter banks mostly grew faster than the 
Bank of England, whose expanded discount window they made regular use of, and moved 
their business model towards a higher-risk composition of assets with a greater proportion 
in bill discounting and lower cash reserves. Consistent with bankers differentiated cognitive 
framing of money postulated in Part II, the Goldsmiths appear by their actions to have 
viewed the new environment as predominantly more risky, because bringing potential 
dilution of real asset values and greater credit risk, and because their low-risk lending model 
did not incentivise them to use the new source of Bank of England funding to leverage the 
operating model, so instead they reduced balance sheet risk relative to total assets by 
increasing the proportion placed in government securities. When they eventually did reduce 
the cash reserve ratio after 1815, it was only to hold an even greater proportion of assets in 
government securities (Exhibit 11.14). By contrast, the Discounters appear by their actions 
to have embraced the new environment of enhanced ‘shiftability’ of their main asset (bills 
of exchange) as bringing a reduction in operating risk, so they increased their balance sheet 
risk. The younger Discounters facilitated the acceleration in the broad money supply relative 
to the given stock of high-powered money (specie) within the whole banking system, 
becoming a secondary source of additional lending by increasing their balance sheet gearing 
to specie and expanding their off-balance sheet assets. The Discounter had two incentives 
to expand its balance sheet: a profit incentive and a liquidity management incentive. For 
Discounters, use of the expanding Bank of England discount window was a more natural 
extension of their core business of discounting bills: the enhanced Bank volumes meant 
greater access to a source of off-balance sheet funding that came at an attractive costs 
relative to their gross interest margin, and the related greater ‘shiftability’ of these bills also 
reduced the overall liquidity risk of their balance sheet without increasing the maturity 
mismatch.  Discounter banks that entered the Restriction still feeling their way towards the 
full-fledged Discounter business model of Prescotts, with its 70% asset allocation to 
discounts, soon took the opportunity to move towards that proportion – see Exhibit 11.15 
for a graphic view of the evolution in the balance sheet composition of the Discounters.  
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The Goldsmith was propagating the Bank’s actions upon the income velocity of specie, but 
without accelerating it. The Discounter was accelerating the income velocity of specie by 
increasing its asset gearing to specie and using the Bank of England as the equivalent of an 
off-balance-sheet special purpose vehicle that took care of financing the surplus stock of 
assets.  
 
The willingness of the banks’ to take on additional credit risk was not an empty constraint, 
but it did seem to act more strongly upon London banks. The evidence from Country 
banks presented in Part III suggested banks allowed any such access to greater ‘shiftability’ 
of assets to weaken their lending standards when judged ex post by the loan loss experience. 
In London, the best bills probably found their way to the Bank of England. The Bank’s 
Mode of Conducting the Business in the Discount Office74 explains that they only discounted top 
quality paper with less than a month to maturity and only for amounts above £100 for notes 
and £20 for bills; acceptable counterparties had to be primarily “Bankers, Merchants, 
Wholesale Dealers and those of the greatest respectability & opulence” or, at worse “One 
degree below the former in extent of Business & Capital.” In a table produced in the Report 
of Secret Committee (1819), the Bank listed the number of discounts which had gone bad: just 
one between 1790 and 1807, and then between one and five each year from 1808 to 1818, 
totalling just 37 bad bills (0.05%) out of the total 74,004 bills and notes discounted over the 
whole period 1808-18.75 To the extent that the financial records give a true account of the 
credit losses, these varied amongst London banks, but if we take the policy more typically 
adopted by Discounters of reserving part of the annual profit as a proxy for the actual 
average loan loss experience over time, then these reserves typically constituted a 
proportion of loan assets far greater than 0.05%. It seems there was also a hierarchy of 
credit quality: the best quality bills were taken by the Bank of England; the quality below 
that were discounted by the London Discounters; and the poorest quality bills would mostly 
end up in the hands of the newest and smallest Country banks.  
 
In summary, it was left to the Discounters’ marginal tolerance for credit risk and the 
Goldsmiths’ marginal tolerance for liquidity mismatch risk to determine the maximum 
expansion in broad money. The Goldsmith showed little or no sign of wanting to take 
                                                
74 Bank of England archive ref: C36/14 Account of Books used and Mode of Conducting the Business in the Discount Office, 13 
July 1820, p.6 and p.11  
75 Bank of England archive ref: 9A35/1 Table produced for the Secret Committee of the House of Lords, 4 Mar 
1819 & Table of average yearly discounts presented to the House of Commons, 30 Mar 1821 
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greater mismatch risk; this left the Discounters’ marginal appetite for credit risk as the 
principal constraint on runaway expansion in the broad money supply. For Ricardo this was 
not an adequate constraint, while for Bosanquet it was an optimal constraint because 
flexible, always reflecting the rational identification of what was the demand for financing 
from ‘real bills’.  The analysis presented in this thesis suggests that until 1810 the 
Discounters were de facto conduits for channelling the Bank’s monetary accommodation 
towards the country, where Country banks mostly did not expand lending beyond the 
inflow of deposits, and instead used any success at pushing out their banknotes to substitute 
them for funding coming from customer deposits and, in turn, placing the additional funds 
in government securities, either directly, or indirectly by augmenting their balances with 
their London correspondent. The London bank, depending on its asset and liability strategy, 
would use these funds to invested in government securities, or increase its discounting of 
bills, or on-lend to different Country correspondents with unmet demand for credit (e.g. the 
Smith Group).  
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Exhibit 11.14  – Goldsmiths’ balance sheets (4 banks): changes in composition  
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Exhibit 11.15  – Discounters’ balance sheets (3 banks): changes in composition  
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SECTION IV 
The Restriction, the banking system, and monetary theory 
 
Chapter 12. Approximating the behaviour of ‘the money supply’ 
 
1. Previous estimates 
2. Consolidating the London bank balance sheets 
3. Scaling the sample of London banks 
4. Country banks: formation and destruction 
5. Aggregating the balance sheets of the sample Country banks 
6. Estimating the total Country bank liabilities 
7. Quantifying total British bank liabilities 
8. Estimate of the annual aggregate British bank liabilities 
9. Implications for income velocity of money 
10. Monetizing war debt 
 
In this chapter I consolidate the available sample data in order to construct what is, to the 
best of my knowledge the first continuous estimate of total British bank liabilities from 
1780 to 1832. This aggregate balance sheet series approximates with confidence the 
behaviour of all London banks and – with a wider margin – that of all British banks 
including Country banks. I contrast these with some previous point estimates offered by 
other scholars as well as by contemporary commentators. Within the limits of such a 
holistic view of the historical records of British total bank deposits, I use these series 
(combined with records from the Royal Mint) to infer some conclusions in regard to the 
hypotheses underpinning the 1809 theoretical debate. In a final section I briefly revisit the 
ancient debate regarding whether the government’s borrowing during the Napoleonic wars 
“crowded out” private capital formation during the early Industrial Revolution.  
 
 
I proceed as follows: first, I consolidate the individual London bank balance sheets into a 
single aggregate data series; second, I scale the London bank series using their relative usage 
of the Bank of England’s discount window; third, I calculate a composite of all scholars’ 
previous estimates for the number of Country banks operating in each year; four, I combine 
this composite with available estimates of the number of banks starting and stopping each 
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year, and use these with the pro forma behaviour of Country banks extracted from the case 
studies (Part III) in order to construct an estimate of total Country bank balance sheets; 
five, I combine the London and Country bank series and adjust for the overlap of Country 
bank net deposits with London banks; and finally, six, I add the London and Country bank 
series to the Bank of England data. I conclude by comparing the resulting estimate of M2 to 
measures of GDP, price inflation, and the Royal Mint’s production of coin.  
 
 
12.1 Previous estimates 
 
I am not aware of any previous continuous estimates of the size of the banking system for 
the period analysed. However, the question has intrigued a few brave scholars because the 
answer has the capacity to further our understanding of how finance was found for the early 
Industrial Revolution and the related debate as to whether the government’s borrowing to 
support the wars with Napoleon ‘crowded out’ private sector borrowing.  This chapter 
focuses predominantly on the construction of a data series for total bank deposits and only 
briefly explores its potential use for further research.  
 
Answering the question is fraught with difficulty because historical records of Country 
banks are few and because no attempt had yet been made to systematically reconstruct 
annual balance sheets for all London banks with surviving records. However, scholars have 
provided selective estimates of specie and banknotes in circulation.  
 
Contemporary commentators focused on estimates of banknotes in circulation: a useful 
summary by Heywood (1812) is reproduced in Exhibit 12.1. Clapham (1970: Vol. 1: chapter 
4 and Vol. 2: chapter 1) makes numerous incidental references to material relevant to the 
broader banking system, but his focus was on the Bank’s balance sheet. Pressnell’s (1956) 
seminal work was the product of many years searching for the surviving bank records at a 
time when these were far less organised than today, but he stopped short of offering an 
aggregated series. In his chapters on “The Supply of Money” and “The Means of Payment”, 
he limits himself to using his detailed micro-economic history to make only broad 
judgements relating to the stock of Country banknotes relative to those of the Bank, and 
presents yearly estimates of the total banknote issue only for the period after 1834.  
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Exhibit 12.1 – Contemporary estimates of the “circulating media, 1798-1811 
 
 
More recently, Dawes and Ward-Perkins (2000: Vol. 1, 6-9) produced a register of Country 
banks by town, and in their short commentary they include useful aggregate statistics on the 
number of banks created and failing in sequential ten- and two-year periods respectively 
(which are used below), but made no attempt to construct a total balance sheet series.  
 
In Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization, Cameron (1967) makes the only attempt to 
construct point estimates of the aggregate ‘money supply’, using the most suitable 
secondary sources available at that time rather than a bottom-up quantification of bank 
liabilities. Cameron offered estimates of the total ‘stock of the means of payment’ for twelve 
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dates between 1750 and 1913, of which five come within the period examined here (1750, 
1775, 1800-01, 1811, 1821, 1831). He defines this ‘stock’ as the sum of specie in circulation, 
plus banknotes and (part of) deposits. He calls this M1. To this he adds “other” to create an 
estimate of the total means of payment, which he denotes as M2. “Other” is intended mainly 
as the bills of exchange circulating, to which he adds a portion of the bank deposits. When 
calculating the two measures of total means of payment, up to 1831 Cameron imposes his 
own ‘haircut’ upon the estimate of total deposits, placing only a portion in M1 and the rest 
in “Other” based on his estimate of their relative ‘moneyness’. I prefer not to make these 
judgements, because such estimates of relative “moneyness” are pre-analytically assuming 
part of the answer to the very question being investigated and, more importantly, for the 
reason that our case studies suggest the majority of bank liabilities were already treated as 
transferable. Instead, I focus on a definition of M2 as the total bank liabilities (net of inter-
bank balances), which sidesteps the need for such value judgements.  
 
Cameron’s estimates of (M2) will tend to exaggerate the ‘total stock of means of payment’ 
because the bills of exchange having the greater “moneyness” were mostly held as an asset 
inside the banking system, making their inclusion a double-counting of banknotes and 
deposits within a definition of M2 based on bank liabilities. The proportion held within the 
banking system was almost certainly high because our analysis has shown (as Bosanquet 
argued) that these were the principal assets of the Bank of England, the London 
Discounters, and most of the Country banks. Furthermore, Cameron does not allow for 
“specie in circulation” to partly double-count what is held as a reserve in the banking 
system.  
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Exhibit 12.2 – Cameron (1967) point estimates for the Stock of Money and Means of 
Payment 
 
 
However, Cameron’s implied estimates of total bank liabilities are more directly comparable 
to those offered here. The estimates of total bank liabilities computed in this chapter should 
be read as comparable to Cameron’s estimates for banknotes plus all bank deposits (i.e. 
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without his haircut for “moneyness”). I have computed this figure for each of the relevant 
dates and compare these to the higher estimates reached in the work here (Exhibit 12.2).  
 
Like this thesis, Cameron was interested in the income velocity of the stock of money, and 
he computes estimates for each of the five dates by dividing British national income by his 
estimate of M1 and M2. My estimates should be viewed as lying between his velocity of M1 
and the velocity of his implied estimates of total bank liabilities, scaled by his estimates of 
British national income at current prices, which he interpolated from Deane and Cole 
(1962) and adjusted upwards to include Scotland national income) As my estimates for total 
bank liabilities are considerably higher than Cameron, my estimates of their income velocity 
are lower – but not to the same degree. This is because Cameron’s scalar was considerably 
lower for the period 1800-31 compared to the recent estimates of nominal GDP used here 
(Broadberry et al, 2015). This gives the following comparison with Cameron: 
 
Exhibit 12.3 – Comparison with Cameron (1967) estimates of income velocity of total 
bank liabilities 
  
Cameron’s estimates for deposits are based on guestimates of the balance sheet of the 
average London bank of £100,000 in 1775, £200,000 in 1800-1, £250,000 in 1811, £500,000 
in 1831 – all of which appear rather too low when compared to the evidence presented in 
this thesis, even after deducting that part of deposits coming from Country banks (which 
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Cameron does not do).  Furthermore, Cameron makes no allowance for Country bank 
deposits having “moneyness” properties until after 1811, an assumption that is clearly not 
supported by our case studies and creates an important divergence with our estimates. This 
divergence is partly – if inadvertently - offset by Cameron’s estimates for Country 
banknotes in circulation: Cameron’s estimates of these are too high because, like those of so 
many scholars, they refer to the gross value of these banknotes, omitting to deduct the 
portion held “in the chest” (i.e. the treasury) of the Country banks, as explained in our case 
studies.  
 
I reach my estimates as follows. 
 
 
12.3 Consolidating the London bank balance sheets 
 
First, I consolidate the balance sheets of all the London banks into a ‘total London bank 
liabilities’.  The sample of banks represents all those for whom records remain, and is 
therefore not randomised and represents only one in seven London banks, but triangulation 
with Bank of England data in the previous chapter supports its predictive quality in respect 
to the changes in the balance sheets of all London banks. The data for the relative usage of 
the Bank of England discount window is used here to determine the scaling factor to 
convert the aggregation of the known balance sheets into an estimate of total London bank 
liabilities. Because I distinguish between Discounters and Goldsmiths, the scaling process 
also modifies some of the pattern of change that would be observed by mere aggregation of 
the sample banks.  
 
When consolidating the London bank balance sheets we face the choice between how many 
of the banks we include and creating a consistent data series for the longest length of time.  
Of our full sample of 14 London banks, five (Smith Payne, Willis Percival, Ranson 
Bouviere, Curries, and Cocks & Biddulph) have data sets of less than ten years and are 
therefore discarded. The remaining nine banks all have data sets for half or more of the 64-
year period we wish to examine, although these are not always for the same years. The 
longest data series that can be constructed stretches from 1780 to 1845, and includes six 
banks: Barclays Bevan Tritton, Goslings, Hoares, Childs, Prescotts and Coutts. This series 
includes just over 60% of the total sample on the eve of the Restriction, based on the year 
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1796 when we have a data point or the nearby data point for all 13 banks. There are three 
years missing in the Barclays Bevan Tritton data that I estimate by interpolation, using the 
average growth rate observed for the peer group of Discounters.  When investigating only 
the Restriction period, we may use a shorter-but-broader alternative data set. This covers 
the period 1799 to 1826 and is composed of the same six banks, plus Drummonds, Herries 
Farquhar, and BHHB. Retrofitting this series back three years to 1796 shows that it would 
cover 89% of the total sample size. It was decided to exclude Coutts at this early stage of 
the consolidation process, when more importance is given on aggregating actual numbers, 
because the change in Coutts’ accounting of the Bank of Scotland business in 1813 would 
require introducing estimates of the data on one or other side of that date. It was felt better 
to add Coutts’ balance sheet back into the aggregation at the end of the process. 
 
Exhibit 12.4 – Two alternative consolidated series for London bank balance sheets,  
1780 - 1845 
 
 
For our purposes, it is pleasing to find that during the period when the two series overlap 
(1799-1826) the yearly delta of the two series taken separately has an R-squared of 0.85, and 
the full 8-bank series is 99% correlated to the 5-bank series (Exhibit 12.4). The 8-bank 
series has the advantage of a better balance of Goldsmiths and Discounters. When I 
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examine the residuals from the linear equation of best fit between the two series, I find the 
8-bank series leads to a small, but consistently higher estimate of the total money supply 
during the latter part of the Restriction period running from 1806 to 1812 – reflecting its 
more accurate representation of the faster growth rate of Discounters highlighted in 
Chapter 11. Hence I create a third data series which I use for final analysis, based on the 8-
bank data and extended in the early and late year by indexing the year changes to the longer 
6-bank series.  
 
 
12.3  Scaling the sample of London banks 
 
The total balance sheet liabilities for all London banks can be estimated for 1809-1826 by 
scaling the usage made of the Bank of England’s discount window by our sample banks 
relative to the total balances recorded by the Bank.   
 
First, I divide the 8-bank sample available for 1809-1826 into the four Discounters 
(Prescotts, Barclays, BHHB and Herries) and the four Goldsmiths (Goslings, Hoares, 
Drummond, and Childs). The Goldsmiths used less than 1% of the Bank’s discount 
window, so their small usage is subtracted from the total balances recorded at the Bank. I 
then compute the proportion of the remaining total balances at the Bank that is accounted 
for by the four Discounters in our sample, measured as at the end of the second quarter 
each year. The second quarter is chosen because Barclays, the largest Discounter, and 
BHHB had fiscal year-ends at the end of June; for Prescotts, the fiscal year-end is uncertain 
but believed to be end-Dec, so the average balance of the two adjacent year-ends is used.  
The inverse of the proportion of the Bank’s balances accounted for by the sample 
Discounters is then used to scale up the actual balance sheet totals of the four Discounters 
for each year into an estimated total of the bank liabilities for all London Discounters. To 
this total, I add back the total balance sheet of the four sample Goldsmith banks, scaled by 
a factor of two to reflect the known number of remaining goldsmith banks in London 
(Chapter 4).  
 
The underlying assumption is that all London Discounters (and all London Goldsmiths) 
used the Bank’s discount window, as a proportion of their own respective balance sheets, to 
the same degree (on average) as the sample banks did within each of the two business 
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model groupings.  On inspection, compared to the simple aggregated series of the sample 
banks, this was found to produce a much sharper drop in the estimated total London bank 
liabilities between 1810 and 1815, back to pre-Restriction Act levels, and equally a more 
rapid rise thereafter into 1824 (ahead of the 1825 crisis). Directionally, this would merely 
strengthen our later argument, but the extent is not only implausible, but also not supported 
by the high degree of uniformity in the actual growth patterns of the sample banks. It is 
likely caused by the greater noise in the data once the Bank’s total discounts fall to very low 
levels. Nevertheless, the message from the data should not be ignored: the London banks 
outside our sample probably suffered disproportionally from the Bank of England’s 
reduction in discounts after 1810, which means the observed aggregate liabilities of our 
sample banks are likely to overestimate the continued growth in balance sheets between 
1810-15, and underestimate the growth between 1816 and the bank crisis of 1825.  
 
Exhibit 12.5 – Estimate of the aggregate London bank liabilities, compared; 1780-1844 
 
 
I have therefore retained the rotational adjustment based on the usage of the Bank of 
England discount window, but I have weighted its impact based on the total volume of the 
Bank’s discounts for all banks. The reader can compare the three different perspectives in 
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Exhibit 12.5. This subjective judgement does not affect in any way the direction of the 
inferences made in the final analysis further below. 
 
The result is an estimate for total London bank liabilities for 1809 to 1826. The final step is 
to index the earlier years (before 1809) and the later years (after 1826) to the aggregate 8-
bank series of actual balance sheets in order to produce the estimate for the ‘total London 
bank liabilities’ for the whole period 1780-1844. 
 
 
12.4  Country banks: formation and destruction 
 
Here I summarize previous estimates of the growth and decline in the number of Country 
banks before going on to create a rather heroic series representing their aggregate balance 
sheet.  
 
As discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 11, after the 1770s the banking landscape 
changed and there was rapid growth in the number of banks, but mostly outside London.  
Exhibit 12.6 shows a composite data series for the number of Country banks from 1775 to 
1850, composed from the two data sets collected by Pressnell (1956: chapter 1)76, and 
overlays various point estimates extracted from the literature offered by Thornton (1802: 
129-160), Feaveryear (1931), Cameron (1967), Clapham (1970), and Orbell & Turton (2001: 
4-6) - none of which diverge greatly from the composite data series. One additional series 
was located in Appendix 98 to the Parliamentary Committee for Secrecy on the Bank of England 
Charter (1832: 602), which shows the cumulative “number of licenses granted to Country 
Bankers”. This series starts only in 1809 and shows a higher peak number of 940 licenses in 
1814, but is directionally highly consistent with the composite series from 1814-1832 (R-
squared = 0.90). The lower directional correlation in the four years prior to 1814, and the 
higher average level after 1814, can both be attributed to delays in the license registration 
process, at first during the period of rapid growth, and subsequently in cancelling licenses to 
banks in the process of ceasing business.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
76 One data set is based on the Post Office Directory, the other on Parliamentary records. 
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Exhibit 12.6 – Number of Country banks, 1775 – 1850 
 
 
The data series shows that in the 20 years prior to the Restriction, the number of Country 
banks nearly triples to 276 from the approximately one hundred before 1785. Then, 
following the start of the Restriction, their number nearly triples again, and in half the time, 
to an estimated peak of 740 in 1810. After 1814, the number of Country banks begins a 
long decline, falling to under 400 by 1850.  Decimation was strongest in the years 
immediately after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and then again following the financial 
crisis of 1825.  
 
The peak in numbers in 1810 is instructive as it coincides with the Bank of England change 
of asset strategy, veering away from discounting private sector bills to supporting the 
government’s unfunded debt (Chapter 10). Throughout the period 1780-1828, Country 
bank numbers are highly correlated to the Bank of England’s discounting of private sector 
paper: changes in the Bank’s discounting and real GDP together explain 91% of the 
changes in the number of Country banks in operation. Country bank numbers are also 
correlated to the Bank’s total circulation of banknotes, but less so (84%), as the turning 
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point in circulation is later (1818). This discrepancy in correlations suggests that the 
mechanism (discounts) and the pathway (via London correspondents with access to the 
London clearing system) by which the Bank injected its notes into the economy mattered to 
the incentives operating upon Country bankers.  
 
Bankruptcies and new entrants  
 
The estimates of the net number of Country banks in operation can be compared to the 
gross number of new bank formations and annual bankruptcies in order to gain perspective 
of the vigour of this section of the banking system. 
 
Parnell (1827: Section II) gave some early estimates of the annual bankruptcies of Country 
banks, subsequently detailed in the appendices of the Parliamentary Committee on Secrecy (1832: 
Appendix 101, 115-6), and Pressnell (1956: 536-8) gave new estimates that also 
distinguished between Country banks and Country scriveners (lawyers that were also money 
changers). More recently, in their comprehensive study of Country bank formations and 
closures, but not of their balance sheets, Dawes & Ward-Perkins (2000) provide bi-annual 
estimates of both new Country bank start-ups and bankruptcies.  While there are some 
discrepancies between these estimates for any single year (due to differences in categorizing 
‘country bank’ amongst all bankruptcies, as well as whether the source were court records 
or newspapers), the pattern of closures is clear (Exhibit 12.7).  
 
 Parnell (1827: 27) records that during the crisis year of 1793 there had been 26 bankruptcy 
filings by country bankers, or about one in ten of the banks operating prior to the crisis. To 
put that into context, that same year there were 1956 bankruptcies across all types of 
businesses in the country: the 1793 economic downturn, though serious, had not spilled 
over into a full-blown banking crisis. The following twenty-year period, encompassing the 
Restriction up to the peak in the Bank of England’s expansion in the discounting of private 
sector bills in 1810, produced a benign environment for Country banks. The rate of 
Country bank bankruptcies slowed to six or less each year, and there is no evidence of the 
liquidity crisis of 1796 in the data presented in any of the data. 
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Exhibit 12.7 – Number of Country banks stopping operations, 1780 – 1842 
 
 
This changed after 1810.  The following decade proved fatal for many Country bankers, as 
monetary conditions tightened when the Bank of England switched to buying Exchequer 
Bills, Britain’s economy cooled after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and Parliament 
debated whether to return to the gold standard. Dawes & Ward-Perkins (2000: 8, Fig.3) 
estimate that no less than 236 Country banks went bankrupt or stopped trading between 
1810 and the end of 1826; Pressnell estimates 225 and the Parliamentary Committee of 
1832 put the number as high as 268. Throughout those sixteen years Country banks were 
failing at three times the rate experienced in the previous sixteen. At least one in every three 
banks operating in 1810 had stopped by 1826. The rate of bankruptcy according to Parnell 
(1827) climbed to a peak rate of over 140 per annum during the five months between Oct 
1825 and Feb 1826. During the 1825 crisis Country banks were perishing at nearly six times 
the rate experienced during the 1793 crisis. Although both crises occurred during a time 
when Britain was on the gold standard, it appears the intervening Restriction period had 
radically changed the vulnerability of the “fringe banking” sector of Country banks to 
respond and survive.  
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Exhibit 12.8 – Net formation of Country banks, 1780-1842 
 
 
With one brief exception, all of the net formation of new Country banks occurred in the 
period prior to the Bullion report of 1809. And net annual bank formation was (on average) 
one and half times greater during the early years of the Restriction compared to the prior 
twenty years. After the Bullion report and the Bank of England’s change of asset purchasing 
policy, for the following thirty years net Country bank formation was positive only for the 
two years after the return to the gold standard (Exhibit 12.8). 
 
In contrast to the formation and bankruptcy data, our sample of surviving banks shows 
that, during that same 1810-1825 period, banks both in London and the Country that were 
perceived as stronger attracted increased deposits and grew their total liabilities. At times of 
Scarcity and crisis, money flowed out of the furthest parts of the “fringe banking” sector 
and into the inner core of banks perceived as safest.  
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12.5  Aggregating the balance sheets of the sample Country banks 
 
 
Here I construct a heroic partial data series for Country bank balance sheets from the 
numerous case studies, and then combine these with the ‘birth and death’ data to construct 
nationwide estimates of Country bank liabilities in order to infer some final conclusions 
regarding the role of this ‘fringe’ banking system during the Restriction.  
 
When consolidating the Country bank data, as with the London data, we face a choice 
between length versus breadth. Furthermore, compared to the London data, the sample of 
Country banks is smaller, contains less continuous data, represents a smaller portion of the 
total population, and clearly contains a significant survivorship bias. Keeping these 
weaknesses firmly in mind, it is still of interest to observe what happens to the 
idiosyncrasies of individual bank behaviour once we aggregate them, even if in such small 
numbers.  We can construct a 4-bank series for 1808-1832 using a usefully diverse set of 
banks: Leyland Bullins, Liverpool, which did not issue notes; Smith Ellison, Lincoln, which 
was an aggressive note issuer; and two other young banks formed during the Restriction, 
one of which had a relatively conservative asset strategy (Barnard, & Co, Bedford) and one 
that was more aggressive (Samuel Smith, Derby). A preferable series starts three years later, 
so as to be able to add Stephens, Harris, & Stephens, Reading (not included in the case 
studies), a well-capitalised and well-run bank formed in 1791, with a branch in Maidenhead 
and using Willis Percival as its London correspondent. This gives a better geographical 
spread, but has no data for the critical period before 1815, so we index it to the aggregate of 
the other 4 banks. As can be observed in Exhibit 12.9, there is a high degree of co-
movement between all the different aggregated series prior to extending them through 
indexing, suggesting that we can have reasonable confidence that filling in a small number 
(8) of data points through indexing is not altering the essential characteristics of the 
aggregate Country bank balance sheet composed of 125 data points. 
 
The resulting 5-bank series from 1808-1832 gives a good cross section of geographical 
locations and typical balance sheet compositions. For the first four years of this series we do 
not have Leyland Bullins data, so the data is indexed and concatenated to the other banks: 
because Leyland Bullins is the only bank amongst the five not to issue notes, it is possible 
that the final data series will over-estimate the growth in the aggregate balance sheets for 
those years 1808-1811.  
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Exhibit 12.9 – Country banks: aggregate balance sheet, various data series, 1780 - 1845 
 
 
The data reveals that our sample of Country banks – as survivors of financial crises - 
suffered the balance sheet declines of the 1815 and 1825 crises, and the stagnation in the 
years immediately after the return to the gold standard. However, they are characterised by a 
return to rapid growth after each of those incidents. Comparing this Country bank series 
with the Bank of England balance sheet shows how, like the London banks, this sample of 
surviving Country banks grows in line with the Bank of England until 1816, and then 
diverges strongly.  
 
Until 1816 it was reasonable for Ricardo and the Bullionists to argue that most Country 
banks appeared to be growing their liabilities in correlation with those of the Bank of 
England; they might have said the same of London banks, had they discussed these. 
Ricardo being closely involved in the London money market perhaps legitimately argued 
from a personal sense of how London bank liabilities moved in synchronisation with the 
ebbs and flows of the Bank of England, and how Country banks’ liabilities moved in 
synchronization with London liabilities. However, after 1816 the Country banks continue to 
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grow their balance sheets in spite of the Bank of England cutting back on its circulation and 
shrinking its balance sheet. For the whole period during and after the Restriction, the 
sample of surviving Country banks appears most strongly correlated, not to the Bank of 
England, but to the London sample of banks (Exhibit 12.10).  The obvious inference is that 
Country banks that survived had built strong ties with the London Transfer and Set Off 
machine via their London correspondent, and together they formed an independent 
capacity to endogenously ‘manufacture’ a supply of broad money that was independent of 
the Scarcity-inducing policy actions of the Bank of England.  
 
Exhibit 12.10 – Correlation of Country bank balance sheets with London balance sheets,  
1801-1832 
 
 
The balance sheets of the surviving Country banks remain highly correlated to the London 
bank balance sheets throughout the period 1801-1832 (Exhibit 12.10). Yearly changes in the 
two series (using natural logs) have an R-squared of 0.96 over that period with a beta of 
close to one (1.06).77  
 
                                                
77 The only significant outlier is 1803, when a small decline in London bank liabilities was associated with a much 
greater drop in Country bank liabilities, and the latter appears uniformly across all the sample Country banks.  
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From these two analyses I infer that by the time Ricardo and Bosanquet were putting pen to 
paper in 1809, the Law of Reflux was already well established. The stronger and better-
managed banks that formed the backbone of the correspondent banking system  - a fast 
flowing river linking the different regional Smithian ponds of money – operated so as to 
connect Country banks to Bosanquet’s London Transfer and Set Off machine in London. It 
was not yet visible to commentators in 1809, but the banking system had already 
constructed the instruments and processes to support a capacity to respond endogenously. 
It was not yet visible because Country banks were managing their liquidity such that the 
gearing ratio was relatively stable both when measured in terms of the sum of specie and 
Bank of England banknotes, as Ricardo proposed, but also when measured in terms of 
specie, banknotes plus their balance with the London correspondent. When the Bank of 
England changed course after 1810, and more so after the war when it began preparing to 
return to the gold standard, the impact was felt almost entirely by the weakest Country 
banks, which failed in large numbers, but the core backbone of the banking system was able 
to continue growing its balance sheet to partly compensate. The British economy had 
financialised and the income-velocity of specie had acquired a partly independent life.    
 
 
12.6  Estimating the total Country bank liabilities 
 
In order to estimate the total Country bank liabilities it is necessary to combine the 
experience of the surviving banks as represented by our sample (section 12.5 above) with 
the impact of the process of formation and closure of all other banks (section 12.4 above).  
I proceed in five steps, as follows.  
 
First, I take the changes in the composite estimate of the number of Country banks in 
section 12.4, and add back Dawes and Ward-Perkins (2000) estimate of the yearly number 
that stopped trading, in order to derive an adjusted yearly estimate of the number of new 
banks opening. Second, I use Dawes and Ward-Perkins (2000: 30, Fig.1) life expectancy 
rates for private Country banks to construct a pro forma expected yearly depletion rate of 
Country banks starting in any year x over the following decade up to year x+10.  Third, 
using these two sets of data, I construct for each year the number of Country banks aged 
between one and ten years that would have been expected to close that year. By subtracting 
the total of these numbers from the actual number of bank closures recorded in the same 
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year, I derive a separate estimate of the number of banks closing each year that were older 
than ten years. Fourth, I use the aggregate growth path actually experienced by our sample 
of banks, from their respective year of formation through to their tenth year of operation, 
in order to construct a pro forma expected size of the total liabilities for the typical bank in 
each year after its formation, rebased to a year-1 balance sheet total of £30,000. This is to 
reflect Pressnell’s intuition of the typical case: because our sample banks – being long-term 
survivors - were most probably larger than the average bank at the moment it began 
operating, this introduces a conservative element to the total estimate. Lastly, I combine 
these pro forma age composition of closing banks and the pro forma age-specific average 
balance sheet size for Country banks, to construct estimates for each year of the total 
balance sheet of all Country banks still operating based on the estimated age-weighted 
composition of both the banks still operating and that of the banks that stopped trading.  
 
The resulting estimate shows Country bank liabilities rising from a little under £10 million 
in the early 1780s to a peak of £57 million in 1814-5, after which they decline steadily over 
the following thirty years. These level estimates are supported by the most authoritative 
contemporary estimate of the volume of Country banknotes in circulation in the years 1811 
to 1818. Mr. J. Sedgwick, Chairman of the Board of Stamps, filed a detailed study for the 
Secret Committee [of the House of Lords] on the expediency of the bank resuming cash payments (1819) 
estimating the volume of Country banknotes in circulation based on the stamp duties paid.78  
In his report he explained that the duties paid after 1809 could be used to give accurate 
estimates of the total Country banknotes in circulation because (i) data on commercial 
promissory notes and banknotes were separated in 1804, (ii) the ruling that banknotes had 
to be re-stamped if re-issued after three years, and (iii) the 1809 increase in the duty payable. 
Although £1 and £2 notes could theoretically be re-issued without limit without being re-
stamped, in his experience none lasted more than three years. Hence he makes his estimates 
based on the assumption that of the notes issued in any year, one third will wear out in each 
of the following three years, adjusted for the assumption that “a Country Banker may 
usually have about One Tenth of the whole amount of his Notes in his Coffers as a 
Reserve, and Nine Tenths in Circulation.”79   
 
 
                                                
78 Report (1819): Appendix F.4 (pp.404-5), F.6 (pp. 407) and F.7 (pp. 408-13). 
79 Report (1819): Appendix F.7 (p.408) 
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Exhibit 12.11 – Country banks: comparison of estimates of balance sheets and banknotes,  
1811-18 
  
 
The Parliamentary Committee’s estimates for Country banknotes and my estimates of total 
liabilities combine to imply that Country banks’ liabilities on average were composed of 40-
43% by banknotes in circulation during the latter Restriction years, and then declined to 
28% in the monetary stringency of 1816 immediately after the end of the war, before 
recovering thereafter (Exhibit 12.11, column 3). The case studies presented in this thesis 
show that the proportion of total liabilities funded by the net notes in circulation could vary 
across Country banks, but both the levels and direction of change implied by the above 
comparison appear consistent (Exhibit 12.11, column 4). The only outlier is 1815, when our 
sample of banks appears to have maintained a higher relative circulation of their own 
banknotes – perhaps explained by the perception, revealed after the fact, that they were the 
relatively safer banks compared to the average Country bank – many of which closed 
shortly thereafter. Finally, it should be noted that Sedgwick’s somewhat higher estimates 
than implied by those presented here are also explained by his assumption that Country 
banks held one-tenth of their note issue “in the Chest” as reserve: this appears to be an 
underestimate if judged by our sample banks, where the proportion was frequently twice 
that much.  
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12.7  Quantifying total British bank liabilities 
 
I conclude by bringing together the estimates for the total bank liabilities of the Bank of 
England, the London banks, and the Country banks. These are shown in Exhibit 12.12.  
 
Exhibit 12.12 – Estimated total liabilities: Bank of England, London banks, and Country 
banks 
 
 
The three estimated aggregations show how throughout the period 1780-1844 Country 
bank liabilities broadly followed the pattern of change in the Bank of England’s balance 
sheet, growing faster during the Restriction period and then declining somewhat less 
precipitously after 1815. After 1832 we see a shaper decline as more banks switch from a 
private partnership structure (those measured here) to the newly available joint-stock form. 
London bank liabilities grow in pace with the Bank of England until the Bullion Report. 
However, after the Bank switches policy to discounting Exchequer bills, growth stalls, but 
as the main pathway for the monetary injection is now directly into the regions, this allows 
the growth in Country bank liabilities to continue until 1814-5. By 1817 economic agents, 
reacting to the monetary contraction and the increasing closures of Country banks, make a 
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concerted move of their deposits towards the London banks. In such a deleveraging 
environment amongst the wider “fringe” of Country banks, London banks would have 
been perceived as safer because (a) they were generally larger, (b) they did not issue 
banknotes, and (c) they were closer to the London money market  ‘ where money is always 
within reach’.  
 
 
12.8  Estimate of the annual aggregate British bank liabilities 
 
Finally, I construct an aggregate series for all British bank liabilities. This is the sum of the 
three data series above, with one adjustment. As revealed by the Country bank case studies, 
their net deposit balances with London banks constituted a substantial portion of the 
latter’s total liabilities. These need to be subtracted from the nationwide total to avoid 
double counting.  
 
To establish the extent of the adjustment required for such double counting, I take the 
average of the of the actual proportion of the total liabilities accounted for by Country bank 
balances at Barclays, BHHB, and Smith Payne Smith (net of overdrafts), these being the 
three London (Discounter) banks for whom records make the estimation possible between 
1797 and 1826. The average of these three London banks is used to construct an 
exponential log trend of the proportion of double counting before 1797 and after 1826. As 
another manifestation of the Transfer and Set Off machinery, the trend shows how the 
proportion of London bank liabilities accounted for by Country bank deposits rose from 
approximately 10% before the Restriction Act to twice that by the time of the Bullion 
Report, and then settled at 20-22% (see Appendix M for a full table). In a final step, we 
adjust the proportion of double counting to take account of the relative importance of 
Discounters amongst the total of all London banks, on the premise that it was observed 
Goldsmith banks had negligible correspondent banking activity.  
 
No adjustment was made for the possible double counting of Country bank liabilities held 
by other Country banks, on the premise that this would arise from Country banks holding 
each other’s banknotes as part of their cash reserve, and our case studies have shown that, 
while some of this activity did occur, it appears to have accounted for less than 1% of 
assets.  
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Exhibit 12.13 - Annual estimates of total British bank liabilities, 1780-1832 
 
 
For the aggregated series, the years 1832 to 1844 are not shown, as the summation of the 
three series constructed here should be considered as increasingly unreliable estimate of 
total bank liabilities for that later period. An Act of May 1826 induced a gradual new wave 
of change in the banking system by allowing the Bank of England to open branches and 
permitting the formation of joint-stock banks, both outside the scope of this thesis. 
Although adoption started slowly, their number grew rapidly after 1832 (Crick & 
Wadswoth, 1958: Chpt. 1).  
  
Exhibit 12.13 reveals how the London and Country bank liabilities were closely related to 
the movement in the Bank of England balance sheet from 1780 to 1809. When viewed 
together, they show the private bank sector was growing faster than the Bank of England 
already from the end of the 1780s. This continued until the Bullion Report of 1809. 
Thereafter, until the end of the war, when the Bank switches policy to buying government 
bills instead of private commercial paper, London and Country bank liabilities grow more 
slowly. However, more surprisingly, when the Bank sharply deleverages its balance sheet 
between 1814 and 1822, the rest of the banking system merely pauses. The outer “fringes” 
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of the Country bank system collapsed, but the core banks in London attracted the deposits 
searching for a safe home. Even amongst Country banks, some had learnt how to maintain 
confidence in the liabilities they were “manufacturing”, largely by establishing strong links 
with the London Transfer and Set Off machinery.  
 
The aggregate London bank balance sheet from 1780 to 1814 is 91% correlated to the Bank 
of England’ circulation and the Bank’s total balance sheet. However, from 1814 onwards 
there is a complete change: the aggregate London bank balance sheet becomes 84% inversely 
correlated to the Bank’s circulation and 67% inversely correlated to the Bank’s total balance 
sheet. As the Bank’s balance sheet behaviour returns to being driven more by the stock of 
bullion, albeit with a higher gearing (Chapter 10), the rest of the banking system is using its 
newly-acquired practices in order to respond more to the real demand from the economy. 
Unlike the period prior to the Restriction, after 1818 the rest of the banking system viewed 
as a whole is no longer expanding and contracting in synchronisation with the lung of the 
Bank. The London banks and the stronger Country banks are moving in unison and 
independently of the Bank of England – only the weaker Country banks at the “fringes” are 
dependent on the Bank’s actions. 
 
It is ironic that the Scarcity lobby belief - that bank balance sheets followed that of the Bank 
of England - may have been most true during the period of Abundance, which began 
before the Restriction and was then accelerated by it, but not true after 1818 when the 
Scarcity lobby’s views expressed in the 1809 Bullion Report were finally implemented. Had 
it been otherwise, the brutal contraction in the total ‘circulating media’ initiated by the Bank 
would very likely have led to Britain failing to implement that very same return to the gold 
standard.  
 
 
12.9  Implications for income velocity of money 
 
The change in the size of bank liabilities relative to the volume of exchange transactions – 
the measure of the banking system’s impact on the income velocity of money that was so 
little considered by classical economists – can be approximated by scaling our estimate of 
total bank liabilities by the recently available data for real GDP. Conversely, the extent to 
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which bank liabilities moved together with the extrinsic value of those exchange 
transactions can be approximated by scaling our estimated series by nominal GDP.  
 
A close symbiosis is observed between the changing levels of aggregate bank liabilities and 
the total extrinsic value of exchange transactions. As a corollary, there is a close symbiosis 
between the ratio of bank liabilities to real GDP and the level of the GDP price deflator 
index (Exhibit 12.14).  Based on our estimates, total bank liabilities remain within a 
relatively stable ratio of 0.3 to 0.4 of real GDP throughout the 63 years analysed, with only a 
few rare exceptions.  
 
Exhibit 12.14 – The income velocity of British bank balance sheet liabilities, 1780-1844 
 
 
Had Bosanquet had these estimates, he would have argued that the overall banking system 
reflected what would be expected if all bankers’ decisions followed the Real Bills Doctrine: 
the banking system delivered a quantity of total bank liabilities, to act as circulating media, 
that bore a relatively stable ratio to the extrinsic value of real transactions in the economy.  
Ricardo would argue that, viewed over the whole 60 years, the British economy showed it 
could operate under a gold standard with a ratio of bank liabilities to nominal GDP of 
approximately 0.40, both before and after the Restriction period; he would argue that by 
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allowing the ratio to climb to almost 0.70, the Restriction Act had merely allowed the level 
of prices to rise proportionally.   
 
However, inspection of Exhibit 12.14 suggest the favoured hypothesis, based on these 
estimates, is that price inflation mostly led the expansion in bank liabilities from the early 
1790s until 1813, and also the initial monetary contraction after the end of the war. The 
spike in the price level in the two years before the temporary peace treaty at Amiens in 1802 
does not appear to have had a monetary catalyst from within the banking system. The 
inflation experienced towards the end of the war, between 1809 and 1813, was only partially 
accommodated by a rise in bank liabilities, suggesting it was more likely induced by the 
accelerating government expenditure flowing directly into the regions and funded by the 
Bank of England monetizing short-term government debt. After the decision is taken to 
return to the gold standard in 1818, both the price level and monetary contraction appear 
more co-determined until 1832.  
 
In a final note, it is useful to return to the issue of the quantity of specie circulating outside 
the banking system. Only highly speculative estimates are possible as, for example, no 
proper long-run records exist of the bullion imported, or the specie melted down for 
export, other than what was ‘sworn as [of] foreign [origin and] for exportation’, as melting 
down any other specie was an illegal activity. However, the new specie coin minted by the 
Royal Mint provides an indication of changes in its relative usage within the payments 
system.  
 
Prior to the Restriction Act, circulating media was augmented by both bank liabilities and by 
new specie coin. During the Restriction period up to the end of the war, little new coin is 
minted (£10.1 million) and almost all the new supply of (potentially) circulating media is 
provided by the banking system (£70.9 million). During the initial decade of monetary 
Scarcity that followed the end of the war, the monetary system seeks to deleverage by 
converting part of the circulating bank liabilities back into specie. Between 1815 and 1825, 
£40.8 million of new coins were minted, but less than half of this is replacing bank 
liabilities, which are reduced by only £24.7 million. Just as the London banking system’s 
gearing to cash never returned to its pre-Restriction levels, the broader monetary system 
also did not return to the status quo ante.  
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Exhibit 12.15 – British bank liabilities and Royal Mint output of new coin, 1780-1844 
 
 
 
12.10  Monetizing war debt 
 
As a corollary of the analysis in this chapter, here I add a final word in regard to the 
controversy played out mainly in the 1980s and 1990s, and never fully resolved, as to 
whether the financing of the Napoleonic wars encouraged investment in the early part of 
the ‘industrial revolution’ or crowded out its financing. The debate concerned whether the 
debt taken on by Britain to pay for the expenditure on the wars against Napoleon had 
stimulated the changes associated with the Industrial Revolution by increasing demand for 
semi-manufactured goods, or if instead that borrowing had crowded out the financing 
needed for private sector fixed capital formation.  
 
Many historians such as Fetter (1965) and Viner (1937) have pointed to the Bank’s 
accommodation of both government and private sector bills as contributing to Britain’s 
financing of the Napoleonic wars, but studies to date did not attempt to quantify this 
monetary transmission mechanism. Bordo and White (1993), in their comparative study of 
French and British financing of the Napoleonic Wars, separated out the Bank’s holding of 
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private securities from those of government securities, but did not use these as separate 
variables in their model, lamenting that “the unavailability of other than fragmentary data 
on London and country bank liabilities makes the case hard to test”. Like Cameron (1967), 
they were hampered by having to use estimates of national income interpolated over 
decade-long gaps. They found evidence of tax smoothing (a policy whose origins are 
attributed to Ricardo), but found no evidence of a significant contribution to war finance 
coming from the Bank’s monetary inflation, which would contradict Ricardo’s views in 
1809. Gent (2016, LSE Working Paper, forthcoming) applies a more recent model of fiscal 
revealed preference (as developed by H. Bohn, 2008) to the same definition of monetary 
inflation, but using annual GDP data, and finds the same lack of support for monetized 
government financing. However, these studies do not investigate the detailed micro-
economic evidence of indirect monetary financing from private sector bank balance sheets. 
Indeed, Bordo and White admit that their measure of monetary finance80is biased 
downwards because “they omit the private banking system, whose liabilities, according to 
Pressnell (1963) were at least as large as those of the Bank.” The evidence presented in this 
thesis suggests that private banking liabilities were not only larger than the Bank’s, but were 
both an important contributor to the elevated income velocity of specie and an important 
indirect source of monetary financing of government.  
 
Throughout the Restriction period, Parliament retained a legislative commitment 
mechanism restricting the Bank of England from buying government debt with newly 
printed banknotes (Chapter 1). However, the Bank of England interprets the ban on 
making any “Loan or Advance, for or on Account of the Publick Service” (37 George III, 
Cap. XCI, para. II and III) as referring to funded long-term debt and not Exchequer Bills. 
Furthermore, in a continuing Act of 30th November 1797 the government eked out some 
wiggle room under the cap by allowing the Bank to lend against expected additional 
revenues from future new taxes “on the Credit of any Duties to be imposed by any Act … 
for continuing the Duties on Malt, and for granting an Aid to His Majesty by a Land Tax”. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
80  They use what they call “seignorage revenue”, defined as the change in Banknotes, deflated by the average 
price level, as a percentage of the government’s expenditure deficit.  
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Exhibit 12.16 – Country bank holdings of government securities, 1812-1832 
Source: The main series is constructed from the simple average percentage holding of the 6-bank series for 
which data exists for 1815-1832 with the first three years 1812-4 constructed by indexing to the 4-bank 
series. For the earlier period data can only be computed for Smith, Hull and the Bank of Scotland, and is 
shown for comparative purposes as it overlaps in the years 1812-3.   
 
Computed over the whole Restriction period, this nineteenth century form of “quantitative 
easing” was indeed modest: I estimate the Bank bought 6% of the additional government 
debt (funded and unfunded) raised between 1797 and 1815 totalling £225 million in cash 
terms.81 However, almost all the net additional buying by the Bank was concentrated in the 
years 1810-1814. The records show that between 1785 and 1805 William Pitt the Younger, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Prime Minister, wrote 63 letters to the directors of the 
Bank, of which no less than 48 were requests for accommodation or support for new issues 
of unfunded debt, Exchequer Bills.82 In spite of this political pressure, during this early part 
of the Restriction the legislative constraint appears to have been effective, especially in 
                                                
81Author’s calculations based on P. O’Brien unpublished numbers used in Heim & Mirowski (1987). In the past five 
years the Bank of England has bought over 30% of the outstanding government debt, similarly financed by the 
issuance of new high-powered money.   
82 Bank of England archives, ref: M5/606 
  
320 
regard to direct lending (purchases of long-dated annuities, called Consols). A summary of 
direct lending prepared by the Bank for Parliament in March 1822 shows that, up until the 
famous additional £3 million loan granted in 1816, there was no such lending beyond the 
£986,800 of Exchequer Bills that had been cancelled in 1746. During the Restriction, up to 
1816, the direct lending balance of £11,686,800 (outstanding since 1746) was broadly 
matched (i.e. was re-cycling) the operational balances kept at the Bank by the Exchequer 
and other public bodies that averaged £11,313,14183.  
 
However, after 1810 the Bank and the government appear to have interpreted the 
legislation as referring only to longer-term debt and not to short-dated government bills. 
While still expanding the circulation of its banknotes, the Bank switches to buying 
government securities instead of discounting private bills. In the following four years the 
Bank’s balance expands by a further £5.8M, but holdings of government securities nearly 
double, growing by £13.5M; a £6.6M drop in private discounts compensates this. The 
government’s annual borrowing requirement rose from a low of £1.3M in 1811 to £73.3M 
in 1814 if calculated in face value terms or, if calculated more appropriately in net cash 
terms it rose from £6.4M in 1810 to a peak of £25.7M in 1814.84 I estimate the Bank 
bought 20% of the cumulative net new borrowing by the government of £69M during the 
four years after the Bullion Report (1810-14).  
 
The analysis in this thesis reveals how the private banks were an important additional source 
of buying of government securities throughout the Restriction. The London Goldsmith 
banks placed the majority of their deposit growth into government securities and Country 
banks held some 20-30% of their assets in these securities in direct form (Exhibit 12.17), 
and indirectly enabled many of their London correspondents like Smith Payne and Coutts 
to place further sums this way using the excess liquidity deposited with them. The evidence 
presented in this thesis from London and Country balance sheets suggests that a 
considerable part of the monetary injection from the Bank was first channelled via the 
London banks to the Country banks where it was potentially available to satisfy local 
demands for credit, subject to the Country banker’s assessment of the credit risk, before the 
excess – for there appears to have been an excess – was channelled back to London where 
it was made available for purchasing government securities. This well developed, fast-
                                                
83 Bank of England archives, ref: 9A/35/1 
84 Using P. O’Brien unpublished figures, reverse engineered from data quoted in Heim & Mirowski (1987) 
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flowing and inter-connected interbank network and its two-way Reflux allowed much of the 
government’s borrowing requirements to be met indirectly by the increased banknote 
issuance and the raised gearing levels within the private banking system, without the full 
risks of the direct monetization of the government debt that had caused so many problems 
for the assignat in France.    
 
Exhibit 12.17 – London Goldsmith banks: expansion invested in government securities,  
1797 - 1817 
 
 
The London Goldsmith banks are the poster children for the “crowding out” hypothesis. 
During the Restriction years from 1797 until 1810 the balance sheets of the Goldsmiths in 
our sample (Hoares, Goslings, Childs and Drummonds) increase by £1,195,449, of which 
£941,925 is accounted for by increased holdings of government securities. In other words, 
79% of the Goldsmiths’ balance sheet growth up until 1810 flows into their holdings of 
government securities. By 1817, after twenty years of Restriction, two-thirds of the £2.5M 
increase in their aggregate balance sheets has flowed into government securities (Exhibit 12.17). This 
occurs mostly in three stages: in the first two years of the Restriction; in 1806; and in 1817, 
the year we observe the major reflux of deposits towards the safer London banks. 
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Exhibit 12.18– Goslings and Coutts: holdings of government securities, 1775 - 1845 
 
 
The Goldsmith banks’ concentration of asset growth into government securities is most 
vividly shown by Goslings’ decision to shift the balance sheet into government risk exactly 
at the time of the Restriction, and appears to have been driven by commercial 
considerations, as there was no coincident succession issues. During the 1780s Goslings had 
briefly moved towards a Discounter business model, but following the death of Robert 
Gosling in 1792, Francis and William Gosling had almost completely reversed that strategic 
move (Chapter 4.5). When the Restriction was imposed, the Goslings again briefly flirted 
with increasing bill discounts in order to take advantage of the Bank of England’s low-cost 
facility, but the balance sheet clearly shows how the partners once again turned their back 
on this activity after 1800. This time there is a stronger case for arguing that the decision 
reflected the risk-averse nature of the partners, since the capping of the bill discounting 
exposure occurred in spite of the renewed growth in deposits, and this time the partners did 
so without a compensating increase in their exposure to secured lending. Instead, they 
chose to invest the increased deposits entirely in government securities (Exhibit 12.18). 
With one exception, from 1800 these accounted for at least 36% of the assets, and at least 
half the assets from the end of the Restriction until 1845. From the eve of the Restriction to 
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1845, the Goslings’ balance sheet balance grows nearly three fold or by £755,729; of that, 
£682,017 is invested in government securities rather than in bills or secured lending, with 
the residual accounting for an increase in the average balances held in cash or at the Bank of 
England. The bank bought well, holding little when yields were low in the late 1780s and 
accumulating after 1815 ahead of the post-war drop in yields. However, for the 
shareholders the Gosling balance sheet became a near-proxy for what today would be seen 
as a leveraged government bond fund. Not surprisingly, profits stagnated and the return on 
assets sank to less than 1% per annum.  
 
Historians viewing Britain’s monetary system solely through the prism of the better known 
Goldsmith business model could be induced to support the argument that the 
unprecedented borrowing spree by the British government up to the Battle of Waterloo had 
indeed been responsible for crowding out private borrowing, delaying the industrial 
revolution. However, as we have shown, careful consideration of a broader set of bank 
business models reveals a more nuanced picture of monetary expansion based on co-
dependency between growth in short-term private credit and an expanded supply of traded 
government securities. The latter acted as a flexible buffer for the banking system to meet 
the demand, whenever it arose, to ‘shift’ quasi-monies (in the form of commercial paper) 
into high-powered money (specie) or the next best form of money, namely Bank of 
England notes that were ranked next highest for their capacity to extinguish liabilities.   
 
The government were well aware of this indirect mechanism for funding the war debt 
during the Restriction – what Hilton (1977: 36) called the “Vansittart’s system.” When in 
1810 Parliament debated the Bullion report’s recommendation to return to the gold 
standard, Spencer Perceval, the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer said that 
adopting the recommendation was tantamount to allowing Britain to be invaded: 
 
“[…] tantamount to a declaration that they would no longer continue those foreign 
exertions which they had hitherto considered indispensable to the security of the country … 
[and become] the involuntary instruments of their country’s ruin” (Hansard, 1811). 
 
The government’s dependency on this mechanism became one of the perceived obstacles to 
returning to convertibility after the war. In 1818, George Harrison, Secretary to the 
Treasury, reported to Nicholas Vansittart (1766-1851, later Lord Bexley), Chancellor of the 
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Exchequer (1812-1823) that a threatened reduction in such bill discounting by the Bank 
could cause the government’s lead underwriter (Rothschild) to curtail the government’s 
access to the bond market: 
 
“Its effect upon our concerns and upon the Stocks [i.e. government bonds] may be very 
considerable – for such a proceeding would drive him [i.e. Rothschild] in all probability to 
become a Seller of his Stock … and would inevitably affect the Funds more or less …. We 
could not with justice or propriety be pressing him to extend his accommodations to us, 
when the Bank refused to accommodate him by Discounts – as he would then be driven to 
become a Seller to a larger extent to enable him to meet our Wants.”85 
 
This “Vansittart system” had also transformed Britain’s monetary system.   
                                                
85 Harrison to Vansittart, 1 Oct 1818, in Torrance (1968: 56-8) quoted in B. Hilton (1977:36). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Over the past century, historians of economics led by the seminal work of Viner (1937) 
have been drawn to the monetary debates conducted during the British Restriction (1797-
1818) in search for the scientific genesis of the policy debates of their respective times. They 
typically focused on a comparison of Ricardo with Thornton, rather than with the more 
antithetical views of Bosanquet expressed at the height of the private credit expansion. 
Their empirical corroboration has been based on Bank of England data and the number of 
Country banks. Historians of banking during the Restriction, led by the seminal work of 
Pressnell (1956) have studied Country banks, or banks in a particular city (e.g. Cave, 1899), 
or individual banking families (e.g. Leighton-Boyce, 1958), or the Bank of England 
(Clapham, 1970), or focused on an older London bank business model (Temin and Voth, 
2013) that I have shown was no longer dominant. The latter scholars incorporate the 
concurrent theoretical debates only tangentially, and to date have omitted a comprehensive 
quantification of the financial records of the London banks. Finally, historians of banking as 
it relates to money have had to contend with the paucity of data and have struggled to build 
upon Cameron (1967).  
 
In this thesis I have drawn from all three areas of research, together with recent work on 
strategy and business model cognition, and complemented these with a comprehensive 
firm-level examination of London (and Country) bank financial records in order to answer 
the following concatenated question: 
 
How did the bifurcated response of political economists in the way they sought to adapt 
classical theories of money to the events they observed after the Restriction Act, compare 
to actual concurrent behaviour of the banking system when analysed with the benefit of 
hindsight?  
 
In order to answer this question, the thesis has brought together the three strands of the 
academic literature, complementing them with novel contributions. These have identified 
two London bank business models; examined the differentiated behaviour and incentives 
acting upon them and Country banks; analysed the nature of the monetary flows within 
their correspondent banking relationships between London and Country banks; constructed 
quantified approximations of British aggregate bank liabilities, scaled to GDP; and 
  
327 
contrasted all these to the bifurcated competing hypotheses put forward by the political 
economists Ricardo and Bosanquet in 1810, at the height of the Bank of England’s 
expansion in private sector credit and the related concerns over its monetary consequences 
expressed in the Bullion Report.   
 
I find that, faced with bewildering and rapid changes to the institutional and economic 
environment, political economists bifurcated classical theory according to the outcome they 
sought, and both lobbies used ‘models’ of the monetary system that were only partially 
useful representations of how the concurrent banking system was actually functioning. The 
Bullionist lobby advocated for the Scarcity-of-base-money, and money’s primary role as a 
store of value linked to a standard of real value; they embraced Smith’s more realistic view 
of banker rationales, but their (early) ‘modelling’ misrepresented the role of bank credit, and 
underestimated the capacity for financial innovation and ‘fringe’ Country banks to raise 
gearing ratios and otherwise provide the fractional banking system with the ability to 
‘manufacture’ the means of payment independently of the stock of base money. The Anti-
Bullionist lobby advocated for the Abundance-of-broad-money, and money’s primary role 
as a nominal unit of account acting as the means of exchange; they embraced financial 
innovation and the endogeneity of the supply of money, but their (early) modelling 
misrepresented banker rationales, and underestimated how the locus of systemic credit risk 
became both more concentrated and more volatile as the volume of credit-based money 
being netted through the London Transfer and Set Off clearing system grew (Coutts - Bank of 
Scotland case study).  
 
In this sense, both lobbies underestimated the role of the new Discounter banks and the 
Country banks at the “fringes” of the monetary system, but they did so for different 
reasons: the Bullionist-Scarcity lobby underestimated their capacity to have an independent 
impact on the supply of broad money; the Anti-Bullionist-Abundance lobby underestimated 
their potential impact on systemic risk.  
 
It was the period after the Ricardo-Bosanquet debate of 1809-10 that gradually revealed the 
lacuna in both theoretical approaches. After the Bank of England begins to cut back on its 
discounting of private sector bills (but not yet its Banknote circulation) in 1810, the inner 
core of London banks and stronger Country banks, linked together through deep 
correspondent banking relationships, increasingly reveal their capacity to operate their 
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balance sheets independently of the Bank. When the Bank begins to sharply deleverage its 
balance sheet in 1818-22, the concentrated locus of systemic credit risk is revealed as 
located in the outer ‘fringes’ of the Country bank system, leading many to collapse. 
However, the first of these factors appears to have been stronger than the second, thereby 
mitigating the decline in total bank liabilities relative to real GDP that would have ensued if 
the banking system had remained fully connected to the sharply deleveraging Bank balance 
sheet.  Contrary to Ackworth (1925), without the ‘new movement of credit’ carried on by 
the private bankers, it seems likely that the deflationary adjustment required to return to the 
gold standard would have rendered the ‘public outcry against austerity’ overwhelming. 
Finally, it can be argued that the banking crisis of 1825-6 revealed the limits to this capacity 
of the banking system to independently expand the supply of broad money and prevent a 
decline in relation to nominal GDP.  
 
Prior to the Restriction, political economists ‘modelled’ the economy in real terms and the 
cognitive framing of money was that of a real commodity, elevated to the primus inter pares 
status of means of exchange and store of value, because possessing the qualities of 
divisibility, durability, transportability - and linked to the system of economic exchange 
through relations of relative scarcity like all other commodities. Based on this textbook 
anthropology of money, classical theories employed a comparative statics methodology 
emphasising self-regulating private incentive mechanisms driven by arbitrage processes. In 
all but the short-run there was no money illusion and no Cantillon effects, and prices 
returned to their long-run ‘natural’ factor costs based on an exclusive mediating force: the 
“vix mediatrix” of the flow of specie (gold coin). There was no independent role for the 
banking system: the implicit assumption was that banks were passive intermediaries of real 
resources, what recent theory calls “loanable funds”, from savers to producers.  
 
These theories were ill suited to accommodate the impending longer-term structural 
changes to the balance sheet velocity of specie brought about by the Restriction. Theories 
anchored in the labour theory of value, combined with a monetary system operating with 
few banks and low gearing to the stock of gold coin, provided little encouragement for 
policy makers to explore the conceptual difference between intrinsic value and extrinsic 
value in exchange. In the middle of the eighteenth century this ‘model’ was a reasonable 
reductive stylization of a monetary system dominated by the Bank of England operating 
with a target asset gearing to bullion of just two; where its banknotes circulated only in 
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denominations of a value equivalent to over £500 today; in which few note-issuing Country 
banks existed outside Scotland; and where banks in London could not issue notes and most 
operated with the Goldsmith business model that emphasised medium-term lending 
secured on real assets, with low transaction frequency and low asset gearing, mirroring the 
cognitive framing of money and banks in the thinking of theorists.  By the 1770s, the role of 
banknotes was recognised by theorists, more in Scotland than in England, but they were still 
‘modelled’ as if they were mere temporary substitutes for specie during each production 
cycle. The existence of unregulated fractional banking was discussed, but not incorporated 
in the classical ‘model’ that implicitly assumed bank asset gearing to be stable. As a 
corollary, the long-run marginal rate of substitution of banknotes for specie was assumed to 
be zero and the marginal rate of substitution of goods for specie to be one.  
 
Already by the 1780s this body of theory was being left behind by the innovations in 
financial instruments and the bank business models that had grown to support them. At the 
margin the Bank of England’s circulation was already less responsive to changes in the 
reserves of bullion, and London banks were already increasing their gearing to cash. Banks 
in London and the Country had doubled since 1750 and the newer entrants were adopting 
the Discounter business model involving the high frequency trading of short duration 
paper-based instruments. They were also learning to develop Heywood’s (1812) London 
Transfer and Set Off machinery: a high volume payments clearing system to support the 
correspondent banking services that linked London banks with the rapidly growing network 
of Country banks. By 1809, Bosanquet would describe the London money market clearing 
system as being able to clear 95% of the flows of paper-based quasi-monies - each day 
totalling sums equivalent to the balance sheets of four large banks - without the need to 
transfer any specie or Banknotes. The growing number of Country banks were 
‘manufacturing’ liabilities by issuing their own banknotes, but evidence from the Old Bank, 
Bristol and Smith Payne, Nottingham suggests that until the Restriction banknotes 
accounted for no more than a fifth of total funding, even for older and well-established 
banks. 
 
The Restriction removed the fixed and arbitragable parity between banknotes and gold coin, 
and, in doing so, it also separated the conceptual notion of extrinsic exchange value and that 
of intrinsic value indexed to the money standard. Suspension of convertibility of banknotes 
into specie exposed Smith’s distinction between the intrinsic value of the stock of bullion at 
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a single instant in time, and the cumulative extrinsic value in exchange over multiple time 
periods. The gap between the two notions, being the income velocity of specie as defined in 
this thesis, is built upon the banking system’s balance sheet multiplier to the stock of high-
powered money (specie), which this thesis has referred to as the bank balance sheet velocity 
of specie. This ‘gap’ gives the banking system a potentially independent role in the creation 
of the broad money supply, the latter being intended as the total extrinsic exchange value 
mediated by all forms of quasi-monies (banknotes, bills of exchange). This multiplier can 
expand or contract as banks alter either their asset-side gearing to the reserves of high-
powered money, or the proportion of their liability-side funding coming from the issuance 
of banknotes. In other words, as Bosanquet described in his criticism of Ricardo’s gold 
mine example, banks could potentially create additional supply of credit-based broad 
money. They could do so either by enhancing the operation of fractional banking (asset 
gearing) or by ‘manufacturing’ additional bank liabilities that the ‘community’ accept to use 
as a means of payment.  
 
During the Restriction banks did both. The extent to which they did so depended on the 
Goldsmith’s tolerance for incremental liquidity risk and the Discounter’s tolerance for 
incremental credit risk. The Goldsmith bank had a lesser interest rate incentive to use the 
Bank’s expanded discount window, and to do so would have required becoming more 
involved in an activity for which they had little taste or informational capacity, so they 
recycled most of the growth in deposits into government securities. By contrast, the 
Discounter bank had a material incentive, from the (gross) interest margin, to use the 
Bank’s discount window as a source of off-balance sheet leverage for its core activity. 
However, because the Bank of England would only discount the best quality private sector 
bills and notes, the Discounters became the vulnerable leading edge of the expansion in the 
money supply, and some (Prescotts) but not all (Barclays) suffered after the Bank changed 
strategy.   
 
The Restriction of 1797 led to a credit boom financed by the printing of banknotes by the 
Bank of England and the Country banks, and the increased gearing of London Discounters. 
By the time the decision was taken to return to the gold standard in 1818, the stock of 
Banknotes was two-and-half times greater relative to real GDP than it had been in the years 
between Adam Smith Wealth of Nations (1772) and the start of the Restriction. I estimate 
that by 1818 the aggregate balance sheet of the London banks had almost doubled with no 
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change in the stock of specie. In the first fifteen years of the Restriction up to 1811 the 
Bank of England balance sheet and circulation grew three times faster than previously and 
three times faster than real GDP; the Bank’s monetary injection through the medium of its 
discounting of private sector commercial paper is equivalent to adding the balance sheet of 
twenty large banks to the seventy that actually existed in London. The aggregate bank 
balance sheet of the existing London banks kept pace with the growth of the Bank: with 
Discounters mostly growing faster than Goldsmiths as they alone made extensive use of the 
Bank’s rapidly expanding discount window, a form of profitable off-balance sheet funding 
which came to account for as much as 12% of total liabilities. This in turn enabled 
Discounters to safely increase their gearing to cash reserves from 3.5x to 6x.  
 
In the Country the number of banks tripled and operated with reserves of specie and Bank 
of England notes that were typically as low as 4-5%. Specie plays a very minor role (less 
than 1%) in the cash management of Country banks, and makes almost no part of the inter-
bank payments flows. Well-established Country banks like the Old Bank, Bristol and Smith 
Ellison, Lincoln rapidly “pushed out” their notes until they accounted for 40-50% of total 
funding, incentivized by pure rent-seeking goals; adventurous newer banks like Barnard & 
Co, Bedford pushed this up to 75% of total liabilities, albeit when pursuing a very 
conservative asset policy. The exceptions were Lancashire and Scotland. The Lancashire 
banks did not issue their own notes and so grew their balance sheets in line with deposits, 
making their experience similar to that of the Goldsmiths in London. In Scotland, having 
“pushed out” more banknotes in the decade prior to the Restriction, and harder hit by the 
recession following the peace at Amiens in 1802, the joint-stock banks allowed note issue to 
slowly decline; however, increased asset gearing allowed private sector lending to eventually 
recover at the end of the Restriction years.  Furthermore, some Country banks did not 
increase their lending apace with the growth in funding, and recycled the increase back to 
their respective London correspondent and invested in government securities. 
 
By the time Parliament convened the Bullion Committee in 1809, the trend rate of inflation 
had tripled and every third year it was exceeding (often by substantial amounts) the 
reference rate on lending capped at 5% by the usury laws; the pound was trading at a 
discount to its 1717 parity to gold bullion and had suffered two bouts of devaluation on the 
foreign exchanges in Hamburg; and the government debt had doubled again. These unusual 
economic symptoms, produced by a mix of the expansion in credit and the challenges of 
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the Napoleonic Wars, brought out into the open the growing discrepancies between 
monetary theory and practice. These discrepancies acted as a catalyst for political 
economists to rethink classical theory and adapt the tenets of Hume and Smith to a 
monetary system that after eighty years was no longer anchored to gold. 
  
Political economists struggled to respond to three inter-related areas affected by the changes 
in the rules of the game: the effects of innovation in financial instruments and practices; the 
role of credit and the “fringe” of Country banks; and the rationales driving banker actions. 
Whether any one political economist joined the Bullionist-Scarcity lobby or the Anti-
Bullionist-Abundance lobby depended on the outcome he favoured – respectively, 
constancy in the real value of money or flexibility in the supply of the medium of exchange. 
This in turn influenced which parts of this classic theory he chose to keep and which parts 
he chose to reject or adapt to the new conditions imposed by the Restriction.  
 
Ricardo’s Bullionist-Scarcity position favoured the ancien regime with a standard of money 
having a stable parity to real goods, and so continued to ‘model’ the monetary system with a 
cognitive frame of specie being the only true money and (therefore) the only “vix mediatrix”. 
This deductive cognitive framing of money resembled that revealed by bankers following 
the Goldsmith business model and spurning the discounting of bills as a fundamentally 
unsound business, as Richard Hoare and the Gosling brothers did. Consequently Ricardo 
rejected the Real Bills Doctrine as an inadequate constraint on any endogenous supply of 
paper money, and instead relied on the Price-Specie-Flow hypothesis, extended to domestic 
inter-regional trade by the addition of the Stable Fringe Velocity assumption. This 
‘modelled’ Country bank balance sheets as being closely correlated to that of the Bank of 
England. As a corollary, Ricardo saw the price premium of bullion and the devaluation of 
the pound in Hamburg as prima facie evidence of the excess supply of Bank of England 
notes.  
 
By contrast, Bosanquet’s Anti-Bullionist-Abundance position rejected the Price-Specie-Flow 
as unrepresentative of the wartime impediments caused by Napoleon’s continental 
blockades, and the Stable Fringe Velocity hypotheses as “metaphysical”. Instead he relied 
on the private incentive mechanisms of the Real Bills Doctrine to regulate the supply of 
money to its demand, enhanced by the Law of (macro) Reflux. He correctly recognised that 
incremental paper money comes into existence, not like a new gold mine (as Ricardo had 
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compared it to), but with the simultaneous creation of a liability having on-going costs that 
– in theory - encouraged its prompt redemption at the end of the production cycle. 
Bosanquet applied a cognitive framing of money as being a nominal unit of account of debt 
that was consistent with the more inductive thinking revealed by bankers following the 
newer Discounter business model at the fringes of the core banking system of the 1750s. 
The Law of Reflux ensured that while these quasi-monies circulated, the money markets 
would convey any excess supply of one such money-form to where it could be extinguished 
by an agent having a matching liability (e.g. a tax liability) or where it could be purchased by 
an agent holding surplus quantity of a higher quality money-form (e.g. Bank notes) that he 
was looking to invest in a lower-quality, higher-yielding money-form (e.g. bills of exchange). 
For Bosanquet, endogenous money creation by the banking system could be allowed to 
self-regulate, not only because the rationales and incentives of bankers would ensure that 
only ‘real bills’ for ‘real transactions’ would be discounted, but also because the London 
Transfer and Set Off market for quasi-monies ensured the “shiftability” of all the quasi-
monies: it enabled the daily rebalancing of both the supply and demand for each form of 
this quasi-money, as well as between the aggregate stock of quasi-monies and that of high-
powered money (specie).  
 
During the years up to 1810, when the Bank of England is predominantly buying private 
sector commercial paper, the empirical evidence supports the Ricardo-Bullionist position 
for the de facto presence of a Stable Fringe Velocity at the aggregate level of the monetary 
system, but paradoxically it appears to have stopped working just at the time when the 
Bullionist views that relied on that hypothesis were finally implemented after 1818. The 
monetary system already begins to work differently once the Bank switches to buying 
government securities after 1810, but a clear change occurs when the Bank begins to shrink 
its balance sheet after 1817. After 1817 the balance sheets of the inner core of London 
banks and the stronger Country banks continue to move in unison with one another, but 
are now negatively correlated to that of the Bank.  
 
By the time Ricardo and Bosanquet were putting pen to paper in 1809, the Law of Reflux 
was already well established; and the stronger and better-managed banks forming the 
backbone of the correspondent banking system  - a fast flowing river linking the different 
regional Smithian ponds of money – was operating so as to connect Country banks to 
Bosanquet’s London Transfer and Set Off. An analysis “from both ends of the pipe” of the 
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daily flows between them and their London correspondent (Smith, Derby with Smith & 
Payne, London; and the Bank of Scotland with Coutts, London) reveals how these flows 
were very large relative to the size of balance sheets, and made up almost exclusively of bills, 
settled via offsetting accounting entries, carefully monitored by both banks on a daily basis 
along the lines of a modern reconciliation function. The analysis provides strong evidence 
that specie, and even Bank of England banknotes were a small component of the very 
substantial inter-bank payments system, and that the large expansion in other quasi-monies 
(country banknotes, bills of exchange, drafts and notes) was supported by powerful offset 
mechanisms embedded in the correspondent banking relationships between London and 
Country banks. These offset mechanisms allowed the monetary system to operate with high 
rates of turnover of these quasi-monies, with final net settlements requiring only small 
stocks of specie and Banknotes (high-powered money), as postulated by Bosanquet. At the 
time of the Bullion Committee, every month Smith, Derby was sending to London bills for 
a value equivalent to one-third of its net balance sheet, and receiving approximately the 
same back from London. Consistent with the analysis of the maturity profile of BHHB’s 
stock of bills in London, the Smith bank in Derby was turning over the equivalent of its 
entire balance sheet more than once every month. Similarly, an average balance of £16,079 
with its London correspondent SPS is supporting an annual two-way turnover of bills of 
over £360,000. The turnover of the Bank of Scotland’s balance at Coutts was much higher 
still. These flows included almost no specie except on very rare occasions, mostly associated 
with extreme crisis events. The flows contain a small amount of Banknotes, consistent with 
the Ricardo’s hypothesis, but these regularly travel in both directions, and the Derby Bank’s 
stock of such notes is turning over 25 to 50 times per year, which is rather more consistent 
with Bosanquet’s Law of Reflux.  
 
It was not yet visible to Bullionist commentators like Ricardo in 1809, but the banking 
system had already constructed the instruments and processes to support the capacity to 
respond endogenously. It was not yet visible because Country banks were managing their 
liquidity such that the gearing ratio was relatively stable both when measured in terms of the 
sum of specie and Bank of England banknotes, but also when measured in terms of specie, 
banknotes plus their balance with the London correspondent. They targeted a stable reserve 
ratio (4% to 5%) to total assets defined as the sum of specie and Bank of England notes, as 
suggested by Ricardo’s Stable Fringe Velocity. However, as intimated by Pressnell (1956) 
there is equal evidence that Country banks also managed their liquidity risk in function of 
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specie and Bank notes plus the net balance on their nostro account at their London 
correspondent, targeting a ratio to total liabilities of 11 – 16% during the Restriction and 13 
– 22% thereafter. In effect the stronger Country banks had incorporated Bosanquet’s 
London Transfer and Set Off into how they managed their liquidity risk.  
 
When the Bank of England changed course after 1810, and more so after the war and when 
it began preparing to return to the gold standard, the impact of this restrictive policy was 
felt almost entirely by the weakest Country banks, which failed in large numbers, but the 
core backbone of the banking system was able to continue growing its balance sheet to 
compensate. The British economy had financialised and the income-velocity of specie had 
acquired a partially independent life.    
 
While the London Transfer and Set Off was visible to Bosanquet and Heywood, what was not 
visible to the Anti-Bullionist/Abundance lobby was how that inverted pyramid of offsetting 
notional claims had rendered the locus of credit risk more volatile and unpredictable within 
the banking system (Chapter 6). When the deleveraging cycle began after 1815, this proved 
fatal for the Country banks at the outer fringes of the banking system that had not 
capitalised profits during the good years and/or had weaker correspondent relationships 
with the London banks.   
 
If the Law of Reflux was doing important work maintaining a balance between the supply 
and demand for quasi-money, by contrast the incentives implied by the Real Bills Doctrine 
were working less well in keeping a balance between the supply of all monies and its 
demand stemming from ‘genuine’ real projects. The aggregate bank balance sheets were 
growing three times faster than real GDP which has been shown to be a good lead indicator 
of ‘credit booms gone bust’, especially for countries not on the gold standard (Schularick & 
Taylor, 2011). For many of the Discounters benefitting from greater asset turnover, and for 
Country banks collecting ‘free’ rents from their increased note issuance, the improvement 
of gross margins did not translate into higher net profit margins due to increased operating 
costs and worsening write-offs that exceeded the bankers’ expectations (as proxied by their 
loan loss reserves). The evidence from Old Bank, Bristol suggests only a weak relationship – 
as the Real Bills Doctrine would lead us to expect - between write-offs and the issuance of 
notes, and the relationship becomes even weaker during the Restriction. Instead, behaviour 
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was dominated by the quantum shift in the proportion of liabilities funded by note issuance 
brought about by the suspension of the convertibility requirement.  
 
Soon after the Bullion Report the Bank veers away from the discounting of commercial 
paper towards the direct financing of the government’s unfunded (short-term) debt, and the 
growth in the fringe sector of Country banks stops and then begins to reverse. The 
behaviour of the monetary system changes such that by the time the decision is taken to 
return to the gold standard in 1818, the London banks have acquired the capacity to partly 
compensate for the Bank’s sharp reduction in the supply of high-powered money. The 
expansion in the broad money supply during the Restriction, and its partial resistance to the 
contraction in high-powered money after the Restriction, raises questions for political 
economists of the Scarcity lobby who emphasised a supply-driven money hypothesis. 
Equally, the behaviour of Old Bank, Bristol raises questions for political economists of the 
Abundance lobby who emphasised a self-regulating demand-driven money. 
 
Both the Bullionist-Scarcity lobby and the Anti-Bullionist-Abundance lobby typically 
underplay the full potential of such endogenous money creation within the banking system 
– but they do so for different reasons. The Scarcity lobby underplay the capacity of the 
economy to endogenously expand the supply of money through the creation of new forms 
of money and/or an expansion of lending via an increased number of a fringe banking 
institutions and/or a willingness of the banking system to tolerate lower reserve ratios. This 
lobby denies the ability of ‘fringe banking’ to respond to a range of endogenous economic 
and psychological incentives, and hence its capacity to operate with at least partial 
independence from rules set in relation to a fixed standard of value. In contrast, the 
Abundance lobby begins by acknowledging that such endogenous money creation by the 
‘fringe banking’ sector exists, but believe that this money creation is self-regulating so as to 
match the demand for money coming from the real economy. The adherents to the 
Abundance lobby underplay the reflexive nature of the endogenous mechanisms that are 
present within the financial sector in practice, and hence the potential for a ‘fringe banking’ 
activity to de-stabilize the real economy.  Both lobbies made the mistake of assuming that ex 
post cash flows at the level of the aggregate economy are always at least equal to ex ante 
expected cash flows.  
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The growth in the number of Country banks and their balance sheets was truly a 30-year-
long explosion in “fringe banking”. The boom period is characterized by a multiplying of 
smaller companies offering a diverse set of lending and financial services at the periphery of 
the core banking system. The core banking system in 1770 was constituted of long-standing 
larger banks (in London) operating established business models (the Goldsmith), practices 
(no bill discounting) and products (secured term lending) within a more regulated arena 
(issuance of banknotes not permitted to all banks). By contrast, the smaller “fringe” banking 
companies typically operated newer and more experimental business models (various forms 
of London Discounter plus the Country banks) at the periphery of the more regulated arena 
(in this case, literally outside the 65-mile London perimeter where the issuance of banknotes 
was permitted) and are early adopters of new practices (using Bank of England banknotes as 
reserves in lieu of specie) and products (issuing their own banknotes and, after 1797, for 
denominations under £5).  The expansion in the numbers and balance sheets of the “fringe 
banks” is a secondary effect of, and dependent upon a prolonged expansion in lending (the 
Bank of England’s discounting of bills) and the access via the core London banks to the 
growing liquidity of quasi-money paper instruments, including government securities. This 
growth in the “fringe” balance sheets in response to lower perceived liquidity risk premia is 
funded by the banking system manufacturing quasi-money. This quasi-money has a 
contingent shelf life, being matched one-for-one to a liability. As this lending expands faster 
than nominal GDP, eventually the boom turns to bust. The banking system as a whole is 
obliged to search out greater stocks of central bank money that counts as reserves – for 
only repayment using such money can extinguish the previously issued quasi-money. As the 
“fringe banking” sector has less ready access to such central bank money compared to the 
core banks, it shrinks faster. In fact, the core banks experienced a counter-cyclical 
expansion in their deposits as flows cascade back towards the perceived safety of the core – 
recently termed the “Systematically Important Financial Institutions”.  
 
In summary, with the benefit of hindsight, the Restriction provided monetary theorists with 
a condensed lesson as to why money is a nominal unit of debt that can be ‘manufactured’ 
endogenously to the limits of what a given Fisher ‘community’ is willing to accept, 
reinforced by explicit public declarations of that joint commitment, as it was in London, 
Lincoln and Bristol. The capacity of the banking system to endogenously manufacture 
credit-based money makes the broad money supply always capable of escaping the supply-
side control of the executive entity acting upon either the quantity or the price of high-
  
338 
powered money. Equally, money created as the alter ego of a debt is always vulnerable to the 
failure of agent expectations beset by radical uncertainty over future state of affairs, which 
make the supply of money vulnerable to the failure of today’s cash flows both to match the 
expectations of prior lenders and satisfy the demand for new credit from today’s borrowers.   
 
       Epilogue 
 
John Turner (2014: Chpt. 3 and pp. 67-71) has recently argued that the financial crisis that 
bears the greatest similarity to the crisis of 2008 is the dénouement of the Restriction 
experiment in the shape of the 1825-6 banking crisis. During the past forty years British 
banking has experienced a long period of progressive regulatory liberalization, accompanied 
by a significant expansion in the provision of credit and the ‘fringe’ banking institutions that 
provided it. This was followed by an economic contraction at the start of the century, and 
finally an unprecedented financial and banking crisis in 2008. To this author, this pattern of 
events appears similar in kind to the years after 1780, with the Restriction Act of 1797 
having the role akin to the 1986 Financial Services Act (known colloquially as “Big Bang”)86 
as the accelerant of banking and credit expansion, and as a catalyst to Panglossian wishful 
thinking in monetary policy formulation. 
 
Since the 2008 crisis, this author has been aware of various expressions of regret by senior 
policy makers in respect of how their conceptual and theoretical understanding during the 
years of credit boom had not adequately matched the true operation of the banking and 
monetary system. Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, speaking about the 
2008 crisis in his BBC Today Lecture of 2012, stated: “With the benefit of hindsight, … we 
should have preached that the lessons of history were being forgotten” (King, 2012). Adair 
Turner, former head of the British Financial Services Authority admitted in a recent 
interview: "I'd never believed in the efficient market hypothesis or the rational expectations 
hypothesis. But I'd forgotten that banks create credit, money and purchasing power and 
that they can create too much" (Turner, 2016). In the USA, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve, 1987-2006 stated: “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-
interests of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such as that they were best 
capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms [….]. You know, 
                                                
86 Although we have not been to war in Europe, wars in Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan and again Iraq have regularly 
impacted government expenditure, and total public and private sector debt has seen similar expansion relative to 
GDP.  
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that’s precisely the reason I was shocked, because I have been going for 40 years or more 
with very considerable evidence that it [free market theory] was working exceptionally well” 
(Radia, 2011).   
 
The thesis has explored ‘the lessons of history’ provided by the British Restriction on how 
policy-makers seeking the Scarcity of money as a store of value forget that ‘banks can create 
money’; and those seeking the Abundance of money as a means of exchange forget that the 
‘self-interests of banks are not sufficient to protect their firms’ nor the wider monetary 
system. In order for the British Restriction period to offer up such ‘lessons of history’, this 
work has used the benefit of the historian’s hindsight to juxtapose the contemporary 
monetary theorising of 1810 with the concurrent changing behaviour of the banking system 
viewed through the lens of a comprehensive quantification of bank financial records. It has 
shown how the Restriction provides fertile ground for exploring policy-setting mistakes that 
have been repeated since, whereby the operative framework of financial institutions is 
viewed by policy-makers as that contained solely within the known, historically-defined, 
more easily measured, and ‘regulated’ arena. In turn, this arena is often permitted for too 
long to determine the theoretical sphere: too little attention is paid to the impact of financial 
innovation at the ‘fringes’ of the monetary system, and the evolving nature of the 
institutions, instruments, processes and practices operating just outside that better known 
and understood arena. 
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Appendix A – Summary of archival records of London banks 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Orbell and Turton (2001).  
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Appendix B (1) – Archival data collected and contribution: London banks (cont.) 
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Appendix B (2) – Archival data collected and contribution: London banks (cont.) 
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Appendix B (4) – Archival data collected and contribution: Country banks 
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Appendix C – Smith group banks: lending to non-group entities 
 
total lending to non-group entities
SPS SPS SEB SS SS
London Nottingham* Lincoln Hull* Derby
tot lending tot lending tot lending tot lending tot lending
"Private 
ledger" + 
"Discounts"
"Advances" "Debtors in 
ledger" + 
Borrowers 
secured on 
Bonds & 
Notes
"Advances" Bill & Note 
a/c
total Hull "Bonds & 
Notes" + 
Debtors in 
General Ldgr 
& Private ldgr 
+ SPS nostro 
a/c + SS 
notes paid in 
Ldn
1795 58,139
1796 46,136
1797 609,924 36,531
1798 765,319 39,592
1799
1800
1801
1802 52,643 43,618 96,261
1803 119,140 57,019 176,159
1804 111,513 43,990 155,503
1805 63,199 45,496 108,695
1806 92,431 35,280 127,711 24,567
1807 96,428 28,600 125,028 36,529
1808 83,639 147,180 68,788 52,558 121,346 45,722
1809 144,478 103,871 12,148 116,019 79,310
1810 144,393 112,960 24,778 137,738 121,909
1811 198,200 98,224 16,909 115,133 131,709
1812 173,511 46,493 17,440 63,933 139,617
1813 1,070,393 224,628 71,446 39,570 111,016 133,774
1814 1,071,571 162,443 45,630 51,580 97,210 134,560
1815 132,554 38,756 57,819 96,575 120,390
1816 1,282,449 125,101 89,226
1817 1,472,314 145,788 50,603
1818  119,127 57,252
1819  152,192 94,045
1820 1,588,100 142,573 94,803
1821 1,537,016 123,439 77,980
1822 1,926,992 109,253 73,167
1823 1,714,986 153,859 76,955
1824 1,821,503 183,817 92,045
1825 225,746 129,847
1826 267,956 85,635
1827 226,756 68,683
1828 237,872 31,734 0 88,917
1829 1,469,517 252,031 65,764
1830 218,365 66,397
1831 203,765 74,943
1832 238,957 77,959
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Appendix D – Smith group banks: cash and SPS nostro accounts 
ca
sh
 SP
S
SP
S
SE
B
SS
SS
Lo
nd
on
N
ot
ti
ng
ha
m
*
Li
nc
ol
n
H
ul
l*
D
er
by
ca
sh
ca
sh
ot
he
r
to
ta
l
ca
sh
ca
sh
 b
oo
k
to
ta
l
ca
sh
 b
oo
k
SP
S 
a/
c
to
ta
l
ca
sh
ca
sh
 b
oo
k
to
ta
l
al
so
 "
Ca
sh
 in
 
H
ou
se
";
 in
 
17
97
 "
Ba
nk
 
N
ot
es
 &
 
Ca
sh
"
"C
as
h 
in
 t
he
 
H
ou
se
" 
[g
ol
d 
+
 B
oE
 n
ot
es
]
"B
ill
s 
an
d 
N
ot
es
 in
 
ha
nd
" 
[r
un
ni
ng
 b
ill
s 
+
 o
th
er
 b
an
k 
no
te
s]
"S
pe
ci
e 
& 
Bk
 
no
te
s 
in
 
Ch
es
t"
ot
he
r 
ba
nk
 
no
te
s 
& 
bi
lls
 
+
 S
PS
 a
/c
Ba
la
nc
e 
of
 
th
e 
Ca
sh
 
Bo
ok
s"
 
[s
pe
ci
e,
 B
an
k 
no
te
s,
 
ru
nn
in
g 
bi
lls
, 
ot
he
r 
ba
nk
 
no
te
s]
"S
m
ith
, 
Pa
yn
e,
 &
 
Sm
th
"
"C
as
h"
 - 
so
m
et
im
es
 
re
fe
re
d 
to
 a
s 
"B
ill
s 
& 
Ca
sh
"
"S
m
ith
, 
Pa
yn
e,
 &
 
Sm
th
"
17
95
18
,0
93
88
,0
69
10
6,
16
2
17
96
15
,2
17
88
,9
49
10
4,
16
6
17
97
14
7,
47
3
11
,9
93
10
5,
66
2
11
7,
65
5
17
98
16
8,
97
6
10
,5
85
12
9,
04
1
13
9,
62
6
17
99
6,
08
6
30
,3
73
36
,4
59
18
00
18
01
18
02
36
,9
96
24
,3
87
61
,3
83
18
03
53
,2
62
-3
2,
97
8
20
,2
84
18
04
31
,0
75
34
,4
32
65
,5
07
18
05
25
,4
79
20
,7
31
46
,2
10
18
06
45
,3
45
58
,3
94
10
3,
73
9
7,
74
8
8,
68
3
16
,4
31
18
07
56
,6
00
32
,0
09
88
,6
09
17
,6
45
16
,3
88
34
,0
33
18
08
54
,2
80
5,
21
6
29
,1
63
34
,3
79
94
,3
75
43
,9
72
13
8,
34
7
23
,6
60
13
,8
55
37
,5
15
18
09
4,
98
6
40
,8
59
45
,8
45
24
,5
27
 
22
,6
90
18
,3
03
40
,9
93
18
10
5,
53
2
38
,2
27
43
,7
59
12
5,
84
3
76
,6
79
20
2,
52
2
24
,7
87
40
,0
41
64
,8
28
18
11
5,
21
1
47
,1
91
52
,4
02
47
,2
70
28
,4
62
75
,7
32
31
,9
31
55
,1
12
87
,0
43
18
12
83
,3
98
17
,6
80
31
,8
89
49
,5
69
86
,7
43
29
,4
12
11
6,
15
5
34
,5
13
62
,9
42
97
,4
55
18
13
22
8,
19
8
9,
34
3
42
,1
93
51
,5
36
71
,1
89
-5
29
70
,6
60
42
,5
74
51
,3
25
93
,8
99
18
14
23
,5
02
42
,3
02
65
,8
04
76
,0
46
40
,4
96
11
6,
54
2
71
,2
33
56
,7
16
12
7,
94
9
18
15
25
3,
24
8
16
,7
20
43
,5
92
60
,3
12
77
,5
45
-4
83
77
,0
62
63
,8
19
39
,6
76
10
3,
49
5
18
16
17
8,
69
9
15
,3
48
40
,7
64
56
,1
12
45
,3
69
39
,9
84
85
,3
53
18
17
12
3,
46
8
14
,3
99
35
,4
17
49
,8
16
33
,8
67
10
,5
09
44
,3
76
18
18
20
,5
38
41
,7
34
62
,2
72
45
,4
14
9,
20
5
54
,6
19
18
19
23
,3
20
39
,0
92
62
,4
12
63
,9
38
15
,2
33
79
,1
71
18
20
16
6,
10
1
20
,1
10
48
,7
92
68
,9
02
55
,3
84
31
,7
08
87
,0
92
18
21
21
6,
13
9
19
,4
10
42
,0
32
61
,4
42
68
,7
57
19
,4
29
88
,1
86
18
22
20
5,
00
5
18
,7
26
49
,3
37
68
,0
63
82
,0
88
15
,7
29
97
,8
17
18
23
16
0,
25
6
16
,7
46
43
,9
09
60
,6
55
64
,6
29
14
,2
36
78
,8
65
18
24
19
2,
05
3
17
,8
91
58
,7
70
76
,6
61
63
,0
31
18
,4
78
81
,5
09
18
25
40
,8
35
59
,0
56
99
,8
91
99
,8
26
17
,5
27
11
7,
35
3
18
26
32
,4
90
47
,7
61
80
,2
51
74
,8
59
17
,3
37
92
,1
96
18
27
29
,8
95
47
,1
07
77
,0
02
56
,6
89
2,
19
7
58
,8
86
18
28
28
,0
95
52
,5
81
80
,6
76
43
,7
55
21
,3
52
34
,3
79
72
,2
56
30
,3
60
10
2,
61
6
18
29
16
1,
83
2
48
,2
95
55
,7
18
10
4,
01
3
64
,6
15
9,
16
4
73
,7
79
18
30
24
,7
50
51
,8
84
76
,6
34
61
,0
82
9,
82
7
70
,9
09
18
31
17
,7
00
46
,7
90
64
,4
90
68
,3
05
10
,3
55
78
,6
60
18
32
17
,5
00
45
,6
98
63
,1
98
67
,7
82
7,
69
3
75
,4
75
  
347 
Appendix E – Smith group banks: notes outstanding as % of total balance sheet 
  
notes outstanding, as % bal sh
SPS SPS SEB SS SS
London Nottingham* Lincoln Hull* Derby
founded in: 1758 1658 1775 1784 1806
gross notes
notes net of 
holdings in 
own chest gross notes
notes net of 
holdings in 
own chest
1780 2.6%
1781
1782
1783
1784
1785
1786 5.5%
1787
1788 7.8%
1789
1790 10.2%
1791 9.2%
1792 13.0%
1793 13.9%
1794 14.3%
1795 17.8%
1796 19.2%
1797 26.7%
1798 32.3%
1799 44.0%
1800
1801
1802 36.2%
1803 26.2%
1804 34.9%
1805 22.1%
1806 18.8% 26.4%
1807 16.6% 23.5%
1808 22.4% 52.6% 16.0%
1809 53.3% 30.5%
1810 52.7% 11.8%
1811 53.7% 11.6%
1812 49.7% 10.5%
1813 54.9% 14.6%
1814 50.5% 12.6%
1815 45.2% 11.0%
1816 46.4% 44.4%
1817 39.4% 37.2%
1818 42.9% 40.5%
1819 41.9% 45.4%
1820 42.2% 49.5%
1821 41.4% 45.6%
1822 38.0% 36.8%
1823 37.1% 36.6%
1824 35.8% 37.6%
1825 35.7% 31.9%
1826 38.8% 36.6%
1827 37.2% 34.3%
1828 38.0% 11.1% 28.2%
1829 40.5% 21.1%
1830 30.9% 18.9%
1831 34.4% 21.7%
1832 33.2% 18.9%
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Appendix F – Lincoln bank: cash reserves and note issuance  
 
 
 
 
Appendix G – Lincoln bank: cash reserves to total customer lending 
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Appendix H – Smith group: cash ratio to total balance sheet 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I – Barnard & Co, Bedford: correlation with London banks 
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Appendix J – Comparison of estimates of Bank of England banknotes in circulation 
 
Circulation 
(incl. Drawing 
accounts) Banknotes
composite 
estimate of 
Circulation
 - using BoE 
for 1797-1818
Mitchell & 
Deane (1962)     
[av. Of Feb & 
Aug]
Mr. Pearse, for 
Bullion 
Cmmttee  
(1810)
David Ricardo   
(1811)
BoE figures 
produced for 
House of Lords 
(1818)    [av of 
yr]
Parnell    
(1827)
Clapham    
(1970)
1770 5,237,000 5,237,000
1771 6,823,000 6,823,000
1772 5,962,000 5,962,000
1773 6,037,000 6,037,000
1774   
1775 8,762,000 8,762,000
1776 8,626,000 8,626,000
1777 8,033,000 8,033,000
1778 7,099,000 7,099,000
1779 8,145,000 8,145,000
1780 7,376,000 7,376,000
1781 6,701,000 6,701,000
1782 7,394,000 7,394,000
1783 6,991,000 6,991,000
1784 5,898,000 5,898,000
1785 6,247,000 6,247,000
1786 7,883,000 7,883,000
1787 9,008,000 9,008,000
1788 9,782,000 9,782,000
1789 10,465,000 10,465,000
1790 10,737,000 10,217,360 11,000,000 10,651,453
1791 11,556,000 11,556,000
1792 11,157,000 11,349,450 11,253,225
1793 11,377,000 11,377,000
1794 10,515,000 10,515,000
1795 12,440,000 11,600,000 12,020,000
1796 9,988,000 9,700,000 9,844,000
1797 10,394,000 8,500,000 11,019,829 11,600,000 11,019,829
1798 12,638,000 13,334,752 12,579,616 12,579,616
1799 13,175,000 13,500,000 14,062,327 13,450,294 13,450,294
1800 15,946,000 15,841,932 15,160,641 15,451,000 15,160,641
1801 15,385,000 16,169,594 15,810,902 16,000,000 15,810,902
1802 16,142,000 16,500,000 17,054,454 16,427,889 17,000,000 16,427,889
1803 15,652,000 16,847,522 16,505,272 16,505,272
1804 17,116,000 17,345,020 17,408,060 17,600,000 17,408,060
1805 17,130,000 17,241,932 16,876,071 16,876,071
1806 19,379,000 17,135,400 16,791,824 16,800,000 16,791,824
1807 18,315,000 18,000,000 17,405,001 16,705,903 16,800,000 16,705,903
1808 17,650,000 17,534,580 17,128,650 17,100,000 17,128,650
1809 19,059,000 18,000,000 19,001,890 18,927,833 18,927,833
1810 22,907,000 22,730,285 22,541,523 22,500,000 22,541,523
1811 23,324,000 23,547,525 23,282,672 23,282,672
1812 23,218,000 23,237,318 23,237,000 23,237,318
1813 24,020,000 24,023,569 24,023,000 24,023,569
1814 26,585,000 26,901,422 26,901,000 26,901,422
1815 27,255,000 26,887,017 26,887,017
1816 26,886,000 26,574,841 26,574,841
1817 28,471,000 28,274,902 28,274,902
1818 26,987,000 26,987,000
1819 25,190,000 25,190,000
1820 23,892,000 24,500,000 24,196,000
1821 22,090,000 22,090,000
1822 18,065,000 18,065,000
1823 18,812,000 17,750,473 18,281,237
1824 19,935,000 19,935,000
1825 20,076,000 20,861,123 19,800,000 20,245,708
1826 23,516,000 23,516,000
1827 22,319,000 22,319,000
1828 21,669,000 21,669,000
1829 19,709,000 19,709,000
1830 20,758,000 20,758,000
1831 19,069,000 19,069,000
1832 18,016,000 18,016,000
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Appendix K – net government borrowing, in nominal and cash terms: 1797 - 1816 
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Appendix L – London banks: balance sheet totals, 1770 - 1844 
      
[Please contact author] 
 
Source: see Chapter 1: “Data contribution” and archival references listed in Bibliography. 
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Appendix M – London bank liabilities: % of Country bank balances, 1780-1844 
 
Source: Constructed from the respective archival records – see Bibliography.  
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Appendix N – Case study of Locke, Hughes, Saunders & Co, Devizes 
 
Thirty miles east of Bristol and the Old Bank was the market town of Devizes where James 
Sutton, John Bevan and Richard Read had first set up a bank in 1775, later also styled as 
Devizes & Wiltshire Bank (hereon ”LHS”).  Semi-annual balance sheets survive only for 
1825-1829, which give us no overlap with the Old Bristol Bank, but provide useful insight 
into the financial crisis of 1825.  
 
In 1825 the business was owned the 46-year-old Wadham Locke (3/8th), William Hughes 
(3/8th) and Henry Saunders (2/8th). The records do not state the paid-up capital at this time, 
but the previous partnership (which included Francis Locke and a Henry Oliver) was 
reportedly set up in 1803 with a fixed capital of £20,674 (The Bankers Magazine, 1845: 
420). Locke came from a well-to-do family, his father having bought the splendid 
Brownston House in Devizes in 1784. He acquired additional valuable land by his marriage 
to Anna Maria Powell in 1801 and by 1808 he was able to buy from the Duke of 
Malborough the imposing Rowdeford House in Rowde and completely rebuild it. In 1804 
he served as High Sheriff of Wiltshire and later became a Liberal Party MP for the town in 
1832. William Hughes was son of a local attorney, Solomon Hughes, and served as Deputy 
Sheriff in 1794 (Bull, 1859: 125).  
 
Balance sheet and note issuance strategy 
 
During this short period LHS followed a balance sheet strategy focused on managing 
liquidity through appropriate asset and liability matching. The bank made no long-term 
loans, and overdrafts were closely matched to call deposits on which it paid no interest. 
Some 40-50% of net liabilities were made up of more ‘sticky’ deposits on which it paid 
2.5%. These deposits were made by some 300 different customers, all recorded as 
individuals rather than commercial entities, and usually in round amounts ranging from £30 
to £500, but with a few for £1,000 to £2,000. These deposits were used to finance the 
discounting of bills (which generated gross yields in excess of 5%) and any excess was 
invested in Exchequer bills and government bonds that yielded rather less than commercial 
bills after 1825. It appears interest-bearing deposits were also used between mid-1825 and 
the end of 1828 to make a loan to William Hughes secured on government bonds on which 
he was paying “the Firm” a rate of 4% per annum.  Just as the Smith group in the north-
east of Britain, LHS used its capacity to ‘push out’ its own (low cost) notes to fund its most 
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liquid, safest assets: government securities, the balance on its nostro account at its London 
correspondent (Lubbocks), and its cash reserves87 (Exhibit O.1). 
 
The policy proved its worth during the 1825 crisis. When interest-bearing deposits fell 30%, 
the bank responded by selling down its large holdings in government bonds in order to be 
able to meet its depositors’ withdrawals and still maintain (and even increase) the 
discounting of its customers’ bills. No doubt this projected confidence in the bank’s 
solvency amongst the local population and, it seems, allowed LHS to maintain almost 
unchanged the net circulation of its own notes.  
 
Exhibit O.1 – Locke, Hughes, Saunders & Co, Devizes: asset and liabilities, 1825 - 1829 
 
 
A&L structure and the Stable Fringe Velocity 
 
During this period after Britain had returned to the gold standard, LHS provides evidence 
that is generally supportive of what we observe elsewhere: a stable multiplier of Country 
bank balance sheets to deposit flows (liability-side) appears to have been re-established, but 
                                                
87 LHS does not specify what is included in “Cash in hand” but we have assumed that it followed other banks in 
including holdings of its own notes returned but not cancelled, which are shown in separate records, and we 
have therefore excluded these from ‘net cash’. The latter will have contained specie and Bank of England notes. 
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not to cash reserves (asset-side). With the exception of the second half of 1825, (a) total 
lending broadly followed the evolution of total deposits, and (b) net notes in circulation 
followed deposits (Exhibit O.2). 
 
The behaviour of cash reserves is more problematic. Firstly, cash excluding own notes, but 
including Bank of England notes represented only 2.3 to 6.6% of the net balance sheet. 
This is similar to the proportion of 5.1% to 6.0% held by Smith Ellison in Lincoln during 
the same years (whose accounting allows direct comparison) and suggests that pure specie 
was playing a minor part in ‘money’ transactions. Secondly, if there was a relationship 
between net cash reserves and total lending, it was the wrong sign: increases in total lending 
were associated with a reduction in net cash88 - prima facie evidence that lending was 
demand-led. Not only was the multiplier of lending to the stock of cash reserves not stable, 
but also its behaviour favours the view that lending was driven by demand for loans more 
than the supply of specie and Bank of England banknotes.  
 
Exhibit O.2 – Locke, Hughes, Saunders & Co, Devizes: lending and funding, 1825 - 1829 
 
 
   
 
                                                
88 Statistically it appears there was one, despite the few data points: Regressing total lending, y (overdrafts plus 
bills discounted) on net cash, x (cash, excluding holdings of its own notes) yields the equation: y = £109,931 – 
3.23 [t=-3.87] * x (with R-sq = 0.714) 
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Profitability and the Real Bills Doctrine 
 
In 1825, LHS suffered severe losses equivalent to an estimated 40% of paid-up capital, and 
in the following three years the total net assets stagnated. The losses that year were three 
times the size of the accumulated loan loss reserves. At the end of June, in order to offset a 
loss of £3,782, the partners used the entire accumulated loss reserve of £3,177 (the 
“Accumulation Account”) and also paid-in a further £605. They also jointly bought £1,000 
of the Reduced 3% government bond “for the purpose of establishing a New Accumulating 
Fund”89 and undertook to double that by further reserving part of the profits in future. 
Unfortunately losses incurred during the subsequent six months were even worse. The 
‘new’ fund was wiped out, and the partners had to inject a further £4,978. In one year the 
partners had suffered total losses of £9,583 compared to typical annual net profits of less 
than £4,000.  
 
It is possible to argue that for banks following the practice of reserving part of the yearly 
profits against future loan losses, that such reserves represent the bankers’ rationalization of 
the expected natural long term wastage occurring amongst ‘real projects’ and hence that part 
of the banks’ gross excess return which bankers’ expected to lose while making only ‘real 
loans’ for ‘real needs’, as stipulated by the advocates of the Real Bills Doctrine. Losses in 
one year that were three times what had been expected and reserved for are unlikely to be 
consistent with such a hypothesis of perfection in bankers’ information or expectations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
89 Lloyds Bank Archive:  Locke, Hughes & Co records ref: A/53/14/b/1 to 9, General Balance Book  for 30 
June 1825 (p.31) and for 30th December 1826 (p.29). 
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